Nаncy WORLEY, et al., Plaintiffs v. The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants
Civil Case No. 1:12-CV-02069 (RCL)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed March 31, 2016
283, 284, 285
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. The attack resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. servicemen. Many more were wounded. Still more were permanently traumatized. Among those killed were David E. Worley, John B. Buckmaster, Virgel Hamilton, Lloyd Dennis West, and Roy Lee Edwards. Also present were Mario H. Vasquez and Jeffrey Dadich. These individuals, their estates, аnd their family members bring this suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
II. LIABILITY
In an order and accompanying memorandum opinion, ECF Nos. 32 and 33, dated December 8, 2014, the Court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute and that it could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. In the same order and opinion, the Court found the defendants liable under
In that same memorandum opinion, the Court noted that the various estate plaintiffs had failed to present evidence regarding their ability to bring and maintаin the claims they alleged. Mem. Op. 26-27. Accordingly, the Court directed the Special Master to take evidence and make specific findings on the state law that governs each estate plaintiff‘s claim, and whether under that law the estate plaintiff has standing to bring the claim. Id. at 27. The Special Master has done so, and the Court hereby ADOPTS the Special Master‘s findings with regard to the estate plaintiffs’ standing under state law.
III. DAMAGES
Damages available under the FSIA include “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.”
“To obtain damages in an FSIA action, the plaintiff must prove that the consequences of the defendants’ conduct were reasonably certain” to occur, and “must prove the amount of damagеs by a reasonable estimate consistent with this Circuit‘s application of the American rule on damages.” O‘Brien v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 853 F.Supp.2d 44, 46 (D.D.C.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 681 (D.C.Cir.2003).
The Court hereby ADOPTS all facts found by and recommendations rendered by the Special Master relating to the damages suffered by all plaintiffs in this case. An evaluation of each category of damages and the Special Master‘s specific findings thereon follows.
A. Pain and Suffering
Assessing appropriate damages for physical injury or mental disability can depend upon myriad factors, such as “the severity of pain immediately following thе injury, the length of hospitalization, and the extent of impairment that will remain with the victim for the rest of his or her life.” Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25, 52 n. 26 (D.D.C.2007) (Peterson II) (quoting Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F.Supp.2d 40, 59 (D.D.C.2006)). In Peterson II, this Court adopted a general procedure for the calculation of pain and suffering damages in terrorist attacks under which those servicemen suffеring psychological harm are awarded $1.5 million in pain and suffering damages. See 515 F.Supp.2d at 56; see also Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 84.
This Court has also awarded pain and suffering damages to the estates of those victims of terrorist attacks who were injured in the attack, but later succumbed to their injuries. See, e.g., Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2000) (аwarding pain and suffering damages to the estates of deceased victims where expert testimony established a period of several minutes elapsed between injury and death). In this action, the estates of John B. Buckmaster and David E. Worley bring survival claims for pаin and suffering. Pl.s.’ Am. Compl., ECF No. 43, at 10, 13-14. The Special Master declined to award pain and suffering damages to these estates due to the lack of evidence indicating death was anything but instantaneous for both of these men. Report of Special Master Counts I-IV, ECF No. 46, at 13; Report of Special Master Counts V-VIII, ECF No. 47, at 11. The Court agrees with the Special Master. In the absence of evidence tending to show an attack resulted in the fatal but noninstantaneous injury of a victim and that the victim was conscious thereafter, see, е.g., Peterson II, 515 F.Supp.2d at 53, an award of pain and suffering is inappropriate.
After reviewing the Special Master‘s reports, the Court finds the Special Master correctly applied the damages framework outlined in Peterson II and Valore, and therefore ADOPTS the Special Master‘s pain and suffering awards.
B. Solatium
This Court follows the standardized approach for FSIA-derived claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress estаblished in Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F.Supp.2d 229, 269 (2006) under which “[spouses typically receive greater damage awards than parents,” who in their own right are entitled to greater sums than siblings. Id. Relying on the average awards given in these types of FSIA cases,
Even under these standardized rubrics, this Court remains cognizant that “these numbers are not set in stone.” Id. “[D]eviations may be warranted,” id., where, for instance, the evidence demоnstrates a particularly close bond between the victim and the claimant, Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F.Supp.2d 16, 26 (D.D.C.2011), or, conversely, where the evidence tends to demonstrate an uncommonly attenuated relationship, Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 86. In this instance, the Special Master has made no upward deviations frоm the Heiser framework. The Special Master recommends a downward deviation from Heiser for the claims brought by deceased serviceman Roy Edwards’ siblings. The Special Master specifically noted “the testimony elicited from Roy Edwards’ siblings simply do not prove a close emotional relationship” because they each testified they had only seen Mr. Edwards twice in the nearly 24 years preceding the attack. Special Master‘s Report Regarding Count XII, ECF No. 49, at 14-16 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the Special Master‘s findings, the Cоurt agrees that a downward deviation for the claims brought by Roy Edwards’ siblings is appropriate, and, accordingly ADOPTS the Special Master‘s recommendation they be awarded $800,000.
With the exception of the claims of Karen Contrillo and Patricia Ulakovich as discussed below, the Court further ADOPTS the Special Master‘s recommendations for the remaining solatium claims in this action.
C. Economic Damages
As set forth above,
D. Punitive Damages
The FSIA also permits the recovery of punitive damages.
IV. OTHER PENDING MOTIONS
Also before the Court are plaintiffs’ motions to dismiss the estates of Richard Morrow and Jane Chipura, ECF Nos. 55, 56, and 57, as well as plaintiffs’ motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, ECF No. 68. For thе following reasons and by separate order, plaintiffs’ motions to dismiss shall be GRANTED and plaintiffs’ motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem shall be DENIED.
In the same order remanding the economic damage claims of John Buckmaster and David Worley, the Court alsо addressed the potential problems presented by the claims of the estate of Richard Morrow and the related solatium claims of Karen Contrillo and Patricia Ulakovich. Specifically at issue was the exclusion of Richard Morrow‘s estate from thе Court‘s liability determination in December 2014 due to plaintiffs’ inability to properly open Morrow‘s estate under applicable state law. Accordingly, no liability judgment was entered on his behalf. Moreover, because Morrow‘s estate claims pain and suffering damages, the Court expressed its reluctance to award Contrillo and Ulakovich solatium damages in light of this Court‘s previous refusal to allow solatium claimants to receive more than the injured serviceman‘s pain and suffering award. Dec. 9 Order at 3; Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F.Supp.2d 150, 158 (D.D.C.2011). Compounding the issuе was the Court‘s doubt that a nonprejudicial dismissal of Contrillo‘s and Ulakovich‘s claims would be proper after the Court had already entered a liability finding in their favor.
Upon reconsideration, the Court concludes it may vacate the liability finding in favor of Karen Contrillо and Patricia Ulakovich and dismiss their claims without prejudice. The Court, nevertheless, does not do so lightly, and neither does it do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), as dismissal as a matter of right is precluded by the age and posture of this litigation. See Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2nd Cir.1953). Hоwever, under the present circumstances, the interests of justice dictate these claimants should be permitted to dismiss their claims from this action so that they, along with the estate of Richard Morrow, may seek compensation for their alleged injuries. Pursuant to this Court‘s authority under Rule 41(a)(2), Contrillo and Ulakovich shall therefore have fourteen days from the issuance of the order accompanying this opinion to seek to file an amended complaint in Bova v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 15-CV-01074, (filed July 8, 2015). A failure to do so shall have the result of rendering this dismissal with prejudice. Subject to the foregoing, the Court shall therefore GRANT the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the claims of
Finally, plaintiffs have moved for an appointment of a guardian ad litem for Richard Morrow Jr., ECF No. 68, plaintiff Richard Morrow‘s son. Richard Morrow Jr. is not a party in this litigation. Any doubts as to the grounds under which the Court may appoint a guardian ad litem under the present circumstances aside—and those doubts are as numerous as they are substantial—there is no question this Court is without the power to appoint a guаrdian ad litem for a person who is not a party before it. Plaintiffs’ motion shall be DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
The compensation the Court awards today has been long due. However, it is imperfect and incomplete—no sum of money can fully compensate these plaintiffs for their losses. Nor can a monetary judgment meaningfully punish those who have perpetrated these acts. Monetary compensation is, nevertheless, the only tool available to this Court to accomplish both of those ends. And despite its doubts, the Court hopes this award provides some degree of solace to these victims and will equally have some deterrent effect on those states that would utilize terror as a means of advancing their political and religious goals. A separate order shall issue this date.
Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge