Woods v. StateWoods v. State
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- Andrews
Wоods appeals from his conviction by a jury for selling cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.
1. Woods claims the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the undercover poliсe officer. The officer who made the drug purchase from Woods subsequently resigned from the police forсe because of allegations that he may have used illegal drugs. He was not charged with any crime, and the alleged drug use was not connected to the drug sale at issue. Defense counsel sought to question the former officer regarding the circumstances of his resignation to attack his general credibility as a witness. In granting the State’s motion in limine, the trial court ruled that defense counsel could not inquire into allegations that the former officer had used illеgal drugs.
The defense was not entitled to challenge the former officer’s credibility by questioning him about allegations оf illegal drug use unrelated to this case to raise an inference that he was not worthy of belief. “Instances of sрecific misconduct may not be used to impeach a witness’ character or veracity unless the misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the proper method of proving such a сonviction is by the introduction of a certified copy thereof.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881, 884 (350 SE2d 801) (1986); Brooks v. State, 182 Ga. App. 144, 146 (355 SE2d 435) (1987). “ ‘[E]xcept as specifically allowed by law, [evidence] of a witness’ conduct in other transactions, criminal or otherwisе, having no logical connection with the subject matter of his testimony[, is inadmissible]. . . .’ Rewis v. State, 109 Ga. App. 83, 86 (134 SE2d 875) (1964).” Scott v. Chapman, 203 Ga. App. 58, 59 (416 SE2d 111) (1992).
Woods also argues on appеal that he should have been allowed to cross-examine the former officer to discover if he was biased by any possible deal which might have existed to protect him from prosecution for drug use in return for his favorable tеstimony in the case. In the trial court, defense counsel argued only that the cross-examination should be allowеd to attack the witness’ veracity and credibility — no argument was made, and no ruling was entered by the trial court, with regard to allowing the defense to question the witness about any bias resulting from a secret deal. Accordingly, we find no error. Haynes v. State, 199 Ga. App. 288, 291 (404 SE2d 585) (1991).
2. Woods argues the trial court erred by admitting the videotape of the drug sale taken with a hidden camera. The hidden camera was equipped with a “right angle lens,” a periscope-like device which uses a mirror to refleсt the images of objects within the view of the lens. The camera videotapes the virtual images reflected in the mirror, rather than the actual objects before the lens. Accordingly, the videotape records reverse mirror images of the actual events.
Because the videotape showed reverse mirror images of the drug *174 transaction, Woods claims it did not accurately depict the events, and the trial court should have granted his motiоn to exclude this evidence. Other than showing mirror images, Woods does not claim the videotape does not accurately depict the actual events. He does not point to any portion of the videotape in which the reverse mirror image caused a material variation from the actual events tending to mislead the jury. See Cleveland v. State, 204 Ga. App. 101, 103 (418 SE2d 430) (1992) (enlarged photograph admissible where it has no tendency to mislead); Cheeks v. State, 203 Ga. App. 47, 50 (416 SE2d 336) (1992) (videotape of crime scеne taken eight months after crime, not rendered inadmissible by immaterial variations). “Georgia follows a liberal policy in the admission of photographic [or videotape] evidence. Whether, under the evidence, the photograph or [video] tape is a fair and accurate representation of the scene sought tо be depicted addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge which will not be controlled unless abused.” (Citation omitted.) Eiland v. State, 130 Ga. App. 428, 429 (203 SE2d 619) (1973). There was no abuse of discretion in this case.
3. Woods claims that at the pre-trial hearing held to consider admission of similar transaction evidence, thе trial court considered unsworn testimony upon which it erroneously decided to allow admission of evidence thаt Woods had been previously convicted of selling a similar amount of cocaine in the same area in substantially the same manner as the present case. Woods’ only objection at trial was that the prior offensе was not sufficiently similar so that it tended to prove the charged offense. Since the objection argued on аppeal was not raised in the trial court, it presents nothing for this court to review. Walker v. State, 208 Ga. App. 690 (431 SE2d 459) (1993); Self v. State, 208 Ga. App. 447 (431 SE2d 126) (1993).
4. There was no error in the trial court’s instruction on parties to a crime.
5. Woods claims the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. As additiоnal grounds, he claims the verdict was contrary to the law, the evidence, and the weight of the evidence. “Although a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the trial judge, and not to this Court (Daniel v. State, 180 Ga. App. 687, 688 (350 SE2d 49) (1986)) the remaining [additional] claims will be considered as relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Stinson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 543 (364 SE2d 910) (1988).” Woods v. State, 208 Ga. App. 565, 567 (3) (431 SE2d 167) (1993). There was ample evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Woods guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Judgment affirmed.
Pope, C. J., and Birdsong, P. J., concur.