263 Mass. 444 | Mass. | 1928
This case is reported on a finding of material facts for determination whether the petitioner is entitled to render the account. The pertinent facts are that the Fitch-burg Bank & Trust Company, a corporation organized under the laws of this Commonwealth, was appointed on April 21, 1926, by the appropriate court of probate executor of the will of Julia A. Legnard and qualified by giving bond. No qhange in the administration of this estate appears on thé court records. The said Fitchburg Bank and Trust Company, located within our county of Worcester, consolidated with the Merchants National Bank of Worcester, a national banking association organized under the laws of the United States and also located within our county of Worcester, under the corporate title, Worcester County National Bank of Worcester, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Congress approved on February 25, 1927, c. 191, § 1; 44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1224, 1225, amending an Act approved November 7, 1918, c. 209; 40 U. S. Sts. at Large, 1044, by adding at the end of said c. 209 a new section, being § 3 thereof. For convenience, this will be referred to hereafter in this opinion as said § 3. See Act of Congress of May 1, 1886, c. 73, § 2; 24 U. S. Sts. at Large, 18. The certificate approving the consolidation is dated June 27, 1927. It is assumed that the consolidation took effect on that date.
The first statute purporting to authorize a trust company organized under the laws of a State to consolidate directly with a national banking association was said § 3. Its provisions, so far as material to the grounds of this decision, are that any bank, defined to include a trust company, incorporated under the laws of any State, “may be consolidated with a national banking association located in the same county . . . under the charter of such national banking association on such terms and conditions as may
First. The first question to be decided is whether consolidation of a Massachusetts trust company with a national banking association is permissible and valid as provided for in said § 3. On this aspect of the case we shall deal only with consolidation in its general features and leave for later consideration the meaning and effect, as declared in said § 3, of such consolidation on the Massachusetts corporation and its fiduciary appointment by the court of probate, and whether these provisions are in contravention of the law of this Commonwealth.
There is no statute of this Commonwealth prohibiting in terms the consolidation of a trust company organized under the authority of Massachusetts laws with a national bank. We are of opinion that there is no policy of the Commonwealth declared in any statutes on the subject of such consolidation. It is provided by G. L. c. 172, § 44, as amended by St. 1922, c. 292, that “No trust company shall be merged in or consolidated with another trust company except” upon the terms and in the manner there specified. These statutory words in their context and by the express terms of G. L. c. 172, § 1, refer exclusively to trust companies organized under the laws of this Commonwealth. These statutory words, although they do not authorize, do not prohibit a
There is no provision in the statutes of this Commonwealth authorizing or recognizing the consolidation of a trust company or bank organized under such statutes with a national banking association. Formerly there were statutes respecting the conversion of a State bank into a national bank under Act of Congress of June 3,1864, c. 106, § 44; 13 U. S. Sts. at Large, 112, now U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5154. See St. 1863, c. 244, St. 1864, c. 190. Of course these early statutes never were applicable to a consolidation of a State bank with a national bank, which appears first to have been authorized by said § 3, (44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1225, 1226). But those early statutes were repealed by Pub. Sts. c. 224. It is quite possible that that repeal came about because such statutes were thought to be unnecessary in view of the decision in Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, to the effect that no enabling State statute was required to accomplish such change and conversion.
This review of the statutes of this Commonwealth shows that there has been no exercise of whatever power may reside in the State to declare a general policy against the consolidation of a State trust company with a national bank. Thereby in effect that field is left open to the exercise by Congress of whatever power it possesses over that subject. Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 292, 293. Such consolidation, however, must be subject to the limitation already quoted from the final sentence of St. 1922, c. 292, amending G. L. c. 172, § 44.
The question was directly raised in Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, whether a State bank could change its organization into that of a national banking association without any authority given by the State law in its charter or otherwise to make the change. It was said at page 678, “No authority from the State was necessary to enable the bank so to change its organization. The option to do that was given by the forty-fourth section of the Banking Act of Congress, 13 Stat. 112. [U. S. Rey. Sts. § 5154.] The power there conferred was ample, and its validity cannot be doubted. The act is silent as to any assent or permission by the State. It was as competent for Congress to authorize the transmutation as to create such institutions originally.” We are unable to perceive any sound distinction between the power of Congress to authorize the conversion of a State bank into a national bank and its power to authorize the consolidation of a State bank with a national bank under the. charter of the national bank. If no State legislation was necessary to accomplish such conversion, it seems to us that no State legislation is necessary to accomplish such consolidation. Relying upon the authority of Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, we are of opinion that in general consolidation of a Massachusetts trust company with a national banking association as prescribed in said § 3, is permissible and valid.
Second. The next question to be determined is what is the legal effect of such consolidation upon the trust company and upon the national bank. The words of said § 3 (44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1225, 1226) are explicit to the point that the consolidation shall be “under the charter of such national banking association.” This of itself is clear indication of intent that the State trust company shall not continue as a corporation in combination with the national bank. The words of St. 1922, c. 292, amending G. L. c. 172, § 44,
There is no requirement in said § 3 (44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1225, 1226) or elsewhere, so far as we can discover, that the comptroller of the currency must issue a certificate of consolidation, although there is an implication in the pro
The result is that the trust company chartered by this Commonwealth has gone out of existence; all its property of every name and nature has gone into the possession and has become the property' of the national bank, and the national bank continues it's existence and identity under its original charter. The trust company has lost its identity and its assets have become those of the national banking association. The latter is not a newly created organization but an enlargement of the continuously existing national bank. Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460. Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railway v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1, 19-22. Worcester County National Bank, petitioner, ante, 394.
In view of this legal effect, in its general aspects, of the consolidation of the trust company with the national bank upon the trust company as a corporation, it must follow that its identity as a fiduciary appointed by the court of probate has not been continued in the national bank, but has been extinguished. Doubtless in many respects it may be said that the identity of corporations consolidated under the provisions of law is continued in the absorbing corporation. That is true commonly as to contract obligations. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 245 Mass. 52, 59, and cases cited. Atlantic National Bank v. Harris, 118 Mass. 147. Iowa Light, Heat & Power Co. v. First National Bank of Boston, 250 Mass. 353,
The suggestion in the brief of the petitioner that, “strictly speaking, a court cannot appoint an executor,” is without merit in this connection. Probate courts are required to find that a person named as executor “is legally competent and a suitable person ” before issuing letters testamentary. G. L. c. 192, § 4. The form of letter testamentary in common use by probate courts and doubtless approved by this court under G. L. c. 215, § 30, begins with the assertion, after naming the person, “You are appointed executor.” He has no legal authority as executor until so appointed. Manifestly the executor is appointed by the court as the result of a judicial decision.
It is quite possible that none of the officers of the Fitch-burg Bank and Trust Company, in reliance upon whose character, sagacity and skill the original appointment as executor was made in the case at bar, continue as officers of the national banking association. The stockholders hardly can be the same. Its general policy of business and trust administration may have been entirely altered. Its reputation with respect to these matters may have changed radically as a consequence of the consolidation. The court has had no opportunity to pass upon these essential questions. The failure of several trust companies and at least one national banking association in this Commonwealth within recent years accentuates the importance of such judicial examination of trust companies and national banks before appointing them to positions of trust of this nature in the administration of estates.
It is to be observed that there are no statutory words in said § 3 to the effect that the identity of the State bank as a fiduciary by appointment of a court is continued in the national bank with which it has been consolidated. The absence of express words in said § 3 declaring the preservation of the identity of the State bank perhaps may not be of decisive significance. If it be assumed that it was intended by said § 3 to preserve that identity, that result is not accomplished in view of what has of necessity happened in making
The trust arising from appointments to such positions as executor, administrator and the like is highly personal. It is not commercial. It is not contractual. It is not a property right. It involves no pecuniary interest on the part of the fiduciary. Ensign v. Faxon, 224 Mass. 145. Commonwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, petitioner, 249 Mass. 440, 445. Wilkinson v. McIntyre, 254 Mass. 325, 330. A strictly confidential relationship of this nature cannot survive such a transmutation as is wrought by the consolidation of a State bank with a national banking association under the charter of the latter in accordance with the terms of said § 3. To treat the national banking association into which the State trust company has been consolidated as preserving the identity of the trust company in this particular would be contrary to the juridical conception and practice touching the appointment of such fiduciaries under the law of this Commonwealth.
Third. The final question for determination is whether the provision of said § 3 (44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1225, 1226) that the national banking association shall hold and enjoy “the right of succession as trustee, executor, or in any other fiduciary capacity in the same manner and to the same extent as was held and enjoyed by such State . . . bank,” is valid and binding upon the courts of this Commonwealth. This question divides itself into three parts: (1) What do these, words mean? (2) Are they in contravention of the law of this Commonwealth? (3) Do they violate any provision of the Constitution?
The original appointment is to continue wholly unaffected by the fact that the State bank, in the case at bar the trust company, whose credit, standing and competency formed the basis of the judicial inquiry and action culminating in that appointment, has ceased to be, and another and different corporation whose credit, standing and competency have never been the subject of judicial inquiry for this purpose, is to act in its place as executor.. This seems to us to be the plain meaning of the words of said § 3 now under consideration construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.
(2) The next part of the final question is whether the provisions of said § 3 (44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1225, 1226), having .the meaning just stated, are “in contravention of the law” of this Commonwealth under which the trust company was organized. That section, according to its plain interpretation, has a signal force and effect in its application to appointment of fiduciaries by courts of this Commonwealth. That section requires the courts of this Commonwealth to recognize and accept, without inquiry or hearing, as fiduciary in place of a State trust company now gone out
It is provided in art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of this Commonwealth that, “In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.” That principle is thoroughly embedded in the governmental principles of this Commonwealth on which law itself is founded. It often has been referred to in judicial decisions. It has been many times applied to the several departments of government. It is of the very fiber of our institutions. As illustrative of other adjudications, reference may be made to Case of Supervisors of Election, 114 Mass. 247, Boston v. Chelsea, 212 Mass. 127, Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, 520, Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 296, Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 615, Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342, 345, Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 619, 623, Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 242 Mass. 95, 115, 116. Of course that principle has never been and cannot be questioned in the
We are therefore of opinion that it is "in contravention of the law” of this Commonwealth in a fundamental sense for the courts to be compelled, in compliance with the mandate of a legislative body, to recognize as a fiduciary a different corporation from the corporation appointed such fiduciary, simply because, without judicial proceedings and by mere act of the stockholders and officers (who may now have ceased to be such) approved by an executive government official, the corporation appointed such fiduciary has been consolidated with it, without any judicial determination as to the fitness of such different corporation to perform the duties of fiduciary.
(3) The last part of the final question we have to decide is whether this provision of said § 3 as thus-interpreted is within any power conferred upon the Congress by the Constitution of the United States and, if not within such power, whether it is separable from the rest of the act. Plainly the Congress has ample legislative power over national banks.
The consequence is inevitable, in our opinion, that the Congress has no power by simple legislative fiat and without provision for judicial inquiry and decision to make it imperative upon any court of this Commonwealth to recognize the present accountant, a corporation hitherto an utter stranger to its proceedings and records, as the officer and appointee of such court in a highly fiduciary capacity. We feel compelled to reach the conclusion that this clause of said § 3 (44 U. S. Sts. at Large, Part 2, 1225, 1226), here under discussion, is unconstitutional.
This decision, while not required by Commonwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, petitioner, 249 Mass. 440, and Commonwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, petitioner, 261 Mass. 217, is in harmony with the principles on which those cases rest.
We are of opinion, however, that this clause is not the dominant feature of said § 3, but is subsidiary and incidental to its main object, which is to authorize the consolidation of State banks with national banks, that this clause is separable and distinct, that the rest of the section may stand independently, and that there is no such connection between
It is possible that the case at bar might be disposed of with the same result on the ground that, when the will of the testator was allowed and the trust company appointed executor, there was no law permitting a trust company to consolidate directly with a national bank, and that therefore the Act of Congress under which this consolidation took place, having been enacted subsequently to the appointment of the trust company as executor, cannot be operative to affect the decree of the court previously entered and the rights of the beneficiaries of the estate of the testatrix under such decree. See Wright v. Wright, 225 N. Y. 329, 336, 337. This point has not been argued. . We have not considered it because it seems preferable to decide the case on the grounds already stated.
The result is that The Worcester County National Bank of Worcester, the accountant and petitioner in the case at bar, has not succeeded Fitchburg Bank & Trust Company as executor of the will of the testatrix and is not entitled to render an account as such executor. It can account only de son tort. The case upon this point is governed by Commonwealthr-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, petitioner, 261
Probate Court instructed accordingly.