*1 a preponder- it is clearly against unless to revoke petition 166, State, 3 Ark. App. the evidence. Peppers ance of decision the trial court’s find that S.W.2d the preponderance clearly against this case was evidence.

Affirmed. Marilyn WOODSON

Carl WOODSON Mike KILCREASE Karen KILCREASE 648 S.W.2d CA 82-277 of Arkansas Court of March delivered Opinion [Rehearing denied March 1983.] *2 Jones, Harris by: appellants. & Petty, John Jones Pendleton, B. for appellees. Paul George Cracraft, K. Carl and Mari- Woodson Judge. *3 Woodson, the Caroline paternal grandparents lyn Kilcrease, of the Chancery from an order (Woodson) appeal County to enforce refusing right Court Jefferson them the date of Caroline’s granted visitation after her widowed mother’s second husband. adoption by the of an infant is this: When widowed mother question in child remarries and later a second husband obtain- joins child, court decree which he by adopts a ing probate still entitled to obtain visitation paternal grandparents This a identical by chancery proceeding? privileges negative was answered Wilson question The appellants Ark. contend (1981). 622 S.W.2d here that because Wilson controlling order a consent rights visitation were obtained the visitation was adoption to the in this case whereas prior adoption. in a decree awarded consent entered after conclude that the find no substance in that distinction and was chancellor correct.

A determination this case clear of our understanding that the of the requires light development facts be viewed law of our this area. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 French, (1981),

In Quarles v. Ark. common law a pointed grandparent the court out that of visitation with not maintain an action for privilege could In Ark. proceeding. in a grandchild except custody a permits Ann. enacted 1981) Stat. 57-135 was (Supp. § in the courts for maintenance a separate suit child is In own deceased. grandparents whose 1977 Arkansas enacted Revised Legislature Uniform Act, Ark. Ann. et Adoption seq. 1981). Stat. (Supp. 56-201 § Section first time State (a) (1) 56-215 for the in this provided decree, the effect an except adoption respect of that is “to spouse petitioner relatives spouse terminate all between relationships individual relatives, and his his including parents, so that adopted individual is a his stranger thereafter former relatives all purposes.” conflict between potential policies of these Case, enactments came to the attention of court in our In Poe the paternal did grandparents not seek visitation chan- privileges court under cery Ark. Stat. Ann. but 1981) (Supp. 57-135 § obtained those in the rights court at the time same an order of of their adoption grandchild was granted. Supreme Court determined that Adoption Act made no provision for the allowance of such in adoption and that proceedings portion of the decree of adoption allowing them was void and unenforcible. The court rejected the argument of the grandparents an overriding of this state expressed Ark. Stat. Ann. 57-135 § which them granted right. court stated:

Those statutes address to themselves courts having jurisdiction custody proceedings and are clearly own by their terms to inapplicable adoption proceed- case, ings. Since this is the they do not indicate certainly of a reversal the strong public the policy, expressed statutes, to the be- adoption strengthen relationship the tween child and its and adoptive family terminate the ... . previous family relationship Besides, the new is the recent adoption statute most declaration public adop- of reference (Emphasis tions. supplied) It is clear from the in Poe concluding paragraph the court was that when the declaring policy favoring public of maintenance ties collided with the grandparental strong- within the relationships to strengthen er public policy families, to the latter. way the must give former 5, 1980, however, the former Court On November Wist, Hensley decision in handed down its Appeals Hensley 1980). In (Ark. App. Her child had been divorced involved been killed after the natural father had mother remarried petitioned an accident. The paternal grandparents to Ark. Stat. chancery rights pursuant court for visitation it. In no action was taken on 1981) Ann. but (Supp. 57-135 § an order of February adoption court entered mother, but denied the second husband of on their ruling for a grandparents’ petition ruled Appeals for visitation Court petition rights. that the chancellor erred in summarily denying petition for a for visitation and reversed and remanded the cause its of Appeals on that motion. In the Court hearing opinion to the determined that the Poe as concluding paragraph with natural relationship parents’ effect on adoption its not decision and was therefore family necessary It concluded that the two were of policies controlling. public balance required and that chancellor was “to equal weight that of allowing those public policies, and determine making family strong, that of the adoptive the best interest of the children.” This decision of the Court was not reviewed Court Supreme time. Court rendered its Supreme

On October which opinion supra, expressly Poe, reaffirmed its overruled language declared that stating had adoptive family policies favoring and others who favoring grandparents those outweighed its to the child deceased through parent. were related *5 us The critical events in the now before occurred appeal The in the interim between and Wilson. appellee, Kilcrease, was divorced from Woodson Phillip Karen W. married Mike Kilcrease. Phillip and subsequently 1973 his visitation with his Woodson shared court-ordered

257 parents until his death After his death the natural 1979. mother continued to visitation with voluntarily permit In the child Caroline was grandparents. August 1980 Mike court. by by Kilcrease an order those volun- adoptive parents recognize continued until the summer 1981 when a tary arose and they were terminated. dispute 9, On September was resolved and controversy a consent order was entered in the chancery court which incorporated an agreement parties, permitting specific by That order was grandparents. on court written consent of all parties the belief that he could do so under the decision in Hensley. after the

Shortly decision in Wilson was handed down adoptive parents ceased with the comply consent order and the grandparents sought enforcement of it in the court The chancellor contempt proceedings. refused to enforce the order for the reasons: following fact a lower court decision was reversed

highest court appellate does not this permit court to do what the current law says clearly not do. may 9, will enforce the order entered September This action of the chancellor warranted fully by the following from language Wilson v. supra: It was unquestionably within the province decide that the reasons the adoptive family outweigh those favor- ing grandparents and other blood who kin are related to the child through the deceased parent. final decision as to the state’s policy lay the legislature, not with the courts. We have already recognized force of the Case, statute earlier cases. Ark. French, S.W.2d (1978); Quarles We adhere to our position and overrule accordingly the decision of the Court of which in Hensley, effect applied *6 258 not exist. if statute did law as

our former 1977 (Emphasis supplied) determined has legislature already that as the

It follows situations of child lies such the best interest where and balance weigh for the chancellor to nothing there ought order in question it. The visitation determining mandates that and the public policy been entered same have be it not enforced. though with the that even chancellor agree he adoption, after the decree of order was entered it in view of fully refusing enforce warranted favoring adoptive

strong public policy families. further that the the law argue policy appellants such this consent supplemental

is to favor settlements as of a overlooks the declaration again decree. This argument It is to favor families. stronger policy adoptive be noted that visitation order was also in Poe that is also to be noted consent. It agreed had upon relied fact father’s as a basis for those The court in disposed consent to the adoption. the following language: argument for An such visitation agreement provide void the absence of statute is against public policy Pratello, Whetmore Or. unenforceable. Reichardt, Stickles Wis. (1953); P.2d N.W. its as to the of that statement arises from any import If doubt context, the two cited as perusal authority cases simple or crystal it makes it clear that other any agreements actions policy which seek to undermine the public void and unenforceable. adoptive family visitation order was also argue appellants time entered “in accord with the public involved here was declared entry.” public policy Adop- of the Revised Uniform in its enactment misinterpreted fact that it had been Act in tion *7 of it previously not override the interpretation does in Wilson. and affirmed subsequently made error. find no Glaze, Cloninger, concur. JJ., Corbin and Corbin, area This is an concurring. Donald L. Judge, by legislative needs to be addressed clearly of the law that about day Social more each writing scientists action. their interaction with having to be children gleaned by good moral is a biological If there anything, grandparents. their to have a relationship right should All can and and vice versa. grandchildren parties interaction between the grand- benefit some by allowing any and the forecloses authority child. Case do consideration the chancellor these instances. We that visitation not be beneficial recognize may every instance.

Cloninger Glaze, in this concurrence. JJ., join