108 N.C. 729 | N.C. | 1891
Lead Opinion
Two questions must be determined before we enter upon the consideration of the facts of this particular case.
1. Whether the Secretary of State has a right to receive and act upon testimony outside of the papers filed by a claimant for the purpose of obtaining a grant for vacant and unappropriated land belonging to .the State?
We are of the opinion that the question must be answered in the negative. The law has carefully prescribed how vacant lands may be entered and in what cases'the Secretary of State may issue grants. Chap. 17, vol. 2 of The Code. The entry takers and surveyors of the several counties are sworn officers charged with important duties in respect to the subject, and if it appears from the warrant and survey that they have discharged these duties, and if the claimant has in all other respects complied with the law, the Secretary has no discretion and must issue the grant. To permit or require the Secretary to go behind the prima facie right of the claimant and determine whether the land is subject to entry, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the legal or equitable rights of other parties claiming under prior entries or grants, or by adverse possession, and thus a new tribunal, unknown to the Constitution and laws, would be erected for the investigation of titles to real estate, the prac
The trial of such questions is wisely left to the Courts after the grant is issued, the grant being voidable if irregularly issued, and void if the land is not subject to entry. Strother v. Cathey, 1 Murphy, 102; Harshaw v. Taylor, 3 Jones, 514; State v. Bevers, 86 N. C., 591; Brem v. Houck, 101 N. C., 627.
2. The second question is, whether the Secretary of State may refuse to issue a grant when upon the face of the claimant’s papers (that is, the warrant and survey) it clearly appears that the land is not subject to entry, or subject to entry only upon certain conditions which are not shown to exist.
The power of the Secretary as to issuing grants is a limited one, and extends only to those lands which by statute are subject to entry. When, therefore, he issues a grant of lands which are not subject to entry, the grant is void in a Court of law because he has exceeded the authority delegated to him, and his act has no more validity than that of any private citizen. Strother v. Cathey, supra.
This being so, it would seem exceedingly plain that no Court ought to compel him to perform such an unauthorized act where the want of authority appears upon the face of the claimant’s papers.
3. The application of these principles to the case before us is free from difficulty.
Excluding from our view, for the foregoing reasons, the communication of' Mr. Bond and its accompanying exhibits, and looking only at the papers of the claimant, we find, upon an examination of entry No. 39, that the land described is covered by navigable water and in front of am incorporated town. Such- land - is not the subject of entry except-under the conditions prescribed in The Code, § 2751 (subsection 1), one of which is that “ the town corporation shall
It affirmatively appearing, then, that the land is covered by water in front of an incorporated town, and such land not being subject to entry until the town authorities have acted, and this not being shown, we are of the opinion that the Secretary of State had a right to decline issuing a grant for the same.
As to entry No. 38, we think it sufficiently appears from the face of the papers presented by the claimant that the town authorities had designated the line on deep water to which the entry could be made, and that the boundaries indicated are in conformity therewith. We conclude, therefore, that as to this entry a grant should be issued by the Secretary.
It has been suggested that, although upon the face of the papers the claimant has a right to have a grant issued, and although the Secretary cannot consider the communication of Mr. Bond and its exhibits, still, the Court being possessed of this information, we should not require the defendant to do a vain thing. To this it may be answered that the Court cannot act upon such information, as it may be incorrect or susceptible of explanation) and the claimant ought not to be precluded in this “short-hand” way of asserting his alleged rights in “ a due and orderly course of procedure.”
The judgment must be modified to conform to this opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting: I do not concur in the opinion of the Court. I do not think that the Secretary of State “ had a right to decline issuing ” either of the grants applied for by the plaintiff. On the contrary, he is a mere ministerial officer, acting under the positive mandate of the law that he “ shall make out grants for all surveys returned to his office, which grants shall he authenticated by the Governor, countersigned by the Secretary and recorded in his office.” The Code, § 2779. The same section provides further, that “ no grant shall issue upon any survey unless the same be signed by the surveyor of the county.” The requirement that he shall make out and deliver the patent upon every warrant and survey authenticated by the Governor is mandatory. The implication arising out of this command of the law (subject to but a single limitation) is, that the certificate of the surveyor (and nothing short of that) is to be considered by the Secretary as ample evidence, not only of the number of acres embraced within the boundaries, but of the proper and lawful location of the land. A surveyor is required to give bond conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties, and when he'has been inducted into office the law presumes that he has a knowledge of the art of surveying. Lawson on Pre. Ev., p. 57; Ashe v. Lonham, 5 Ind , 434. Our statute recognizes this principle by thus requiring the Secretary to issue grants in all cases where the survey bears upon its face his certificate that he made it in accordance with the law.
I concur with the majority of the Court in the opinion that the Secretary of State cannot assume judicial functions and hear evidence dehors the warrant and survey as to the conflicting contentions of claimants. But it seems to me to be equally without warrant of law to constitute the Secretary of State a judicial officer, clothed with the power to pronounce an entry void upon its face for failure to comply with the law. I find the peremptory requirement that the grant shall issue to the claimant when he presents certain papers,
If we concede the soundness of the abstract proposition that when the Secretary refuses to issue a grant upon an entry void upon its face the Courts will not use the writ of mandamus to do a vain thing by requiring him to issue it, I seriously doubt whether, since the enactment by the Provincial Legislature of 1777 of the first laws authorizing the conveyance of public lands by patent in the name of the State, a single entry or warrant has ever been forwarded to the Secretary which, upon its face, appeared to cover land not subject to entry. The judicial annals of the State for' over one hundred years show no instance where the Secretary of State has refused to issue for any such reason, and no entry upon its face appearing to cover land that could not by law be conveyed by grant. The ruling of the Court in this ease is an innovation certainly upon- the established practice, and, in my opinion, is such a departure from an important principle as will lead to confusion and give rise to unnecessary litigation. A vague entry was declared not to be void against the State, nor against a subsequent purchaser with notice, because the location is made certain by the survey, and because it was and is deemed public policy to have our vacant lands appropriated by our people- and made a source of income to the owners as well as the State. Harris v. Ewing, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq., 374; Bryson v. Dobson, 3 Ired. Eq., 138.
It seems to me manifest that the Secretary of State is a ministerial officer, bound to obey the law and issue grants upon all surveys signed by the surveyor of the county (or deputy when he is authorized by the law to act for him), and that he has no right to pass upon the question whether the entry is void upon its face. If we concede, however, that, whatever maybe the extent of his power, the Courts are not required to compel him to issue a void grant, I maintain that there is nothing upon the face of the entry numbered 39, that would justify this Court in pronouncing it void. The statute (§ 2765 of The Code) as amended, provides, that “the claimant of land shall produce to the entry taker a writing signed by such claimant, setting forth where the land is situated, the nearest water-courses, mountains and remarkable places and such water-courses and remarkable places as ma)'- be therein, the natural boundaries and lines of any other person, if any, which divide it from other lands, and every such writing shall be on one quarter sheet of paper at least, and endorsed by the entry taker with the name of the claimant, the number of acres claimed, the date of the entry, and a copy thereof shall be entered in a book well bound and ruled with a large margin in spaces of equal distance; each space to contain one entry and every entry to be made in the order of time in which it shall be received and numbered in the margin.” This-is all of the statutory provision as to the form of entries, and its requirements are declared to be' largely directory, it being deemed sufficient if the survey contain a specific description though the entry npay be a “floating one;” not upon its face definitely located. Harris v. Ewing, supra; Currie v. Gobson, 4 Jones’ Eq., 25; Munroe v. McCormack, 6 Ired. Eq., 85. The effect of the ruling in this
The material portion of the entry declared void in this case is the following description :
“ The land covered by water in part of Jacob Wool’s wood-yard wharf in the town of Edenton, running out from the foot of said wharf south between lines parallel and distant one from the other sixty-four and one-half feet, so far as the channel, a distance of one hundred and forty-five feet, containing __ acres.”
The entry which is declared by the Court to be upon its face valid is in the following form:
“Jacob Wool, a resident of Chowan County and a citizen of the State of North Carolina, makes an entry of the following described and unappropriated lands to such marks and lines on deep ivaler and at the channel as may have been heretofore indicated by the Board of Councilmen of the town of Edenton, in front Jacob Wool’s John M. Jones lot, bounded on the north by Blount street, on the east by lot No. 187, south by creek and arm of Edenton Bay, and on the west by lot of D. W. Roper, containing_acres, more or less, to-wit, lands covered by water in front of the land of the said Wool above described, running south from the front of said Wool to deep water at the channel, in lines parallel and confined to straight lines, including only the said water-front and the land covered by water within the said lines to deep water on the channel. This entry is made for the purpose of erecting a wharf, and other purposes incident thereto.”
It will be conceded that if Jacob Wool’s wood-yard was located on Edenton Bay, beyond the limits of an incorporated town, he would have the right to a grant for the land covered by the water in his front as far as the channel or margin of the navigable water, and an entry calling for the channel or for navigable water would be valid, the surveyor being of necessity at liberty to locate the line of the channel. There is nothing in entry No. 39, except the expression, “in front of Jacob Wool’s wood-yard in the town of Edenton,” to indicate that the land lies in front of an incorporated town. As the Secretary cannot look beyond the particular entry in passing upon its validity (according to the view taken by the Court), I respectfully insist that neither the Secretary of State nor this Court has the right to draw the inference from the fact that Edenton is called a town in the entry that it is an incorporated town, when the act incorporating it is not in evidence. Town of Durham v. N. C. Railroad (decided at this term). The law recognizes the fact that a town or city may exist with known limits and streets admitted to be highways, but without corporate existence. Merriwether v. Garrett, 10 Meyers’ Fed. Dec., Corp., § 2224. The opinion of the Court rests upon the idea that not only is the marking of the line by the authorities of the town or city a condition precedent
Rut I further maintain that it is not essential to the validity of a grant to a riparian proprietor of his own water-front that the corporation should fix the line of the channel before the entry is made. It has been decided by this Court, and settled by the leading Courts of the country, that littoral and riparian owners have, as an incident to their ownership of adjacent land, a qualified property in that covered by water on their front extending to navigable water (or to the channel or
Per Curiam. Modified and affirmed.