56 F. 654 | 7th Cir. | 1893
(after stating the facts.) Appellees have submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was in issue; that the case involved the construction or application of the constitution.-of the-United States, and that the constitutionality of laws of the United' States was drawn in question therein; that, therefore, the appeal from a final decree would lie to the supreme court of the United States, and not to this court; and hence that this appeal, which is from an interlocutory order, cannot be maintained under the seventh section of the judiciary act of March 8,1891. We do not understand that the power of the circuit court to hear and. determine the cause was denied, but that appellants contended that the United States had not, by their bill, made a case properly cognizable in a court of equity. The objection was the want of equity, and not the want of power. The jurisdiction of the circuit court was therefore not in issue within the intent and meaning of the act. So far as.the construction or application.of the constitution of the
The question io be determined is whether, upon this record, a preliminary injunction should have been granted. The bill avers that the defendants are usurping an unlawful authority oven the exposition and grounds, and in virtue ihereof are assuming to open the gates on Sunday in contravention of the acts of congress, and notwithstanding such opening would be "of great injury and a grievous prejudice to the common public good and to the welfare of the people of the United Hi ates.” It is not charged that any property interests of the complainants will be affected by the threatened action, nor is (here any allega!,ion of irreparable injury or probable loss by reason thereof. The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of prox>erty. The court is conversant only with questions of property and (he maintenance of: civil rights, and exercises no jurisdiction in matters merely political, illegal, criminal, or immoral, In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Cope v. Association, 99 Ill. 489; Sparhawk v. Railway Co., 54 Pa. St. 401; High, Inj. § 20. But it is said that the interposition of the court may be rested upon the protection of the United States in their possession, use, and regulation of Ihe grounds for the purposes of the exposition, upon Ihe doctrine of chan table trusts, and upon the principles applicable to the restraint of negative covenants.
1. It is true that undertakings upon sufficient consideration not to do a given thing nmy, on occasion, he enforced by restraint of their violation; and where the covenant is express the element of ascertainable pecuniary' damage or injury to the covenantee is not regarded as of essential importance. Coal Co. v. Schmisseur, 135 Ill. 371, 25 N. E. Rep. 795; Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, 24 N. J. Eq. 206; People v. Diodrich, 141 Ill. 665, 30 N. E. Rep. 1038; Leech v.
. On this branch of the case it may be remarked that appellants insist that the government has wrongfully withheld one million, one hundred and forty-one thousand, seven hundred and sixty of the souvenir coins, and therefore does not come with clean hands, is itself in default, and has no standing in a court of equity to compel specific performance. Upon accepting the act of August 5, 1892, the corporation raised five million dollars on the pledge of its net gate receipts and the agreement that it would create no debt or obligation in excess of that sum. By the act of March 3, 1893, five hundred and seventy thousand, eight hundred and eighty dollars were appropriated to pay the costs and expenses of the jury of awards, and it was provided that this sum should be charged
2. Xor can we concur in the proposition that the appropriation of the 82,500,000 amounted to a charitable trust upon cer
3. This brings us to consider the position that the court might intervene, as prayed, to protect the United States in their possession, use, and regulation of the gi’ounds for the purposes of the exposition. The argument is that the exposition is a national undertaking, and, as such, an enterprise of the United States; that the tender of the grounds and buildings and their acceptance amounted to a grant of them for a limited time for the purposes named; and that they are therefore in the exclusive possession and control of the United States in every respect. ' If the United States have the paramount authority and dominion involved in this proposition, it is not made clear why resort to a court of equity in aid of the exercise of such authority should be necessary; but, apart from that, we are unable, on the record before us, to concede the exclusive possession and dominion thus asserted, or that congress has proceeded upon any such assumption. Under the seventeenth clause of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, the congress has power to exercise exclusive legislation “over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings.” The government becomes the
It is claimed that changed circumstances justified a change of regulation as to closing, and that the new rule has not been modified; but, after all, unless the government possessed the exclusive power to control, regulate, and manage the grounds and buildings, the case would still stand upon the alleged violation of a condition, and the consequences flowing therefrom. If the status quo were restored, or capable of restoration, through remedy at law, the bill cannot be sustained, neither the commission nor the corporation could impose liability upon the United States. The fifteenth section provided “that the United States shall not in any manner, nor under any circumstances, be liable for any of the acts, doings, proceedings, or representations of said corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois,” or for any of its debts, liabilities, or expenses of any kind; and section 20, “that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to create any liability of the United States, direct or indirect, for any debt or obligation incurred or created by said commission in excess of appropriations made by congress therefor.” Suitable buildings for governmental exhibits were provided and appropriated for, and a board created to prepare and take charge of such exhibits, and provision was made for the expenses of that board and of the commissioners, but no control was asserted over the construction, preparation, and administration of the exposition, and no appropriation made in aid thereof. And while the appropriation of August 5, 1892, was made to assist in defraying the cost of completing the work of preparation, the act in terms reaffirmed the provisions of section 15. In short, the government did not intend to permit any inference of liability beyond what was specifically expressed; nor, by asserting absolute control over the enterprise, to put itself in an attitude which might justify such an implication. The congressional legislation recognized the exercise by the corporation of its appropriate powers, and left to it the matters of construction and of administration to the extent referred to. The exposition was to be managed, the expenses borne, and the income received, by the corporation, and accordingly it has directed and controlled all the physical -agencies employed in the work of preparation and administration. The corporation selected, with the concurrence of the national commission, Jackson Park as a proper site for the location of the necessary buildings for the exposition. The South Park Commissioners are a corporation created upon a vote of the legal voters of the South Park district to hold, manage, and control certain lands, of which Jackson Park and the
By act of the general assembly approved August 5, 1890, the South Park corporation was empowered to allow the use of the park, or any part thereof, for the purposes of the exposition, on such terms and conditions as might be agreed upon, and thereupon the South Park Commissioners passed the ordinance giving permission and authority to the Illinois corporation to use Jackson Park and the Midway Plaisance for those purposes. No question is raised as to the competency of the general assembly to allow this to be done, and it is admitted that by a majority vote of the legal voters of the park district bonds were authorized to be issued by the park commissioners as provided for by the act. The ordinance fixed the terms and conditions of occupancy, and was accepted and bond given by the corporation as required. The contract thus made was with the local corporation, and in virtue thereof the corporation entered into possession, which possession it still retains; and it has never assigned or transferred, or attempted to assign or transfer, to the United States or any other party. Title and physical possession were thus both in the corporation for the purposes of the exposition, and to be held in due accordance with the provisions of the original act of congress in that behalf. The act did not require the closing of the gates on any particular day, and no interference by the corporation with (he control of the United States over their own buildings and exhibits, the action of the commission and the boards of lady managers and of management and control of the government exhibits, or of the officers of the revenue, is complained of. The situation demanded the harmonious co-opera! ion of the United States, through their agencies, and the corporation, but did not involve the absolute dominion of the one over the other as claimed.
We think, furthermore, the position that the exposition was exclusively an undertaking of the United States, and the corporation a mere agent., is shown to be untenable by the consequence contended to be deductible therefrom that therefore the corporation, while responsible to the state of Illinois for the proper exercise of its franchises, and to its creditors and stockholders for the proper administration of its affairs and property, might be subjected to obligations which it never* incurred, and to indebtedness which it never created, and its ability to discharge its legitimate functions and respond for its legitimate liabilities might be at any moment utterly destroyed. We find no warrant in the documents before us for holding that the corporation occupied any relation involving such results. The original amount of expenditure was defined, and the assumption to pay and the payment of the further amounts rendered necessary by the expansion of the scope of the affair constituted, under the circumstances, no recognition of the right to impose obligation compulsorily and without consent. We perceive no reason for attributing to congress, while disclaiming any responsibility whatever for the acts and doings of the corporation, or lia
In the Philadelphia case the exposition was managed by two bodies organized by authority of congress, yet their rights and property were not regarded as in any legal sense the rights and property of the United States. The supreme court held them to be merely organizations through which the people might carry out an enterprise of their own, which was national, in that it had the sanction of the government, but was not therefore a governmental enterprise. Eyster v. Board, 94 U. S. 500. The supreme court said, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Waite, that it was very apparent that the object of congress in all its legislation with reference to the Centennial Exhibition was to enable the people of the United States to commemorate “the completion of the first century of their national existence” by an exhibition “in which the people of the whole country should participate,” and which should have the sanction of the government, and that in that sense the object was’ national; but that, it was equally clear that until the act of 1876 it was expected that the entire expense would be borne by the people without assistance from congress. And as to the appropriation of 1876 it was held, under the terms of the act, that after payment of debts the amount had to be returned before any distribution to stockholders,- — a result reached by construing the word “profits,” as used, to be equivalent to “net receipts.” In that case, as in this, congress, out of abundant caution, lest the enterprise might be regarded as governmental, and, if so, some question might be raised as to the operation of state laws, provided that nothing in the act of congress should be construed so as to override or interfere with such laws or contracts made thereunder; but this was as a measure of precaution, and not by way of a necessary reservation of state jurisdiction, which had not been ceded, and could not be held as surrendered by implication.
Something might well enough be added as to the bearing in a court of equity of this late assertion of absolute dominion after the corporation had so long managed and controlled the exposition and expended sixteen' millions of dollars in the effort to complete the work in a manner commensurate with the magnitude of its design and the honor of the nation, the state, and the municipality, whose interests as well as the interests of all peoples were to be subserved by its success; but we forbear further observations upon this topic. We are of opinion that the disposition of the case, whether tested by the bill, or, irrespective of any technical adherence to its aver-ments, by the facts shown, must turn upon the legislation of 1892, our views in regard to which have already been sufficiently indicated.
We have given to this record patient investigation, and to the able arguments of counsel the attention which their merits deserved and the character of the controversy demanded, and we can-dis
The order is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.