Woods v. BailetWoods v. Bailet
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Coleman, Becker, Baker
Allie Woods sued her doctors for operating on her without her informed consent. The trial court dismissed the case because Woods failed to first file a claim with the doctors’ employer, a public development authority organized as a public corporation and created by the City of Seattle. We affirm because we hold that the doctors’ employer was a “local government entity” as that term was defined by
FACTS
On May 7, 1998, doctors Jeffrey Bailet and John Rowland performed surgery on Allie Woods. The purpose of the surgery was to determine whether a spot in her throat was malignant. When Woods awoke in the recovery room, she was having trouble breathing. The doctors tried various techniques to help Woods breathe, none of which were successful. Finally, Woods became unable to breathe at all and the doctors performed a tracheotomy, a procedure that involves cutting a slit in the patient‘s throat and inserting a tube to help with breathing. Since then, doctors have attempted on several occasions to remove the tube, but Woods had trouble breathing after each attempt and the tube had to be reinserted. When this lawsuit was filed, the tube was still in Woods’ throat.
At the time they treated Woods, the doctors were employed by the Pacific Hospital Preservation and Development Authority, doing business as Pacific Medical Center and PacMed clinics. PacMed was created by the City of Seattle to provide free and low-cost health care. It is a “public corporation” organized under
On May 7, 2001, Woods sued the doctors on the basis of lack of informed consent,1 claiming that they never told her that the routine diagnostic surgery could result in the permanent placement of a tube in her throat. She claims she never would have consented to the surgery if she knew the tube was a possible consequence of it. The trial court granted the doctors’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Woods had failed to comply with a statute that requires plaintiffs suing local government entities to first file a claim with the entity‘s governing body.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The first issue before us is whether PacMed is a “local government entity” as defined by
At the time Woods filed this lawsuit,
The doctors argue that PacMed is covered by the above definition because it is a “quasi-municipal corporation” under
As used here, the term denotes a corporation created or authorized by the legislature that is merely a public agency endowed with such of the attributes of a municipality as may be necessary in the performance of its limited objective. In other words, a quasi-municipal corporation is a public agency created or authorized by the legislature to aid the state in, or to take charge of, some public or state work, other than community government, for the general welfare.
1 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 2.13, at 163 (John H. Silvestri & Mark S. Nelson eds., 3d rev. ed.1999) (footnotes omitted). This definition encompasses any corporation created by a municipality that performs a public service but does not fit the traditional definition of a municipal corporation. A public development authority such as PacMed falls squarely within this definition since it was created by a city to perform the limited objective of providing health care for the general welfare.
The legislature‘s omission of the term “public corporation” from the definition of “local government entity” does not change this result. PacMed‘s charter indicates that it is organized under
to provide a single, uniform procedure for bringing a claim for damages against a local government entity. The existing procedures, contained in
chapter 36.45 RCW , counties,chapter 35.31 RCW , cities and towns,chapter 35A.31 RCW , optional municipal code, andchapter 4.96 RCW , other political subdivisions, municipal corporations,and quasi-municipal corporations, are revised and consolidated into chapter 4.96 RCW .
Laws of 1993, ch. 449, § 1. Woods argues that because the legislature did not include the term “public corporation” in the definition of “local government entity” or cite
Woods further argues that the 2001 amendments adding the term “public hospital” to the definition of a local government entity demonstrate that PacMed was not a local government entity before the amendments. We disagree. First, PacMed is not a public hospital, but a health authority that operates through a number of clinics. Further, even if we assume that the legislature intended the term “public hospital” to apply to an entity like PacMed, that would not change the fact that PacMed is also a quasi-municipal corporation under the former statute. To help clarify the original legislative intent of a statute, we may turn to its subsequent history. Littlejohn Constr. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 74 Wash.App. 420, 427, 873 P.2d 583 (1994). But where a statute‘s meaning is plain, no clarification is necessary, and subsequent amendments adding the term “public hospital” do not retroactively change the plain meaning of the former statute. As a quasi-municipal corporation, PacMed was, and continues to be, a local government entity subject to the claim filing requirements of
CLAIM FILING AGAINST DOCTORS SUED INDIVIDUALLY
Woods also argues that
Our previous opinion in Hardesty controls this issue. In that case, we dismissed a claim against an individual physician who worked for University of Washington Medical Center, a state hospital, because the plaintiff failed to comply with the claim filing statute. Hardesty, 82 Wash.App. at 261, 917 P.2d 577. The plaintiff argued that the claims statute did not apply to employees sued in their individual capacity. We rejected that argument.
Clearly, Stenchever performed the actions upon which Hardesty bases her claim entirely within the scope of his employment at the UW.... [T]he attorney general is required to defend him and satisfy any judgment against him. The suit, therefore, exposes state funds to liability, making this precisely the type of case to which [the claim-filing statute] applies.
Hardesty, 82 Wash.App. at 261, 917 P.2d 577. Here, as in Hardesty, there is no dispute that the care provided by the doctors was within the scope of their duties as employees. This case, like Hardesty, is therefore distinguishable from the cases cited by Woods involving intentional torts, civil rights violations, and other employee actions that are clearly outside the scope of their employment. See Boss v. City of Spokane, 63 Wash.2d 305, 387 P.2d 67 (1963) (no claim filing required for intentional tort claim); Jones v. Univ. of Wash., 62 Wash.App. 653, 655, 814 P.2d 1236 (1991) (age and race discrimination). See also Hardesty, 82 Wash.App. at 262, 917 P.2d 577 (distinguishing Jones).
Woods argues that this case is distinguishable from Hardesty because it concerns a corporation created by a city rather than a state hospital and because the city does not
DUE PROCESS
Woods next argues that the application of the claim filing statute to her case violates due process. She argues that the statute failed to give her sufficient notice that claim filing was required or how she should go about filing a claim. The statute has since been amended to require local government entities to appoint an agent to receive claims. But the former statute, while requiring inquiry by a plaintiff to determine the proper claim filing procedure, was not so vague as to violate fundamental principles of fairness. Woods has therefore failed to demonstrate she was denied due process.
We disagree. Claim-filing statutes that impose reasonable procedural burdens do not violate the Constitution. Hintz v. Kitsap County, 92 Wash.App. 10, 960 P.2d 946 (1998) (citing Pirtle v. Spokane Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 81, 83 Wash.App. 304, 308, 921 P.2d 1084 (1996)). Although the legislature has since recognized the need for more specific procedures by amending the statute to require designation of an agent to receive claims, it does not follow that the procedure outlined in former
Woods further argues that she was given insufficient notice that the statute applied to her claim at all. She argues that where, as here, a plaintiff receives treatment at a private hospital by two doctors employed by a “public corporation” such as PacMed, it would be fundamentally unfair to expect her to know that PacMed falls within the vague definition of “local government entity” contained in former
But minimal inquiry would have revealed that the doctors worked for PacMed and that PacMed is a quasi-municipal corporation and therefore subject to claim-filing requirements. Although the doctors performed the operation at a private hospital, they first treated Woods at a PacMed clinic. PacMed‘s website states that it is a public development authority created by the City of Seattle. Upon reading any of the broad common law definitions of “quasi-municipal corporation” quoted above, a plaintiff exercising due diligence would have discovered that
RETROACTIVITY OF AMENDMENTS
Woods next argues that the legislature‘s 2001 amendments to
In 2001, the legislature amended the claim-filing statute to require local government entities to appoint an agent to receive claims:
The governing body of each local government entity shall appoint an agent to receive any claim for damages made under this chapter. The identity of the agent and the address where he or she may be reached during the normal business hours of the local governmental entity are public records and shall be recorded with the auditor of the county in which the entity is located.
Laws of 2001, ch. 119, § 2. According to the Senate Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the bill, it was intended to be a “technical fix” that would “lower the transactional costs for litigants.” SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY REP., H.B. 1530 (March 27, 2001). The testimony in favor of the bill was summarized as follows: “The current law is confusing as to how a claim for damages is to be served on a local government. The concept in the bill is the same as having a registered agent receive process for a corporation.” SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra. Statutory amendments are presumed to be prospective only. Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 114 Wash.2d 42, 47, 785 P.2d 815 (1990). That presumption can be overcome if (1) the legislature specifically provides for retroactivity, (2) the amendment is curative, or (3) the amendment is remedial. State v. T.K., 139 Wash.2d 320, 332-33, 987 P.2d 63 (1999). A “curative” statutory amendment is one that clarifies or technically corrects an ambiguous statute. State v. Smith, 144 Wash.2d 665, 674, 30 P.3d 1245, 39 P.3d 294 (2001). A “remedial” change in a statute is one that relates to practice, procedures, or remedies and does not affect a substantive or vested right. Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 674, 30 P.3d 1245. Even if remedial, an amendment should be applied retroactively only when doing so would further the remedial purpose. State v. Humphrey, 139 Wash.2d 53, 63, 983 P.2d 1118 (1999).
The legislature did not expressly indicate that these amendments were to apply retroactively. See In re Marriage of Hawthorne, 91 Wash.App. 965, 967, 957 P.2d 1296 (1998) (noting statement that amendment was “`a long overdue clarification of the law‘” not clear legislative statement of retroactivity) (quoting H.B. REP. 2559). The question, then, is whether the amendments are either remedial or curative.
The 2001 amendments are not curative. The statute was not ambiguous before—it merely lacked specific procedures. Plaintiffs were required, under the former statute, to identify the “governing body” of a local government entity in order to determine where to file a claim. But the amendments did not clarify that term. Instead, they established a new procedure requiring government entities to designate an agent to receive claims. Although these amendments made it easier to file a claim, they did so by establishing new requirements for government entities, not by clarifying old ones.
Further, although the amendments are remedial, we will not apply them retroactively in this case because to do so would not further their remedial purpose. Humphrey, 139 Wash.2d at 63, 983 P.2d 1118. The remedial purpose of the amendment was to alleviate confusion regarding where to file claims against government entities. But this is not a case in which the plaintiff attempted to file a claim but sent it to the wrong office or agent. Cf. Kleyer v. Harborview Med. Ctr. of Univ. of Wash., 76 Wash.App. 542, 545-46, 887 P.2d 468 (1995). Further, Woods
SANCTIONS
The doctors argue that this is a frivolous appeal and request attorney fees as sanctions under RAP 18.9(a). But reasonable minds could differ as to the issues raised, as demonstrated by this court‘s decisions denying the doctors’ motion on the merits and setting the case for oral argument. See Johnson v. Mermis, 91 Wash.App. 127, 137, 955 P.2d 826 (1998). The doctors’ request for sanctions is therefore denied.
Affirmed.
BECKER, C.J., and BAKER, J., concur.