for the Court:
¶ 1. “Thе fact that a witness changes his testimony after the trial does not necessarily entitle the [post-conviction-relief (PCR) ] petitioner to a new trial.”
¶ 2. Arthur Woods was granted an evi-dentiary hearing on his successive PCR motion because the statutory-rape victim filled out an affidavit in which she recanted her trial testimony. But at this hearing, the judge — who had also presided over Woods’s trial — found both the victim’s affidavit and her testimony at the hearing were not credible, while her testimony аt Woods’s trial had been credible. Because the judge was not satisfied that the recanting testimony was true, he denied Woods’s request for a new trial. After review, we cannot say the judge’s determination was clearly erroneous. Thus, we affirm.
Background
¶3. In 2008, two eighth-grade girls were passing a note back and forth in sciencе class. Their teacher intercepted the note. And when the teacher read the girls’ exchange about both having had sex with the same grown man, the tеacher immediately showed the note to one of the girls’ mother, who worked at the school.
¶ 4. At trial, Katrina testified she and Amy had snuck out of Katrina’s house one night and gone to Woods’s. Both girls went back to Woods’s bedroom, and Woods had sex with each girl twice. Katrina also testified that she loved Woods аnd did not want anything to happen to him, which is why she had initially told
¶ 5. During the investigation, Amy had told investigators she had sex with Woods that night. But prior to trial, the Statе learned Amy intended to recant. The prosecution called Amy anyway. And when Amy testified that she had not had sex with Woods, the State impeached her with hеr prior sworn statement. At the close of trial, the court dismissed the count charging the statutory rape of Amy based on insufficient evidence.
¶ 6. The jury convicted Woods on the remaining count — the statutory rape of Katrina. The court sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment. Woods appealed, and this сourt affirmed. Woods v. State,
¶ 7. In 2010, twenty-one-year-old Katrina swore out an affidavit recanting her trial testimony. In that affidavit, she attested she had never had sex with Woods. She claimed she had been pressured by her parents to testify against Woods in 2005. But now that she was grown, she wanted to make things right. Woods applied for and was grantеd leave by the Mississippi Supreme Court to file with the trial court a successive PCR motion based on “newly discovered evidence” — i.e., Katrina’s recаnted testimony. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Supp.2013). The supreme court also ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 8. The hearing took placе in August 2011, before the same judge who had presided over Woods’s criminal trial. Katrina testified that her 2010 affidavit reflected the truth, not her 2005 trial testimony.
¶ 9. The judge denied Woods’s PCR motion. Woods was granted leave to file a notice of appeal under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h).
Discussion
¶ 10. On appeal, Woods claims he is entitled to post-conviction relief based on Katrina’s recanted testimony. But “[ejxperienee teaches all courts a healthy skepticism toward recanted testimony.” Yarborough v. State,
¶ 11. Recanted testimony is, however, adequate to entitle a pеtitioner to an evidentiary hearing. This is why the supreme court granted Woods leave to file
¶ 12. Based on the inconsistencies in Katrina’s hearing testimony and her demeanor, the judge determined Katrina’s recent testimony was unreliable and untrue. The judge remembered Katrina’s demeanor when she testified in 2005 and found her trial testimony, in comparison, had been credible. Further, he found her justifications for recanting — that she had been coerced by her family to testify against Woods and that she did not want to harm Woods — had already been presented to the jury аt the 2005 trial. And the jury resolved those issues, finding Katrina’s trial testimony credible and sufficient to support finding Woods guilty of the statutory rape of Katrina. See Woods,
¶ 13. Consequently, the judge denied Woods a new trial. And “it is the right and duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that [the recanting] testimony is true.” Howell v. State,
¶ 14. The judge’s decision came down to assessing Katrina’s credibility. The judge had the benefit of witnessing Katrina’s demeanor when she testified in 2005 and later when she recanted in 2011. But we do not. Instead, we have only the inanimate record before us. And from this record we cannot say the judge’s credibility assessment was clearly erroneous. Because the judge supported his decision with substantial evidence, we affirm the judgment denying Woods’s PCR request for a new trial.
¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LE-FLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALT. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LEFLORE COUNTY.
Notes
. Howell v. State,
. Id. (quoting Bradley v. State,
. A fuller account of the events can be found in this court's opinion affirming Woods’s conviction on direct appeal. Woods v. State,
. In the direct appeal of Woods's statutory-rape conviction, this court used fictitious names to protect the identity of the minor victims. Id. at 1025 (¶ 3) & n. 1. For consistency, we use the same pseudonyms in this opinion.
."[S]tatutory rape is committеd when ... [a]ny person seventeen (17) years of age or older has sexual intercourse with a child who: (i) Is at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of age; (ii) Is thirty-six (36) or more months younger than the person; and (iii) Is not the person's spouse[.]” Miss.Code Ann. § 97 — 3—65(l)(a)(i).
. Amy also testified — and also recanted. Amy insisted, contrary to her 2005 trial testimony, but consistent with her initial statement to the police, she and Katrina did have sex with Woods that night in 2003.