50 Ga. App. 244 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Wilmore Wright was convicted in the recorder’s court of the City of Atlanta, being charged with a violation of the code of said city which requires that all persons doing business in said city be required to register and pay the registration tax upon their said business. The matter comes to this court by reason of the overruling of a certiorari sued out by the defendant from the recorder’s court to the superior court of Fulton county. The tax ordinance which the plaintiff in error was charged with violating is as follows: “Sec. 30. All persons, firms, or corporations doing business in the City of Atlanta shall be required to register each place of business maintained and pay for each of said places of business so maintained a license tax in the amount required by their
The ordinance is attacked by the defendant as unconstitutional and void on various grounds which we will presently note. The evidence at the trial disclosed that the defendant, as district manager of the Spur Distributing Company, was and is operating four retail gasoline filling-stations, selling gasoline to the general public, each of said stations having a storage-tank capacity for the storage of gasoline used in the operation of such business at each place, amounting to more than 6000 gallons; that a license tax of three hundred dollars on each of said stations has been assessed against the defendant by the City of Atlanta, under the terms of the tax ordinance above set forth, which tax or license the defendant failed and refused to pay.
When considering the various attacks made upon the ordinance
The City of Atlanta is given, by its charter, the power to lay taxes upon businesses, trades, and professions, carried on within its limits, and to classify them for the purposes of such taxation. See sections 86, 88, of the charter of the City of Atlanta; Atlanta City Code, 1924, p. 28-9. It therefore could levy and collect the tax in question, subject of course to the constitutional limitations. Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ga. 596; Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 196; Mayor &c. Savannah v. Weed, 84 Ga. 683 (11 S. E. 235, 8 L. R. A. 270); McGhee v. State, 92 Ga. 21 (17 S. E. 276). The constitution of 1877, art. 7, sec. 2, par. 1, declares that “All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” It has been many times held that the provision of this article, “and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws,” has no application to occupation and business taxes, as involved in the case at bar. See Wright v. Hirsch, supra, and cit. The only requirement with
There are, however, certain limitations upon the power of the taxing authority to make classifications of subjects for the purpose of levying occupation taxes. “The classification must be reasonable, and not unreasonable or arbitrary. ‘Any classification may be made which is not arbitrary/ Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Cooper, 131 Ga. 670 (63 S. E. 138); Williams v. State, 150 Ga. 480, 485 (104 S. E. 408). In the first instance it is for the legislature to judge of the reasonableness of the classification; but finally the courts decide for themselves the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the classification. Now, by what rule are the courts governed in deciding upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
The plaintiff in error further complains that the taxing authority of the municipality did not seek to discriminate between wholesale and retail dealers in gasoline, but to the contrary, by the terms of the ordinance, does seek to discriminate between retail dealers in gasoline on a basis which bears no relation to the amount of business done. As pointed out above, we do not understand the law to be that the classification made by the taxing authority must in every instance have a direct relation to the amount of business done by the business taxed. It is to be admitted that the' taxing authority could have made classifications of wholesale and retail dealers in gasoline, but the fact that they have not seen fit to do so but have classified retail dealers according to the way their business is conducted is no reason why the ordinance is void. One who operates a filling-station which has a storage capacity of a large amount of gas has many advantages, of various kinds, over those operating with a smaller capacity, which it is not necessary to enumerate here. Filling-stations which have large stor
The other attacks made upon the ordinance are without merit, and, from what has been said above, we are of the opinion that the judge of the superior court properly overruled the certiorari.
Judgment affirmed.