*1 P.3d 1066 WOODWORTH, Brian P.
Plaintiff-Appellant, through Idaho, ID
STATE BOARD
AHOTRANSPORTATION Department, Transportation De
fendant-Respondent.
No. 38884. Idaho, Court of
Supreme
Boise, February 2013 Term. 1, 2013.
April
363 wаlk 11th across Avenue in the area where Woodworth was hit.
Woodworth filed against suit the State of Idaho, by through its Idaho Transporta- tion Board and Transportation Idaho Depart- ment, City and the Nampa of to recover for injuries 27, on October alleged He two counts: per se and negligence. However, common law at a mo- hearing tion Woodworth’s counsel stated that he was pursuing his negli- common law gence claim. February 2011, of both defendants summary judgment.
moved for Following a hearing, motion granted the court both mo- tions. The district granted summary judgment in favor of the sepa- State on two grounds. First, rate the court found that the Office, Boise, Crandall Law and Patrick D. State was entitled to immunity from suit Boise, Furey, appellant. for Patrick D. Fu- Second, regardless of rey argued. immunity, the court found that Woodworth genuine failed to raise a issue of material fact Lopez Kelly, PLLC, Boise, & respon- for that the negligently. State acted Following Kelly argued. dent. Michael E. summary judgment ruling, Woodworth reached a Nampa settlement with whereby JONES, J. Justice. City was dismissed from the case. Brian Woodworth initiated this action appeal Woodworth filed regard against the of City Idaho and the the court’s dismissal of against his claim Nampa injuries to recover he State. sustained highway. while a state
The district
granted summary
judg-
II.
ment in favor of the defendants and Wood-
timely appealed.
worth
We affirm.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. Did the district
holding
court err in
I.
State immune from suit under
6-904(7)?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
II. Did the district
court err
finding
HISTORY
Woodworth failed to
29, 2007,
On
approximately
Oсtober
7:34
viable negligence claim against
PM,
Woodworth was struck
a vehicle and
State?
injured
pushing
shopping
while
cart across
11th Avenue
Nampa,
South at 3rd Street in
III.
(hereinafter “Intersection”).
Idaho
This sec-
tion of 11th
part
Avenue is
Highway
U.S.
DISCUSSION
part
which
highway system.
of the state
A. Standard of Review.
accident,
At the location of the
11th Avenue
road,
was a five-lane
with two north bound
In reviewing
grant
lanes,
lanes,
two south bound
judgment,
and a center
employs
this Court
the same stan
turning lane. The intersection of 11th
Ave- dard as used
originally
the district court
nue and 3rd
a “T”
Street is
intersection with
ruling
Cnty.
on the motion.
v.
Boise
Ida
terminating
3rd Street
Cntys.
as it meets 11th
Mgmt.
Ave- ho
Program,
Risk
Underwrit
ers,
nue.
pedestrian
901, 904,
There was no marked
cross-
151 Idaho
entity
damages arising
out
(2011).
proper
liable
judgment is
when mental
Summary
Lawton
of its
acts
omissions.”
and admissions
depositions,
pleadings,
“the
Pocatello,
affidavits,
City
Idaho
any,
file,
together
However, the
Act
any P.2d
genuine
as to
there
no
issue
show that
immunity in
“preserves
traditional rule of
moving party
fаct and that
material
specific
Id.
Code
certain
situations.”
as a matter
law.”
to a
entitled
*3
6-904(7),
Exceptions
§
entitled
Govern-
56(c).
Court exercises free
I.R.C.P.
Liability, provides
mental
that:
Boise,
Cnty.
questions of law.
over
review
of
entity
governmental
employees
claim which: governmen- B. entitled to The State is 6-904(7). immunity § under I.C.
tal (7) plan design con- Arises out of a or for improvement highways, or to the struction granted the mo- court State’s The district roads, streets, bridges, public or other ground tion for plan design pre- property where such or immune from that the State was Wood- in en- pared substantial conformance with 6-904(7). § ap- On under I.C. worth’s suit design or in at gineering standards effect peal, contends that the district Woodworth preparation plan of the or the time of 6-904(7) § in applying I.C. erred of design approved or advance the con- contends that I.C. this case. Woodworth legislative by body struction 6-904(7) § applicable is not here because his entity governmental some other or allege negli- did not body agency, exercising or administrative designed gently planned or the Intersection. by authority give ap- discretion such Rather, claims that he sued the Woodworth proval. perform any engi- “for its failure to State claim arises of an Where out study neering study, and to do what the alleged negligent plan design part or on the performed, have shown to neces- would entity, governmental entity of a is enti sary.” further contends that the Woodworth 6-904(7), immunity § if the tled to under I.C. his to the State miseharacterized (1) entity can “establish of a existence relating design district court as to the of one (2) plan design prepared or that was either immunity the Intersection in order invoke existing engi substantial conformance with 9-604(7). neering design or approved standards or response, argues Wood- legislative of construction or advance argument fails “it miseharac- worth’s because Lawton, authority.” 126 Ida administrative Appellant’s of terizes the own cause ho at and, result, mistakenly as a asserts that Ida- case, correctly In this the district court 6-904(7) point.” ho Code is not on The applied the outlined test claims “arise insists that Woodworth’s respect in Lawton. With to the first Court design ‘plan out of the or for the construction element, plan, the existence of a the Court highway.” improvement’ or of a state Be- Sabíаn, on the Affidavit of Kevin Dis relied cause the State believes that Woodworth’s Engineer De trict 3 Traffic for Idaho plan design claims arise out of the or for the partment Transportation.1 In affida his improvement construction Intersec- vit, office researched Sabían stated tion, it is it contends that immune under I.C. plans designs for and reviewed files In improvement the construction Sabían, Act, According most The Tort tersection. Claims I.C. plan developed §§ 929, “abrogates the doctrine of reсent Intersection 6-901 3B29, govern- prepared Plan in 1954. sovereign immunity and which was renders part City Nampa of District 3. 1. The Intersection where Woodworth was struck argues the State’s should district found evidence Woodworth have been performed necessary, not have this element to be uncontroverted. With element, Lawton but for the inferior regard to the second the intersection (1) based on the: of traffic de- court found that for the lack control district (3) vices; prepared warnings markings; laсk of Intersection was substantial con- and, engineering lighting; high lack of enhanced rate with the standards of formance speed. Intersection time and that the was also construction approved advance of plain language pro- governmental authority. appropriate any neg- vides the State with from ligence merely “arises out of’ appeal, On has not Woodworth chal improve- for construction or application lenged the district court’s of Law- simply ment highways. to the To “arise” is Rather, to this case. as ton mentioned originate from. stem Black’s Law *4 above, that Woodworth asserts this case sim (8th ed.2004). Thus, 115 based Dictionary immunity ply provision does not invoke the 6-904(7), on § the text of has I.C. § because his cause of I.C. immunity originate from all claims that or not arise from a claim that the does stem plan design. from a or Accordingly, designed negligently planned or the Intersec plaintiffs primarily claim not be need based Thus, tion. the main issue before the Court on plan design to or invoke immu- in this ease is whether Woodworth’s claim case, nity § under I.C. In this from an against the State arises assertion allega- Woodworth’s claim does arise from negligently planned the that Intersection was tions that negligently the Intersection was designed. or designed And, result, planned. as a and/or The district court found that “Woodworth’s we hold that in- properly the district action arises out of claims that the his state” immunity provision voked the 6- I.C. “located, construct, design, failed to recon- 904(7). struct, alter, repair maintain” or 11th Ave- argues holding Woodworth that also such a agree, accordingly We nue. and find that will “forever the immunize” State from “fail- negligence common Woodworth’s law claim ing for, to inspect find and correct or warn “plan design” out of or arises the key hazards that have arisen” over A time. Intersection. argument element of Woodworth’s is that The essence of Woodworth’s fifty-four years the since the Intersection against expressed claim the in para- State is constructed, designed was and on burden eight graph Complaint, of his which alleges: dramatically Intersection has changed usage. Because the was due to crossing frequently so increased us- increased by pedestrians age, used and it argues, because lacked Woodworth makes the Intersec- devices, warning formerly traffic control tion’s adequate approved mark- and de- ings; lawfully permitted sign currently and because the inadequate. speed in four main lanes of Eleventh This is not the first time that this Court hour, fully per
Avenue North 35 miles has heard appeal. such an on sufficiently hazardous to Johnson, Leliefeld, appellant v. raised public as to requisite precisely “change same conditions” pedestrian ‘warrants’ for a substantial argument. 357, 104 Idaho 659 111 P.2d system lighting, crosswalk and enhanced (1983). There, large two commercial trucks all of which would shown 361, had collided. 659 Id. P.2d at 115. competent engineering study traffic had driver, plaintiff, injured truck the same been conducted or at the brоught against suit the other driver and the direction of the [State]. State. Id. The actual collision occurred on a Paragraph eight bridge. roadways illustrates Woodworth State Id. The from each taking in fact leading bridge twenty- issue direction were contrary bridge, two feet to his wide. The which was built Intersection — 1937, engineering study twenty otherwise. The assertions feet no wide and non-diseretionary violating a directive of the concerning the were erected
warning signs
Control
Traffic
Devices
The Court notеd
Manual
Uniform
Id.
bridge’s width.
(MUTCD).4
bridge was constructed
Court has held that
that the
“uncontested
law,
applicable
the standards
effect of
MUTCD
the force and
conformance
P.2d
How-
comply
at 120.
Id. at
failure to
with a
1987.”
the State’s
ever,
theory at
trial court
mandatory
provision of the MUTCD consti
State,
was that:
negligence per se. Esterbrook
tutes
P.2d
change
[the
in traffic conditions
124 Idaho
[T]he
may
Thus,
made
once
what
6-
bridge]
although
since
unsafe,
bridge
904(7)
a safe
long lasting,
have been
does not
is broаd and
hazard-
put on notice of the
the State was
absolutely
negligence claims related to
bar
(1)
bridge
its knowl-
nature of the
ous
highway
of a State
where
changing standards
for such
edge of
specific
point to a
statute or
can
knowledge
changes in
bridges,
mandatory provision
of the MUTCD that
conditions, and
its knowl-
flow
traffic
has been violated.
frequent
collisions
edge of accidents
negli-
common law
Woodworth’s
bridge.
with the
6-904(7),
gence
I.C.
claim is barred
at 121. At
conclusion
Id. at
becаuse his
fails
Leliefeld, the
jury
trial in
district court
briefing
failed to show
had
jury
instructed the
“engineering study”
to conduct the
he
6-904(8)2
necessarily permanent
“is
*5
supports
believes
his ease.
“may
immunity
and that the
dis-
perpetual”
appear
when
if
conditions
failed to
C. Woodworth has
appeal,
rejected
we
changed.” Id. On
against
negligence claim
viable
regarding
longev-
trial
instruction
court’s
State.
immunity
§
ity
I.C.
6-
of the State’s
under
Complaint also
Woodworth’s
asserts
904(8)
very clearly
§
held
6-
that I.C.
duty
perform engineer-
аn
the State had a
to
904(8) “provides
perpetual
immunity.”
ing study
briefing
In his
of the Intersection.
sense,
Id.
Beyond citation mere to “Idaho Code § 40-201. 40-310, 40-313, 40-502, 40-1310, § 40-312 Because we hold that claim Woodworth’s (A) 1A-1, (C) ... MUTCD MUTCD 1A- against is barred 6- (D) (R) (E) l(A)-4, 1A-3.1, 2C-1” 904(7), and because Woodworth has failed to Complaint, provide any does not Woodworth present any other viable language support his claim against State, need not we address the study had a perform negli or was surrounding program. issues HAL gent failing an perform engineering study. After careful examination of the Ida IV. provisions ho Code and cited MUTCD provision Woodworth the that mentions CONCLUSION study engineering 2C.01.01 of the *6 The judgment district court’s in favor of 2C “Warning MUTCD. Section addresses Appeal State is affirmed. costs are Markers,” Signs Object subpart and and .01 awarded to the State. warning signs states shall “[t]he use of be engineering study based оn an engi or on BURDICK, Chief However, Justice and Justices neering judgment.” 2C.01 does EISMANN and concur. HORTON any duty engineer not to create conduct an ing study, requires merely engi it that an JONES, Justice, dissenting. W. neering study engineering judgment or respectfully I majority dissent from the warning signs in used the event are erected. Opinion grounds. in on case two result, As a find that we Woodworth has First, “design immunity” this is not a case. support allegation failed to his Second, were, even if it I would overrule was in failure to its conduct an Johnson, v. 659 P.2d engineering study. Leliefeld (1983), holding design immunity that briefing, acknowledged its its perpetual, was poor as that decision based on obligation improve 40-201 to legal reasoning proven and has to be unwise However, highways. and maintain the state policy. as a matter of argued to the State that the extent it owed Woodworth, any duty duty that This never to was ful- case is not and has been a by complying High “design immunity” majority filled with the State’s The case. con- (HAL)5 that, monitoring Accident pro- Location cedes failure-to-warn Leliefeld gram. subject “design immunity” In response, Woodworth contended claims are not to (2) problem objectives monitoring program systematically compare 5. The HAL of the locations on basis; and, proba- identify High- to: minimize are locations the State statewide deficiencies; way bility problem System potential identifying spurious areas. and clearly alleged duty to warn view is this case This to I.C. pursuant interpreting jurisdictions statutory law claims with other common accord Kallio, 92 Nev. resulting statutes. See State to personal injury similar for (1976) (remedying design totally unrelated plaintiff to warning con- or of such conditions hazardous issues. duties). Here, it is are ditions alternative along got line matter Somewhere were am- absolutely indisputable there “design into a twisted the State Complaint a failure allegations ple resulting claim” in a motion majority’s inter- warn. Even under im- seeking ITD not have should pretation, Woodworth’s munity provided by the Idaho Tort Claims Furthermore, I hold would thrown out. Although argued was that he Act.6 “design” not on the is a claim based that this ITD for the improve- contesting any subsequent highway or of the ments, highway, such never- the failure to make initial but rather on persisted all. out of improvements at theless claims “arise ‘plan design’ for the construction pre- in a Complaint mentions highway.” The case improvement of a state duty the State had a liminary paragraph that that the plaintiffs argument focused also alleges highway, engi- implemented ITD should a traffic have times to this “at all material paragraph neering study That intersection. statutorily obligated Ida- ITD action, claim, however, not a but cause of maintain, to ‘erect ho Code ITD simply argument rather public safety necessary for whenever performed study some to deter- should markers, convenience, signs, signals suitable comply mine what should do control, guide and warn and other devices to statutory law obligations under and common ... travel- pedestrians and vehicular traffic ” (Em- public roadways pursuant to maintain safe highway system.’ ling upon the state added.) clearly Complaint allege al- The did not that the paragraph law. phasis statute, itself, duty study mandatory leged a to warn mandated in and of Legislature not do suggestion which the State was offered as as but such indeed the State were immune from likely could be done to how what determine alleged duties. further improve safety particular at this intersec- in this paragraph 8 that the involved gave lip service to tion. district poor con- lighting, had lacked traffic accident that ITD “failed to use devices, and, to- warnings markings trol ordinary carry responsibilities care out its gether thirty-five-mile-per-hour with the oversight subject management *7 limit, safety. speed public was hazardous to North,” segment of Avenue it fo- 11th but alleged fully further that ITD aware It was entirely the upon cused basis of the State’s 29, multiple 2007 of occasions before October judgment, summary which was motion using crossing pedestrians were design immunity under IC The seriously injured by struck and motor vehi- ignored law completely the common cles, resulting reports duly filed in accident negligence statutory and which duties alleged was petition with the ITD. It also a Complaint clearly alleged were breached. seeking local the installa- filed residents a Again, is not never has been pro- control tion of suitable traffic devices design immunity case. safety. Complaint alleged mote further joins majority of this Court likewise duties, statutory the ITD its breached Nothing design immunity bandwagon. legislature were which enacted duty to sаid about the fact that this is a ever public promote safety of members law case as warn and common proxi- all highways, state of which statutory of duties well as a claim for breach mately caused brain short, injuries. imposed Legislature in on ITD. other In §§ 6-901 to -929.
369 produced dangerous opposing public In the State’s motion for sum- a condition mary judgment, pointed property, reasonably out that it must act plaintiff correct weeks after was in- within few alleviate the hazard.
jured,
engineеring firm
an
recommended to
State,
424,
Baldwin
Cal.Rptr.
Cal.3d
Nampa’s public works director the installa-
I
my-
P.2d
find
pedestrian-
tion of a new crosswalk with
agreement
self in wholehearted
with Justice
button)
flashers,
(push
in-pavement
actuated
Bistline, who,
Leliefeld,
in his dissent in
la-
adjacent post-mounted sign,
and amber
litigants
plagued
mented that “Idaho
are
now
beacons. The letter also noted that nine
and henceforth with overruled California
people
injured
been
in
in the last decade had
case
is not
upon
law which
visited
Californi-
lighted
the crosswalk and that a
crosswalk
ans,
is,
they
enough
unless
are foolish
anticipated by
in
long
had
residents
highways]
travel
in
[on
Idaho.” 104 Idaho at
of those
are
area. None
matters
matters
persuaded
Plaintiffs be liable held after made very summary judgment at least dangerous condition, raised a aware of a traffic genuine regarding fact issue material adequate study does not undertake an whether ITD breached its to warn of determine may what reasonable measures clearly dangers cоndition, of which it was aware and its necessary or, to alleviate the statutory resulting common having law duties determined what reasonable meas- injury plaintiff. Design serious to the necessary, unjustifiably immu- delays ures were nity totally addition, irrelevant in this case taking because after them. original design highway municipality implements was never a traffic questioned. continuing duty it is under a to review light opera- its actual However, even if this immu- were tion. case, nity I would the holding overrule York, City Turturro v. New 77 A.D.3d Leliefeld, suprа, that design per- (emphasis N.Y.S.2d 740-41 petual. I was on the Court at the time of added, quotation citations marks omit and, were, I decision if I Leliefeld ted). have dissented. Even at time Leliefeld decided, precedent which it relied firmly I design immunity believe *8 Supreme had been reversed California 6-904(7) provided in I.C. was never intend- emphatic Court with these words: perpetual. ed to be It impossible is for me [Djesign persists long Legislature so to as believe that the intended that changed. Having ap- designed conditiоns have not once highway is it is forever proved governmen- intend, design, why If did so hallowed. it would it not, ostrich-like, entity may tal enact hide its statutes such as I.C. re- blueprints, blithely ignoring quiring head in signage the State to erect and warn- operation ing pedestrians plan. the actual Once the devices to warn traffic of entity dangerous particular design, has notice that the conditions? changed conditions, physical highway stretch of designed has 1954. later, the area sur- Now, nearly sixty years dramatically highwаy
rounding this Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE of sleepy rural town once changed. What was Is city far heavier traffic. busy with is now obligation to review the under no
the State BARTLETT, Jacob Bennett passage after the roadway, even safety of Defendant-Appellant. decades, changes in the surround- massive if a of deaths? What ings, litany and a No. 38589. center, school, hospital or a were shopping simply cannot counte- I area? built Appeals Idaho. Court absolve the State nance a rule that would Feb. 2013. circumstances, for all duty under any these point highway at some can clear- eternity. A April Denied Review deficient, inadequate or ex- even ly become changed condi- tremely hazardous due
tions, improvements. require and therefore say as the. this Court
To district say, has no
seem respect any further to warn-
take markers, lighting,
ings, upgrades, limit, safety precaution any other
speed design original ac-
simply because the incomprehensible. sixty years ago is
ceptable accept reasoning. I
I for one cannot Leliefeld, even
therefore would overrule immunity case, I were a which
this already simply it not. I can- stated agree the decision the district majority or the here 6-904(7) protects from the claims in the case for provide
failure to warn or measures crossing. particular
this
Although the court found that the district (“HAL”)
High Program Accident Location case, my opinion applicable to this showing No is made
irrelevant. summary judgment
in its motion that its safety improvements
inability any to make prohibited by
whatsoever this location was Indeed,
budget no constraints. there was relating budget the IDL’s
evidence what- merely alterna-
soever. this argument, way my affects conclu-
tive in no remanded to
sion case should be opportunity prove Woodworth an
allow
IDL’s and obtain
which he is entitled.