This is an action commenced in the District Court of Sonoma County to quiet the title to a section of land in the possession of the plaintiff, to which the defendant claims title. The action is brought under Sec. 254 of the Practice Act. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner and in actual possession of the premises; that defendant claims some estate or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff, which casts a cloud upon his title and lessens the value of his estate, and prays that defendant’s claim may be declared invalid. The defendant, by his answer, denied generally
It was admitted by the parties that prior to the date of that deed, Carillo was the owner of the premises in controversy, and still is, unless said deed passed the title; that the plaintiff was in the possession of the premises and claiming title under the deed. The jury found that the deed was genuine, and the Court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff. A motion for a new trial was made, on various grounds, which was overruled, and the defendant takes this appeal from the judgment and the order overruling the motion for a new trial.
The first error assigned is that the evidence does not support the decision. The question whether the deed from Carillo to Hendley & Neville was genuine or not was a very proper one to be submitted to a jury. The jury in this case, and also the Court, found that it was genuine. A large mass of evidence bearing upon the question was introduced by the parties, and under these circumstances it would require a very strong showing against the verdict of the jury and the finding of the Court to induce us to hold that the decision was contrary to the evidence. Carillo was himself made a
The next error assigned is that the Court below erred in admitting Hendley as a witness to testify on behalf of the plaintiff. Hendley was one of the vendors who sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff, but the deed executed by him was not introduced in evidence. Appellant contends that the Court should have presumed that he was interested and incompetent, unless it was made to appear that he did not warrant the title, and that it is to be presumed that the deed contained covenants of warranty. We know of no rule of law justifying such a presumption. The plaintiff offered the witness, and as he was not a party to the action the presump
The examination of Hendley on his voir dire disclosed the fact that $2,500 of the purchase money due from the plaintiff to the witness had not been paid, but the witness had canceled the debt by writing the word “ canceled ” across the face of the note, dating, signing, and delivering it to plaintiff’s attorney. Defendant objected that the plaintiff was stiff liable to the witness, notwithstanding the cancellation and delivery of the note, and he was incompetent on the ground of interest. But the record discloses the fact that the witness, while the objection to his competency was being argued to the Court, executed to the plaintiff a formal release of his liability, and thereupon the Court overruled the objection. We see no error in this. Even if the cancellation of the note and its delivery thus canceled to the plaintiff, or his attorney, for the very purpose of discharging plaintiff from his liability, did not have that effect, which point we do not pass upon, stiff the formal release would be sufficient to remove all objection on this ground.
But it is also urged that Hendley was an incompetent witness, on the ground that he was liable for the amount of the purchase money ($2,250) paid him by the plaintiff, in case the latter should fail in this action. It is contended that Hendley, being one of the grantees in the deed alleged to have been forged, is, in contemplation of law, a party to the crime; that his title was thus acquired by crime and fraud, and that he was guilty of a further fraud and
In reply to this, the respondent cites the case of Peabody v. Phelps (9 Cal. 213), where it was held that an action for a false and fraudulent representation as to the naked fact of title in the vendor of real estate cannot be maintained by the purchaser who has taken possession of the premises sold under a conveyance with express covenants; and that if a party takes a conveyance without covenants, he is without remedy in case of failure of title; if he takes a conveyance with covenants, his remedy, upon failure of title, is confined to them. In answer, the appellant contends that the case of Peabody v. Phelps is, upon this point, in direct conflict with the decision of Alvarez v. Brannan (7 Cal. 503) and the whole current of authorities, and he asks us to review and overrule this decision in Peabody v. Phelps. That case was decided after a full and elaborate discussion of the points involved, and this question seems to have been fully considered by the Court. Under these circumstances we should hesitate long before overruling it, and then only upon being fully satisfied that the Court had departed from and violated a well-established rule of law, and that the evils likely to flow from it were great. Instability and uncertainty in judicial decisions, especially those relating to titles of real estate, are great evils in any country. Upon no question is a community-more sensitive than upon those which affect the titles to their homes, and in none should greater care and caution be observed by Courts in their adjudications. The prosperity and progress of a country depends so much upon the validity of its land titles that no Court can be justified in overturning long-settled principles of law relating to them, unless compelled to do so by the plainest dictates of reason and justice. The reports of judicial decisions are full of overruled cases. The highest Courts and the ablest Judges have repeatedly overruled and changed their own decisions, and this Court has been no exception. Human judgment is imperfect, and errors are a necessary consequence. Still, it is often better to submit to the evils arising from erroneous decisions, in view of the advantages
The next assignment of error is in permitting Walton to testify that Carillo had told him that he had deeded the land to Peabody and the time he so told him. We see no valid objection to this testimony.
Carillo’s statements about having executed a deed or deeds to this land were admissible, as circumstances to show that this deed to Hendley & Neville was in fact executed by him, and that he was mistaken as to the name of the grantee. We understand this evidence to have been offered by. the plaintiff, as admissions by the defendant upon this subject, and not for the purpose of proving a deed to Peabody, or its contents,, if any such ever existed. The evidence of Hendley, respecting a conversation he had with Carillo a few days before the date of the deed, was also objected to, but we can see no error in its admission. It does not seem to have been offered to prove a deed to Peabody, or for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching Carillo, but merely to connect the deed to Hendley & Neville with the agreement by Carillo to convey a tract of land to Peabody, and to show that Carillo knew of the arrangement between Peabody and Hendley & Neville, by which the deed was made to the latter and not to the former. It also tended to show how Carillo might have been mistaken in supposing that he had made the deed to the former instead of the latter.
The appellant also assigns for error the refusal of the Court to give the following instructions asked by the defendant: “ 1st, that if the jury believe from the evidence that the pretended deed from
The last assignment of error is that the defendant has newly-discovered evidence, set forth in the affidavits of R. H. Sinton, B. R. Nesbitt, J. R. Pitch, Chas. H. Horton, and J. M. Neville, which he desires to introduce. This testimony all relates to the genuineness of the signature of Carillo to the deed to Hendley & Neville, and is therefore clearly cumulative, and it affords no just ground for a new trial of the cause.
It may be doubtful whether this action lies under the circumstances of this case; but as no question of that kind was raised by the counsel for the appellant, either in the Court below or in this Court, we merely refer to it that it may not be treated as a precedent in any future case.
The judgment is affirmed.