84 N.J.L. 171 | N.J. | 1913
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The motion for a nonsuit should have been allowed and its refusal requires a reversal of this judgment. We think it must be admitted that if a person, in the usual course of business or pleasure, was driving this team of horses at the speed, and in the manner, plaintiff admits he was driv
The city ordinance does not justify the driver of a fire engine even while on duty, in entirely disregarding the rights of others on the public highway. It is intended, by its terms, to prevent the operators of other vehicles from refusing the right of way to a lire apparatus, on its way to a fire, and declares a refusal thereof by anyone to he a misdemeanor, but it is no authority for the negligent running down by such apparatus of any other vehicle, and when this driver approached a street upon which lie knew he was liable to find a car in his pathway, or so close thereto that it might he impossible to stop it, he should have had his team under such control as to he able to stop, if necessary, to prevent a collision with another vehicle lawfully upon the street.
An ordinance which imposes a liability for the non-observance of its terms does not abrogate the rule of contributory negligence. 33 Cyc. 991. To give full effect to the argument of the plaintiff in this case, he would have been absolved from contributory negligence if, seeing the car in ample time to stop his team, he had nevertheless, relying upon his claim to a right of way, driven directly into the trolley car. Such a doctrine has no support in the law.
The right of way, such as the plaintiff claims in this case as his justification for the speed at which he was driving at the point of the accident, did not excuse him from exercising
As the result which we have reached requires a reversal of this judgment, it is not necessary to consider the other questions raised hy the plaintiff in error. The judgment will be reversed and a new trial awarded.