71 A.2d 80 | Conn. | 1949
In this action the plaintiff sought to secure a reconveyance of property which she had conveyed to the defendants, claiming that they had agreed with her that they were to pay certain overdue taxes and that when the plaintiff was able to reimburse them for the money so spent and for any sums they might pay upon a mortgage upon the premises they would convey the property back to her. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff has appealed.
The determinative issue is whether the trial court erred in excluding a question asked of a witness called by the plaintiff. The trial court found that in 1937 the plaintiff did convey the land to the defendants and that in consideration for it they paid certain interest on the mortgage and the overdue taxes, but that they did not promise to reconvey it; and in its conclusions the court stated that the plaintiff had failed to sustain the material allegations of her complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Because error is assigned in the finding that the defendants did not promise to reconvey the property and the plaintiff requests an addition to the finding in effect asserting that there was such an agreement as was alleged in the complaint, we have examined the evidence. The plaintiff offered evidence without objection which might have justified the court in finding that there was an oral agreement substantially as alleged between herself and the named defendant, to whom we shall hereinafter refer as the defendant, but he testified that there was no promise to reconvey, and that testimony, with other evidence, was a sufficient basis for the finding *355 of the trial court that this was so. The court had to determine, by balancing conflicting testimony, whether the claimed agreement was made. It is out of this situation that the question presented to us on the appeal arises.
The plaintiff called a witness who testified that she was present at a conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant in 1944. She was asked what the conversation was; the defendants objected and the trial court sustained the objection. The plaintiff claimed the testimony on the ground that it would support her contention that the property was to be reconveyed to her when she reimbursed the defendant for the sums he had expended; the defendants' objection was that oral evidence was inadmissible to establish an express trust in real estate. It is obvious that, if the plaintiff would be entitled to relief upon the basis of the oral agreement she alleged, she had a right to put in evidence statements made by the defendant which would throw doubt on his claim that there was no such agreement. The ruling on the admission of the testimony, then, raises the question whether the plaintiff could secure a reconveyance of the property upon the ground she claimed.
Our law is settled that property absolutely conveyed cannot be shown to be subject to an express trust by reason of a parol agreement to that effect. Andrews v. New Britain National Bank,
In Fisk's Appeal,
The claim of the plaintiff in this case is that she and the defendant were in a confidential relationship so that the real estate was subject to a constructive trust for her. She rests her case on four New York decisions: Wood v. Rabe,
What relations between parties will be deemed by equity to be so confidential as to be a basis upon which it will raise a trust is, of course, impossible of definition. Analogies can be found in those cases where the relationship between the parties is such that the burden is upon the recipient of the property to prove the transaction to be fair and equitable. Where there is no proof of an actual confidential relationship and the law looks only to a presumption of fraud arising out of the relationship of the parties to each other, that relationship must be one where there is ordinarily a special trust and confidence and the likelihood of the exercise of personal influence and control such that one would expect of the other fair dealing and mutual consideration. Cowee v. Cornell,
That statement applies in the situation before us. The only facts appearing in the finding upon which any claim of a confidential relationship could possibly rest are that the plaintiff and the defendant are both Russian, that they are unable to read or write English and speak it with difficulty, that they have known each other for a long time, and that the defendant is the godfather of one of the plaintiff's children. The conveyance was made upon a valuable consideration; the plaintiff was personally liable for the payment of the overdue taxes; General Statutes 1842; Cromwell v. Savage,
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.