602 So. 2d 1210 | Ala. Crim. App. | 1992
The appellant, Roderick Woods, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. He raises two issues on this appeal from that conviction.
The 14-year-old appellant was a student at Hayes Middle School in Birmingham, Alabama. On the morning of November 14, 1990, following an altercation between the appellant and another student, the appellant fired at least two shots from a .22 caliber pistol into a crowd of students on the school campus. One of those bullets struck and killed 11-year-old Secoria Weatherly.
It is settled in this state that the sentence enhancement provisions of §
"Reckless" murder and "reckless" manslaughter do not involve the same degree of "recklessness."
Ex parte Weems,"The difference between the circumstances which will support a murder conviction and the degree of risk contemplated by the manslaughter statute is one of degree, not kind. . . . [I]t appears that the degree of recklessness which will support a manslaughter conviction involves a circumstance which is a 'gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation,' but is not so high that it cannot be 'fairly distinguished from' the mental state required in intentional homicides."
In "reckless" or "universal malice" murder, "the defendant evinces a culpable mind, determined to act no matter what the consequences to others. He must have determined to follow a course of action which he knows, or should know, will, in all probability, lead to harm to another." Napier v.State,
Ex parte Weems,"In providing that homicide committed 'recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life' constitutes murder, the drafters of the model code were attempting to define a degree of recklessness 'that cannot be fairly distinguished from homicides committed purposely or knowingly.' Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 210.02, Comment, 4 (1980)."
In convicting this appellant of "reckless" murder, the jury necessarily determined that the appellant knew that he was firing the pistol into a crowd of students, that he knew that a bullet would strike one of those students, and that he knew that death to some student would probably result. SeeLangford,
"Section
13A-6-2 (a)(2) requires the prosecution to prove conduct which manifests an extreme indifference to human life, and not to a particular person only. Its gravamen is the act of reckless[ness] by engaging in conduct which creates a grave or very great risk of death under circumstances 'manifesting extreme indifference to human life.' What amounts to 'extreme indifference' depends on the circumstances of each case, but some shocking, outrageous, or special heinousness must be shown."
The trial judge indicated that he intended to give the requested charge and the following occurred:
"THE COURT: Well, I don't mind giving these [requested instructions], as they're here. I had intended to eliminate a few of the wording [sic] in there, such as 'special heinousness must be shown.' I'm not aware of any evidence of special heinousness in this instance."
"MR. BOUDREAUX [defense counsel]: Your Honor, but I would renew my motion for judgment of acquittal, and, as additional grounds, assign that universal malice requires shocking, outrageous, and special heinous conduct, of which there's been no proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
"THE COURT: Well, if we argued the semantics of the definition of heinousness, then counsel may be correct, but that is not the only definition of heinous. I was thinking from the jury's standpoint, I did not want to confuse them. However, I don't mind giving — they accurately depict applicable law in this case, because they came from specific cases.
"MR. BOUDREAUX: I do not object to them." R. 572-73.
"The textbook examples of universal malice are generally such acts as shooting into an occupied house or driving an automobile into a crowd." Napier,
Here, the appellant was charged with both intentional murder and universal malice murder as those crimes are defined in §
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All Judges concur.