128 Iowa 261 | Iowa | 1905
The defendant corporation is the proprietor of a mill or factory at Waterloo, Iowa, in which doors and certain other building materials are made or prepared for the trade. Among the employés in its service on September 12, 1902, was plaintiff’s son Loren Woolf, then about II years of age. The boy being engaged in using or operating a circular saw cutting boards into suitable sizes for door panels, one of the boards was in some manner caught upon the back part of the saw and thrown forward with great violence against his person, inflicting an injury from which, a day or two later, death ensued. The defendant was charged with negligence in permitting said Loren Woolf to engage in such dangerous work, in failing to provide him a safe place to work, in providing, unsuitable and improper tools and appliances for the work being done, and in failing to properly guard or shield the saw to prevent accidents of the kind from which the boy received his fatal • injury. The defendant denies all charges of negligence, and alleges that the deceased contributed to his injury by his own negligence, and further pleads that he voluntarily engaged in the defendant’s service with full knowledge and appreciation of all the mattei’S and things charged as negligence on its part, and thereby assumed the risk of injury. We will consider the questions raised by the appellant in the order of their statement in the brief of counsel.
The appellee relies upon this statute as making the omission by defendant to guard the saw, and its act in employing a boy of the age of deceased in operating such saw, negligence per se. In avoidance of the point thus
But counsel say that, conceding this proposition, the doctrine of assumption of'risk is still applicable. As applied to an adult, who voluntarily enters and remains in a service which be knows is not regulated or conducted according to law, we have held tbe employe to tbe rule contended for by counsel. Martin v. R. R., 118 Iowa, 148. But we think the case before us does not come within the authority of this precedent. Tbe statute which. we
It is thus'apparent that the knowledge and capacity of the infant, his judgment, discretion, care, and caution, and his ability to know and appreciate the dangers that surround him, even prior to the adoption of the labor law, were questions of fact for the jury. We do not regard the case of Kinsley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372 (42 N. E. 986, 32 L. R. A. 367), as controlling upon the question. In-that case the plaintiff was upwards of 21 years of age, and her faculties had fully matured.' She consequently was held to have assumed, the risks of the employment. In this case the plaintiff was under the age required by the statute, and he had' not arrived at that period in life, in which the judgment, discretion, and caution of persons ordinarily become mature. It has been said of the last century that it was the age of invention. Machines had been . devised and constructed with which very many of the articles used by mankind were manufactured. Numerous factories had been established throughout the country, filled with machines, many •of which were easily operated, and the practice of employing boys and girls in their operation had become extensive, with the result that injuries to them were of frequent occurrence. We think it is very evident that these reasons induced the Legislature to establish definitely an age limit under which children shall not be employed in factories; and, to. our minds, the statute in effect declares that a child under the age specified presumably does not possess the judgment,-discretion, care and caution necessary for the engagement in
Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530 (66 N. E. 572, 61 L. R. A. 811). To give this statute any less effect than is here indicated is to deprive it of all substantial value as a measure of protection.
Other exceptions argued by counsel, so far as they are pertinent to the appeal, are governed by the conclusions already announced, and require no further consideration in this opinion.
We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.