119 Mass. 550 | Mass. | 1876
The defendant Warner denies that the plaintiff has now the right to redeem the premises in dispute, and contends that the mortgage from Mrs. Luce to Sprague, by which he derives title, has been legally foreclosed.
In a suit upon this mortgage, conditional judgment was recovered by Sprague, and an execution for possession was issued dated May 6,1869. The officer’s return of the delivery of seisin
It is contended by the plaintiff that the return must be taken as it stands, without amendment; and that Sprague’s possession, therefore, does not appear to have been obtained in a way which is effectual under the statute to foreclose the mortgage, and cannot so operate, however long continued. The statute provides that possession recovered by a real action in which conditional judgment is rendered, and continued peaceably for three years, shall foreclose forever the right of redemption. Gen. Sts. c. 140, § 1. It is apparent from the date of the execution, and the time of its registration, that the date of the return is an error. The papers as they stand indicate that June 3 was the date intended; but whether so or not, it is certain from the whole record alone, without resort to other evidence, that possession was actually taken by Sprague’s attorney under and by virtue of the judgment and execution, on some day after the process was issued, and before June 10, 1869, when it was left for registration. This was enough to commence the foreclosure, and, counting only from the latter date, there is time for three years’ possession by the mortgagee, or those claiming under him, before this bill to redeem was filed.
The plaintiff further contends, that, before the defendant Warner acquired title, the mortgage had been paid by Sidney A. Luce, after he became owner of a legal interest in the equity of redemption; or, at least, that there had been a waiver and abandonment of the foreclosure by the holder of the mortgage.
It appears that Sprague’s conditional judgment was recovered against Luce as tenant by the curtesy, and also against the two minor heirs of Mrs. Luce, who were all made parties after her death. The point relied on depends upon the effect to be given to the transaction between Sprague, Luce and his sureties, and the insurance company, after judgment had been recovered for foreclosure. The case shows that Luce, desiring to pay Sprague
In view of the legal and equitable rights of all parties under the several deeds and assignments, it is plain that the payment of the note by the sureties cannot be construed as a payment of the Sprague mortgage, or as manifesting .an intention to waive or abandon its foreclosure; on the contrary the purpose and effect of all the proceedings was to transfer to the insurance company in the first instance, and then to the sureties, the security of the mortgage with the benefit of the judgment for foreclosure and the possession had under it. The amount due was paid Sprague by the insurance company and the judgment assigned by him to them directly; they became, if not the legal, at least the equitable, owners of the mortgage. This title passed to the sureties, was conveyed to Warner, and was confirmed by Sprague’s deed conveying whatever legal title may have remained in him.
The mortgage thus held by the insurance company did not lose its character because' Luce had given his note with sureties feo> secure the amount paid Sprague. If Luce had himself paid