48 F. 62 | 8th Cir. | 1891
The effect of the judgment of the state court, dismissing, on the defendants’ motion, the action brought in that court, at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony, upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case, is a question of local law depending on the construction of a statute of the state. Tt appears from 'the latest adjudged cases to be the established doctrine of the supreme court of Minnesota that under the statute of that state, upon a dismissal of .the action when the plaintiff rests his case, on the motion of the defendant, upon the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish'a cause of action, the proper judgment to render is one of dismissal merely, such as was rendered in this case. That court holds that such a judgment is not a judgment upon the merits of the action, such as will bar the plaintiff from maintaining another suit for the same cause, but that it is, in effect, nothing more than a common-law or voluntary nonsuit. Craver v. Christian, 34. Minn. 397, 26 N. W. Rep. 8; Andrews v. School Dist., 35 Minn. 70, 27 N. W. Rep. 303; Conrad v. Bauldwin, 44 Minn. 406, 46 N. W. Rep. 850. The construction placed on the state statute by the supreme court of the state will be followed by this court. The .record of .the judgment of dismissal constitutes no bar to this action, and it was rightly excluded.
Are the plaintiffs in error chargeable with this faulty construction of the trestle, and liable to the defendant in error for ¡he injury he sustained by reason thereof? If ibis trestle liad -been erected under the immediate personal supervision and direction of the plaintiffs in error, it is clear they Avould be liable. But, instead of supervising and directing the work in person, they delegated this power and duty to Murdock; and it is .said Murdock and the plaintiff aro felloAA’-servants, and that the rule which precludes a servant from recovering from liis master for an injury received through the negligence of a fellow-servant is applicable to this case. The proper construction of this trestle mis a work that required more mechanical skill, judgment, and experience than is commonly possessed by the ordinary laborer, and the plaintiffs in error recognized this fact. They appointed a foreman to superintend, direct, and control the Avork. Murdock Avas intrusted AA’ith full control of the construction AA'ork on the section of the railroad embracing this trestle. He had authority to direct all the men on that section — between 30 and 40 in number — Avhen to work, where to work, and Iioav to work, and it was their duty to obey liis orders. He superintended and supervised ail the Avork on the section, and laired and discharged workmen, at liis discretion. in these respects he A\ras invested with all the poAver and authority his principals possessed. He did not ordinarily do manual labor; his chief duty was to personally supervise the AA’ork, including the building of the trestle, and to give directions how all parts of the same should
Whether the trestle was one of those structures the building of which the master might have committed to ordinary fellow-laborers, without any instructions or superintending care, by simply providing them with adequate materials and tools to do the work, need not be discussed. The plaintiffs in error did not attempt to build the trestle in any such way. They did not leave the mode and manner of its construction to the discretion or judgment of the laborers doing the work, but they constituted Murdock their representative, and imposed on him the duty, and conferred on him the authority, to supervise, direct, and control its construction, and required the laborers to obey his orders and directions in the premises. Under these circumstances, Murdock did not sustain the relation of a fellow-servant to the defendant in error in respect to this work. He stood in the shoes of his employers, and was their representative, and they are responsible for the results of his negligence in the work so committed to his direction, supervision, and control. This is the doctrine of the supreme court of the United States, (Railway Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184; Railroad Co. v. Herbert, 16 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590,) and is the rule laid down in this circuit, (Borgman v. Railway Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 667,) and by the courts of last resort in many of the states, and is appropriately denominated the “American Rule,” (Shear. & R. Neg., 4th Ed.,§§ 226-228.) This court unanimously approved and applied the rule in the case of Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 48 Fed. Rep. 57, (decided at the present term.) The reasons in support of the rule are forcibly and convincingly stated in the authorities we have cited, and need not be repeated here. In our judgment, the rule is right in principle, and is supported by the weight of authority. There was abundant evidence to warrant the jury in finding that Murdock did not exercise ordinary skill and care in supervising and directing the construction of the trestle, and that by reason of this negligence on his part the trestle was so defectively and imperfectly constructed that it fell and injured the defendant in error. This disposes of the first, second, and third assignments of error.
According to the view we have taken of the case, the court below properly modified the third request to charge, and properly refused the thirteenth and fourteenth requests. The fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are therefore untenable. In the seventh assignment complaint is made of the action of the court in leaving the jury to determine
Hallett, J., dissents.