*1 327 Bаr, State General Counsel Bar of Cooper, Assistant for State Geor- gia. THE STATE.
S92A0034. WOODY (418 SE2d Justice. Sears-Collins, Woody fatally Mark shot Thomas O’Neal Purdue after Clarence felony dispute money. Woody of drug over was convicted murder aggravated appeals.1 assault and and now 1990, 6, July Wоody
On and a male friend drove Purdue’s money Woody from the seeking home that Purdue owed sale of a home, Woody finding of Not Purdue at and his рound marijuana. again him locate him. friend to town to search for but could not drove p.m., evening Woody 12:00 approximately Later that same 11:00 or Woody and his friend to Purdue’s home. As exited the girl returned car, pocket. emerged he in his from his placed a loaded Purdue Woody Woody the front door. demanded that home after knocked on money repaid fight and ensued. be began beating in the and gained upper Purdue hand Woody Woody severely. his life testified pistol firing two shots. The pulling before from his and missed, Woody shot eyewitnesses first but two testified thаt Pur- shot running of his home. The due the back as the door fatally wounded, Woody girl friend drove victim was of the disposed the scene of the crime. murder way weapon by throwing it the automobile window on out of home. gunshot day of the following victim died the result
wound. self-defense, Woody presented
At a sec- trial a main defense of ondary request for of made a written defense denied instruction on trial court charge, quest. Subsequently, murder jury rejected malice felony charge. The split on murder trial the determination of the States, Allen v. United court pursuant instructed the 528) (1896), 154, 41 delibera- U. S. 492 LE continue their murder, aggravated July 6, 1990. Woody malice crime occurred on indicted for murder, assault, felony September 6, acquitted malice 1990. He was of 25, 1990. aggrаvated felony September guilty On was found murder on October of assault and 14, 1991. 19, 1990, Woody His June notice filed a motion new trial which denied on appeal July appeal on October was filed on was docketed this court argument and was submitted without oral on November
tions,
aggrаvated
was convicted
assault and
evidence in
Having
light
reviewed the
most favorable to
verdict,
jury’s
we conclude that the evidence
forth at trial was
trier of fact to
sufficient for
rational
have found
be-
Virginia,
Jackson v.
yond
charged.
a reasonable doubt of thе offenses
*2
(99
560) (1979).
(1987).
In gave this case the trial court jury charge justification, on requested jury charge refused to on distinguishing voluntary characteristic between manslaughter justifiable homicide is whether the accused was so influenced and excited that he passionately simply reacted rather than to defend Gregg v. himself. presented
The evidence
in this casе was sufficient
to warrant a
charge
voluntary
manslaughter. Eyewitness testimony showed that
point
had beaten
where
Additionally,
his life.
the fatal shooting happened after Purdue
had retreated but within
seconds of the
sufficiently
and was
within the nexus of the
conclude,
altercation so that we cannot
as a
law,
matter of
that a
“cooling
period
off”
had occurred.
OCGA 16-5-2.
§
Stewart,
v.
The State cites
supra,
manslaughter
is not available where a defendant’s
testimony
own
shows that he
angry
impassioned
was not
or
when the fatal wound
was inflicted and the other
presented
prove
does not
other-
wise.
applies
That rule
only where
and circumstances
Washington
v.
equivocal.
are not
731; Saylors, supra
Judgment reversed and Weltner, J., J., Bell, judgment only; who concurs in the C. cept P. Hunt, J., who dissent. Justice, dissenting. Chief Weltner, would the conviction of reverse new trial judge this case and order a trial for failure of the in- manslaughter instruct on the elements of an cluded offense to (a) provides: OCGA 16-5-2 § person vоluntary manslaughter
A commits the offense cir- being when of another human under he causes death if he be murder and acts cumstances which would otherwise violent, pas- the result of and irresistible solely as *3 to resulting sion sufficient excite . . . person; in a passion trial, in Throughout Woody’s dеfense was (“I I trying protect myself.”) nature of to reiterate self-defense. opinion: in fn. here the as set 3 of out Q: time, you? You were on thе defense the entire weren’t I trying protect myself. A: to time, you?” “You were on the defense the entire weren’t
3 Q: protect trying myself.” A: “I was to why you your you put gun doing. in “That’s all were I mean that’s the loaded Q: self-protection. you, you just he started were for And then after yourself?” trying protect “Yes, A: sir.” got you ground, enough “And wasn’t was it?” Q: after that “No, sir, enough enough A: him. It was it wasn’t for for me.” fact, your you many you beg begging. How for “As a matter of were times did Q: night?” life that A: . . .” “Twice. — you your fighting life? Q: for “[So “No, were] fight.” A: I couldn’t mean, you your you?” struggling life weren’t “I were for Q: trying away struggling get A: him.” “I was Q: you why you I doing. That’s all were mean that’s your pocket for self-protection. loaded And then after you, you protect just trying your- he started were self? Yes,
A: sir. Q: gоt you ground, And after he on the enough that wasn’t was it? No, sir,
A: wasn’t for him. enough enough it It was for me. fact, Q: As a you matter were How begging. many times you your bеg night? did life that A: Twice. . . . —
Q: you your fighting life? [So were] No, A: I fight. couldn’t
Q: mean, I you were struggling your you? life weren’t A: I struggling get trying from him.
3. It is nothing clear the evidence shows that would warrant finding by that Woody acted a result of a violent, and irresistible resulting provocation.” from severe the contrary, To evidencе shows that was either murder or acquittal entitled to on self-defense. and own account of the event demon- clearly
strate cоrrectly the trial court declined to quested charge Swett v. See 629) (1978); Ga. 796) (1983); and 213-214
I am joins authorized to state that Justice Hunt this dissent. *4 July
Decided Walter Harvey, B. appellant.
Timothy Madison, G. Morrow, Attorney, Jeffrey District G. As- Attorney, Bowers, General, District sistant Attorney Michael J. Su- san V. Boleyn, General, Senior Attorney Katz, Assistant Peggy R. Attorney, appellee. Staff