87 Iowa 217 | Iowa | 1893
The declarations and documents admitted are 'somewhat numerous, and it is not practicable that we '.'here discuss them in detail. It is sufficient to say that, In view of the evidence that‘preceded, we think this evidence was properly admitted under the rule requiring prima facie evidence of conspiracy to be first introduced. The court instructed specifically that, unless the jury found the conspiracy they should not consider this evidence as against the appellant, and that the conspiracy could not be established by the acts or ■ declarations of McCoy alone.
The appellant cites and largely relies upon Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. (U. S.) 407. In that case the plaintiffs, Fenton et al., had sold goods to Adler & Scheff on their own credit, and, after receiving the goods, Adler & Scheff conspired with their codefend-ants to conceal their property from their creditors by making an assignment thereof to their codefendants. Plaintiffs attached sufficient property of Adler & Scheff
VII. The appellant complains of the following instruction: “And you are further instructed in this connection that the alleged conspiracy can not be established on what the said McCoy might have said, done, or written alone, but there must be other evidence, which may be shown by facts and circumstances showing the conspiracy, before what the said McCoy might have said, done, or written can be considered by you as evidence against said Lord.” The complaint is against the use of the word “alone.” As it takes two or more to form a conspiracy, the words or acts of one will not establish it. There must be other evidence than that of McCoy, showing that Lord was a party to the alleged conspiracy. We seo no error in this instruction.
' Our conclusion is that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.