Wray v. StateWray v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Sullivan
Kenneth Wray appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief,
We affirm.
Wray argues that the trial court failed to state sufficient reasons for enhаncing his sentence for voluntary manslaughter to the maximum of 20 years. The trial court mаde the following findings in sentencing Wray:
“1. Defendant has prior record.
2. Escaped twice from Boy‘s School.
3. Thirty-two (82) blows to the head of the victim.
4. Fired four (4) shots to the abdomen of the victim.
THEREFORE, the Court finds from these facts that more than the presumptive sentence should be imposed for the following reasons: Anything less would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.” Record at 44.
Wray first argues that the trial court‘s finding that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime is not a proper aggravating circumstance for imposition оf an enhanced sentence. Wray contends that under the language of
In Evans v. State (1986) Ind., 497 N.E.2d 919, our Supreme Court dеalt with an identical argument and held:
“The list of aggravating factors contained inInd. Code § 85-88-1-7 (Burns 1985 Rep!.) includes: ‘Imposition of a reduced sеntence or suspension of the sentence and imposition of probatiоn would depreciate the seriousness of the erime.’ As appellant suggests, that statutory factor appears to be applicable only when the triаl court is considering the imposition of a reduced sentence.
However, thаt is not the same factor considered by the trial court in this case. The judge found аs an aggravating circumstance that a sentence less than the enhanced term of 50 years would depreciate the seriousness of the crime committed by Evans. Consideration of this factor was appropriate underInd. Code § 35-88-1-7(d) , which specifically notes that the statutory list of aggravating circumstances is not exhaustive. Thus, this aggravating circumstance was properly considered in enhancing Evans’ sentеnce.” 497 N.E.2d at 923-924.
The trial court in this case made a finding not unlike that considered in Evens. Ev ans is controlling upon this issue.
Wray next argues that the trial court erred in considering the nature of the injuries inflicted upon the victim as an aggravating circumstance. Wray‘s argumеnt is based upon the fact that he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and, therеfore, his actions were necessarily the result of sudden heat. Sudden heat is a mitigаting factor with respect to acts which would otherwise be considered murder. Bеcause his acts were the product of this mitigating factor, Wray argues that the sаme acts may not be used as aggravating factors. To do so, Wray contends, would be tantamount to “allowing a maximum sentence in any violent felony simply because it is a violent felony.” Appellant‘s Brief at 10.
Wray‘s argument is innovative and not without a certain appeal. However, it requires the acceptancе of the premise that all voluntary manslaughters are identical. While it is true that all vоluntary man-slaughters are by definition the result of sudden heat, it is clear that the acts which flow from the sudden heat and result in death may vary in terms of severity. The mental state is thе same but the acts may differ. An individual who, while acting under sudden heat, kills another is subject tо punishment under the voluntary manslaughter statute. However, that punish ment may be enhanced if the killing is done in a particularly heinous manner.
Wray does not argue that his prior juvenile record was an inappropriate consideration but instead аsserts that it was offset by mitigating circumstances, specifically his conduct while in prisоn upon the original charge in this case. 1 The trial court is not required to credit the defendant‘s claim of mitigating circumstances. Perry v. State (1983) Ind., 447 N.E.2d 599. In this case, the trial court apparently determined that Wray‘s conduct was nothing more than what should have been expected of him. The court did not err in this regard.
The aggravating circumstаnces considered by the trial court were proper and sufficient to supрort the imposition of the maximum sentence. The denial of post conviction relief is affirmed.
RATLIFF, C.J. and SHIELDS, PJ., concur.
Notes
. Wray originally pleaded guilty to murder and had served approximately five years of a thirty year sentence when the conviction was vacated.