58 Minn. 236 | Minn. | 1894
The effect of the findings of the trial court is that the real estate which is the subject of this action was formerly the property of a manufacturing copartnership composed of defendant’s husband and one Holmes, having been purchased, paid for, and used by the firm as a site for its manufacturing plant, the title being taken in the individual names of the partners; that, in an action brought by one partner against his copartner to dissolve the partnership and wind up its affairs, the property was ordered sold as one parcel, the proceeds to be applied in payment of the firm debts, and the surplus, if any, divided between the partners according to their respective rights; that at such sale it was sold to plaintiff’s grantor for an amount somewhat in excess of the sum required to pay the debts of the firm; that this surplus was distributed between the partners, no part of it being paid to defendant Laura Nudd; that she was not a party to the action, and has never joined in any conveyance of the property.
She, as wife of William H. Nudd, one of the partners, claimed an inchoate interest in an undivided half of the premises, and this action was brought to determine this adverse claim.
It is well known that the English doctrine was that partnership real estate is considered as personal property for all purposes. The doctrine of the American courts on the subject is more restricted. Some of the earlier decisions in New York and Massachusetts went almost to the length of entirely subverting the equity doctrine prevalent in England; but, as remarked by Chancellor Kent, the other American decisions are not inconsistent with the more correct and improved view of the English law. It is now held with practical unanimity by the American courts that, if partnership capital be invested in land for the benefit of the company, all the incidents attach to it which belong to any other stock, so far as consistent with the statute of frauds and the technical rules of conveyancing, and that it will be treated as personal estate until it has performed all its functions to the partnership, and thereby ceases to be any longer partnership property, and until then it is not subject to either dower or inheritance, but that, after all the purposes of the partnership have been thus accomplished, whatever land remains in specie will be regarded as real estate. The question is, at what precise moment is it reconverted into real estate, or, to speak more accurately, does
During the continuance of the partnership the partners can convey or mortgage it, in the course of their business, whatever they see fit, without their wives joining in the conveyance or mortgage, and the wives would have no dower or other interest in it. This is one of the very objects of treating partnership real estate as personal property; for otherwise the business of the firm might be stopped, and the partners unable to realize on the assets of the firm, by reason of the wife of one of them refusing to join in the conveyance ■or mortgage.
They have the same power of disposition over it for the purposes •of a dissolution of the partnership, the payment of its debts, and the distribution or division of the captial among themselves; for until that is done the property has not fulfilled its functions as personalty, ■or ceased to be partnership property. And what the partners may thus do voluntarily the court may do for them, in an action brought to dissolve the partnership and wind up its affairs. As the defend.ant Laura Nudd was not a party to the former action, she is, of course, not estopped by it, nor is it evidence against her of anything •except of the fact of its own rendition. But the material fáct remains that in the process of the dissolution of the firm, and the winding up of its affairs, in an action for that purpose, the land was sold .and converted into money, and the money distributed among the creditors and partners according to law. Upon these facts, under the rules already announced, the land in the hands of the purchaser is not subject to any inchoate interest of the wives of the partners.
The error which lies at the foundation of the whole argument of defendants’ counsel is in the assumption that, at the time of the purchase of this property, it became the individual real estate of the husband, and that the inchoate right of the wife under the statute im
If counsel's contention is correct the partners could never, even during the active life of the copartnership, convey perfect title to partnership land without their wives joining, except to the extent actually necessary to pay existing debts of the firm. This would practically involve, in every case where one of the wives refused to join in a conveyance, the necessity of a suit to which she is- made a party, in order to determine whether the sale was necessary to pay debts. Any such rule would hamper the business of the firm to an extent that might practically defeat the purposes of the partnership.
The court below seems to have laid special stress upon the fact that it was not made to appear on the trial that it was necessary to have sold all this property to pay the debts of the firm, but this is immaterial, either under the view of the law which we have taken, or under that urged by counsel. In fact, we understood counsel to frankly concede this on the argument. Upon the facts found, judgment ought to have been ordered in favor of the plaintiff, adjudging that defendant has no interest, inchoate or otherwise, in the land.
Cause remanded, with directions to the court below to render judgment accordingly.
(Opinion published 59 N. W. 1010.)
