666 N.E.2d 283 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1995
This case presents the issue of whether prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
On November 8, 1992, Deborah C. Woods, the decedent herein, was killed as a result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist. On July 22, 1993, Kevin D. Woods, the administrator of Ms. Woods's estate, her children, Matthew S. and Christopher P. Smith, and her parents, Richard N. and Marion J. Governor, filed suit in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas against the Governors' *391 insurer, Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co. (hereinafter "appellee"). Other claims and parties were joined, none of which are relevant to this appeal. On April 19, 1994, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Governors, declaring that the uninsured motorist provision of the Governors' policy covered their wrongful death claims. The parties agreed to submit the issues of liability and damages to arbitration. On October 26, 1994, the arbitration panel awarded the Governors $175,000 each, and on November 8, 1994, the Governors collected the $350,000 and signed documents titled "Full and Final Release of All Claims and Demands and Trust Agreement," in which the Governors expressly reserved whatever rights they had to prejudgment interest on the arbitration award.
On November 22, 1994, the Governors applied to the court of common pleas for an order confirming the arbitration award and for a judgment entry thereon pursuant to R.C.
1. "The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs Richard and Marion Governors' application to reduce their arbitration award to judgment by finding that plaintiffs may not avail themselves of R.C.
2. "The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion for prejudgment interest and requests for an oral hearing."
R.C.
"At any time within one year after an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court of common pleas for an order confirming the award.Thereupon the court shall grant such an order and enter judgmentthereon, unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections
R.C.
"Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding, the court must enter judgment in conformitytherewith." (Emphasis added.)
We hold that a court does not have discretion under R.C.
The language of R.C.
"It is axiomatic that when used in a statute, the word `shall' denotes that compliance with the commands of that statute is mandatory unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that it receive a construction other than its ordinary usage." See, e.g., Moskovitz v. Mt. SinaiMed. Ctr. (1994),
We are aware of no legislative intent, much less unequivocal legislative intent, that a court have some discretion in confirming or entering judgment on an arbitration award. While not expressly construing the mandatory language of R.C.
Our holding is consistent with that of the Seventh District Court of Appeals in J. Philip Davidson, DPM, Inc. v. Higgins
(Mar. 31, 1992), Mahoning App. No. 90CA-207, unreported, 1992 WL 73590, and the dicta in Davidson v. Bucklew (1992),
We disagree with the reasoning of the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Luby v. Saveco Ins. Co. (Oct. 29, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52874, unreported, 1987 WL 19250, in which the court held that a party that has collected fully on an arbitration award is not entitled to a judgment entry pursuant to R.C.
Appellants are entitled to an entry of judgment upon their arbitration award pursuant to R.C.
R.C.
"Interest on a judgment, decree, or order for the payment ofmoney rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct andnot settled by agreement of the parties, shall be computed from the date the cause of action accrued to the date on which the money is paid, if, upon motion of any party to the action, the court determines at a hearing held subsequent to the verdict or decision in the action that the party required to pay the money failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case and that the party to whom the money is to be paid did not fail to make a good faith effort to settle the case." (Emphasis added.)
Before R.C.
This case and the opinions in eight other Ohio cases that have addressed the availability of prejudgment interest on arbitration awards reveal four distinct preconditions, or requirements, for a hearing under R.C.
Prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
The Supreme Court has emphasized many times the primary need to apply statutes by their plain meaning: "Courts do not have the authority to ignore the plain and unambiguous language in a statute in the guise of statutory interpretation." State v.Krutz (1986),
We disagree with the opinion in Vanderhoof v. Gen. Acc. Ins.Group (1987),
This court's decision in Griffith v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co.
(Sept. 29, 1987), Franklin App. No. 86AP-1063, unreported, 1987 WL 17805, is consistent on this point. Griffith involved an "unliquidated claim," presumably a claim to an arbitration award that had not been reduced to an R.C.
Finally, we reject appellee's argument that, even if the trial court had granted an R.C.
We conclude that an R.C.
Prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
"The judgment entered in [a proceeding for an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding] shall be docketed as if rendered in an action.
"The judgment so entered shall have in all respects the same effect as, and be subject to all laws relating to, a judgment in an action. Such judgment may be enforced as if rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered."
R.C.
Our holding that an R.C.
We conclude that an R.C.
Prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
Appellee argues that appellants' claims are, instead, contract claims because the claims arise from a contract — an insurance policy — to which they are parties. Appellee also argues that the fact that tortious conduct was a condition precedent to the contract claim does not alter the fact that the claim sounds in contract and not in tort. We agree that appellants' claims sound in contract and not in tort. However, both the statutory language and public policy suggest that R.C.
Had the General Assembly wanted R.C.
A second reason why the phrase "civil action based on tortious conduct" in R.C.
Appellee argues to the contrary that only a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor's insurer can be subject to prejudgment interest under R.C.
We do not find these statements of the Supreme Court to be dispositive of the question of whether "based on tortious conduct" is broader than "in a tort action." It is clear from the context of the statement in Kalain, supra, that the court was not purporting to delineate the scope of the statute's applicability. Rather, the court was merely discussing the statute generally as an introduction to its holding defining "good faith effort to settle." In Galayda, supra,
Although the variety of prejudgment interest statutes defies precise categorization, our review of prejudgment interest statutes in other jurisdictions reveals that five of the six courts faced with the issue have held that a claim for uninsured motorist coverage is a tort claim rather than a contract claim within the meaning of the state's prejudgment interest statute.2
In Torres v. Kansas City Fire Marine Ins. Co. (Okla. 1993),
In Louisiana, in Brown v. S. Farm Bur. Ins. Co.
(La.App. 1982),
In North Carolina, where by statute prejudgment interest was limited to noncontract claims covered by liability insurance, the court in Ensley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1986),
In Georgia, in J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. Woodard (1989),
In New York, where the prejudgment interest statute was available for wrongful death claims, the court in Russo v.Kemper Group (1989),
Tex. Civ. Code 5069-1.05(6) limits prejudgment interest to judgments "in wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage cases." The court and the parties in Potomac Ins. Co. v.Howard (Tex.App. 1991),
One court has even held that a state uninsured motorist compensation fund can be liable for prejudgment interest because the claim is based on tortious conduct. See Douglas v. Hare
(1971),
In contrast to these cases, only one court has held that a claim for uninsured motorist coverage is a contract claim and not a tort claim for the purposes of prejudgment interest. InVasquez v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. (Iowa 1991),
While in theory a claimant's cause of action in tort against the third-party tortfeasor may be distinct from a cause of action in contract against the claimant's own insurer for uninsured motorist coverage, the distinction is meaningless in the context of a claim for uninsured motorist coverage. We, therefore, conclude that a claim against one's insurer for uninsured motorist coverage is a claim "based on tortious conduct" within the meaning of R.C.
Prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
We hold that prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
In opposing the availability of prejudgment interest upon entry of judgment on arbitration awards, appellee would have us vitiate the judicial policy of encouraging arbitration and settlement. If appellee's position were adopted, parties would be forced to choose between (1) litigating, thus maintaining the availability of prejudgment interest, and (2) arbitrating, in which case the parties would lose the opportunity to pursue prejudgment interest. One of the purposes of the statute is to encourage good-faith efforts to settle, and there is no reason to discriminate in this regard between cases in which a claim is finally resolved by arbitration and those resolved by litigation. As stated in Evans, supra, Mahoning App. No. 88CA-196, unreported at 5:
"[T]he prejudgment interest statute seeks to prevent a party from receiving a benefit where that party fails to make a good faith effort to resolve the matter. *400 * * * Obviously, this purpose is not served if a provision to arbitrate renders the statute inapplicable."
In Ankney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1992),
"If the legislature saw a need to promote settlement efforts and prevent frivolous delays, the only proper implementation of this purpose is to have R.C.
We note in conclusion that, of the four Ohio cases expressing a view contrary to our holding in this case, only Luby would have been decided differently under our holding. In Luby, the court held that, because the purpose of R.C.
With this decision, we join the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals in holding that (1) a common pleas court has no discretion under R.C.
For these reasons, both assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law, consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
PETREE and TYACK, JJ., concur.