*1 municipality by imposed expressed in the sovereign power as Con- Legisla- acts of the
stitution and the valid County Mul-
ture.” Board Comm’rs v. 628, 628, lins, 217 P.2d 202 Okl. 4). (Syllabus the Court no. Be-
cause the extension of terms of part city’s duty
contract is bar- faith,
gain good article section 26 is
inapplicable.
Although evergreen clause was en- parties after the entered into the
acted bargaining agreement,
collective the result By enacting change.
does not the ever- clause,
green Legislature simply made
explicit always implied what was in the negotiate good
statutory duty to faith.
I am authorized to state that Justice expressed
SIMMS concurs the views
herein. Joy
Robert L. WOODS
Woods, Appellants, LAWTON,
CITY OF Board of Commis
sioners, Employee System Lawton, Comanche Coun
ty, Oklahoma, Appellees.
No. 70662.
Supreme of Oklahoma. Court
Dec.
Rehearing Denied Feb. *2 Oklahoma the Greg McCracken, Miskovsky & Western District of McCrack- City, appellants. charge devising of and en, for a scheme to defraud Oklahoma City the of money from Lawton obtain Williams, Jr., Atty., City Law- Wiley L. City by in violation of employed the while ton, appellees. for and 1342. Law- 18 U.S.C. Sections 1341 17-108(f) city pro- Section ton’s LAVENDER, Justice. that: vided city employee requisite works the A in a Any is member who him for years qualify of as would number competent jurisdiction court of com- of retirement, his he benefits. After pension any mitting, aiding abetting or embez- for offenses commit- convicted criminal city, the or or brib- zlement theft from against city employed. he was the while ted ery in connection with the city forfeiture of all A ordinance dictated retirement, prior the or committed benefits under the retirement rights and employment is termi- member whose or upon conviction of theft embez- system nated his admitted commit- reason of commit- if the criminal acts were zlement abetting an aiding or embezzlement It not before the retired. ted city bribery or or theft from the such disputed that this clause was effect un- rights all and shall benefits forfeit eligibility for the employee’s the bene- except the the retirement der ordinance, the on trial fits. Based return of his accumulated con- member’s right the employee’s court found as of his date of termination. tributions not vested. We affirm. pension had (Emphasis added). I. 22, 1987, the Accordingly, September Employee of Board Commissioners Woods, City for the Robert L. worked System City of Lawton Retirement years approximately 29 Lawton for (Board) voted to terminate Woods’ retire- years completed had He months. ment benefits. April, City 1981. The as of 17-98(27) Municipal Section Lawton Code for appealed this decision recon- Woods states: argued He the Board. sideration before first 'Early Date—the date Retirement law, upon meet- under case Oklahoma (a) following the date month both: service, his ing years the minimum 25 (i) completed years ten that member April, “vested” on age and attained the of creditable service the offenses occurred be- 1981. Because (ii) fifty-two years completed or December, October, tween twenty-five years of creditable ser- occurred, “vesting” Woods after (i) vice, age, whichever of regardless of for the denial of his benefits contends that earlier, (b) (ii) the date that years the Lawton code was under to receive retirement such member elects deny The Board voted unconstitutional. provi- in accordance with request for reinstatement of benefits. sions hereof. Declaratory filed a Petition for Woods provision, early retirement Under this challenging court Judgment in district application Woods submitted constitutionality of ordinance. Employee Commissioners the ordinance valid court determined trial System Lawton applied to Woods. and constitutional December, retired in retirement. He for citing Board appeals reversed Septem- January, 1986 until 1985 and from That court deter- v. Weed.1 of mined that Woods ber, monthly re- 1987 he received $726.97 all had fulfilled tirement benefits. illegal to the requirements prior eligibility acts, had even his “vested” 21,1987, guilty in and that pled Woods August
On actually retired and though he had for the District Court the United States 1. 719 P.2d pension recipient’s becoming “divested” eli- rights could
these granted gible payment pension.... previously We criminal actions. also We have stated that certiorari. to a
claimant
is controlled
*3
of the
in effect when
terms
statute
the
II.
implied
right
pension
to a
and have
vests
that
generally been held
“It has
vesting
occurs as of the date of
voluntarily
have
contribut-
who
employees,
retirement.
fund, have a vest-
a retirement
ed to such
pre-
right
receive the
ed,
to
contractual
pension
apparent
is
that the view of
[I]t
payment
from it once their
scribed benefits
rights
jurisdiction
taken
this
benefit
unquali-
If
had an
Woods
becomes due.”2
rights
been that
neither
vest
benefits, then
to his retirement
right
fied
nor accrue until the contract between the
of
requiring forfeiture
city
the
beneficiary
and the
comes into
state
exis-
would be unconstitutional.
those
tence.
Const,
provides:
art.
Okla.
question presented
in this
exact
case
law,
attainder,
post facto
of
ex
No bill
us, although,
has not
before
we did
been
obligation of
impairing the
any law
nor
Weed,4
consider in
Trustees
contracts,
passed. No con-
shall ever be
pension
right
whether vested
to a
benefit
corruption
work a
viction shall
consequence
could be forfeited as a
Provided,
estate:
blood or
felony conviction for offenses committed
prohibit the
this
shall not
case,
retirement.
In that
we conclud-
after
(Em-
pecuniary penalties.
imposition of
meeting
requirement of
ed that on
the
mer-
added).
phasis
retirement,
prior
itorious
Therefore,
whether
we must determine
right
to such benefit was a substantial
rights
such as would
were absolute
Woods’
right and
property
that to divest one
this
preclude forfeiture.
right was an unconstitutional forfeiture of
Firefighters Pen-
In
v. Oklahoma
Baker
3
under the
estate
Oklahoma Constitution.
sion,
stated:
we
do cer-
right’
power
A
‘vested
III.
possess
things
actions or
certain
tain
Therefore,
nor
neither Baker5
Weed is
substantially
property
lawfully, and
dispositive
today.
before us
issue
by com-
right,
may be created either
performed twenty-five years
had
Woods
law,
statute,
by
contract.
mon
eligible
service and was
for retirement as
created, it has been once
And when
he
of 1981.
offenses for which
absolute,
protected from
has become
it is
subsequently convicted were committed
Legislature
those
the invasion
af-
twenty-five years
ter those
of service but
ap-
which
provisions in the Constitution
argues
to his
prior
retirement. Woods
rights. And a failure
ply to such
Weed,
right
that under
his
to his
pas-
a vested
before
exercise
for
statute,
eligible
vested at
time he was
re-
subsequent
which
sage of a
tirement or
1981 and he wants his retire-
it,
way affects or
to divest
in no
seeks
years
twenty-five
service.
right.
lessens that
key
In
weWeed
stated that
distin-
“[t]he
law,
to a
guishing
among
jurisdictions
Oklahoma
fact
which
[U]nder
absolute,
vest,
whether
pension would
or become
have addressed this issue is
Kern,
repealed
Baker case
effect of
2. Board
5.The
involved the
legislation
(Okla.1961).
employ-
retirement benefits.
trying
post
facto
ees were
avoid an ex
law
part
keeping
law
an old
in effect that formed
(Okla.1986).
350-51
3. 718 P.2d
their
Woods on the oth-
contract.
trying
the terms of
er hand
to avoid
4. 719 P.2d
1277-79
contract.
prior
a felony
occurred
his conviction
felony conviction or misconduct
actively
was still
order
render
entire statute
while
ful-
eligibility requirements or
easy
filling
meaningless. Certainly such
cir-
benefits were vested.”6
after
purpose
cumvention
law’s
can-
bar,
had
at
Lawton
In
case
not have been intended.
required forfei-
in effect that
an ordinance
under the
of all
and benefits
ture
however,
urges,
Plaintiff
con-
theft
conviction for
clusion renders the statute unconstitu-
if
were com-
the offenses
or embezzlement
XIII,
under
tional
article
section
retirement.
other
mitted
pro-
Illinois Constitution of
which
retired,
words,
he
up
the time Woods
until
vides:
*4
fulfilling eligibili-
required to continue
was
‘Membership
any pension
or retire-
he
requirements, one which was that
ty
State,
system
any
unit of
designated
any of the offenses
not commit
district,
government or school
or
local
it
in the
in the ordinance or would result
thereof,
agency
instrumentality
any
or
pension. While Woods
forfeiture of his
an enforceable contractual rela-
shall be
“eligible”
his
for retirement
was
tionship,
shall
the benefits which
to
did not vest
his
because
impaired.’
diminished or
be
vesting
precluded
ordinance in effect
if
explain
how
Plaintiff does
enforce-
committed certain
Woods
offenses
condition,
par-
ment of this
to which the
in fact
which
did occur.
to his retirement
agreed and which has existed
ties
rights
government
The
throughout
contract,
the duration of
by
limits
contract. Cer
defined
impair-
become an
can
unconstitutional
provide
tainly,
city may
vesting
that
be
ment of the benefits
that contract....
contingencies
can
subject to
which
cause
System
Membership
sought
in the
Emp. Retirement
forfeiture.
In Kerner v. State
condition,
knowledge of this
and it
with
Syste
our’s,
a case similar to
m,7
clearly
impair
cannot
said to
or dimin-
plaintiff’s argument
the court considered
meaning
ish the benefits within the
his
to those benefits had “vest
that
provision.8
the constitutional
receiving
begun
monthly
ed” since he had
agree with the Kerner court and
We
convictions for of
payments prior
his
our
case. Fur-
apply
holding
own
The Ker-
fenses committed while in office.
ther,
acknowledge,
did the Kerner
we
as
ner
stated:
court,
interpretation
that
other
would
plaintiff’s reading of the
flaw
intent of
ordinance and
circumvent the
emphasized
appellate
statute was
meaningless.9
it
breached
plaintiff’s
render
Woods
noted
under
court when it
terms of the ordinance
theory,
only
need
retire
the contractual
Weed,
added).
receiving
(emphasis
retirement benefits. Given
at
from
6.
discovery
ultimate time of
this intent the
507, 21
committing offenses forfeiting his thereby, employed opinion I allows a dissent because merit Equally without to such benefits. contrary to Art. 15 of the Okla- result began because Woods the contention homa Constitution.1 in 1985 this somehow receiving his City Lawton created a actions so as to criminal his absolved system by ordinance. employee retirement only right is to Woods’ right. “vest” procedures that a “re- The retirement state contributions his accumulated the return of years twenty-five occurs after of his termination tirement” the date acquired as of from active em- under the ordinance.10 withdrawal provided ployment. Also found in the ordinances is city ordi- purpose of the Obviously, the of retirement for termination activity discourage criminal nance was a member of the retirement benefits when employees deny- city by its against the of commit- been of such of- employee, convicted ing an aiding abetting any embezzlement ting, he fenses, benefits to which his retirement or theft from the of Lawton.2 Moreover, be entitled. would otherwise being language of the ordinance states that purpose the dual served the ordinance *5 guilty” specified of crimes forfeits “found right to faithful ser- public’s promoting the benefit. posi- holding governmental from those vice Indeed, approvingly cite to could tions. we 21, August 1987 the On jurisdictions have case law from other devising a to de- guilty of scheme im- service as an recognized “honorable” City previ- He had fraud the of Lawton. requisite for entitle- indispensable plied municipal employ- ously withdrawn from pension.11 government ment to begun ment in December of 1985 and had however, case, on In our receiving retirement At that time benefits. service as would mandated such its face for retirement bene- he met the conditions for the duration the ordinance not violate Lawton, City of because fits set out to entitle one to a employment in order of had at the time he retired no conviction The order of the pension upon retirement. occurred. affirmed.
trial court is payments that were When he retired the to him were then authorized under made HARGRAVE, C.J., SIMMS, OPALA, and possessed He ordinances. WATT, JJ., and concur. ALMA WILSON time. payments lawfully at those KAUGER, J., in in part, concurs dissents right” power is the Generally, a “vested part. lawfully. possess things certain In re 92, (Okla.1985); V.C.J., SUMMERS, J., HODGES, 711 P.2d 96 Bomgardner, Board v. Resources dissent. Oklahoma Water Provided, 108(f) estate: of blood or 10. Section states that member 17— forfeiture of prohibit imposition accumulated contri- entitled the return of his shall not acquired added). his date of termination. butions as of (Emphasis pecuniary penalties.” Employees’ Sys., Retire. 11. Masse v. Public "(f) Any in a 2. member who is found 252, (1981); Virginia A.2d 1339 West NJ. jurisdiction committing, competent court of Dodd, System Employees Retirement Public aiding abetting any or theft embezzlement or 544, (even (1990) S.E.2d 725 183 W.Va. city, bribery in connection with the from the or statutory requirement express without an retirement, employment or committed course, service, is, honorable "'[i]t employment any is terminated member whose purposes of the fundamental axiomatic that one aiding his admitted commitment reason of pensioning civil servants is to secure abetting good embezzlement or theft from of reason- or behavior and the maintenance service.”’). discipline during bribery able shall forfeit all standards of or such system except the retirement benefits under the 1. Okla. states: "No bill of § Const. Art. contribu- member’s accumulated return of his attainder, law, impair- post law ex facto nor date of termination.” tions as of his contracts, ing obligation ever be shall corruption passed. shall work a No conviction
«85
Conservancy
amounting
they are unconstitutional
Master
Central Oklahoma
in
District,
Specifi-
a forfeiture of estate
violation of
Const,
we
regard
Okla.
art.
cally, with
Police Pen-
said
at
Id. 719 P.2d
(Okla.1986):
Weed,
719 P.2d
language clearly
This
indicates that an em-
public employ-
agree that
courts now
“most
may not
ployer
use the conviction of
pur-
pension fund
to a
who contribute
ees
subsequent
deny
as a
crime
condition
contract have a
suant to their
vested
benefits.
vested,
right to receive the ben-
contractual
It
is true that in Weed we also noted
thereof,
ser-
when the conditions of
efits
illegal activity
dicta that the
did not occur
payment becomes
are satisfied and
vice
employee’s
duty
during the
active
with his
Upon retire-
P.2d at 1277.
due.” Id. 719
employer.
719 P.2d
Id.
at 1278-1279.
years
1985 the conditions
unnecessary observation was
resolution
from
withdrawing
active
thus,
controversy, and
should
met. The ben-
employment were
dispose
today’s question.4
explaining
In
time,
at that
and the
be-
efits vested
why this
so
on the
observations
some
gan making
pension payments.
first,
majority opinion must be
made—
re-
question
us is whether a
before
theory
its
that the benefits never vested
vest”,
“conditionally
may
tirement benefit
involved,
type
and the
subsequent
subject
to a condition
vest
second,
on its reliance
Kerner v.
all
operate retroactively
deny
that will
Emp.
System, 72 Ill.2d
State
benefits, including
previously
(1978),
21 Ill.Dec.
said: majority that the did The states benefits vest, in although not the retired appellee ob-
Upon meritorious retirement
retirement benefits until
right in his
1985 and received
property
a substantial
tained
argue
in
pension
as 11
1987. Could a
pension and insofar
O.S.1971
City
faith
such as
541p
good
2-342
benefits
and Oklahoma
Code §
vest,
(1970)
and that
it
free
purport
appellee
of
these never
divest
conviction,
particular
change or alter
a
felony
on his
benefits
pension based
right
characterizing
corresponding
payments
I
and Woods’
I note that
am not alone in
controversy
language.
type
extinguished.
See
payments
of
with this
In addi-
to the
tion,
were
System,
Emp.
Ill.
v. State
747,
payments
Kemer
App.3d
was also
Woods’
to future
513-514,
N.E.2d
Ill.Dec.
extinguished by
subsequent. See
the condition
ex-
where that court
1121-1122
opinion by
Holmes for the Court in
the
Justice
subsequent
con-
plained
that'
condition
Baltimore,
Shipbuilding Co. v.
Baltimore
pension.
"divest” a
Pursuant
viction could
51-52,
375, 382,
49 L.Ed.
U.S.
S.Ct.
prior
of
con-
to the date
the ordinance and
discussing
present
and
a
in rem
City possessed
duty
a
to make
viction the
subject
property
a
a condition
possessed
payments
and Woods
retirement
subsequent.
corresponding right
payments.
In other
i.e.,
words,
"present right”
possessed no
long recognized
that dicta
4. This court
payments
“no-right” to
to Woods
made
Ry. Co.
dispositive.
T. &
See Atchison
S.F.
Hohfeld, Fun-
and 1987. See W.
between 1985
Corporation
Okla
Commission of
of
Legal Conceptions,
Pur-
State
damental
36-38
homa,
68 Okla.
P.
upon
of
to the ordinance and
the date
suant
City’s duty
to make the 1985—
conviction
(date
City’s performance due under re-
possibility, how-
there is a
person because
contract)
had not
remote,
person may be found tirement
ever
at some un-
I
the lan-
crime
a criminal act.
view
prohibited
committed
guilty of
likely.
Not
as a condition sub-
guage
future date?
of the ordinance
known
sequent.7
vesting oc-
that no
states
majority
“precluded
curred because
finding
guilty
this case did not
certain
vesting
committed
Woods
of-
if
retirement
after the
until after
occur
which
retirement
'prior to his
fenses
The forfeiture
pension rights had vested.
is incor-
This statement
occur.”
fact did
ordinance without
occur under the
can not
First,
the ordi-
grounds.
what
two
rect on
competent
finding
guilty by a court of
“Any member
provide was that:
did
nance
the ordinance
It is true that
jurisdiction.
compe-
guilty in a
iswho
found
finding
guilty
limit when the
does not
[spec-
committing,
...
jurisdiction
tent
occur,
and that under the terms
must
shall
prior to retirement
...
ified crimes]
finding
guilty may
the ordinance
under the
rights and benefits
all
forfeit
exact-
This issue is
occur after retirement.
(Emphasis
system....”
us:
presented
the case before
ly what is
added).
of ben-
The forfeiture
explanation
finding
guilty
used to forfeit a
be
Can
being
predicated
efits was
the crime occurred
pension benefit when
mere commis-
by court and not the
guilty
finding
guilty
prior
retirement but the
lan-
act. Forfeiture
of the criminal
says yes, it
majority
after retirement?
course,
must,
strictly con-
guage
during
the crime occurred
may, because
strued.5
vesting.
sayI
it
does not state
Secondly, the ordinance
ordinance-required
may not because
“precluded
will be
(i.e.,
finding
convic-
condition of a
prohib-
by the occurrence of
vesting”
from
tion)
pension rights
oc-
used to forfeit
acts,
“forfeit”
that a
shall
ited
but
member
thus constitu-
vesting and is
curred after
rights under certain circumstances.
tionally prohibited.
receiving
bene-
This difference between
juris-
“criminal” forfeiture
Historically,
al-
loosing (forfeiting) benefits
fits and
prudence included in rem forfeitures
obviously makes a differ-
ready obtained
An in rem for-
personam
forfeitures.
*7
prohibi-
the constitutional
ence because of
proceeding directly
was a civil
feiture
theo-
forfeiting pension rights. The
tion on
prop-
property, the title to the
against the
majority appears to be that the
ry of the
upon the commis-
erty passed to the state
precedent;6
provided
“contract”
a condition
act,
finding
and no
of the criminal
i.e.,
rights (pension rights)
no contractual
property.8
to forfeit the
was needed
unless at the date of
would vest
e. This court’s
authorizing
at
224 Comment
§
must be
Restatement
A statute
a forfeiture
Willhite,
my analy-
strictly
Willhite v.
546 P.2d
terms is consistent with
construed.
use of these
Martin,
(Okla.1976); Pirkey
Margay
Corporation,
v. State ex rel.
612
v.
Oil
194
sis. See Franklin
Fish,
(Okla.1958);
486,
519,
747 P.2d
State v.
relate back
country’s
jurispru
This
constitutional
attempts to
transfer. Lawton’s
clearly
governmental
shows that
dence
do,
England
do
the court in
could
what
capacity
employer
in its
entity
prohibited by
Art.
Okla. Const.
what
on the
subject to constitutional restraints
a convic-
II
and that is to “back-date”
consti
relationship, i.e.
employer-employee
purpose
forfeiting property.
tion
re
restraints on
contract-based
tutional
Republican
Par
lationship. See Rutan
THE
ASSER-
II.
MAJORITY’S
DOES
*8
2729,
62,
Illinois,
110 S.Ct.
THAT
IS
497 U.S.
ty
THE FORFEITURE
TION
EXEMPT
separate
ON CONTRACT
BASED
L.Ed.2d 52
111
THE
FORFEITURE
THE
FROM
Em
Michigan’s Public
involving
opinions
CONSTITUTION?
Fer
Act at
v.
ployment Relations
Lehnert
— U.S. -,
Association,
Faculty
ris
the, “rights of a
majority states that
The
1950,
(1991).
We
114 L.Ed.2d
by
are defined
the S.Ct.
government employee
v.
ap
opinion by
Mansfield in Johnson
The
Lord
a more reasonable
11.
relation-back doctrine:
cases,
Smith,
drug
proach
legal
76 Va.
supra,
civil
in
that the
fiction
concluded
forfeiture
Comment,
165,
(1990);
165-166 n. 3
relating
process,
L.Rev.
to an
back
date on
Attacking
Di
the Economic
Criminal
by
plaintiff used
date could not be
earlier
Forfeiture:
Organized
Trafficking,
Narcotics
mension of
a statute of limitations defense.
defeat
(1982). See
State ex
also
Am.U.L.Rev.
Truck,
Pickup
Turpen v. A 1977 Chevrolet
rel.
pub-
private wrongs and
For a discussion of
P.2d 1356
Education,
Cummings
wrongs
v.
see
Board
lic
W.
and 3
190 Okla.
9. Id.
Blackstone, Commentaries, 2.
authority
supra.
cited at footnote 8
See
ty. Chicago,
Ry.
R.I.
v.
Territory
& P.
a constitu
recognize
principle
when
Oklahoma,
as the non-forfeiture of
25 Okla.
The continuous IN KERNER PERSUASIVE? and meritorious service. majority places great reliance question thus Can the becomes: ben- Kemer doing II. so it indicates its efit the forfeiture from willingness legislative to allow a intent be- property upon a conviction of crime when hind a ordinance to outrank an against public agency, that crime is “out- express provision of the Oklahoma Consti- weigh” free constitutional tution, and this deserves some discussion. majority from such forfeitures? from Ker- Language opinion quoted in our deterrence, speaks language i.e. “to ner II approval part: with states in discourage activity”. Obviously, criminal government interest plaintiff’s reading has an deter- The flaw in crime, is, ring emphasized all deterrence appellate but such statute was course, “outweigh” insufficient the anti- plaintiff’s court when it noted that under only need provision. theory, If it were otherwise retire to his in order there would effective Art. 2 conviction to ren- be no der outlawing forfeitures based on conviction meaningless. Certainly the statute easy circumvention of a crime. the law’s purpose cannot have been intended. crimes, All regardless of the immediate *9 victim, are opinion considered be offenses The uses the term “circumven tion”, against appears interest and common and this in the sense of welfare, manage get and thus State and Federal laws “to avoid”14 or “to 15 have been enacted to deter criminal activi- purpose. around” the law’s There is a Collegiate Dictionary, 13. Section 48-101 was amended in and the 1984 15.Webster’s Ninth New language (1984). later version has similar to that used 243 here. (2d Heritage Dictionary, 14. See American 275 1982) College ed.
889
opinion
attempt
an
cir-
The
condemns
meanings of the eva
in the
difference
vast
of a
law,
thereof.
cumvent the effect
ordi-
and the avoidance
of the
392,
attempted
La.
46 So.2d
Nasif,
217
to order
Anglin
In
v.
nance.
“eva
(1950)
explained that
advantage
the court
to take
of what the
309
his affairs
of the
wrongful avoidance
a
allows, i.e.,
means
sion”
to circumvent the ordinance
law
at 311.
Id. 46 So.2d
or a statute.
15,
law
upon
a
by reliance
Okla. Const. Art. §
words,
has come to mean
an evasion
other
in
that is found
our State Consti-
provision
wrongful act that is
the commission
in
Article entitled “Bill of
tution
an
law”,
“the
particular statute or
against a
legisla-
Rights.” To avoid or circumvent a
an act that is
means
an “avoidance”
where
reliance
tive act
Nasif,
Anglin
law.
v.
permitted by the
Rights
Bill
is
the State or Federal
either
an avoidance
evasion and
Both an
supra.
country,
tradition in our
a hallowed
non-application attempts to cause
no defense.
If the ordinance
should need
the for
The difference is that
a statute.
meaningless,
majority
is rendered
unlawful;
the latter
not.16
mer is
contends,
by provision
so
it is rendered
evasion
The distinction between
Constitution.
the State
be,
is,
least should
known to
avoidance
or
majority appears
stating
to be
that a
Garner,
lawyer.
v.
every tax
See Jones
rely
protection
on the
of the
citizen cannot
909,
(1968),
479,
158 S.E.2d
S.C.
“purpose”
Constitution when
State
discussed the difference
where the court
conflicting ordinance is cir-
policy behind a
“tax evasion” and “tax avoid
between
saying
many
it in so
cumvented. Without
non-payment of taxes due un
ance.”
opinion adopts the relation back
words the
may be tax evas
the letter of the law
der
easy
“such
circumvention
doctrine because
ion,17
taxpayer may order his or her
abut
in-
purpose cannot have been
of the law’s
advantage the tax
to take the most
affairs
body
legislative
course a
does
tended.” Of
in
example,
For
Atlantic
laws allow.
the intent that it be
pass
an act with
168,
Phillips, 332 U.S.
Line R. Co. v.
Coast
avoided,
Although
easily or not.
such an
L.Ed. 1977
67 S.Ct.
construing an
may be a basis for
intent
Court said:
consistent with the
ambiguous ordinance
taxpayers
or-
As to the astuteness
Constitution,18
an
or Federal
State
so as to minimize
dering their affairs
not sufficient to validate
other-
intent is
very
said that “the
mean-
we have
taxes
unconstitutional
ordinance.
See
wise
you
law is that
ing of a line
Borough
Hynes Mayor
and Council of
you
intentionally may go as close to it as
610, 616-619,
Oradell,
96 S.Ct.
425 U.S.
pass it.”
you
can if
do not
1758-1760,
48 L.Ed.2d
at 1587.
pension plan. The decision also makes
sense in the of the decision of the context court, governmental Kerner that a
lower I plan created under constitution- changed or provision
al divested could vesting.
after a comparable Oklahoma have does not HAYES, Roger Appellant, Dale provision specifically constitutional creat- plans munici- ing governmental pension pal employees incorporate could which Oklahoma, Appellee. STATE give force and such the effect No. F-82-466. provision of our State Constitution. Nei- Appeals Court of Criminal Oklahoma. possess such ther does Oklahoma a consti- allowing for tutional the divest- March ing pension plans.
CONCLUSION Art. 2 Oklahoma Constitution at prohibits a criminal conviction from
working a forfeiture of estate. The em-
ployee began receiving here retired XIII, Const.1970,
19. Ill. sec. 5. art.