(after stating the facts).
There can be no doubt that the cases relied upon by the chancellor, if presently authoritative, fully support his opinion. The trouble is that this Court has “recently еvidenced” a disposition “to liberalize its interpretation of the statute of frauds”
(Goldberg
v.
Mitchell,
“To the extent that our prеvious decisions may be considered inconsistent with this opinion, on -the specifiс question as to admissibility of extrinsic testimony to supplement a description in a mеmorandum for sale of real estate, or an interest therein, for. the purpose of identifying the property, .not contradictory or inconsistent with the memorandum description, but merely to show that no other property could have been in contemplation, it must be understood that the court now declines to follow such decisions-.”'
What was done in Cramer is quite consistent with the trend of modern authority. Professor Grismore, noting this new course of the judiciary in his “Principles of the Law of Contracts” (1947, Bobbs-Merrill), § 261, p 449, said:
“Preliminary to this discussion (of the statute of frauds) it is. worthy of observation that the tendency, in genеral, has beeh to interpret the statute in *435 such a way as to narrow the scope of its operation as much as possible. This result has been accomplished not only by resolving all ambiguities in the phraseology of the statute in such a way аs to exclude as many cases as possible from its operation, but also by excluding cases which are within .the language, on the ground that they are not within the purрose or spirit of the statute. In fact, in recent years there has been a tеndency to doubt the wisdom of the statute as applied to modern, conditions аnd to advocate its outright repeal.”
It is not to be gainsaid that our quoted cоmmitment to the rule of evidentiary supplementation, of an otherwise insufficient mеmorandum relating to sale of real estate, partially eviscerates section 8 of our statute of frauds (CL 1948, § 566.108 [Stat Arm 1953 Rev § 26.908]) as once understood and interpreted. Such being the case,' it is advisable that the fact and effect be openly hеralded, and that we firmly announce that which is to be in this field of law relating to rights in and titles tо land. • Whether, the old interpretation of said section 8, or the new one, is best for society remains, and will remain, debatable. The change having-taken .place, .we can only say that equity can and will, given appealing equities arrayеd against perfidy or fast dealing, prevent most of the frauds that section 8 of this venerable statute * was intended to frustrate.
Defendants, gazing at Cramer’s quoted rule, say that plaintiffs offered no extrinsic evidence оr proof on strength of which we may find that no other property than Josephine Kuszinski’s home was contemplated by the parties when the memorandum was signed and the earnest deposit paid. To this we can only say that the parties negotiated to an agreed conclusion in the very home plaintiffs intended to buy and defendant Josephine Kuszinski intended to *436 sell, and that they thereupon repaired to a scrivener for conclusion of their business. Since the street address of the home is given correctly in the memorandum, and since defendant Josephine Kuszinski owned thе property answering such address and the record is clear that the parties were intending to deal with respect to it and no other, we are constrainеd to hold that the description given in the memorandum was appropriately suрplemented according to Cramer’s said rule. As was said in 49 Am Jur, Statute of Frauds, § 348, p 657:
“A descriptiоn is sufficient if when read in the light of the circumstances of possession, ownership, situation of the parties, and their relation to each other and to the property, as they were when the negotiations took place and the writing was made, it identifies the property.”
Reversed and remanded for entry of decreе in favor of the plaintiffs, conditioned on due payment by them of the agreed purchase price. Costs to plaintiffs.
Notes
Rev Stat 1846, eh 80, § 8.