22 Barb. 561 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1856
It is claimed by the plaintiffs, that the defendants -entered into a contract to carry and -transport the brandy, -one cask to Battle Creek and the -other to
In this case there is no such reference when speaking of the delivery. There is a reference in the body of the receipt, “ the following packages of goods,” and we find that they are “1 qr. cask brandy, also for 1 qr. cask brandy,” and these specifications of the articles are connected with the addresses in the margin and the indication of the mode of transport in Michigan, viz. M. G. R. R. In my opinion this instrument does not contain any agreement to transport the .cask of brandy to Kalamazoo or Battle Creek; no such agreement is expressed. It can only be inferred from the fact that it contains the address or direction, copied from the direction upon the respective cards put upon the casks. These were copied into the receipt for the purpose of identifying the “ following packages of goods.” Suppose in the body of the receipt the language had been the packages of goods marked as follows, there would then have been no doubt of the meaning of the instrument, and it would not have been insisted that the defendants were liable. (6 Hill, 157.) In my opinion the instrument should be so construed ; that is, the address, &c. was incorporated in. the instrument for the purpose of identification, and the parties had no idea that the defendants were entering into a contract to transport the casks of brandy beyond the route occupied by them as common carriers.
This view is greatly strengthened, if not rendered conclusive, by consulting the shipping bills signed by the defendants and delivered to the plaintiffs. Thus, “ Shipped, Lewiston, August 12,1852, in good order, and so to be delivered, to wit: one qr. cask brandy, marked Israel Kellogg, Kalamazoo, Michigan, M. C. R. R.” Here we have the reference to the address
In Van Santvoord v. St. John, (6 Hill, 157,) the receipt given by the carrier was like the one in the present case, with this difference. In that the word marked preceded the address as copied into the receipt. In that case the carrier transported goods between New York and Albany. The goods were addressed to J. Petrie, Little Falls. The goods wrere delivered by the defendants to a. canal boat, and some of the goods were purloined. The supreme court held that the defendants were liable; that by their contract they were bound to transport the goods to Little Falls. (See the case, 25 Wend. 660.) The court for the correction of errors reversed the judgment, and held that the defendants were only bound to carry the goods safely over their route and deliver them to the next carrier. And the court held that evidence of the custom and course of the carrying business was proper. The case is an authority for the views I have taken. There was no express agreement that the defendants should transport the goods to the place designated in the address, and such agreement should not be inferred, or rather the written instruments should not, under the circumstances disclosed, be construed as containing such agreement. The judgment should be reversed, and there should be a new trial; costs to abide the event.
Bowen, Greene and Marvin, Justices.]