*1 orders, to remand the ease and you act like trial court’s at least prejudiced, will and trial. for a new you’re following the like you’re fair and act my As you’re ruling for client?” when law said in O’Dell:
we temptation judges must resist the
Trial simply prospective jurors
to “rehabilitate” “magic question”
by asking the by promising to be fair respond
jurors show the facts and circumstances all when juror could be fairness of that Worley, Cynthia Michael WORLEY reasonably questioned. Below, Wife, Plaintiffs His O’Dell, 412. at 565 S.E.2d at Appellants sum, dissenting opinion ignores this by suggesting that point of O’Dell whole defense approved of the Court should have MECHANICAL, INC., al., et BECKLEY judge’s of Dr.
lawyer’s and trial resurrection Below, Appellees. Defendants preju- he indicated his bias and Polack after No. 33190. dice. in and defender of a stout believer I am Appeals Supreme Court juries democracy, I believe that are Virginia. democracy as representation of direct pure a March 2007. Submitted: republic. The members you can have our representatives— jury May our elected 2007. Decided: —like open ready to render service with must Concurring Opinion of Justice mind, predisposi- ready recognize their 22, 2007. Davis June they ready to set them aside when tions but Opinion Justice Concurring or the But in conflict the facts law. are with June 2007. Starcher prejudice expresses a clear person when party, or a clear bias favor against one Justice Dissenting Opinion of evidence, and theories or forms of certain Benjamin July folly possible nothing to reflect on the does regardless of prejudice or bias
holding the facts, has no business then judges juror. Circuit
being qualified as else, integrity
must, preserve all above by seating vitality jury system prospective jurors who demon-
only those expression rather than reci- by plain strate — impartiali- “magic phrase”
tation of a —clear ty- Polack, juror in Dr. potential
The prejudice. clear bias and
demonstrated juror potential mandated that
O’Dell cause, as a matter of law.
excused Dr. judge disqualify the trial did
fact that lawyers elicited after the defense
Polack (while everything impartiality
few words predis- expression of
else he said was spirit of O’Dell.
position) violated (cid:127) respectfully concur with
I therefore to reverse
majority opinion’s decision *2 Bucci, Javins,
Guy Esq., Bailey Bucci & R. Charleston, Lambert, LC, Esq., A. Pamela Associates, Gilbert, A. Lambert Pamela & Cynthia Worley. Michael and Moore, Brewster, Esq., Kermit J. Mor- Cameron, Mullins, Caruth, Moore, *3 hous, Ker- Stafford, Bluefield, PLLC, sey Beckley for & Mechanical, Inc.
Christopher Brumley, Esq., A. Nathaniel Akers, Tawney, Esq., Esq., Shannon N. K. Bonasso, Flaherty PLLC, Sensabaugh & Charleston, Virginia Sprinkler, for West Inc. Taylor, Bailey Wyant, Esq., C. & Justin Charleston, PLLC, Riddleberger for Broth- ers, Inc. Akers, Summers, Esq., L. Robert H.
Scott Charleston, Offut, Nord, Esq., Fisher & Builders, Nielsen Inc. and Klockner Penta- America, plast of Inc.
MAYNARD, Justice. Cynthia Appellants, Michael and Wor- ley, appeal the December order of County Raleigh Court the Circuit complaint prejudice their dismissed with finding that based on the court’s com- applicable plaint was not filed within the For the reasons set statute limitations. below, we the circuit court’s forth reverse proceedings order and remand for further opinion. with this consistent I.
FACTS morning Sunday, May On Worley, Appellant and Plaintiff be- Michael low, working pipe Appel- fitter for was as a Inc., lees, Mechanical, Beckley and West Inc., a construction Virginia Sprinkler, rotating a project. Worley Mr. was valve pressure. exploded under when the valve forcefully Worley struck Mr. The valve abdomen, him a scissor lift knocking off approximately floor and onto concrete thirty feet below. Worley transported ambulance
Mr. was he Raleigh Hospital where re- General July 2000.1 The hospitalized until mained Worley time. Upon hospital, Mr. a short release from the mained facility he re- where entered a rehabilitation Worley evidence that Mr. suffered no ac- shows from the time when the accident. brain trauma from the crues. Several days Worley’s after Mr. admission to the hearing After con evidence and hospital, experienced complica- he medical sidering arguments parties, including tions an infected central venous line circuit court ruled that Mr. perforated and a during liver incurred “insane” at the time the cause of ac result, insertion of a tube. As a chest he crued so as to toll the statute of limitations. developed sepsis seriously and became ill. Specifically, the court reasoned: Subsequently, Worley’s Mr. level of mental noted, however, It must be that the run- functioning significant periods varied for ning of the limitations is sus- hospitalization. pended if he is insane “at the time July On and his wife [cause action] accrues.” ... *4 complaint they filed their alleged in which provide The statute does not the for recovery against Ap- various theories of the situation the where is sane at pellees Beckley Mechanical, Inc., including moment the cause of action but accrues Inc.,2 Virginia Sprinkler, Kloekner Pen- becomes ques- insane afterward. The sole America, Inc., taplast Brothers, Riddle (sic) presented by tion the statue is wheth- Inc., Builders, and Nielsen Inc. The com er he at was insane the time the cause plaint also included a loss consortium action The evidence supports accrues. the by Worley. claim filing Mrs. The of the conclusion that he was sane at mo- that complaint approximately was six be weeks ment, and that continued he to be sane yond two-year the statute of limitations. days a few thereafter. The evidence present difficulty would more if ques- the Appellees subsequently
The filed motions tion any is whether he was insane on given complaint to dismiss the for a number of day following the date that the cause complaint reasons including that the was not may action accrued. There timely have been filed. court The circuit converted the days days that he was and that not. he was motions to summary dismiss into motions for But way, the does statute not work that judgment and the denied motions on the question. so that is not the that a question basis of fact existed as to Mr. disability whether had suffered a There is no claim that the Plaintiff was that tolled the statute limitations. The immediately prior insane to or at the time ultimately court held a bench trial on the injury. question of the This of fact focuses specific question whether immediately on inju- the time following the running “insane” so as to the toll of the ry. It is Plaintiffs contention that he was pursuant statute of limitations W.Va.Code instantly injury, rendered insane the provides: and that he did not recover from that insanity, purposes for the statute any person If the whom accrues limitation, discharge until his from the hos- to bring any action, such suit or pital July 10, instantly 2000. If he was facias, any scire or repeal bill to injury, rendered insane the the onset grant, be, shall at the time the same ac- insanity would be the simultaneous with crues, insane, an infant or the same injurious event.... brought like number of after becoming age matter, however, of full or In present sane that it fact, person having allowed to a finding upon no such court’s the evidence impediment herein, the same after the summarized that the Plaintiff was right accrues, acknowledg- or after such not insane at the moment injury, nor ment as is eight instantly mentioned section was he rendered insane article, except [§ 55-2-8] of this that nor did he become insane immedi- shall ately in no twenty (Emphasis case be after original). thereafter. cal, Inc., Worley alleged Inc., 2. Mr. Virginia Sprinkler, a deliberate intent pur- cause of and West against 23-4-2(2). employers, Beckley Mechani- suant to W.Va.Code the circuit Ap- Because court found that the tal illness must occur at the same time the pellant disability was not under a that tolled cause of action accrues in order to toll the limitations, the statute of the court dismissed running commencement of the of the statute Appellants’ complaint untimely filed. Appellants of limitations.5 The assert that Appellants appeal ruling.3 The now that the circuit construing court erred in require 55-2-15 to appellant
II.
mentally
ill at the same time that his
STANDARD OF REVIEW
cause of action
order to toll the
statute of
Appellees
limitations. The
counter
In this
we are asked to review
findings of
properly applied
fact and conclusions of
the circuit court
law made
by the circuit court
after
bench trial. This
according
plain
to its
unambigu-
held,
Court has
ous terms.
reviewing
challenges to
findings
and conclusions of the circuit court made
determining
When
meaning
trial,
after a bench
a two-pronged deferen-
statutory language, this Court is mindful that
tial
applied.
standard of review is
“[wjhere
language
of a statute is clear
final order and
disposition
the ultimate
are
ambiguity
without
meaning is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion
accepted
to be
resorting
without
to the rules
standard, and the circuit court’s underlying
of interpretation.” Syllabus
State v.
*5
findings
factual
are reviewed under a Elder,
571,
(1968).
DISCUSSION
having
son
impediment
bring
no such
to
primary
right
The
same after the
Generally,
issue in this case
accrues.”
is
whether,
55-2-15,
§
under W.Va.Code
men-
“the
to
an action for
determining
3.In
Worley
whether
comprehending rights
Mr.
was "in-
sufferer from
which he
55-2-15,
purposes
§
sane” for
of W.Va.Code
is otherwise bound to know.” Williams v.
correctly
§
circuit court
2-10(n) (1998)
looked to
2-
Psychiatric
W.Va.Code
Hospital,
F.Supp.
Westbrook
420
322,
(E.D.Va.1976).
which
that '‘[t]he
indicates
words
way,
325
Staled another
"
person’
everyone
'insane
include
who has mental
'insane' or of
...
‘unsound mind’
a
means
27-1-2],
illness
defined in
[§
as
section two
arti-
derangement
condition of mental
which ren-
one,
twenty-seven
chapter
cle
code[.]”
of this
incapable
caring
ders the sufferer
for his
According
§
to W.Va.Code
27-1-2
business,
property,
transacting
of under-
" 'Mental illness' means a
in
manifestation
a
acts,
standing the nature and effect of his
person
significantly impaired capacity
to
comprehending
legal rights
and liabili-
acceptable
functioning
maintain
levels of
in the
States,
539,
Goewey
ties.”
v. United
612 F.2d
intellect,
physical
areas of
emotion and
well-
(1979). (Ellipses
origi-
This Court has held that purpose ultimate “[t]he statutes of limita Thus, find from we the evidence that Mr. require tions is to the institution of a cause of Worley May day sane on was of his Syllabus action within a reasonable time.” injury, following day. and the If discount we Hess, Perdue day Sunday, which was a as a (1997). By providing meaningful S.E.2d 182 day Worley on which Mr. could have asserted legal protection mentally ill, to the arewe legal rights, May are we left with 29. holding confident that our follows the intent May 29, The evidence reveals that on Mr. Legislature drafting of the exceptions Worley pain being treated with to the statute of limitations in W.Va.Code morphine. circumstances, Due to these we time, § 55-2-15. At the equally same we are that it believe would be unreasonable to ex- holding sufficiently convinced that our nar pect Worley Mr. to initiate the enforcement row to ensure that in cases of mental illness legal rights May 29. As noted causes of action will be instituted above, Worley’s began Mr. mental condition reasonable time. May Therefore, to deteriorate on we conclude from the evidence that the interval Having rule, applicable stated the Worley’s injury between Mr. and the result- we now must determine applies whether it ing incompetence mental was so brief that Worley Mr. so as to toll the commencement reasonably could not have taken running of the statute of limitations steps legal rights during to enforce his under the facts this case. The circuit period. Accordingly, find that we the circuit court found that Mr. was sane from *7 finding Worley’s court erred in that Mr. May day the through his June mental not toll illness did the commencement finding 3. The court based this of fact on of the statute of limitations. nursing consistently reported notes that dim ing Worley “alert, this time that Mr. was order, In its memorandum the circuit court oriented, cooperative.” We find that the Worley’s found that Mr. of mental func- level finding circuit court did not err in that Mr. tioning continually changed during his course Worley May May was sane on 28 and 29. of treatment between June and his However, we find clear error in the court’s hospital July from release the finding Worley that Mr. remained sane from However, finding the court did not make a May through June 3. Worley to when Mr. became “sane” under pre- §
This Court’s of the provides review evidence 55-2-15. W.Va.Code The statute sented indicates that below Dr. Russell I. that the statute of limitations commences to Voltin, Appellees’ expert, the testified that person run after the “insane” becomes objective Therefore, there is no necessary while evidence of mental “sane.” it is to remand May May illness on 28 and ... circuit “[f]rom this case the court for a determina- 28th, May through likely 30th June it is that tion of when Mr. became Once sane. limitations, plaintiff 'discovery applies only ble statute of the the has rule’ when there is a showing exception strong showing by plaintiff burden of to the statute. the that some action Marcum, Syllabus part, prevented plaintiff See Cart v. the defendant the from ("[T]he knowing wrong injury.”). of the at the time the provisions the finding, proceeding, to the instant it can makes this the circuit court permit § 55-2-15 that W. Va.Code determination wheth- the ultimate then make complaint right within Appellants any person filed their to whom the ac- er the [i]f any re- ... years bring time that Mr. of the crues to two accrues, be, the ... sanity. shall at the time same gained his
insane,
brought
the same
becom-
like number of
after his
IV.
ing ...
to a
sane that is allowed
bring
having
impediment to
no such
CONCLUSION
..., except
right
after the
same
above,
stated
the Decem-
For the reasons
after
that it shall
no case be
Court of
order of the Circuit
ber
twenty years
time
when
untimely
Raleigh County that dismissed as
accrues.
reversed,
complaint is
Appellants’
explaining
mental illness tolls the
In
how
to the circuit court for
this case is remanded
of the statute of limitations
commencement
opin-
this
proceedings consistent with
further
55-2-15,
§
in accordance with W. Va.Code
ion.
exception
majority
not created a new
has
remanded.
Reversed and
general
statute of limitations or creat-
the statute of
ed a mechanism
DAVIS, C.J., concurring.
started, stopped,
is
and restarted
limitations
case,
correctly
majority
has
In
Rather,
this
merely clari-
again.
the Court has
that the commencement
held
tolling
mechanism of W. Va.
fied how
plaintiff
period within which
limitations
operates
plaintiff
when
of action is
required to
cause
delayed
or
his/her
has a mental illness. This
start
mentally infirm
plaintiff
tolled when
the statute of limitations is
commencement of
See W.
from a mental illness.
or suffers
longstanding recognition
our
consistent with
(1923) (Repl.Vol.2000).
I
“[ajfter
that,
Va.Code
has
the statute
limitations
that the ma-
separately to demonstrate
write
run,
disability
subsequent
commenced to
no
strayed from our
jority’s opinion has not
2, Mynes
inteiTupt
Syl. pt.
it.”
v.
will
strictly
directing us to
con-
prior precedent
(1900).
Mynes, 47
concur. cases, approach might, This in some result approach of greater fairness than the
STARCHER, J., concurring.
opinion.
majority opin-
majority
Under the
injured might
approach,
party
a
ion’s
who
I
concur with
result reached
required
as
almost
be seen
to have
immedi-
majority opinion, reversing
the dismissal
legal
ately
possible
filed suit to
a
bar
avoid
complaint.
separately
I
plaintiffs
write
claim—if a mental
illness should later
I am inclined to
a somewhat
because
take
incapable
taking
him
action within
render
approach to the
in the
different
issues raised
This
not
the statute
limitations.
would
case.
instant
prudent or fair.
not be
a
We should
First,
majority opinion ably
as the
discuss-
pushing
position
people
to file lawsuits
es,
public understanding
scientific
nor should
quickly;
sanction unfairness
we
hugely improved
brain
has
since
disorders
people
against
with disabilities.
the time when the statute in
Code, 55-2-15
[1928]
was enacted.
question,
limitation
The law
is not so
as to
preclude equitably
obsessed with
statutes of
tolling
tempo-
limitation
statutes of
in some cases
Moreover,
ability
our
to ameliorate these
rary disability.
all,
injured
After
twelve-
improved
Today,
has
disorders
well.
action,
year-old has six
to file a tort
illnesses are
many people with severe mental
subjecting
finds no
problem
and the law
a
Rather,
for all
the se-
“insane”
times.
potential delay
a
in a
to such
claim
defendant
disabling
many
symptoms
vere
acute
being brought.
brain
can be
medical
disorders
abated with
(And the
can also re-
symptoms
treatment.
Therefore,
could,
suggest
I
that a court
for
course.)
cur,
Today’s
recognize
must
law
equita-
in accord
good cause shown and
with
this fundamental fact.
extend
principles,
a statute
limitations
ble
periods
“insanity”
to exclude
than
—rather
W.Va.Code,
Second,
(1923), read
up-front duty to file a lawsuit
impose an
literally, only applies in
instances when
being
risk
forever
one
still sane or
while
i.e.,
severely disabled
is “insane” —
from suit.
barred
right
disorder —at the time that their
brain
majority opinion,
I read the
does not
accrues.
its
As
suit
equitable tolling. I think
such an
applicability
preclude
own
has no
to the facts of
terms
good grounds
that had
for such a
trial court
plaintiffs
the instant ease—where the
holding
appeal,
find
support
would
he became
accrued
“insane.”
before
majority
“fairness” reasons that underlie
fairness,
However, in the
interest of
opinion.
looks to
the statute
majority opinion
what
I
Consequently,
concur.
“intends,”
if
even
contradicts
intention
quar-
literal
I do not
meaning.
statute’s
BENJAMIN, Justice, dissenting.
taking
an approach
rel
order
with
—in
*9
Despite
repeated
in
this
admonitions
apply
to
a statute that
created
earlier
Court’s
superlegislature,
not
a
good
modem
For a
dis-
that it should
sit as
times to
realities.
time,
re-writing
guise of
courts do
the
see
statutes under the
statu
cussion of how
this all
Calabresi, Guido,
interpretation,
exactly
tory
“A
for the
that is
what the
Common Law
Statutes,”
Age
University
has done in this matter.
Sub
Majority
Press
of
Harvard
Nield,
Communications,
v.
Inc.
218
carrier
642
Communications,
292,
this Court
at
W.Va. Accord, 299, 10, 736, recently recognized: n. 624 S.E.2d at n. 10. “ Capital Corp., Lucas v. Fairbanks 217 W.Va. arbitrarily is to read ‘[I]t [courts] 479, 484, 488, (2005); 618 493 ex say. it S.E.2d State into that which does not [a statute] City Wheeling, through to eliminate rel. v. 212 W.Va. as courts are not Just of Orlofske (2002). 538, 546-7, 148, interpretation words that judicial were 575 S.E.2d 156-7 included, obliged are purposely we not to herein, The statute at issue W. Va.Code something Legislature the to statutes add (1923), clearly unambiguously and Banker, Banker purposely omitted.’ v. provides: 546-47, 535, 465, 474 196 W.Va. S.E.2d any person right If to to whom the (1996) (citing Bullman v. D R 476-77 & action, bring any or suit such 129, Company, Lumber 195 W.Va. 464 facias, any such bill a repeal scire or to Bracken, (1995); Donley 771 v. S.E.2d 192 grant, (1994)). ([E]m shall at the time the ac- 383, be same 699 452 S.E.2d W.Va. added). crues, insane, may or the same ex phasis See State rel. Frazier v. infant Meadows, 20, 24, years 65, brought the 193 454 be like number of W.Va. S.E.2d (1994). Moreover, statute, becoming age after of full ‘[a] 69 or an or sane rule, not, may person administrative under having the is to allowed no modified, guise “interpretation,” be re impediment the same the to after vised, Syl. 1, pt. amended or rewritten.’ accrues, right acknowledg- or after such Consumer Advocate Division v. Public eight ment as is mentioned section Commission, 152, 182 Service W.Va. 386 article, except [§ 55-2-8] (1989). Huffman, 650 Sowa v. S.E.2d See twenty be shall no case after 105, 262, 111, 191 W.Va. 443 S.E.2d 268 time ac- when the (1994).” Greene, Williamson-v. 200 crues. 421, 23, 426-27, 490 S.E.2d W.Va. 28-29 added.) (Emphasis language “Where the (1997). ambiguity statute is clear and without Communications, Subcarrier 218 W.Va. at plain meaning accepted be re- is to without 299, 736, quoting, Longwell 624 S.E.2d at v. sorting interpretation.” Syl. the rules Marshall, County Board Educ. 213 2, Elder, 571, Pt. State v. 152 W.Va. 165 491, (2003). 486, 109, 114 W.Va. 583 S.E.2d “ (1968). Thus, pro- statutory S.E.2d 108 ‘[a] continued, 10, by Court in footnote stat vision unambiguous which is clear and and ing: plainly expresses legislative intent will “ Likewise, judiciary may not ‘[T]he sit as interpreted not be courts but will superlegislature judge wisdom or given Syl. 2, full force and effect’ Pt. v. State desirability legislative policy determina- 877, Epperly, 135 W.Va. tions made areas that neither affect (1951).” 2, Kirwan, Syl. 212 Pt. Kirwan v. rights proceed along fundamental nor sus- 520, also, W.Va. 575 130 S.E.2d See ” pect Blankenship lines.’ State rel. ex v. Kennedy, v. 205 DeVane W.Va. 519 Richardson, 196 W.Va. 474 (1999) (“Where 622, language S.E.2d 632 (1996) 906, (quoting S.E.2d 915 Lewis v. statutory provision plain, its terms Resorts, Inc., Valley Canaan applied should be as written con- and not 634, (1991)). 692, 408 642 S.E.2d In- strued.”). Virginia deed, province is not “‘[i]t unambiguous. clear and A statute of limita- supervise legislation, courts to make or may only tions be tolled for reason of insani- not, guise under the ty if the is insane at the time interpretation, modified, revised, cause action accrues. amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewrit- ” Richards, applying unambig- Instead of the clear ten[.]’ State v. statutory language uous affirming 526 S.E.2d (quoting Raleigh Majori- Morgan County, Circuit Court of
State General Daniel Post No. ty has chosen to amend the lan- (1959)). guage pur- supposed “general achieve
643 legislation to pose” policy underlying power the statute its to amend the as it 30, v. Ghaphery, the fit.” Verba 210 W.Va. provide an interval of time sees after curiam). 406, 36, (per 412 552 S.E.2d plaintiff the during tortious act alleged specific language produces statutory When a tolling the may insane become invoke argued by Legis to be result unforeseen the See, provisions of W. Va.Code 55-2-15. lature, remedy Legislature, “the lies with the 4, Majority opinion. In an Syl. Slip & Pts. 3 produced it, whose action and not with the that herein apparent recognition its decision question dealing courts. The of with the statutory principles all established violates satisfactory in a more situation or desirable construction, Majority adopts a “new” the a matter policy manner is which calls for justify to principle of construction judicial, not legislative, action.” Verizon meaning allow the plain its result Virginia, Virginia Inc. v. West West Bureau applica- disregarded its statute to be where Programs, Employment Workers’ Com demonstrably a at produce tion result “will Division, 114, 95, pensation 586 the drafters.” odds with the intentions of (2003), quoting S.E.2d 189 Hereford However, Slip Syl. Majority opinion. Pt. Meek, 52 S.E.2d 748 legislative to the intent neces- demonstrate (1949). Unfortunately, Majority the herein justify principle this “new” to sary under this prior “unyielding has abandoned Court’s rejection meaning, the plain of the statute’s legisla a altering from the tenor of refrain[ ] upon language in the Majority relies by appending ele tive enactment additional legislative history, its but statute itself or un to a statute. a statute is ments Where upon In past this Court. statement ambiguous, the incorporation of additional v. Board Education Kanawha Whitlow words, provisions terms or is not the domain County, 190 W.Va. Dailey of the courts.” v. Board Review 23 this Court found that W. Va.Code Virginia Pro Employment Bureau of designed tolling extend the 55-2-15 was to grams, 214 S.E.2d W.Va. rights period protect the of infants where to (2003). Herein, Majority has im the fail act on the infant’s behalf those who properly superlegislature acted as a Thus, upon itself to the Court relies do so. statutory language produce clear to amended “legislative” which it provide to the intent desired, Legislature a result it not what the meaning disregard uses to the now wrong. desired. This is actually Legis- the statute as enacted Majori- Finally, I must take issue with lature. prior ty’s treatment of this Court’s decision effectively Majority decision herein Bethany College, v. Trustees in Jones remedy to amends W. Va.Code The Ma- Majority policy considers to be a what jority provides notes that that Jones in- legislative judgment. This inadequacy gener- bring personal injury right to yet again legislative prerogative trusion into ally injury at the is inflicted. time an ready to this Court inclination shows However, Opinion, Majority Slip p. 6. in the proper constitutional role exceed its acknowledge holding that its Majority fails thereby en- governance of this State and to long-estab- our in this matter conflicts with which, judicial arrogant an activism gage in Syllabus precedent Jones. lished inhibit, itself, long it will for as as manifests “[wjhere Jones, plain- this Court held 3 of to, progress positive fatal indeed be injury from tiff sustains noticeable this State. event, of limitations a traumatic the statute Previously, this declined Court has begins run and is not tolled because there legislation in the face injury arising amend or overrule a latent may also be Jones, legislation meet that the is not argument event.” Under same traumatic up to ing goals, noting County properly Raleigh “[i]t its desired Circuit Court alleged Worley’s and not Court to decide claim. His legislature dismissed at insanity meet the not exist legislation continues to or mental illness did whether its developed as a originally enacted. time of the but instead purposes for which was such, not, injury. As it is treatment for the If finds it does result of legislature *11 analogous injury to the latent involved in Jones does not toll the limi- statute of Therefore, Majority’s
tations. decision only legislative pre-
herein not conflicts with
rogative, long- it also conflicts with our own precedent.
established reasons,
For I these dissent
Court’s decision this matter. Virginia rel.,
STATE West ex Keith McCOURT, Petitioner,
O’Dell ALSOP, Judge
The Honorable Jack
the Circuit Court of Webster
County, Respondent.
No. 33213.
Supreme Appeals Court of Virginia.
Submitted Jan. 2007.
Decided Feb.