In рroviding an example of when Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute,
This case is only slightly more complex than the Blackacre hypothetical. Here,
A special motion to strike is no more applicable here than it was in the Blackacre hypothetical: Information about the views from a private residence affecting only those directly interested in buying or selling that house is not an issue of public interest. The trial court's denial of defendants' special motion to strike is affirmed.
After the trial court denied defendant's special motion to strike, Workman filed a motion for attorney fees, asserting that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous and solely intended to delay the litigation. Defendants opposed the motion on the basis that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous. The trial
Workman also filed a motion for sanctions on appeal, asserting that defendants' appeal from their anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous and intended to delay the litigation. We requested a response from defendants. We find that sanctions to both Workman and the court are warranted. We therefore grant Workman's motion, and order sanctions in the amount of $ 35,985.00 to be paid to Workman, and $ 8,500.00 to be paid to the clerk of this court.
ANTI-SLAPP
A. Background
1. Workman's complaint
Workman alleged in her complaint that she was trustee of two family trusts that owned real property on a hill in the Bel Air neighborhood of Los Angeles (the trust property). A neighboring house on the same street was owned by Colichman and his trust. Workman alleged that the trust property has a higher elevation than Colichman's property, which "allows it to have sweeping views of Century City, Westwood, and downtown Los Angeles from several vantage points throughout the house." Workman alleged that the views from the house "are a substantial factor in its value." She also stated, "The corridor of these views runs directly over the Neighbor Property."
Workman listed the trust property for sale with real estate broker Kimberly Doner and Teles Properties for $ 2,750,000. Doner held an open house, and neighbors Colichman and Millbern attended.
Workman received multiple offers for the trust property, and after some negotiation, entered into an agreement to sell it for $ 3,053,000. Escrow was opened оn March 20, 2017. The same day, Colichman emailed Doner, stating that he and Millbern intended to construct a second story and rooftop deck onto their home, which would substantially interfere with the views from the trust property. The body of the email, which was attached as an exhibit to the complaint, states, "I wanted to let you know that David and I have
Workman alleged that defendants did not actually intend to build upon their property, and this representation was made "solely to interfere with the sale of the Trust Property, so that Defendants Colichman and Millbern and/or one of their 'friends' could purchase the Trust Property at a substantial discount from its fair market value." Workman also alleged that defendants' actions were intended to interfere with their contract to sell the trust property. She asserted that as of thе date of the complaint, defendants had not applied for or obtained any permits regarding construction on their property.
Doner provided Colichman's email to the potential buyer's broker. The broker attempted to find out more from Colichman, but Colichman repeatedly said he was too busy to talk about it and refused to provide the name of any architect involved in the construction plans. The buyer backed out of the sale, which, according to his broker, was a result of Colichman's representation that the construction would interfere with the views from the trust property.
Shortly thereafter, Workman received an offer to buy the property for $ 2,200,000 from a couple she believed were friends or acquaintances of Colichman. The email with the offer stated that the potential buyers were aware of defendants' construction plans and were willing to buy the property nonetheless. Workman did not name the potential buyers as defendants, but stated in her complaint that she "reserves the right to do so if initial discovery confirms they are conspiring" with the other defendants.
Workman asserted four causes of action: Intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, negligеnt interference with prospective economic advantage, conspiracy to defraud, and unfair business practices under Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. Workman prayed for damages "not less than the difference between the contract price of $ 3,053,000.00 and the amount ultimately received for the sale of the Trust Property," as well as punitive damages, costs, and injunctive relief barring defendants from interfering with the sale of the property. While the case was pending, the trust property sold for $ 2,635,000.
2. Anti-SLAPP motion and opposition
Defendants filed a special motion to strike under section 425.16-an anti-SLAPP
In their motion, defendants asserted that Workman's action was "frivolous on its face," and that it was "based solely on a single email" that "expresses a true statement of fact." They also contended that Workman's real estate agent, Doner, "was falsely and fraudulently representing to the public and potential purchasers of the property that the property had free and unencumbered views-which is a false and misleading statement should Defendants decide to proceed to exercise their legal right to add a second story to their home."
Defendants asserted that each cause of action in the complaint "is based solely on written representations by Defendants which are protected activity under Section 425.16(e)(4)." The email was "protected communication in furtherance of Defendants' right of free speech in connection with a public issue, inasmuch as it concerns real property rights and restrictions in the County of Los Angeles and the marketing of residential real estate to the public through false and misleading marketing materials." Defendants asserted that it was "indisputable" that this was a "matter of public concern for purposes" of the anti-SLAPP law. Defendants argued that their conduct fell under the definition of a "matter of public interest" in section 425.16(e)(4), because it involved the marketing of real estate to the public and fraud, which "impact a broad segment of society and thus relate to matters of consumer protection and public concern."
Defendants also asserted that the action had no probability of success, as Workman could not establish causation or damages because she "sold the Trust House for its fair market value instead of the fraudulently inflated value based on Plaintiff's false representation of the quality and characteristics ('expansive views') of the Trust House." They asserted that Workman had been required to disclose defendants' right to build upon their property to any potential owner, even without defendants' email. Defendants stated, "Plaintiff is suing because she was caught in the act of attempting to deceive the
Workman opposed the motion, asserting that "this entirely private dispute" was not a matter of public interest and therefore did not fall under the parameters of the anti-SLAPP statute. She also argued that a property seller had no duty to disclose public records or permits relating to off-site properties, and therefore defendants
Workman submitted a declaration by Doner, the seller's agent for the property sale. Doner is Workman's niece; the prior owner of the trust property was Doner's grandmother. Doner's declaration reiterated the factual allegations of the complaint, including the open house, the offers, the escrow, the email from Colichman, and the buyer's withdrawal. She stated that despite strong initial interest in the house, after Colichman's email, interest in the property waned.
Doner's declaration discussed the receipt of the low, post-email offer for the house, and stated that she latеr learned that the buyers who submitted that offer "are friends and longtime business associates of Defendants Colichman and Millbern." After Workman made clear that she "would not be selling the Trust Property in the ballpark of the low price offered by [defendants'] 'friends,' [defendants] then modified their 'construction plans' to claim they only intended to build up a portion of their residence, and place a deck only on top of the first story of their residence." Doner then received an offer of $ 2.5 million from a different potential buyer, and eventually contracted to sell the property for $ 2,635,000. The sale was completed on July 24, 2017. Doner said that defendants also sent a letter to her employer accusing her of misrepresenting the trust property and disparaging defendants' property.
Defendants filed a reply supporting the motion and objections to Doner's declaration.
3. Ruling
The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, stating, "This is a private matter; not a public issue or an issue of public interest." At the hearing, the court ruled on defendants' objections to
The court denied defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, stating, "I don't believe that we have a matter of public concern here. It's a private dispute." The court also noted that "[t]he Motion may not be timely." After a notice of ruling was served, defendants timely appealed.
B. Discussion
" Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the trial court to engage in a two-step process when determining whether to grant a motion to strike. First, it decides whether defendant has made a prima facie showing that the acts of which plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of defendant's constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. If defendant satisfies this threshold burden, plaintiff must then demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits. On appeal, we review these legal issues de novo." (
Here, we find that defendants have not satisfied their threshold burden to demonstrate that their actions were connected to a public issue. We therefore do not address the second prong of the test. (See Nam v. Regents of University of California (2016)
Workman's complaint focused on Colichman's email to Doner regarding defendants' purported plans to construct an addition to defendants' property that would interfere with the views from the trust property. Nevertheless, defendants' arguments focus entirely on different communications: representations Doner purportedly made about the trust property to potential buyers. Defendants assert that they met their initial burden under section 425.16 because Workman's claims "fall squarely within the purview of 425.16(e)(4),
To fall under section 425.16(e)(4), "the conduct must be in connection with an issue of public interest." ( Weinberg v. Feisel (2003)
Defendants assert that the public interest at issue here is the "fraudulent practices of a real estate broker in marketing real property to the public." This contention vastly overstates the issue in this case. Colichman's communication to Doner was about defendants' construction plans on their own home and the potential effects on the views from the neighboring trust property. Defendants' argument that this case does not involve a specific, private transaction, and instead involves fraud in the marketing of real estate in general, is not supported by the record or applicable authority.
" 'The fact that "a broad and amorphous public interest" can be connected to a specific dispute is not sufficient to meet the statutory requirements' of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] By focusing on society's general interest in the subject matter of the dispute instead of the specific
Defendants' claims are similar to those rejected in Bikkina v. Mahadevan (2015)
In response to Bikkina's lawsuit, Mahadevan filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that his "criticism of Bikkina's data was on a topic of public interest because it relates to 'one of the most important issues of our time-climate change and greenhouse gases.' " ( Bikkina, supra,
The Bikkina court relied on Weinberg v. Feisel , supra ,
Many other cases have found that communications to small, limited-interest groups do not meet the "public interest" requirement of section 425.16(e)(4). In Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003)
Similarly, in Commonwealth, supra,
Commonwealth relied on Consumer Justice, supra,
The court then discussed the Blackacre hypothetical cited at the beginning of this opinion: "[The plaintiff] suggests a hypothetical regarding false statements made in the course of a real property sale. Blackacre sells a house to Whiteacre, and Whiteacre sues, claiming the defendant misrepresented the square footage. Blackacre brings a special motion to strike, claiming his speech involves a matter of public interest, because millions of Americans live in houses and buy and sell houses. [The plaintiff] correctly suggests that applying the anti-SLAPP statute in such a case would be absurd." ( Consumer Justice, supra,
Here, defendants assert that this case involves "issues of consumer protection and fraud, which necessarily impact a brоad segment of society" and are therefore matters of public interest. They cite Chaker v. Mateo (2012)
Defendants also cite Carver v. Bonds (2005)
Defendants also contend that because real estate is a regulated industry, and the "very purpose of real estate licensing is to protect the public," their communication involved the public interest. They cite
The Cross court acknowledged that cases such as Rivero and Consumer Justice hold that a "broad and amorphous public interest" is insufficient to warrant protection under sеction 425.16. ( Id . at p. 378,
In this case, by contrast, there is no issue of widespread public concern. Defendants' communication involved construction plans for their own property, with the suggestion that their plans may impact the views from the trust property. The views from a private residence do not involve a matter of public concern. Defendants' attempt to characterize this private dispute as a matter of public interest is not supported by any authority. The trial court was correct in denying defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.
WORKMAN'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
A. Background
After the court denied defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, Workman filed a motion for attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), which states, "If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5."
As for evidence of delay, Workman noted that the lawsuit focused on defendants' attempts to interfere with the sale of the trust property, and defendants had attempted to interfere with Doner's employment by sending a
Workman's attorney, Alan N. Goldberg, submitted a declaration in support of the motion. He stated that based on the date of service of the complaint, defendants' response to the complaint was due on June 19, 2017. Defendants requested a 15-day extension, and Goldberg agreed. Before defendants' answer was due, Goldberg and Mark Share, defendants' counsel, considered resolving the case by mediation, and "discussed potential mediators and possible Mediation dates and we agreed to attempt to complete a Mediation by September 10, 2017." Goldberg prepared a stipulation and sent it to Share. Share responded that he wanted the stipulation to include an extension of time to file an anti-SLAPP motion. Goldberg refused the request, stating in his declaration, "I felt it made little sense to schedule a Mediation with that issue unresolved." The parties then signed a stipulation, which did not include an explicit extension for an anti-SLAPP motion, providing defendants a 70-day extension to "file their response to the Complaint."
Goldberg stated in his declaration, "After the Stipulation was submitted, I made numerous efforts to contact Mr. Share to select a mediator and schedule a Mediation. However, Mr. Share did not respond to my initial request for nearly 3 weeks ...." He continued, "We finally agreed on a Mediator on August 14, 2017, and on that date we were provided with six (6) dates of availability in October 2017 by ADR Services." A week later at a case management conference, "Mr. Share advised the court that none of those dates will work." Goldberg stated, "Given that Mr. Share had not cooperated in scheduling a Mediation, we served written discovery on Defendant Colichman on August 22, 2017. We also noticed the Deposition of [other witnesses]."
On September 8, 2017, the parties agreed to hold the mediation on November 21. On September 14, defendants filed their anti-SLAPP motion, thus staying all discovery.
Workman requested attorney fees in the amount of $ 19,780.00, which included hourly rates for attorneys and filing fees.
As to whether the anti-SLAPP motion had merit, defendants asserted that "Plaintiff effectively contends that she was entitled to deceive the public in advertising materials published to the public ... to lure unsuspecting buyers to purchase" the trust property. They contended, "Defendants' position in the anti-SLAPP Motion was that the efforts by a licensed realtor to intentionally deceive the potential buying public online and in the MLS regarding characteristics of real property located in California constituted an issue of public cоncern, and as such Defendants' anti-SLAPP Motion was well-founded and was by no means totally and completely without merit or solely for purposes of delay."
In her reply, Workman noted that defendants had not challenged the amount of attorney fees requested, and had presented no evidence or argument suggesting that the motion had not been brought for purposes of delay.
Before the hearing on the motion, the court issued a tentative ruling that stated, in its entirety, "Plaintiffs' Motion for SLAPP Fees against Defendants Paul Colichman and David Millbern is denied. [¶] In order to prevail on the Motion, the Court must find that the motion to strike is 'frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.' " At the hearing, the court heard argument from both parties, and without stating any additional reasoning on the record, stated, "The court is going to adopt its tentative. That will be the ruling of the court."
Workman timely appealed.
We review an order on a request for attorney fees under section 425.16 for abuse of discretion. ( Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011)
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because it was clear that this dispute did not involve an issue of public interest, and there was "ample evidence" that the anti-SLAPP motion was solely intended to cause delay. In their respondents' brief, defendants assert that the appeal was meritorious, repeating their arguments that section 425.16 applies. As was the case in the trial court, however, defendants do not address Workman's assertion that the motion was filed solely for delay, or the evidence supporting that assertion.
As we discussed above, the anti-SLAPP motion lacked merit. Defendants did not meet the threshold burden of demonstrating that the communication at issue in the complaint was made in furtherance of defendants' constitutional rights of free speech in connection with a public issue. Case law is abundantly clear that for section 425.16 to apply, "the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech." ( City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002)
Moreover, the evidence that the anti-SLAPP motion was filed for purposes of delay was both persuasive and unopposed. First, defendants requested multiple extensions to respond to the Complaint, stating that they were interested in mediation. However, after taking advantage of those delays, they cancelled the mediation. Second, the anti-SLAPP motion was not filed until
Defendants made no effort to contradict this evidence. They did not assert that Goldberg's interpretation of events was mistaken, or argue that they did not intend to delay, or submit any additional facts to contradict Workman's arguments about delay. Indeed, they did not even assert that Workman's evidence was insufficient to establish intent to delay. Defendants
Under these circumstances, an award of attorney fees was mandatory. In L.A. Taxi, supra,
This court sustained the denial of the motion, and held that the court erred in denying the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. Regarding the attorney fees, we stated, "[I]t was well-established when defendants filed their motion that purely commercial speech is not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute," and defendants did not "provide any reasonable basis for arguing that their search advertisements were not purely commercial speech." ( L.A. Taxi, supra ,
The trial court denied the plaintiff's request for attorney fees, but the Court of Appeal reversed. It noted that a "determination of frivolousness requires a finding the anti-SLAPP 'motion is "totally and completely without merit" (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2) ), that is, "any reasonable attorney would agree such motion is totally devoid of merit." ' " ( Moore, supra,
Here, defendants' anti-SLAPP motion was similarly frivolous, and Workman presented undisputed evidence that it was brought to delay the litigation. Under these circumstances, section 425.16, subdivision (c) states that "the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion." The court abused its discretion by denying Workman's motion.
A. Background
In defendants' appeal from the anti-SLAPP motion ruling, Workman filed a motion for sanctions on appeal. We gave defendants written notice that we were considering imposing sanctions, and informed them they could serve and file a written opposition. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(c), (d).) The parties had the opportunity tо address sanctions at oral argument. ( Id ., rule 8.276(e).)
In her motion, Workman asserts that sanctions are warranted under section 907, which states, "When it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just." (§ 907.) She also asserts that sanctions are warranted under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1), which states, "On motion of a party or its own motion, a Court of Appeal may impose sanctions ... on a party or an attorney for ... [t]aking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay." ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).)
Workman argues that the appeal was intended to further delay the case and harass Workman. As evidence of delay, Workman points out the evidence she previously submitted relating to the delay in responding to the complaint, the delays in scheduling a mediation, the filing of the late anti-SLAPP motion, and the immediate appeal after the motion was denied. She also points out that while the appeal was pending, defendants filed a request to stay all proceedings until the California Supreme Court decides a pending anti-SLAPP case, FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc. (2017)
Workman also contends that defendants' appeal of their anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous, because there was no protected activity involved and no reasonable attorney would believe the appeal had merit. Goldberg also submitted a declaration in which he noted that defendants' attorney has been harassing Workman and Doner during the pendency of the appeal. Goldberg included a copy of a July 23, 2018 letter to him in which defendants' counsel, Todd S. Eagan of Lavely & Singer, stated that the "complaint is objectively
Eagan responded to Goldberg with another letter, dated August 7, 2018, reiterating his position that Workman's claims are "not supported by existing law, lack legal and evidentiary support and are presented for an improper purpose in what is nothing more than an attempt to shake down my clients for money." Eagan threatened again to file a malicious prosecution action, accused Workman and Doner of committing fraud in advertising the trust property for sale, and demanded that Workman dismiss the action with prejudice. Eagan closed by stating. "We take very seriously the tactics in which [Workman] has engaged based on your (poor) advice to her, and, rest assured, our law firm will utilize its full resources to hold both [Workman] and your office fully accountable."
Goldberg included a third letter from Eagan, dated August 20, 2018, to Peter Hernandez at Teles Properties, Doner's employer. Eagan stated in the letter that Doner's "admissions" in the declaration she submitted in support of the opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion "implicate the Company and gives [sic ] rise to potentially significant liability on its part." Eagan demanded that the company preserve all communications regarding the sale of the property and the litigation.
Workman asserts that defendants' counsel's actions, including the attempt to stay the appeal and "seeking to harass [Workman] and her real estate agent during the pendency of this appeal, provide substantial evidence that the purpose of the appeal was to unnecessarily delay the proceedings." Workman requests attorney fees in the amount of $ 35,985.00 for handling the appeal and the motion.
B. Opposition
In opposition, defendants assert that sanctions are not warranted because their motion and appeal were not frivolous. They contend that in cases in which appellate sanctions were imposed, "the sanctionable conduct was egregious, inexcusable and far removed from anything that [defendants] or their counsel have done in connection with this litigation." They cite
Defendants also reassert their argument that there is a "public interest in preventing fraudulent disclosures in connection with real estate sales." They contend that "it is indisputable that there is a long-standing (and statutorily recognized) public interest in preventing deceptive disclosures in connection with residential real estate sales; hence [defendants'] alleged conduct in insisting that [Workman] disclose their second story rights was in furtherance of that public interest."
Defendants further contend that they were "well within their rights" to send "litigation hold letters" to Doner and her employer, and "it is unclear how these letters in any way evidence a meritless appeal." Defendants assert that there is no evidence the appeal was filed solely to cause delay. They state that Workman's motion "does not actually contain or refer to any evidence whatsoever (documentary or otherwise) of purported delay. To the contrary [Workman's] entire position concerning delay is premised on nothing more than self-serving and disingenuous argument (not evidence)." They further claim that the anti-SLAPP motion was timely filed in the trial court based on the parties' stipulation, and defendants "moved with all due haste in filing this appeal on October 24, 2017, a mere 6 days after the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion."
Defendants also assert that their request to stay the case pending the decision in FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc., review granted was warranted, because at issue in that case is "whether it is the content of an alleged harmful statement, as opposed to the size of the statement's audience , that determines if California's anti-SLAPP statute applies to a claim arising from the statement." They state that defendants "contend that the anti-SLAPP statute applies because the content of the alleged statements pertains to an issue of widespread public interest: namely, preventing consumer fraud in the highly regulated area of real estate sales. Accordingly, Appellants' position is directly in line with this District's holding in FilmOn ."
"Under section 907 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1), we may award sanctions when an appeal is frivolous and taken solely to cause delay." ( Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018)
"In determining whether an appeal indisputably has no merit, California cases have applied both subjective and objective standards. The subjective standard looks to the motives of the appealing party and his or her attorney, while the
As discussed above, defendants' private email regarding the views from the neighboring private property is not an issue of рublic interest under the anti-SLAPP statute. Moreover, case law does not support defendants' attempts to divert the focus away from their own communication and onto the speculative impact their email might have had on communication from Doner to potential buyers that could then, hypothetically, impact an issue of public interest (real estate advertising). As in the Blackacre hypothetical, a claim that private communication about a private residence "involves a matter of public interest, because millions of Americans live in houses and buy and sell houses" is "absurd." ( Consumer Justice, supra,
In their opposition to Workman's motion for sanctions on appeal, defendants assert for the first time that the anti-SLAPP motion and appeal were not intended for delay, but these arguments are feeble. Defendants' response to
We are also unpersuaded by defendants' claim that further delay was warranted due to the pending Supreme Court case FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc ., review granted. As our colleagues in Division Three stated in their opinion, "Plaintiff FilmOn.com (FilmOn) is an Internet-based entertainment media provider. Defendant DoubleVerify, Inc. (DoubleVerify) provides authentication services to online advertisers. FilmOn sued DoubleVerify for trade libel, slander, and other business-related torts, alleging DoubleVerify falsely classified FilmOn's websites under the categories 'Copyright Infringement-File Sharing' and 'Adult Content' in confidential reports to certain clients that subsequently cancelled advertising agreements with FilmOn." ( FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc ., supra ,
Defendants assert that a stay was warranted to await the Supreme Court's ruling in FilmOn.com because "[h]ere, [defendants] contend that the anti-SLAPP statute applies because the content of the alleged statements pertains to an issue of widespread public interest: namely, preventing consumer fraud in the highly regulated area of real estate sales. Accordingly, [defendants']
This case is simply "[a]nothеr appeal in an anti-SLAPP case. Another appeal by a defendant whose anti-SLAPP motion failed below. Another appeal [with] no merit, [which] will result in an inordinate delay of the plaintiff's case and cause [her] to incur more unnecessary attorney fees." ( Moriarty v. Laramar Management Corp . (2014)
"Among the specific factors we may consider in determining the appropriate amount of sanctions are the amount of respondent's attorney fees on appeal; ... the degree of objective frivolousness and delay; and the need for discouragement of like conduct in the future." ( Pierotti v. Torian (2000)
"Courts, with increasing frequency, have imposed additional sanctions, payable to the clerk of the court, to compensate the state for the cost to the taxpayers of processing a frivolous appeal. [Citation.] The cost of processing an appeal that results in an opinion has been estimated to be approximately $ 8,500." ( Singh v. Lipworth (2014)
"Sanctions may be ordered against a litigant [citation] and/or against the lawyer." ( In re Marriage of Schnabel (1994)
This opinion constitutes a written statement of our reasons for imposing sanctions. ( In re Marriage of Flaherty, supra ,
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants' special motion to strike is affirmed. The trial court order denying Workman's motion for attorney fees is reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter a new order granting that motion. Sanctions are imposed upon defendants Colichman and Millbern, as well as their counsel of record, Todd S. Eagan of Lavely & Singer Professional Corporation, jointly and severally, in the amount of $ 35,985.00, to be paid to Workman, and $ 8,500.00 to be paid to the clerk of this court. Defendants' counsel of record and the clerk of this court are each ordered to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar upon return of the remittitur. ( Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6086.7, subd. (a)(3), 6068, subd. (o)(3).) All sanctions shall be paid no later than 15 days after the date the remittitur is filed. Workman is entitled to costs on appeal.
We concur:
MANELLA, P. J.
WILLHITE, J.
Notes
"SLAPP" is an acronym for "strategic lawsuit against public participation." (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc . (2002)
We granted Workman's motion to consolidate the appeals.
Millbern's connection to the property and other parties is unclear in the cоmplaint and throughout the record, but references to Colichman's property as "their" home suggest that Millbern lived at Colichman's property.
Defendants also filed a demurrer, which is not relevant to the issues on appeal.
Upon the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion, "[a]ll discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed" unless the court orders otherwise. (§ 425.16, subd. (g).)
"[S]ection 916 stays all further proceedings on the merits during the pendency of an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion." (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005)
The anti-SLAPP statute does not make clear that this is an appealable order, but "[i]n cases where, as here, the issue of whether the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted is properly before the appellate court, it would be absurd to defer the issue of attorney fees until a future date, resulting in the probable waste of judicial resources. When the first issue is properly raised, appellate jurisdiction over both issues under section 425.16, subdivision (i) is proper." (Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010)
At oral argument, after the court suggested that sanctions payable to the court would be appropriate, counsel for defendants stated that for due process purposes, he would like a chance to look at the cases that discuss such sanctions. Kleveland is cited throughout Workman's motion for sanctions on appeal, and defense counsel had ample opportunity to read it and other cases regarding sanctions. All due process requirements have been met here.