114 Ky. 556 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1903
— Affirming.
Mary J. Woolley, owned a number of lots in the city of Louisville, and these actions were instituted to enforce the lien of the city for taxes on the property for the years 1885-1900, inclusive. She died on February 2, 1897, leaving surviving her, her husband and two daughters, who are the appellants herein. The first suit (No. 3,140) was filed May 20, 1888, on the taxes for the years 1885-88, inclusive. On June 18, 1888, the defendants filed a demurrer to the petition, and no further steps appear to have been taken until August 19, 1891, when they filed their answer. Nothing further was done in the case until June 30, 1900, when the plaintiff filed an amended petition, setting up the death of Mrs. Woolley. The property was assessed in the name of Mary J. Woolley. She was sued in this name, and also answered in the name of Mary E. Woolley. As we understand the record, her maiden name was Mary E. Johnston, and in this way her name was sometimes written “Mary E. Woolley,” and sometimes “Mary J. Woolley.” As more than three years had elapsed after her death, there was no revivor of the case against the children, but the court held that it might proceed against her surviving husband, who was a party to the action originally, and that his interest in the land might be subjected to the taxes without revivor. A reply was filed to the answer, and after various amendments to the pleadings the issues were made up. The second action, known as “No. 4,992,” was filed August 8, 1894, to recover for the taxes for the years 1889-94, inclusive. The defendants filed a demurrer to the petition on September 12, 1894. The demurrer was passed from time to time. The plaintiff amended its petition, and on April 14, 1896, the defendants filed answer. After this in some way the papers of the case were lost, and nothing was done until
As between the city and the defendants, the issues were fully made up before its amended petition was filed, on March 2d. The answer to this amended petition, with
In section 2996, Kentucky Statutes, it is enacted concerning tax bills: “Each bill shall be authenticated by the assessor by his signature, or a stamped fac simile thereof, and when so authenticated, it shall be prima facie proof that all steps have been taken to make it a binding tax bill for the amounts and purposes and against the person and property therein named or described; and this rule of evidence shall apply to the tax bills of 1885 and 1886 that have been so authenticated under the ordinance of the general council.” The validity of this statute was upheld in City of Louisville v. Johnson, 95 Ky., 254, 15 R., 615 (24 S. W., 875), and has been recognized in many subsequent cases. In certifying the original transcript the clerk stated that certain of the tax bills referred to in the petition, and the duplicate tax bills named in the consent orders above referred to, were not filed. But under a certiorari from this court he has sent up copies of these papers, with the following certificate: “I, John H. Page, clerk of the Jefferson circuit court, county and State aforenamed, do hereby certify that the papers attached hereto are true and correct copies of what purport to be, and evidently are, copies of the tax bills, or duplicates thereof, for the years 1889,1890, 1891 and 1892, filed with the substituted petition in case No. 4,992, City of Louisville, Plaintiff, v. R. W. Woolley et al., Defendants, said to be marked 'Exhibits No. 1 to 56/ inclusive. Said exhibits are and have been among the papers of this action, though they are not
That judgment is in these, words, as admitted by the pleadings: “It is agreed, and so ordered, that the defendant, the city of Louisville, be, and is hereby, perpetually enjoined from asserting any claim for taxes in, on, or to the property described in the petition prior to March 31, 1881 — being the day on which the petition was filed herein — • and the plaintiffs shall recover their costs herein.” This
This precise question was considered and determined otherwise in City of Louisville v. Meglemry, 107 Ky., 122 (21 R., 751), (52 S. W., 1052).
In City of Louisville v. Woolley, 108 Ky., 691 (22 R., 405), (57 S. W., 499), it was held that no revivor was necessary against him, and that his life estate could be subjected to the payment of the taxes. In that case it was further held that actions Nos. 4,992 and 5,040 might properly be revived against the children of Mrs. Woolley. We regard both these questions as settled by the decision in that case, and not open now to discussion.
This provision is taken from the act of May; 12, 1884 (2 Sess. Acts 1883-84, p. 1274), and its validity has often been recognized by this court. Fonda v. City of Louisville, 20 R., 1652 (49 S. W., 785); Crecilius v. City of Louisville, 20 R., 1551 (49 S. W., 547); Powell v. City of Louisville, 21 R., 554 (52 S. W., 798; Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louisville, 23 R., 1655 (65 S. W., 814). While taxes do not bear interest
The act requires the assessor to' keep hooks in which he shall cause to he entered the names of all persons who are the owners or holders of land, and the number and block of each of his lots, according to the maps in his office. Kentucky Statutes, section 2985. It is further enacted: “No mistake in or omission of the right name of the owner or holder of the land or improvements liable to be assessed, under the provisions of this act, shall impair any assessment thereof, if such land be designated in said books by its corresponding number and block on said map; or if such improvement be there designated by the number and block of the land on which it rests; or if such lands and improvements be otherwise fully identified in said books.” Section 2986. It is earnestly insisted that this statute is invalid, as local and special legislation, and much force is given to the fact that in the fore part of the section quoted these words are used: “Any lot of land which is not now designated by a number in the assessor’s book.” It is urged that by the use of the word “now,” as well as from the fact that this provision was brought over from the old charter, the Legislature had in mind only the city of Louisville. But although this may be true, still the fact is that the act applies to cities of the first class, whether now in that class or hereafter coming into it; and, as said, in no other way could the Legislature provide for the government of a city when no other city of its class is in the State, than by a general law. The Constitution, by section 156, requires the Legislature to divide the cities of the State into six classes, and assign to the first class cities with a population of 100,000 or more. As long as there is only one
Similar provisions are made for suits to collect taxes, and for interest on them, in other classes.of cities. See Kentucky Statutes, sections 3187, 3396, 3546, 3644. The constitutionality of these statutes has often' been recognized by this court. Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louisville, supra; Board of Councilmen of Frankfort v. Farmers’ Bank, supra.
The original act creating the board of commissioners of
In actions Nos. 18,257, 18,258 and 18,262, there was an order filing a demurrer of the defendants to the first, second and third paragraphs of the petition. The demurrer was sustained in the first and second paragraphs, and overruled as to the third. Plaintiff was given leave to amend' the petitions and reparagraph the same on the face of the papers. The three cases were then consolidated. The petitions as copied in the transcript are in one paragraph, and really set out but one cause of action. We must assume, therefore, that the pláintiff amended its petitions by striking out so much of them as divided them iuto paragraphs. After the consolidation there was an order entered overruling the defendants’ demurrer to the petition. This or
The deed under which these lots were held is not produced in evidence, although the condition of the title was denied. R. W. Woolley stated that the title was conveyed by James 0. Johnston to Mrs. Woolley for life, who then had had no children, with remainder to her heirs. It' could not be known who would be the heirs of Mrs. Woolley until she died, and therefore her children were not nec-> essary parties to the suit in her lifetime. They were made parties soon after her death, and the, cause of action against them did not accrue until her death.
Our statutes confer upon the chancellor very broad discretion in enforcing tax liens. It is provided: “All tax bills uncollected in whole or in part . . . shall be deemed a debt from such person to said city arising as by contract and may be enforced as such by all remedies given for the recovery of debt in any court of the Commonwealth otherwise competent for that purpose.77 Kentucky Statutes, section 2998. “The action herein authorized and the judgment and Subsequent proceedings therein, except as hereinafter excepted, shall be conducted in all respects lifce suits upon liens' arising from contracts, and the court shall have jurisdiction of all suits for taxes irrespective of amount.77 Section 3005. “From the beginning of the ac
At the conclusion of the judgment is this clause: “The court reserves power over the distribution of the fund arising from the sale as above ordered to the parties respectively entitled thereto.” If it shall turn out, when the sale is made, that any injustice is done the remaindermen, the court can adjust this matter between them and the life tenant, and direct him to contribute to them as the ends of justice require. But the city has a lien upon the remainder as well as the particular estate of the lots ordered to be sold as the property of the life tenant and the remaindermen, and, in view of all the facts, we do not see that any substantial injustice has been done any of the parties by the decree complained of. It is true that to
These defects were cured by the subsequent leadings, and by the proceedings had in the consolidated action.
Judgment affirmed.