Mary WOODS, individually and on behalf of her minor niece, Patricia Jones, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Stanley A. MILLER, Secretary of Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Edward Kalberer, Executive Director of the Allegheny County Board of Assistance, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 70-780
United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.
Sept. 23, 1970
318 F. Supp. 510
3. The defendant‘s reason, i. e., economic gain, for the continuation of the embargo is within the control of the carrier and, therefore, a violation of
ORDER OF JUDGMENT
The following orders shall become effective as follows:
A. If the defendant should decide to appeal, the orders will not become effective prior to final judgment; or
B. If the defendant decides not to appeal, the orders will become effective one hundred and twenty days from date.
1. The defendant is hereby ordered and required to cancel its “Notice of Embargo No. 2” in accord with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
2. The defendant, its agents, employees and representatives are permanently enjoined and required to render reasonably continuous and adequate service to the public in pursuance of the authority granted the defendant by the Interstate Commerce Commission, unless and until such time, if at all, as there is in force with respect to said defendant authority from the I.C.C. authorizing and permitting said defendant to discontinue such operations.
3. The defendant, its agents, employees and representatives are perpetually enjoined and required to discontinue giving or causing any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage between shippers of a like or similar nature as considered in this action.
No costs to either party.
So ordered.
Tom M. Lytton, Neighborhood Legal Services, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Jacques H. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., William H. Eckert, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.
Before STALEY, Circuit Judge, and GOURLEY and WEIS, District Judges.
OPINION
STALEY, Circuit Judge.
This is a class action attacking the validity of two regulations of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. These regulations provide for termination of welfare payments to recipients who refuse to initiate court action against the relatives obligated to support them under the Pennsylvania Support Law,
The action was brought by Mary Woods individually and as next friend of her niece, Patricia Jones, as representatives of that class of persons who are
Under the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program,
In the instant case, Mary Woods and her niece, 15-year-old Patricia Jones, were receiving a monthly assistance payment of $202. In February 1970, Mary Woods was informed that she would have to sue her 24-year-old daughter, Ruth Woods, in order to continue to be eligible for public assistance. Ruth Woods resides in Washington, D. C., and is employed there as a secretary with the U.S.I.A. at a salary of approximately $510 per month, or approximately $344.00 after deductions. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, after requesting and receiving information on the financial resources and whereabouts of Ruth Woods, determined that she could contribute to the support of Mary Woods, her mother. Ruth Woods told the Department that she could not afford to do so. The Department then asked Mary Woods to sue her daughter. Mary refused and asked for an administrative hearing, which was held on May 22, 1970. No reductions or waivers were allowed by the Department and because of her refusal to sue her daughter, Mary
At the outset, it should be noted that this case does not involve a single individual living alone and receiving welfare assistance other than AFDC aid. A crucial element of this case is that the plaintiffs are receiving assistance as a family unit under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
Plaintiffs allege that the regulations in question are invalid in that they (1) are in conflict with the Social Security Act of 1935 (“Act“), (2) are violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3) are violative of the penumbral constitutional rights of privacy and preservation of family integrity. Since it will be unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues presented by the case if the challenged regulations are in conflict with the Act, we will first consider the statutory issue.
Plaintiffs argue that these regulations contravene the Social Security Act by purporting to establish a condition of eligibility for full, continued assistance which is unrelated to the determination of “need” and “dependence.” They contend that since “need” and “dependence” are the only two conditions of eligibility for AFDC aid, the imposition of additional eligibility requirements by a state is a violation of the Act‘s requirement that aid shall be promptly furnished to all eligible individuals.
We think that the defendants’ argument is not to the point at issue. Their regulations provide that court action is an eligibility requirement for assistance, PA Manual 3237.15, and that if the person refuses to take court action, assistance is discontinued for those members of the assistance unit for whom the relative is legally responsible, PA Manual 3237.14. It is this assistance unit, however, that is the essential element of the AFDC program,
In Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (D.Conn., 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488, 90 S.Ct. 641, 24 L.Ed.2d 677 (1970), a three-judge court held invalid a Connecticut regulation which provided for termination of AFDC welfare payments to illegitimate children whose mothers refused to disclose the identity of the father. The court held that the state‘s regulation imposed an additional condition of eligibility not required by the Act. In a sequel to Shapiro, the same court, in Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D.Conn., 1970), held that the state‘s attempt to amend the regulation at issue in Shapiro by providing for termination of payments to the mother rather than the child was likewise invalid. “This regulation, while in form directed at the mother rather than the child, has the same vice as the original. It reduces the assistance to the family by creating an additional eligibility requirement identical to that held invalid and not authorized by the federal statute.” 310 F.Supp. at 303.
We hold that the instant regulations have that same vice. Assistance is reduced to the unit by imposing the requirement of initiating court action when the Commonwealth deems it necessary. This is described by the regulations as a requirement of eligibility for assistance. Such a requirement contravenes the Social Security Act requirement that aid be furnished promptly to all eligible individuals and is therefore invalid.
Accordingly, it is ordered that defendants be enjoined from denying or discontinuing AFDC assistance to plaintiffs on the ground that they are barred from receiving such assistance under 3237.14 or 3237.15 of the regulations of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. The parties will submit a proposed order in accordance with the terms of this opinion.
WEIS, District Judge (concurring).
The primary duty for the support of an indigent parent rests upon the financially responsible children, not the state. The obligation is as old as the family itself and in Pennsylvania has been incorporated into statutory law.
The regulations of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Assistance which require recipients who are parents to take the relatively simple and uncomplicated step of filing a civil suit for support from their children are not unreasonable or arbitrary. They appear consistent with the professed intent of the Pennsylvania Public Welfare Law, inter alia, “* * * to encourage self-respect, self-dependency and the desire to
The difficulty in this case arises because the penalty for non-compliance with the regulations, that is, a reduction in the total amount payable to the family unit—falls not only upon the reluctant mother but also upon the minor niece who is in no sense responsible for the infraction. Another significant factor is that the state has available to it an alternative remedy which would exact the same measure of responsibility from the uncooperative daughter and thus comply with the state‘s obligation to the taxpayers who ultimately pay what the daughter should, but will not. With an annual income of approximately $6,100.00 and apparently with no dependents other than her mother, the daughter should be required to explain her failure to fulfill her filial duties.
As the majority opinion indicates, it is clear that the state is empowered to prosecute the claim against the daughter by a suit filed either in its own name or in the name of the Department of Public Assistance.3
While the Department of Public Assistance has a legitimate interest in securing whatever benefit may be obtained by having the parent institute the litigation, the sanction for refusal must yield to the realities of the greater need of the niece toward whose welfare the provisions of the Aid For Families Of Dependent Children are primarily directed.
In reality, it is not the requirement for a support suit which is in conflict with the federal law but rather the means for enforcing compliance. I do not agree with the contention of the plaintiffs that the imposition of the obligation to file suit against a legally responsible relative is an unlawful addition to the test of eligibility, but instead find it perfectly consistent with the federal statute.4
By upholding the legality of the support litigation requirement but channeling enforcement of the rule into an area consistent with the primary purpose of the AFDC, we are observing the respect due the state regulations in harmony with the Supreme Court‘s recent decision of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491. To this extent, I concur with the result in this case.
Notes
“3237.14 Support from LRR Found Able to Contribute
“When it has been determined that an LRR is, under the Department‘s standards financially able to provide support, the client, as a condition of eligibility, is expected to arrange with the LRR for the amount of the expected contribution. If the expected contribution from the relative is secured, it becomes income available to the client.
“If the total amount of the expected contribution is not secured and the County Office does not exercise its discretion to waive court action, the client must, within ninety days from the date of the decision that the LRR is expected to contribute, initiate court action for support from the relative if he wishes to remain eligible.
“If the person decides to take court action, assistance is continued until the court makes a decision. In such circumstances, any amount that the LRR is actually contributing is considered income available to the client.
“If the person refuses to take court action, assistance is discontinued for those members of the assistance unit for whom the relative is legally responsible.”
“3237.15 Court Action
“Court action is an eligibility requirement for assistance under the conditions specified in 3237.11, 3237.13 and 3237.14. It also is the recourse client has when he is not satisfied with the Department‘s findings on the amount of support expected from his LRR.
“The client is expected to take responsibility for initiating court action for support. However, when legal action for support is required of the client but taking it would be a hardship, the County Office may bring the action providing (1) the client wants it to do so, and (2) the County Board approves the action, and (3) the costs will not be placed on the Department.”
The initials “LRR” stand for “legally responsible relative.”
“(a) The husband, wife, child, (except as hereinafter provided), father and mother of every indigent person, whether a public charge or not, shall, if of sufficient financial ability, care for and maintain, or financially assist, such indigent person at such rate as the court of the county, where such indigent person resides shall order or direct. * * *
“(b) The courts shall have power to hear, determine and make orders and decrees in such cases upon the petition of such indigent person or of any other person or any public body or public agency having any interest in the care, maintenance or assistance of such indigent person.”
The Commonwealth has advised the court that it has never brought suit to force a relative to contribute support to an indigent.
“for the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence * * *.”