OPINION
Janet Wooler (“Wooler”) appeals from the final order entered on November 30, 2006,
I.
Between November 2001 and January 2005, Wooler — a woman who was 52 years of age in January of 2005 — worked as the Assistant Branch Manager аt Citizens Bank’s Doylestown, Pennsylvania branch. After receiving several negative evaluations for her performance, Wooler was fired in January 2005. At the time she was fired, Wooler was serving as the acting Branch Manager; that position was
Wooler sued Citizens Bank, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Eights Act of 1964. With respect to the age discrimination claim, she argued that her supervisor made two off-color remarks: 1) stating in front of the staff at another employeе’s fortieth birthday that he and Wooler were too old to remember their fortieth birthdays; and 2) asking Wooler whether she had Alzheimer’s disease when she could not locate a form on a customer account. Moreover, Wooler alleged that she was subjected to gender discrimination because other similarly situated male еmployees were treated more favorably and because she was eventually replaced by a male employee.
In granting Citizens Bank’s motion for summary judgmеnt, the District Court found that though Wooler made a prima facie case for age discrimination, Citizens Bank had a legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for terminating her givеn the poor performance evaluations she had received. In addition, the District Court found that Wooler failed to establish a prima facie case fоr gender discrimination because she did not present any evidence that similarly situated males were treated differently, or any other evidence giving rise to an inferеnce of discrimination. Finally, the District Court found that Wooler could not sustain a retaliation claim because she did not establish a causal link between her complaint about her supervisor’s comments and her termination.
Wooler filed a timely notice of appeal on December 29, 2006, arguing that the District Court erred in granting Citizens Bank’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over Wooler’s age and gender discrimination claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1831.
We exercise plеnary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard of review that the district court should have applied. See MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
III.
A.
Under the ADEA, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by demonstrating that she: (1) was a member of a protected class, i.e., that she was over forty, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) was ultimately re
Wooler argues that the reason provided for her dismissal was pretextual, as her work performance was positively evaluаted until shortly before her termination. She further argues that the true reason for the termination was Citizens Bank’s retaliation for her complaint regarding her supervisor’s cоmments about her age. Citizens Bank responds that the supervisor in question left the bank four months before Wooler’s termination and that the District Court was correct in finding that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Wooler’s termination, given her deficient sales levels and two successive failed audits. Citizens Bank also notes that Wоoler was disciplined along with four other employees after an internal audit and given a chance to improve her performance, even though onе employee was terminated immediately. Since Wooler subsequently continued to fail to meet her sales standards, Citizens Bank argues, she was ultimately fired.
Based on а comprehensive review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Wooler “failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her age discrimination claim” and that Citizens Bank therefore was entitled to summary judgment on this issue. App. at 9. Similarly, we agree with the District Court’s finding that Wooler failed to demonstratе that Citizens Bank’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her was mere pretext in retaliation for her complaint. App. at 15.
B.
To establish a рrima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff must show that she: (1) was a member of the protected class; (2) was qualified for the job; аnd (3) suffered an adverse employment decision under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Tx. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine,
Wooler argues that the District Court errеd in finding that she did not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, because male employees were allowed to underperform without being disciрlined in the same manner. Moreover, she claims that the supervisor who made off-color remarks about her age was never disciplined. However, the District Court correctly found that there was no prima facie case of gender discrimination, because Wooler failed to identify a similarly situated male who was treatеd more favorably. The record also shows that Wooler’s supervisor was, in fact, disci
We therefore agree with the District Court that Wooler failed to provide any “evidence that similarly situated males were treated differently” or any “othеr evidence sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination” to establish a pri-ma facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII. App. at ll.
IV.
For the fоregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s final order granting Defendant Citizens Bank’s motion for summary judgment, entered on November 30, 2006.
Notes
. Wooler’s claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act fail for the same reasons that her Title VII and ADEA claims fail.