WOOTEN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. KNISLEY, APPELLEE, ET AL.
No. 96-185
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 16, 1997
79 Ohio St.3d 282 | 1997-Ohio-390
Submitted April 2, 1997 at the Athens County Session. CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Highland County, No. 94-CA-858.
A criminal conviction, resulting from a violation of
{¶ 1} George and Alma Wooten, appellants, own a one-hundred-twelve-acre tract of land situated in Highland County, Ohio. The Wootens’ property is adjacent to a tract of land owned by Linda Ballentine and Alberta Hill. In 1988, the two tracts were separated by a natural boundary (a creek) and a woven wire fence.
{¶ 2} Rodney Knisley, appellee, is a sawmill operator who purchases and harvests growing stands of timber. In 1988, Larry Black worked for Knisley as a “timber spotter,” i.e., a buyer’s agent assigned to locate commercially valuable timber available for sale. In June 1988, Black contacted Hill and inquired whether Hill and Ballentine would sell some of the timber on their property. The Hill and Ballentine property containing the timber adjoined the Wootens’ land. Hill expressed an interest in selling the timber and granted Black permission to inspect
{¶ 3} In July 1988, Black showed Knisley the timber he had spotted, including a stand of timber that was actually located on a section of the Wootens’ property. On July 17, 1988, Hill and Ballentine entered into a timber sales agreement with Knisley. Knisley agreed to purchase timber from Hill and Ballentine for $25,000. Thereafter, Black and Knisley marked the area they intended to cut and harvest, which included a stand of timber growing on the Wootens’ property. The Wootens were not aware of Knisley’s plans and never authorized him to remove any trees from their property.
{¶ 4} During the latter part of July 1988, Knisley’s employees commenced timber cutting operations on the Hill/Ballentine property. In August 1988, the Wootens became concerned that the logging operations were coming too close to their property line. Therefore, the Wootens hired surveyors to clearly mark the boundary between their property and the Hill/Ballentine property. On or about August 30, the surveyors discovered that the logging operations had extended onto the Wootens’ property. Knisley was informed of the trespass, but instructed his crew to continue the logging operations. By the time the Wootens were able to stop Knisley from encroaching on their land, Knisley had impermissibly removed approximately one hundred sixty-eight trees from an 8.2-acre section of the Wootens’ property.
{¶ 5} On April 6, 1989, the Wootens (“appellants”) filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Highland County naming, as defendants, Knisley, Black, Hill, Ballentine, and an independent contractor who had been involved in the logging operations. In the complaint, appellants sought recovery for trespass
{¶ 6} Knisley and Black moved to dismiss appellants’ claim for treble damages, arguing that recovery of treble damages under
{¶ 7} Prior to trial, appellants dismissed their cause of action for trespass against defendant Black. Additionally, appellants stipulated that Knisley and Black did not act as the agents, employees or servants of either Hill or Ballentine in conducting the cutting operations on appellants’ property. In March 1994, appellants’ claim for trespass against Knisley and their claims against Hill and Ballentine proceeded to trial by jury. At trial, Knisley stipulated liability for the trespass to appellants’ property. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that damages for the trespass were to be measured by the
{¶ 8} The jury returned a verdict for $10,000 in favor of appellants on their cause of action against Knisley, but determined that appellants were not entitled to an award of punitive damages. In response to written interrogatories, the jury determined that $10,000 represented the stumpage value of the timber removed from appellants’ property, and that the unauthorized removal of the timber had caused no decrease in the fair market value of appellants’ land. Additionally, the jury returned a separate verdict in favor of Hill and Ballentine on the claims that appellants had asserted against them. After the jury had returned its verdicts, appellants moved for a trebling of the jury award under {¶ 9} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in part and reversed it in part. The court of appeals determined that the trial court had erred in finding that appellants were entitled to seek recovery for damages based only on either the stumpage value of the cut timber or the diminution in the value of their land. Specifically, the court of appeals held that appellants “were also entitled to seek restoration damages in lieu of the diminution in market value or damages measured merely by stumpage value.” Therefore, the court of appeals James D. Hapner, for appellants. Coss & Greer and Rocky A. Coss, for appellee. DOUGLAS, J. {¶ 10} The question that has been certified for our consideration is “whether {¶ 11} “No person, without privilege to do so, shall recklessly cut down, destroy, girdle, or otherwise injure a vine, bush, shrub, sapling, tree, or crop standing or growing on the land of another or upon public land. “In addition to the penalty provided in section 901.99 of the Revised Code, whoever violates this section is liable in treble damages for the injury caused.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 12} At the time of the trespass and the unauthorized removal of appellants’ trees, former {¶ 13} {¶ 14} The court of appeals held that a criminal conviction for a violation of “It is obvious from the fact that “Although penalty for the criminal offense defined by the first paragraph of “The second paragraph of {¶ 15} Conversely, several Ohio appellate courts have determined (either expressly or by implication) that {¶ 16} We are persuaded by those decisions which have recognized that {¶ 17} The language and history of {¶ 18} Moreover, appellants contend, and we agree, that a criminal conviction should not be viewed as a prerequisite to an award of treble damages under {¶ 19} Accordingly, we specifically reject the analysis of the court of appeals that {¶ 20} Here, the trial court held that appellants were not entitled to treble damages under {¶ 21} The court of appeals has determined that this cause must be remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of damages and for appellants to select between the alternative theories of recovery outlined in the court of appeals’ opinion.4 On remand, we instruct the trial court that appellants are also entitled to a trial on their claim for treble damages against Knisley. Knisley has already stipulated that he trespassed upon appellants’ land and that he impermissibly felled appellants’ trees. Therefore, the only remaining issue to be decided regarding Knisley’s potential liability for treble damages under {¶ 22} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on the sole question that has been certified for our determination and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We hold that a criminal conviction, resulting from a violation of Judgment reversed and cause remanded. RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. MOYER, C.J., dissenting. {¶ 23} Because I conclude that it was not the intent of the General Assembly {¶ 24} The statute at issue in this case does not explicitly state whether it intends a criminal conviction to be a prerequisite to the award of treble damages. It does, however, state that the treble damages remedy is “[i]n addition to” the criminal penalty provided for in {¶ 25} In my opinion, the common and ordinary meaning of the language of {¶ 26} The majority opinion focuses on only part of the statutory language in holding that the General Assembly did intend to create an independent cause of action. Likewise, the majority underplays the importance of the words “[i]n addition to” in order to reach its conclusion. Indeed, under the majority opinion, the phrase “[i]n addition to” is reduced to mere surplusage. The majority construes {¶ 27} We do not construe statutes so as to render statutory language meaningless. “[I]t is the duty of courts to accord meaning to each word of a legislative enactment if it is reasonably possible so to do. It is to be presumed that each word in a statute was placed there for a purpose.” State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 251, 34 O.O. 151, 152, 70 N.E.2d 888, 889. In order for the words “[i]n addition to” to have meaning, there must be an antecedent {¶ 28} The majority contends that because {¶ 29} Rather than pronouncing that all causes of action not expressly denied in a statute are thereby created, a reasonable and restrained judiciary must resist the temptation to find new statutory causes of action in ambiguous text and must resolve to await explicit language from the General Assembly before attributing to that body the intent to establish a new cause of action. This principle is particularly compelling where, as here, the law already provides other means of compensating an injured party. {¶ 30} As the court of appeals correctly stated, its holding is buttressed by the fact that the {¶ 31} The majority also states that both the language and the history of {¶ 32} The General Assembly is fully able to expressly establish new causes of action. It has not done that in {¶ 33} For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.