Lead Opinion
Appellant, AGA Gas, Inc. (“AGA”), has appealed from a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that awarded appellee, World Metals, Inc. (‘World Metals”), $969,172 in consequential damages for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. 1 This court reverses and remands the case for a new trial.
I
World Metals began business as a producer of tool steel in 1990. Its business soon became profitable and, in the mid-1990s, World Metals decided to enter the stainless steel market. As its controller explained, the new branch of the business was essentially viewed as a new company and was even given a different name, Advanced Master Alloys. The startup costs for this new line of business were substantial because the production of stainless steel required a completely different process from the production of tool steel. World Metals eventually spent over $900,000 to modify its plant and purchase an argon oxygen decarburi
On October 27,1995, World Metals executed a written agreement with AGA for an AOD gas flow control system that would be used by World Metals in its production of stainless steel and alloys. The agreement provided for a purchase price of $95,000, payable in a down payment of $15,000, with the remaining balance to be paid over six months. The agreement further provided that the payment schedule was “based on equipment performance meeting operating speciflcations[.]”
The agreement included an express disclaimer of warranties, including a provision that the remedy for breach of any warranty would be limited to repair or replacement of the equipment and that AGA would not be liable for consequential damages. A handwritten notation on the agreement, however, indicated that the agreement was “IN ACCORDANCE W/ P.O. # 9716,” which provided for a state-of-the-art, computerized AOD control system, with manual control capability, as represented by AGA.
World Metals was apparently never satisfied with the equipment and, consequently, it stopped making payments under the agreement after it had paid less than one-third of the purchase price. World Metals’ efforts to resolve the problems with AGA were unsuccessful. It eventually decided to minimize its losses and ceased production of stainless steel.
On December 24, 1997, World Metals filed a complaint against AGA, alleging, among other things, that through its incorporation of the purchase order, the sales agreement expressly and implicitly warranted the equipment, that AGA had breached those warranties, that AGA had failed to correct the problems despite repeated demands by World Metals, and that World Metals had sustained damages in excess of $2,700,000 as a result. As was later revealed at trial, the damages sought by World Metals included lost profits and apparently the total costs of starting up and running the new stainless steel branch of its business. AGA counterclaimed on several causes of action, including breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking to recover the balance of the purchase price for the flow control system and other amounts that World Metals allegedly owed for other goods and services it received from AGA.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on the claim and the counterclaim. The jury entered a general verdict for World Metals on its claim. In response to special interrogatories, the jury indicated that the agreement was predominantly one for the sale of gdods and that AGA breached no express warranties but that it did breach the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Although the
II
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
“The trial court erred in entering judgment on the jury’s verdict awarding consequential damages to appellee where appellee did not establish its damages were proximately caused by Appellant’s breach.”
This court will address AGA’s fifth assignment of error first because it is dispositive. AGA contends that, even if the jury properly found that it breached an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, 2 the evidence did not establish that World Metals sustained $969,172 in consequential damages as a result of the alleged breach. This court agrees.
R.C. 1302.88(C) provides that consequential damages may be awarded for breach of warranty “[i]n a proper case.” Consequential damages, by their very definition, must “resul[t] from the seller’s breach.” R.C. 1302.89(B). In other words, consequential damages must be a proximate result of the breach. Consequential damages, as with any other contract damages, are awarded to place the aggrieved party in the same position it would have been in had the contract not been breached. See
Schulke Radio Productions, Ltd. v. Midwestern Broadcasting Co.
(1983),
World Metals presented evidence that it sustained the following costs, which it labeled as “consequential damages”:
AOD purchases — hard costs $ 911,184
Line of Credit and Equipment Loan Interest 413,161
ManagemenVSetup Hours 328,636
AMA Direct Labor 121,940
John Bornes — personnel costs 69,769
AOD Labor Costs 59,132
Rent Expense 52,725
Office Supplies/Setup — hard costs 22,274
Carpec — marketing 19,871
John Bornes — personnel taxes and benefits 17,638
Employee Relocating Expense 13,300
San Francisco Trade Show 12,585
Image Producers — marketing 5,067
Investment Casting Institute — dues and fees 4,000
Ken H. Relocating Expense 2,750
2,054,032 3
As briefly explained at trial by the president and the controller of World Metals, these damage figures represented essentially all of the costs that World Metals incurred in setting up and running its new stainless steel division, called Advanced Master Alloys. As the controller of World Metals testified, “It was a completely different name, different company, different concept.” World Metals needed to remodel its plant, purchase new equipment, hire new personnel, and market the new division to the stainless steel market. From the beginning, World Metals tracked all costs associated with the new division separate from its tool steel division, even if that cost was one that World Metals was already incurring. For example, the rent expense listed above was not for a new facility but actually represented space in World Metals’ existing building that it used for the new division.
In addition to the all-inclusive nature of these costs, many of them were incurred prior to any breach by AGA. Most of the setup costs and the AOD hard costs, which included costs to remodel the existing World Metals building and to purchase equipment, were incurred before the AGA flow control system was even installed. In other words, World Metals was seeking to recover as “consequential damages” the general overhead of its stainless steel division. This court has been unable to find any authority for awarding general business overhead as a separate component of damages. These costs were not caused by the breach because they would have been incurred regardless of it. See
Tarter v. Monark Boat Co.
(E.D.Mo.1977),
“When an entire business is wrongfully interrupted and injured,” as World Metals alleged here, “the measure of damages is the decrease in volume traceable to the wrong, as reflected by loss of profits, expenses incurred or similar concrete evidences of injury.”
Guntert v. Stockton
(1976),
In
Great Am. Music Machine v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co.
(M.D.Tenn. 1975),
Outside of the lost-profit setting, while a plaintiff may not recover its total overhead as consequential damages flowing from a breach, it may recover the additional overhead that it incurred due to the breach. Although the court in
Great Am. Music Machine
did not allow the recovery of general overhead, it did allow the plaintiff to recover overhead costs that were reasonably incurred in efforts to rehabilitate the damage to its business caused by the breach because those costs were directly attributable to the breach. A party injured by a breach of contract is entitled to recover indirect costs, such as overhead, when it incurs such costs “as a result of the breach.”
S & D Mechanical Contrs., Inc. v. Enting Water Conditioning Sys., Inc.
(1991),
Although World Metals did present evidence that it experienced production slowdowns and delays due to the alleged problems with the AOD flow control system, it failed to attribute any of its consequential damage figures to those delays. The lump-sum overhead figures given by World Metals gave the jury no reasonable basis on which it could calculate the consequential damages flowing from AGA’s breach. See
Kinetico, Inc. v. Indep. Ohio Nail Co.
(1984),
Because the jury had no reasonably certain basis upon which it could award consequential damages caused by AGA’s breach, this court must remand the case for a new trial. See
Kinetico, supra,
at 32-33, 19 OBR at 97-99,
Ill
AGA’s fifth assignment of error is sustained, the judgment of the trial court on the claims of World Metals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. The remaining assignments of error have been rendered moot and will not be addressed.
Judgment reversed in part and cause remanded.
Notes
. The trial court’s judgment also awarded damages to AGA on its counterclaim, but that aspect of the judgment is not at issue in this appeal. Although World Metals filed a cross-appeal, it later dismissed it voluntarily.
. This court assumes, for purposes of this discussion only, that the jury properly found that AGA breached the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. Because this court reverses and remands for a new trial, it need not address the propriety of the jury’s determination of liability.
. World Metals also presented evidence of lost profits, but the jury indicated in its special interrogatories that no lost profits were awarded. It is impossible to determine from the special interrogatories, however, which of these itemized costs were included in the jury's award.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would overrule AGA’s fifth assignment of error because I do not believe that this is one of those rare cases that justifies disturbing a jury verdict. The assessment of damages lies within the province of the jury and this court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. See
Carter v. Simpson
(1984),
The jury was free to accept or reject any of the damage evidence presented by World Metals. The jury evidently rejected most of the damage evidence for it awarded only one-fourth of the total damages sought by World Metals. It is apparent from the jury’s ultimate award and its answers to special interrogatories that the jury thoroughly considered the damage issue. I would not disturb that determination.
