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Woods Ex Rel. Simpson v. Commonwealth
142 S.W.3d 24
Ky.
2004
Check Treatment

*1 victims and witnesses providing for their Accordingly, judgment of convictions rights protection.” Acts, and the Ky. imposed by Fayette sentences ch. 212. Circuit Court purpose The are affirmed. statute ensure that rights certain were provided LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, victims,

for a particular class of not to limit JOHNSTONE, KELLER, STUMBO, any rights or protections trial court JJ., concur. might choose provide for other classes of victims. Specifically, respect J„ WINTERSHEIMER, concurs in statement, impact the victim KRS 421.520 result without separate opinion. provides: attorney for the Commonwealth that, notify

shall upon victim defendant,

conviction of the the vic- right

tim has the to submit a written

victim impact pro- statement to the responsible prepar- bation officer for WOODS, by Deceased, Matthew ing the pre-sentence investigation through Litem, His ad Guardian T. report report inclusion Simpson, Jr., Appellant, Bruce to the court should report such a be by waived the defendant. KENTUCKY,

COMMONWEALTH OF (Now Cabinet for Human Resources (3) The victim impact shall statement Children), Cabinet for Families and by prior any considered court Appellee. sentencing decision on the or re- No. 1999-SC-0773-DG. lease, including probation, shock the defendant. Supreme Kentucky. Court of added). words, Id. (emphasis In other Aug. 2004. person designated as the “victim” under KRS 421.500 has the absolute impact

submit a victim statement and have prior considered the trial court

sentencing decision. This does not remove trial court the discretion to con- other impact

sider statements from other

individuals affected the crime. See Commonwealth, Ky.App.,

Brand v. (1997) (“We

S.W.2d know of noth-

ing suggests the trial court is without injured

discretion to allow those as a result testifying

of lesser crimes from to

impact lives; of the crimes their or for submitting

that matter from impact state- They simply

ments. are afforded statute.”)

right by *4 Manion, J.

Francis American Center for Midwest, Law and Hope, New Justice — Counsel for Amicus Curiae Catholics Unit- ed for Life.

COOPER, Justice. appeal challenges This the constitution- 311.631, ality provision of KRS Act, Kentucky Living Will Directive inso- far permits as it a judicially-appointed designated or other surrogate the withholding authorize or withdrawal of artificial life-prolonging treatment from a ward or patient persis- who is in a *5 either tent vegetative state or permanently un- If constitutional, conscious. the statute is the issue becomes to implement how it. Matthew Woods was born on November 24, 1941; he during died course these proceedings on June 1996. His intelligence quotient (I.Q.) was between 70 and, by judicial appointment, vari- agencies ous managed state had his affairs Jr., T. Bruce Simpson, Anggelis, Gor- since May January 1970. On don, Simpson Roberts, & Lexington, Coun- pursuant jury’s to a verdict that he was sel for Appellant. partially disabled, 387.570; ’KRS Mercer, G. Thomas Office of the Coun- 387.580, Fayette ap- District Court sel, Children, Cabinet for Families and pointed agent of the Cabinet for Human Pate, Sherri D. Cabinet for Human Re- (“CHR”) Resources as Woods’s limited sources, Counsel, Frankfort, General authority with to make certain for Appellee. Counsel him, decisions for including consent Bush, Richard N. George Schuhmann, S. procedures. medical Woods lived a Louisville, Counsel for Amicus Curiae home, state-approved group attended Citizens, Council for Retarded Inc. church, a girlfriend, participated regu- had larly day-treatment programs, and was Cetrulo, Robert C. Kentucky Northern able by to travel town to visit across bus Life, Right Covington, Edward L. friends. He by was treated for asthma White, III, Thomas More Center Law doctors University Kentucky Justice, Arbor, MI, & Ann Counsel for Medical Center. Amicus Curiae Thomas More Center for Law & Justice. 18, 1995, On April suffered car- Woods Bowman, Zeller, J.

Melissa Kenneth W. diopulmonary while being arrest trans- Frankfort, Advocacy, Protection and ported Coun- aby friend to the Medical Center sel for Amicus Curiae Protection and Ad- for treatment of a severe asthma attack. vocacy Division Kentucky Depart- hospi- His friend detoured to nearest tal, Advocacy. ment of Public Joseph Hospital, St. where medical could be mechanical- hydration trition and personnel and connect- resuscitated Woods him to a ventilator. Efforts directly ed mechanical into his small intes- ly pumped him he failed and never further revive Nevertheless, not dead was tines. Woods regained An electroen- consciousness. short KRS 446.400 because defined (EEG) revealed cephalogram- examination activity still emanated bursts electrical global encephalopathy, which his severe impulses brain stem. These from his ie., agreed hypoxia, was caused doctors man- myoclonus, condition caused severe deprivation that occurred between oxygen that spasms were ifested violent muscle cardiopulmonary arrest the resus- drug. Ac- only by paralyzing controlled treating Dr. Jere- physician, citation. His Robertson, no re- cording to Dr. there Suhl, consulting neurologist, miah myoclonus case of corded Robertson, Dr. agreed William C. absent some im- regaining consciousness had total and irreversible Woods suffered twenty-four first provement within cessation of all normal brain functions. condition did forty-eight hours. Woods’s pain nor responded He to neither voice He remained in a state of improve. He stimuli. was unable breathe unconsciousness,1 a condition permanent A tracheostomy performed swallow. vegetative a persistent more severe than permanently attach a mechanical venti- iwterrwptus, mors state,2 suspended by his pumped oxygen lungs. lator into body and machine”3 in a Lim- “merger of first, hydration pro- At nutrition and were life and cognizant between Later, bo somewhere through feeding vided nasal tubes. *6 legal gastrostomy performed so that nu- death.4 " 'Permanently "Prognosis in Cardio- 1. a condi- Survival Terms unconscious’ means for which, long-term, degree Usually Respiratory Functions: tion to a of medical reasonable years probability, by or even decades. solely pa- as determined Recovery Prognosis Neu- "Time When attending physician tient's and one other for with a examination, rologic Functions Can be Determined physician clinical on charac- cause; Degree by High Certainty: Varies by terized an absence of cerebral cortical usually encephalopathy, 1-3 hypoxic-ischemic or be- functions indicative of consciousness trauma, months; usually 6-12 in head interaction havioral environment.” months. 311.621(12). Physical Psychological “Degree Suffer- ing: None.” vegetative 2. "Persistent state is a condition Life-Sustaining Coordinating Council on having following characteristics: by Making Medical Treatment Decision (Functional): Courts, “Basic Irreversible State Court Decision Guidelines Definition functions; of all brain stem Making Life-Sustaining loss neocortical Medical Treatment rev.1993). (2d app. functions intact. Cases 175 B ed. Awake, unaware; Syndrome: “Clinical but Health, Director, Dep't 3. Mo. Cruzan unconsciousness; cy- eyes-open sleep/wake 261, 339, U.S. S.Ct. independence. present; respirator cles J., (1990) (Stevens, dissenting). L.Ed.2d 224 Damage: Neurologic “Anatomic Substrate of Varies, commonly but destruc- reports most extensive dissenting opinion inaccurately 4. The (see hypoxic-ischemic consciousness, post of neocortex n. regained tion that Woods i.e., dysfunction encephalopathy, recovery,” post brain at 59-60. and "made 58-59 by] during damage respiratory or cardiac Although reported [caused one Dr. Suhl examination, eyes ap- significant respiratory opened or cardiac and arrest ... or Woods his stimuli, compromise), peared matter he did not respond pain or subcortical white (head trauma). regained conscious- that Woods ever claim best, onset, ness, Dr. second- less recovered. At "Onset and Course: Sudden much temporary, partial report ary hypoxic-ischemic acute head Suhl’s indicated insult or permanent progression unconsciousness trauma.

Dr. Suhl estimated that biologi- Woods’s ville where Hurst, Dr. Arthur T. Jr. as- cal functions could be maintained for one sumed responsibility for his treatment. years ventilation, two possibly and agreed Dr. Hurst with the diagnosis and up years, to ten but that if the ventilator prognosis reached Drs. Suhl and Rob- removed, were death would occur in less ertson strongly agreed with the rec- than forty-eight hours. Drs. Suhl and ommendation to terminate Woods’s life- Robertson both recommended withdraw- prolonging regard treatment: “I continu- ing artificial ventilation so that the me- ing such heroic measures as a violation of chanically interrupted natural process of the Hippocratic Oath abdication of dying could conclude. They did not rec- Judeo-Christian ethic which I was ommend withdrawal of the artificially ad- Frankly, raised. I do not see much differ- ministered nutrition hydration until ence between what doing we are here and after death occurred.5 After a two-hour some of the atrocities that we read about meeting with Dr. CHR, Suhl and the elev- in Bosnia.”7 en members (including physicians) four the St. Joseph Hospital ethics committee September 21, 1995, On the district unanimously agreed with the recommenda- court opinion entered an holding order tion.6 CHR filed a motion in Fayette that KRS 311.631 authorizes a judicially- District Court seeking judicial approval of appointed guardian of an adult who the recommendation. The district court lacks capacity decisional and has not made appointed a guardian Woods, ad litem for directive,” an “advance to make health held a hearing, and accepted briefs on the care decisions on behalf patient, issue. Joseph St. Hospital filed an amicus including withdrawal artificial life-sup- brief supporting the motion. During the port systems, course of proceedings, these without obtaining Woods was advance transferred to Hospital Vencor judicial Louis- approval, long so as the *7 persistent vegetative toward a theology, state. See note psychology, psychiatry, and and is 2, supra, syndrome for the persis- clinical of a the former dean of the nursing school of at state, "Awake, vegetative tent but un- viz: Georgetown University Washington, in D.C. aware; unconsciousness; eyes-open sleep/ personally examining After Woods and re- ” However, cycles present wake .... Woods records, viewing his medical she testified: never reached the fourth facet of the clinical just lying up [H]e’s there hooked to these i.e., syndrome, "respirator independence;” breathing machines and from the machine that, and the record shortly is clear after Dr. no, own, independent and has no life of his report, Suhl's relapsed Woods into a state of anything or enjoy about complete life that he can permanent or unconsciousness which from, get any any- satisfaction legal continued until relate to his death. body just with him.... I would take him off machines, of the and let nature take its Contrary 5. to the inferences advanced in the course, 58-62, dignified I dissenting opinion, because that is a post think no one in way to die. proposed fight against this case ever Not to have to removal of Woods’s machine, hydration get artificial nutrition support sys- depleted and so that even a tems. help anymore. machine can’t dissenting opinion, post quotes 7.The at 58-59 Joseph Hospital 6. St. is an arm of the Roman the second sentence of Dr. Hurst’s remarks Charity Catholic Sisters of of Nazareth Health Bohan, suggest System. out of context to Care that Dr. Hurst lik- Sister Kathleen a mem- committee, ber life-support of the ethics ened the removal of holds a artificial masters degree nursing, in degree high- a doctorate in atrocities committed in Bosnia. Obvious- er education ly, administration with referring minors in he was to the artificial mainte-

31 dis- Appeals granted in interest sion.8 The Court good acts faith best patient. cretionary affirmed. also of the review and We affirm granted discretionary review and appealed litem to the guardian ad except as of the lower courts holdings Court, asserting that Fayette Circuit respect, In that proof. to the standard or, 311.681 is unconstitutional if constitu- hold that artificial we withdrawal tional, judicially-appointed guardian prohibited is support patient life prove by convincing must clear and evi- convincing evidence absent clear withdrawing life sup- dence that artificial permanently unconscious patient interests; patient’s is in the port best and that persistent vegetative state public policy that the statute violates is in the withdrawing support patient’s died of modern ethical standards. Woods best interest. 1996, 2, natural causes on June before the rule the appeal; circuit court could ac- on a slate. We do write clean cordingly, the circuit court dismissed as Jersey’s Supreme Since the Court of New Appeals moot. The Court of reversed and Quinlan, re seminal decision in In N.J. 70 remanded, citing exception to the moot- (1976), courts, 10, many A.2d 647 state 355 doctrine, applicable ness when the under- Court, including “ this DeGrella Parrent lying dispute ‘capable repetition, yet Elston, (1993), Ky., ’ v. 698 858 S.W.2d evading Lexington review.” Herald- Court, Supreme well as the United States 658, Meigs, Ky., Leader Co. S.W.2d Cruzan, var supra note have addressed (1988) (quoting Ass’n v. Neb. Press relating ious issues a termi Stuart, 539, 546, U.S. S.Ct. ill life- nally to refuse unwanted (1976)); 49 L.Ed.2d 683 see also prolonging treatment.9 Because Hughes, Ky., Commonwealth v. guardian ad litem asserts that DeGrella S.W.2d case, precludes result we reach remand, Fayette On Circuit Court we in which De- first examine the context opinion entered a comprehensive holding Grella decided. that KRS 311.631 is constitutional and require does proof best I. COMMON LAW BACKGROUND. evidence; interest clear and convincing DeGrella, support supra, withdrawal artificial life As Woods’s systems from permanently question unconscious ad litem does not *8 patient public policy right competent person forego does not of a to med violate by if modern ethical the decision is ical treatment either refusal or with standards made Pac. good (quoting faith and is the ward’s drawal. Id. at 703 Union interest; 250, 251, Botsford, Ry. that there is no to Co. v. 141 11 best need U.S. 1001, (1891), 1000, judicial of a decision 734 su prior approval obtain S.Ct. 35 L.Ed. dispute among perseded by grounds to do so interested rule on other as stat absent Bums, 301, 46 by ConmSupp. to ed Privee v. parties as the soundness of deci- "right 9. to does extend biological nance Woods’s existence where The so-called die” of DeGrella, mercy killing, hope recovery. 858 there was no of to euthanasia 707, or sui- S.W.2d at to suicide or assisted 807-09, Quill, 793, disagree- expressed v. 521 8. Woods’s brother mild cide. Vacco U.S. 2301-02, recommendation, 2293, ment and his niece 117 S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997); agree Washington Glucksberg, disagree. v. 521 U.S. declined Both declined 735, 2258, 2275, 702, guard- 138 appointed to be as a 117 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d successor limited 387.090(3). ian. KRS 772 32 689, (1999);

749 A.2d 695-96 and Schloendorff110 S.Ct. at 2851-52. Courts and com Soc’y 125, Hosp., 211 N.Y. mentators have identified four state inter v. of N.Y. 92, (1914), N.E. abrogated 105 93 on other ests that may person’s limit a right grounds by 656, 2 Bing Thunig, (1) v. N.Y.2d refuse preserving medical treatment: 3,143 3, (1957), 163 N.Y.S.2d (2) N.E.2d 9 and life; (3) suicide; preventing safeguard superseded by grounds other statute on ing the integrity of the medical profession; by Orentreich, stated Retkwa v. 154 and innocent protecting parties. third 164, (1992)). Misc.2d 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 Perlmutter, E.g., 160,162 Satz v. 362 So.2d right That derives from the common law (Fla.App.1978); Superintendent Bel rights of self-determination and informed Saikewicz, chertown v. State Sch. 373 consent, DeGrella, 709; S.W.2d at 858 see 728, 417, (1977); Mass. 370 In N.E.2d 425 Cruzan, 270, also 497 at U.S. 110 S.Ct. Torres, re Conservatorship 357 N.W.2d (“The logical corollary 2847 of the doctrine 332, (Minn.1984); 339 In Conroy, re 98 informed consent is that 321, 1209, (1985); N.J. 486 A.2d 1223 re generally possesses right not to con 114, Colyer, 738, 99 660 Wash.2d P.2d 743 sent, is, treatment.”); to refuse and in (1983) (en banc); President’s Commission liberty by interest protected the Four Study of Ethical Problems in Medi teenth Amendment to the United States cine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re (“nor Constitution shall State deprive search, Deciding Forego Life-Sustain any person life, liberty, or property, (1983) (hereinafter ing Treatment 31-32 law”),10 without due process 278, id. at Commission”). “President’s (“The 110 S.Ct. at 2851 principle that a It universally is also accepted competent person has constitutionally may deprive the state citizens protected liberty refusing un interest rights their solely constitutional because may medical wanted be inferred they possess do not the decisional capacity decisions.”); and, our prior perhaps to personally exercise them. v. Youngberg so, 1 even more of the Section Constitu Romeo, 307, 315, 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. (“All are, nature, of Kentucky tion men (1982) (certain liberty 73 L.Ed.2d 28 equal, free and have certain inherent interests involuntary still intact after com and inalienable rights, among which mitment); Indiana, Jackson 406 U.S. right be reckoned: enjoying First: The 715, 731, 1845, 1854, 92 S.Ct. 32 L.Ed.2d liberties.”) defending their lives and (1972) (indefinite commitment of crimi added). (emphasis Quinlan, But see nal incompetent defendant to stand trial (right A.2d at 663 to refuse treatment was violates right Fourteenth Amendment corollary privacy right ex Thus, process). due to refuse Wade, pressed cases such as Roe v. medical treatment embodied in the consti 113, 152-53, 705, 726-27, U.S. 93 S.Ct. liberty tutional interest extends not (1973), L.Ed.2d 147 Griswold v. Con competent necticut, incompetent, but also 381 U.S. S.Ct. *9 (1965)). However, “because the of human dignity value ex L.Ed.2d 510 this right Saikewicz, tends to both.” 370 at is not absolute. individual’s N.E.2d liberty The against interest must 427. See also v. be balanced relevant Rasmussen Mitchell Cruzan, 279, 207, 674, Fleming, state interests. 497 U.S. at 154 741 Ariz. P.2d 685- implicates agent This case Fourteenth was an re of the Commonwealth. In 10. L.W., 53, Amendment because Woods was ward of Guardianship 167 Wis.2d 482 of Commonwealth, guardian 60, who (1992). N.W.2d 71 sought support to withdraw artificial life his

33 (en ía, will, clearest evi- (1987) banc); living provide the Conservatorship 86 of Knight v. 185, desires. Drabick, Cal.Rptr. person’s 245 of a Cal.App.Sd 200 dence Health 840, (1988), Bay Manor abrogated by statute on Health Care Beverly 855 (but (Ala.2001) 92, re recognized by Ctr., as In Con- 99 other 820 So.2d grounds Care 519, ofWendland, argued 26 Cal.4th servatorship patient’s relatives incompetent 412, 151, 28 P.3d 165 ramifications Cal.Rptr.2d 110 she not understand did (2001); it); v. Foody Hosp., Mem’l Manchester she executed living of her will when 718, 127, 482 718 Conn.Supp. A.2d Browning, 40 568 Guardianship In re of Ctr., Wilmington Med. (1984); (Fla.1990) v. Sevens 4, (patient’s own writ- So.2d 16 (Del.1980); Inc., 1834, John 421 A.2d 1347 designation proxy ten declaration Bludworth, Hosp. Kennedy F. Mem’l v. of pa- presumption rebuttable creates 921, (Fla.1984); In 452 926 re BludwoHh, So.2d wishes); at 452 So.2d tient’s (La.1982); P.V.W., 1015, 424 So.2d 1019 persuasive evidence (living 926 will is 399, MaHin, 204, 450 re Mich. 538 N.W.2d intent and is entitled incompetent patient’s Quinlan, 664; (1995); at 406 355 A.2d at weight); Conroy, 486 A.2d great 431, Dillon, 426 Eichner v. 73 A.D.2d types (living 1229 will is one several (“To 517, (N.Y.App.Div.1980) 546 N.Y.S.2d against ex- person’s evidence of wishes deny patient the exercise because treatment); traordinary life-sustaining affd, deny right.”), is to 52 unconscious Strasser, Incompetents and the Mark 363, 266, 438 420 N.E.2d N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d Consistent Right Die: In Search 64, (1981); Guardianship In re 70-72 Standards, 733, Ky. 83 L.J. Meaningful Hamlin, 810, 1372, 102 689 P.2d Wash.2d (“It (1994-95) for courts 747 is reasonable (1984) (en banc); Guardianship In re presumption that a rebuttable employ 10, 73-74; ofL.W., supra note at David W. competent living represents will Meyers, Medico-Legal Implications preferences.”). informed individual’s 11.6, § at 274 Dying Death and However, unequivocal oral also statements methods Courts have identified three Dillon, carry great weight. Eichner incompe- which to determine whether an 420 N.E.2d N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d right to refuse or terminate artificial tent’s (Whether (1981) other someone systems life-support should be exercised: discontinu- than can authorize (1) “is not Previously expressed life-sustaining ance desires. here case because presented [the incompetent of an explicit wishes himself made decision for be- patient] extraordinary patient regarding life-pro- incompetent.”). fore he became if respected should be longing treatment Cruzan, expressed competent.11 while See judgment. Substituted 289-90, 110 at 2857-58 S.Ct. U.S. unequivocal If own incompetent’s (O’Connor, J., validity concurring) (noting unknown, courts have some wishes are instructions); Wendland, 110 of such Cal. surro- designated permitted (construing at 165 Rptr.2d 28 P.3d none, family or close gate, if member § assign- as Probate Code California judgment associate, a substituted to make ing weight incompetent’s dispositive wishes). incompetent would what prior informally expressed competent. document, had she been decided he or expressed in a written Wishes *10 intent, not to a fact remem- lates to future 11. statements are admissible under Such DeGrella, 803(3), exception 709. See 858 S.W.2d at KRE the "state-of-mind” bered. rule, hearsay the because the statement re- 34 (1995)

The only practical way prevent considerations), (reciting de- same affd, (1996). 592, struction 543 [incompetent person’s Pa. 673 A.2d 905 is to right permit constitutional] the The scope of the evidence that be family and patient] [the inquiry received in the is as as wide render judgment their best ... as to the concepts of relevance and materiali- Oral, whether ty she would exercise it in these are to the state of mind issue. written, circumstances. well as statements of the ward, made to the prior ward’s incom- Quinlan, 664. inquiry 355 A.2d at This petency, should be considered. Evi- subjective one in “the which court ... dence of this character will include must ... act upon the same motives and actual, expressed intent or desire considerations as have would moved [the withdrawn, have sustenance artificial AC., patient].” 1235, In re 573 A.2d 1249 spe- but the evidence is limited to (en (internal (D.C.1990) banc) quotations cific, subjective intent evidence. The omitted); Cantor, Legal Norman L. Fron- “ patient’s ‘philosophical, religious and (1987) (“Un- Dying tiers Death and 63 views, goals, moral values about the judgment the approach, der substituted purpose way the life and it should surrogate the must decision-maker effectu- lived, sickness, and attitudes toward ate, to possible, the extent the course of medical procedures, suffering and conduct which the would have de- ’ death” explored. should be sired.”). Mack, 188, 744, Mack v. Md. 329 618 A.2d judgment Under the substituted doc- (1993) Jobes, 758 445 (quoting 529 A.2d at trine, surrogate ... [t]he considers the Newman, (quoting A. Steven Treatment patient’s prior statements about and re- Critically Terminally the Refusals for issues, actions to medical and all the Proposed III: the the Family, Rules for facets of the patient’s personality that State, Physician and the 3 N.Y.L. Sch. with, surrogate is familiar 35, (1985))). Hum. Rts. Ann. 47 in- with— course, particular reference to his or her competent’s should attitudes be considered philosophical, theological, relevant even if contrary right to convention. “The ethical to extrapolate values—in order self-determination, both for competents what course of treatment medical incompetents, is understood to include patient would choose. refuse even when In re 444 pressed 415, Mass. also (factors (Del.1995); (1987) In re 421 Jobes, 512, preferences; include N.E.2d Tavel, (citing 583 N.E.2d Guardianship 108 N.J. 40, “[1] [2] 56-59 re A.2d 394, Roe, 529 A.2d 1061, patient’s (1981)). 383 Doe, 1068-69 Mass. reli- 434, See ex- interest, making rational or reasonable such refusal L.Rev. Buchanan, to do in similar circumstances.” (3) Best interest. nor The Limits 389-90 would in agreement Incompetents, be neither in persons Proxy with what most would elect 29 UCLA one’s best Decision- Allen E. their relation no evidence of gious pa- convictions and to re- Where reliable fusal treatment; [3] impact tient’s intent exists, precluding substitu- patient’s family; [4] probability of ad- tion of incompetent’s judgment, courts verse side effects; [5] prognosis permitted surrogate base treatment”); Fiori, and without In re decision objective inquiry on an into Pa.Super. incompetent patient’s A.2d best interest. Ras-

35 treatment; Drabick, treat- 689; the various mussen, without 741 P.2d at 245 risks, effects, 856-57; options; and the side Foody, at A.2d at ment Cal.Rptr. 482 Martin, 407; Torres, options.” 721; of each of those 588 at and benefits N.W.2d 337; Conroy, A.2d at 857 at 486 N.W.2d Rosebush, Mich.App. 195 491 In re L.W., 1231; 70. The deci- N.W.2d at 482 (1992) (quoting Conroy, 640 N.W.2d surrogate’s on view of sion is based the (Handler, J., concurring at 1249 486 A.2d “ life, that the quality of but ‘the value dissenting part part)). and in ’ the ... patient, of life has for continuation making court the conclude We find in the con- not ‘the value that others of or with- to withhold decision whether of life....”’ Ras- tinuation the life-sustaining medical treatment draw mussen, (quoting at n. 741 P.2d following the fac- ... should consider Commission, 43), at n. President’s (1) levels of [patient’s] present the tors: L.W., at quoted in 73. N.W.2d cogni- sensory, emotional and physical, surrogate In these decision- situations (2) life, of functioning; quality the tive try ... must to make a choice makers and for recov- expectancy prognosis life implement for the that seeks treatment, includ- ery with and without person’s is in that best interests what treatment; futility of continued ing the objective, societally reference to more (3) options, and the various shared criteria. Thus the interests best risks, effects, and of the side benefits standard does rest on the value of (4) each; degree phys- the nature and solely protec- on self-determination but suffering resulting from the pain ical or patients’ tion of welfare. condition; (5) whether the medi- medical assessing procedure In whether a or being provided causing cal treatment a pa- course of treatment would inbe suffering, pain, or serious or cause interests, surrogate tient’s best must (6) pain suffering or complications; into as the take account such factors if the medical treatment is with- ... suffering, preservation relief or (7) drawn; any particular treat- whether quali- functioning, restoration of and the dispro- or proportionate would be ment ty as well as the extent of life sustained. to be portionate in terms of the benefits ... caused to gained versus the burdens Commission, 134-35. President’s (8) pain [patient]; the likelihood criteria to Courts established various withholding from suffering resulting determining it is in consider whether of treatment could be or withdrawal a patient perma- interest of who is best (9) minimized; degree of avoided nently persistent vege- unconscious humiliation, dig- and dependence loss life-pro- artificial tative state to remove from the condition and resulting nity longing treatment. (10) treatment; fami- opinions “[Ejvidence patient’s present about the opinions, ly, the behind those reasons emotional, sensory, physical, and level why family either the reasons degree cognitive functioning; opinion agree or cannot has no medical physical pain resulting (11) treatment; the moti- [and] course condition, treatment, termination of advocating family vations treatment, respectively; degree .... of treatment particular course humiliation, dependence, loss of /., Cal.App.4th Christopher dignity probably resulting from the con- re 122,134-35 (dealing treatment; Cal.Rptr.2d expectan- dition and child), impli- dependent overmled recovery with and with cy prognosis *12 by S., imminent, cation on grounds other In re was specifically Zeth within a few (b) 396, days; 81 Cal.4th or Cal.Rptr.3d provision “when the of artifi- 73 P.3d cial physically [could not] nutrition be 552-53 as- (c) declarant; by similated” or “when II. 1990 LEGISLATION. provision burden of artificial nutrition ... hydration [outweighed] When this Court rendered and DeGrella in benefit, its statutory provided that the only authorities determination per- of the burden refer to taining subject provi- [would] were the 1990 enact- sion itself quality and not to the Kentucky Act, ments of the Living Will (1990 Further, continued life” of declarant. Acts, Ky. 122), KRS 311.622-.644 ch. hydration artificial nutrition or could not and the Care Surrogate Health Act of be if withheld “needed for comfort or the (1990 Kentucky, 311.970-.986 Ky. KRS 311.978(3). pain.” relief of KRS Acts, 123). (As ch. noted in Part IV this opinion, infra, of those both Acts were Living prohibited The Will Act the with- Acts, repealed 13.) by Ky. § ch. holding life-support sys- or withdrawal patient tems a female known to be The Act Living permitted person Will pregnant. KRS 311.626. The Health with capacity decisional to execute a writ- permitted Care Surrogate Act the with- directing ten declaration that life-prolong- holding or life-sustaining withdrawal ing treatment or be withheld withdrawn so treatment pregnant from a woman if it that the declarant could die a natural would not “maintain the woman in such a death in the that physicians, event two way as permit continuing develop- including physician, the attendant diag- child,” ment and live birth of the unborn or nosed the with declarant a terminal condi- if the treatment cause the would irreversible,” tion that was “incurable and physical harm “prolong pain” severe would death “result within a rela- which could not “alleviated medi- (duration tively short time” not further 311.978(4). cation.” KRS Both Acts con- specified) life-prolonging so that provisions tained for revocation of the dec- would prolong dying process. laration, 311.630; 311.976, KRS KRS KRS 311.626. both provided compli- that taken in actions The Surrogate Health Care Act permit- give ance with a would not declaration rise ted a decisional capacity 311.632; liability. civil criminal KRS execute a declaration designating written 311.984(1). Living pro- KRS Act Will one or more adults to make health care vided that a declaration under the Act or decisions on the behalf declarant’s should an action in conformance therewith would capacity, declarant lack decisional suicide, 311.638, not constitute KRS determined attending the declarant’s nothing the Act should be “con- 311.972, physician. .974, KRS .978. The authorizing] ap- strued as condon[ing], surrogate “in required act accor- proving] killing mercy or euthanasia” or accepted practice” dance with medical “any act affirmative or deliberate to end to consider the recommendation of the at- pro- life other than to the natural permit tending physician, the decision the declar- dying.” cess of 311.636. The Health KRS (“substitut- made, ant would if known Surrogate Care Act made no reference to judgment”), ed and the best interest of killing, mercy perhaps euthanasia or be- However, surrogate declarant. inferentially precluded by could cause such were only consent withholding surrogate’s to the of nutri- the restrictions on authori- (a) hydration ty tion or when as set forth in 311.978. Both inevitable death Acts the pa- The oral directives pursuant action taken nature. provided *13 member, friend or gives family to a impair the Act contractual tient would provider significant KRS are of rights policy. under a life insurance health care 811.984; evidentiary consider- a relevant 311.688. value as ation, evidentiary there are other but withholding Neither Act authorized outweigh such state- matters which an life-support systems or removal ments, as written directives such had not incompetent who executed patient voiced re- contrary, reactions the so, writing, competent in to do either when types medical garding particular designation living will or a of a health treatment, religious the ten- beliefs and DeGrella, at surrogate. care S.W.2d religion, ets of that con- (“[NJeither specifical of these statutes respect of conduct with pattern sistent situation, present ly applies his medical prior decisions about own looking them for a study policy when we care. right overriding common law to refuse treatment, they medical mes send mixed DeGrella, Thus, only

sages.”). of choice patient’s] considered statements [The developments incompetent, the common discussed law made before she became this opinion, supra. dispositive question Part I of at while not

hand, upon competent are evidence III. DEGRELLA. surrogate which a decision-maker could in the judgment Martha dam- exercise circumstances Sue DeGrella’s brain was aged by presented. an acute hematoma subdural aby savage beating. lan- caused She DeGrella, at 708-09. 858 S.W.2d guished vegetative persistent state grounded our decision in DeGrella We only by with her life maintained biological law right in the common self- primarily ventilation, nutrition, artificially supplied consent, id. and informed at determination Woods, hydration. Unlike Matthew judgment” and on the “substituted she was able to react on a reflexive level to Strunk, in Strunk v. principle enunciated painful apparently stimuli and did not suf- (1969), Ky., S.W.2d 145 wherein Woods, myoclonus. fer from unlike Also mother/guardian of adult incompetent expressed, she her competent, had when permitted transplantation to authorize against wishes the use of artificial life- body kidney of the ward’s into his treatment, sustaining specifically express- competent brother. ing Ann plight abhorrence at Karen act incompetent “The for the right (Quinlan, Quinlan supra). On another recognized all cases has become injured being occasion after in an automo- country of substituted as doctrine accident, protested being put bile she on judgment enough and is broad though respirator ques- even there was no to cover but also to cover all property Employing tion that she recover. would touching well-being matters judgment” inquiry, up- the “substituted we the ward.” the trial court’s to permit held decision guardian with- DeGrella’s to authorize DeGrella, Strunk, (quoting sys- life-support of her artificial 148). drawal pointed also S.W.2d at DeGrella tems. reasoning in Strunk that the ward was upon losing brother that recognize previous dependent oral his

We state- so him the ward’s jeopardized cannot be considered conclusive would ments (“best ?) well-being interest” more than patient’s quality life, about the Strunk, kidney. loss of a (quoting Id. life,” individual’s “inalienable 146). supra, at ap- We then cited with so declared in the United States Decla- proval the following passage from Ras- Independence ration of protected by mussen: Section One of our Kentucky Consti- tution,

“Under the judgment substituted stan- outweighs any consideration of dard, ‘attempt[s] to reach life, quality life, or the value of the *14 the decision that the incapacitated per- at stake. Nothing in Opinion this should son would make if he or she were able to be construed as sanctioning support- choose.’ ... guides This standard best ing euthanasia, or mercy killing. doWe a guardian’s decisionmaking pa- when a approve permitting anyone to decide tient has manifested his or her intent when another should die on basis competent.” while other than clear convincing evidence DeGrella, Rasmussen, that the (quoting at 705 choose 741 would to do so. (internal omitted)). P.2d at 688 citations added). Id. at (emphasis 702 Although the guardian The ad naturally litem attaches statement referred to the individual’s in- great significance to the sentence immedi- life, right alienable it did not mention ately following quote, the Rasmussen viz: the individual’s right liberty. inalienable go We do not the next step, as the Cruzan, U.S. S.Ct. at Cf. Arizona court did in the Rasmussen (“It cannot disputed that the Due case, to decide that “best can interest” protects Process Clause interest extend to terminating life-sustaining as well as an interest in refusing life- medical treatment where the wishes of treatment.”). sustaining medical That the ward are unknown. because, have been unlike the case However, Id. go we said do not “[w]e judice, sub seeking to author- step,” the next not that “we would not ize withdrawal of DeGrella’s artificial life go.” expression Our statement anwas support mother, was her not a agen- state restraint because the facts DeGrella did thus, cy; arguably the Fourteenth Amend- not require us to reach the “best interest” analysis ment apply. Cruzan did not analysis, as the case could be decided on Morrison, See United States v. 529 U.S. the basis of judgment.” “substituted 598, 621, 1740, 1756, 120 S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d guardian ad litem emphasizes also the fol- (2000) (Fourteenth ap- Amendment lowing policy statement of expressed as L.W., plies only action); to state but see obiter dictum in the opinion: (“[A] guardian 482 N.W.2d at 71 is a state

As long as the case is guardian’s confined substi- actor. A authority derives decision-making by tute surrogate a in from the parens patriae power state’s conformity patient’s with previously purely statutory.”). Finally, we note wishes, expressed the case involves that had DeGrella’s mother her been of self-determination and not surrogate health care under the Health However, quality Act, of life. Surrogate judicial- as evi- Care than rather regarding dence ly-appointed guardian, wishes she would have weakens, 311.978(1), case moves from self-de- been required supra, KRS termination quality-of-life towards to consider “the recommendation of the point test. At the where attending physician, the withdrawal the decision the of life-prolonging medical grantor grantor treatment be- would have made if the solely person’s known, comes another decision then capacity, had decisional if living rela- majority of the nearest in the best the decision that would be grantor.” add- tives. (Emphasis interest of ed.) (3) authorized consent An individual 1994 LEGISLATION. IV. under section shall for another this year DeGrel- Within after we rendered faith, in good act in accordance n Assembly repealed the the General any advance directive executed Kentucky Living Act and the Health Will who lacks decisional the individual Ky. Surrogate Kentucky, Act of Care and in the best interest capacity, Acts, § ch. and enacted their de- the individual who does Living Directive place Kentucky Will capacity. cisional Act, Acts, Ky. 311.621-.643.1994 ch. An authorized make individual pro- §§ 1-12. This Act combines decision under sec- health care *15 the Act and Living visions of former Will may authorize the withdrawal tion and a Surrogate Health Care Act adds withholding artificially-provid- or of 311.631, provision, pro- new KRS which hydration in nutrition and ed

vides, alia: inter in circumstances set KRS the forth (1) patient, If an adult does not who 311.629(8). capacity, decisional has exe- 311.629(3) added.) KRS lists (Emphasis or to cuted advance directive the in former the same circumstances listed the advance does not extent directive 311.978(3), KRS viz: a address decision that must be made, (1) following one the (3) surrogate may author- A health care of responsible parties, following in the withholding or of ize the withdrawal priority if no in order individual hy- nutrition and artificially-provided available, prior reasonably class is following circum- dration in act, willing, competent shall stances: be authorized to make health care (a) is immi- inevitable death When patient: decisions on behalf of nent, for the of this purposes which (a) judicially-appointed guard- The mean when death is provision shall patient,

ian if the medical expected, reasonable if appointed has been and medical days; judgment, few within a scope of the decisions are within the guardianship; (c) artificial nu- provision When the

(b) patient; spouse The of the physically cannot be assimi- trition (c) An adult child of or if patient, person; lated (1) patient has than more one (d) provision When the burden of child, majority adult chil- hydra- nutrition and of artificial reasonably dren who are available its outweigh tion shall benefit. itself consultation; for in exceptions Even in the listed (d) parents of the patient; (c) (a), (b), of this paragraphs subsection, nu- (e) artificially provided living The nearest relative (1) hydration shall not be trition and or if more than one rela- patient, it is if need- withheld or withdrawn tive of the same relation reason- consultation, pain. or the relief ed comfort ably available for added.) (Emphasis It also as a reject added new argument We two our (3)(b): circumstance subsection amici guardian’s that a authority with re spect to health (b) care decisions is restricted in permanent- When powers those in described KRS ly unconscious state grantor if 387.660(3). KRS 311.631 is a later enact has executed an advance directive ment 387.660, than Ky. KRS authorizing the withholding or with- Acts, 141, 17, § ch. prevails. thus drawal of artificially-provided nutri- Adams, Butcher v. Ky. tion hydration. (1949) (If 398, 400 S.W.2d two statutes are added.) (Emphasis irreconcilable, the later pre enactment Although specifically stated vails.). KRS 311.631 also controls because 311.631(3), legislative intent in it specifically subject deals with the mat enacting obviously the statute was to au ie., ter, authority over end-of-life deci surrogate thorize a acting good faith to sions, 387.660, unlike KRS which address direct withholding withdrawal authority es over healthcare decisions life-prolonging treatment from an “adult general. Phon, Ky., Commonwealth v. patient” lacking decisional capacity who (2000); S.W.3d 107-08 # DeStock has not executed an per advance directive Inc. Logsdon, Ky., 993 S.W.2d taining to that decision if doing so would (1999). Any best interest. oth *16 er Furthermore, construction would render meaningless presumed it is 311.631(4), imposes which law, further re that when legislature the amends if life-supporting strictions the purpose the of the amendment is to effect consists of artificially-provided nutrition a change in the Country law. Louisville Further, hydration. if KRS 311.631 Gray, 915, Club v. F.Supp. 178 918 pertain did not withholding (6th to the (W.D.Ky.1959), with aff'd, 285 F.2d 532 treatment, drawal life-prolonging Cir.1960); of the § 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes 65 statute would have no purpose with re difficulty We have no concluding spect to a guardianship because legislative KRS that the in purpose enacting 387.660(3) already guardian’s establishes a year KRS 311.631 less than one after the authority over most lesser forms of reject treat rendition of DeGrella was De- Reyes ment. v. County, Ky., Hardin 55 Grella’s obiter dictum that artificial life- (2001) (“The 337, 342 S.W.3d rule prolonging universal treatment can be with is, in construing that statutes must be drawn from a permanently who is presumed [ljegislature that the intended unconscious or in a persistent vegetative something attempted what it to do. All subjective state under a judg substituted presumed statutes are analysis be enacted for ment with no consideration of purpose life, ie., the furtherance of a on part quality objective the of of an consider the legislature and should patient’s be construed so ation of the By best interest. as to accomplish 311.631, that end rather than to enacting KRS the General Assem (internal nugatory.” render them quota bly protected has liberty interests of omitted)). or, tions and citations Our convic those who competent either were never tion in regard is reinforced fact if competent, express point once failed to part subject. KRS 311.631was enacted as a of of view on the We assume Kentucky Act, Living Assembly Will Directive the General intended that primary purpose of which provide is to best interest be ascertained un 311.631(3) for decision-making. subjective end-of-life der KRS from both

41 See, e.g., Landry City v. (as pacify_” in a law common substituted evidence of Dearborn, 416, 674 Mich.App. N.W.2d analysis, objective 259 judgment supra) (2003) (“However, term (as ‘per law interest 700 evidence in common best ),12 in statute as a elabo is used analysis, available. We supra sonnel’ Thus, noun, adjective. the best interest as an determining rate that in rather but life” not con patient, “quality given of is a broader mean the term can be view subjective point Indi sidered from v. Cleveland ing.”); United States objective surrogate, inqui Co., but is 121 ans Baseball U.S. (2001) into continuation of ry 1433, 1441, “the value that the 149 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Rasmussen, 741 patient.” has life presume that (“Although generally we n. 28 (quoting P.2d President’s parts identical words used different L.W., 48), Commission, quoted at 135 n. the same act are intended at 73. also In re 482 N.W.2d See Christo rig presumption meaning, same /., Cal.Rptr.2d (“quality at 134 pher id, meaning same [of words] and the life, prognosis life for re expectancy and may vary purposes to meet the well treatment, includ covery and without (internal quotations and citations the law.” treatment”); ing futility of continued omitted)). ca Regardless, mental “[l]ess (“ Rosebush, ‘degree 491 N.W.2d at 640 to make a will than pacity required humiliation, digni dependence, and loss of generally.” Nance transact business ty”’) (quoting Conroy, 486 A.2d at Ky., Veazey, 312 S.W.2d (Handler, J., concurring part and dis (reversing judgment contest case will Commission, senting in part)); President’s in permitted contestant was because (“quality at 135 as well as the extent of judgment of mental troduce evidence sustained”). declaring incompetent, inquest testator incompetence physi was based where reject also the argument We abilities, whereas testa cal mental 311.631(1) of two our amici that KRS *17 mentary solely is an issue capacity apply does he was not Woods because faculties); Guardian mental Perkins’ an not “adult” as defined in KRS “ 617, Bell, 767, 294 172 622-23 Ky. S.W.2d 311.621(1), person viz: means a ‘Adult’ (1943) (“[Pjerfect a sanity requisite is not (18) years eighteen age or older persons ... testamentary capacity is that Obviously, who of sound mind.” mentally distinctly subnormal abnormal applies definition is used when word wills.”). Like may to make (“An competent be noun, a as in adult as KRS 311.623 wise, judicially person a who has been capacity with decisional make a writ manage his or ”), incompetent declared ten .... and “sound living will directive ipso lack deci- estate does not testamentary her capacity. mind” refers facto 311.631(1), capacity to demand termination is an sional In KRS “adult” used as In re adjective life-prolonging artificial treatment. provision to indicate that Austwick, 665, child, Ill.App.3d to a viz: “If an adult Estate apply does not 773, ca- 776-77 does have decisional 212 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d patient, who again argument "best but me when I’m 99.” Profes- 12. is a rational ask There may, suggests hybrid a more than interest" is reliable standard a test sor Strasser Le., judgment," person a who fact, "substituted approach. Id. at best 754-55. preference may a once made statement Conroy, methodology is to in This referred changed his or mind in the interim. her “limited-objective” as 486 A.2d at a Strasser, repeat Ky. LJ. at 742-43. To best interest test.. aphorism, want to live to be favorite "I don’t (1995); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1241. Woods conservatee adjudicated who had been was incapable found of managing some of incompetent to make health care deci- (CHR’s his affairs guardianship only sions, regardless degree of mental one), a limited but there is no evidence physical impairment, and on no that he testamentary lacked capacity. greater showing than that the conserva- tor in good faith considered treatment

Y. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. not to inbe the conservatee’s best inter- We find no constitutional infirmity est. permit The result would be to per se in Kentucky Living Will Di freely conservator to end a conservatee’s rective Act. It specifically violating avoids subjective life based on the conservator’s right inalienable to life because does assessment, “in good albeit faith [and] “condone, authorize, approve mercy based on medical advice” ... that the euthanasia,” killing or “permit any affir enjoys unacceptable conservatee an mative or deliberate act to end life other quality of life. than permit the natural process dy Wendland, Cal.Rptr.2d 28 P.3d at ing.” KRS 311.639. recog The statute (internal omitted). pre- citations To nizes a distinction between affirmative possibility clude the of such an unconstitu- intent kill passive and a decision to application, tional we construe KRS allow a natural death to occur in accor 311.629(3) light 311.631 in per- patient’s dance with a liberty constitutional mitting withholding or withdrawal of interest and common law of self- life-prolonging treatment when the DeGrella, determination. 858 S.W.2d Cf. extremis, ie., is permanently corollary 706-07. A determina or in persistent vegetative unconscious tion that withdrawal of artificial life-pro state, or when inevitable death expected longing patient’s treatment best judgment reasonable medical within a interest is that the patient’s liberty inter days. few est to be free of outweighs any mechanism for balancing rights. tutional

treatment, does not violate Woods, who had not made an advance his authorize the termination directive, ing 311.631, interest the statute, by constitutional biological there is no rights either oral or patient may permitting but existence. Absent KRS ion, supra, liberty way instead written, have maintain for a interest. a third Woods’s two life-sustaining provides to exercise competing party consti Thus, like to A.2d at 1223. Of the four state est ing mination must relevant state ing garded at of the medical *18 279, strongest in preserving suicide; innocent third 110 “[1] As noted in Part I of S.Ct. [3] is the preserving interests, Cruzan, profession; safeguarding also be balanced the lives of its citizens. at parties.” Commonwealth’s 2851-52, right to self-deter life; and [4] Conroy, 486 [2] usually interests, integrity 497 U.S. prevent protect against inter opin re 311.631, however, KRS does not However, “the State’s interests Contra specify any particular diagnosis progno or weakens and the individual’s [interest] necessary sis to withholding authorize the grows bodily degree as the invasion or life-prolonging withdrawal of treatment. prognosis increases and the dims. Ulti extremes, mately to point

Taken its literal the statute there comes a at which the permit would a conservator to in rights withdraw individual’s overcome the State necessary Quinlan, health care to life from terest.” 355 A.2d at 664.

43 pre- a mere whether “need not decide point, At a treatment serves we certain suf- unnatural- would have prolong dying process of evidence ponderance liberty Here, ly, point patient’s this at at howev- 858 706. ficed.” S.W.2d refusing prevails. treatment interest er, held that KRS the lower courts have unqualified preserv- An state interest require proof clear 311.631 does irrespective patient’s of either ing Thus, issue evidence. convincing express wishes or of the best in this case. squarely presented into beings human interests transforms prisoners of medical technolo- unwilling specify 311.631 does gy- proof required deter the standard of L.W., no 482 N.W.2d at 74. There was incompetent mine whether an in this case. Nor was suicide issue in a unconscious or permanently ward at integrity profession of the medical so, or, state if vegetative wheth persistent All involved stake. medical doctors incompetent’s best interest er it is agreed in this condition case Woods’s life-prolonging treat withdraw withhold life-pro- and that was irreversible artificial However, ques kind of that “is the ment. longing should treatment be withdrawn left traditionally been tion which has humane As in Part reasons. noted VTII INS, Woodby v. judiciary resolve.” opinion, infra, the American Medical 276, 483, 487,17 284, L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. U.S. life- Association authorizes withdrawal of (1966). involving “In cases individual who prolonging persons civil, stan rights, [t]he whether criminal or permanently per- are or in a unconscious reflects the proof minimum] [at dard vegetative Finally, sistent state. there liberty.” on society places value individual parties no protect. were third Woods Texas, 418, 425, 99 Addington v. U.S. no was unmarried childless. There is 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. that either his evidence his brother or omitted). (internal quotations citations monetary depended niece him for judgment as “a It also serves societal fact, had emotional sustenance. CHR how risk of error should be about difficulty so locating even them as to elicit litigants.” distributed Santo between input into the decision-making pro- their 745, 755,102 Kramer, 455 U.S. S.Ct. sky cess. conclude that We Woods’s constitu- In a L.Ed.2d 599 tional far out- self-determination requires a proceeding, Due Process civil weighed any interests the Commonwealth “when the heightened proof standard biological have had his continued at ... both individual interests stake are existence. and ‘more ‘particularly important’ substan ” money.’ Id. at AND tial than mere loss VI. CLEAR CONVINCING Addington, (quoting

EVIDENCE. 102 S.Ct. at 1396 1808). “Whether 99 S.Ct. at U.S. actions, proof by pre *19 In civil by type of particular the loss threatened normally of the “de ponderance evidence sufficiently grave to proceeding is warrant rights parties.” Aetna termines the certainty on the average part more than Johnson, (11 Bush) 587, Ky. Ins. Co. 74 v. turns on both nature the factfinder (1874). DeGrella, However, supra, 593 threatened and private interest by trial found clear convinc court Id. of the threatened loss.” permanency ing would evidence DeGrella 758, keeping 102 at 1397. at S.Ct. life-prolonging chosen her to terminate Kentucky Thus, required proof has principle, on appeal treatment. we noted 44

by clear and convincing evidence in the thorized only upon a finding of clear and following situations: convincing evidence that incompetent

Among the patient most common of ward or permanently cases which uncon require proof by clear convincing scious or in a persistent vegetative state evidence are termination of parental and that patient the ward or would choose (Cabinet rights Human Resources v. to withhold or withdraw the life-prolonging for E.S., Ky., (1987)), 730 illegit- S.W.2d 929 if able to do so or that it would (Bart- imacy of a child born in wedlock the best interest of the ward or Commonwealth, lett v. ex rel. Calloway, patient to withhold or withdraw the treat Ky., (1986)), 705 S.W.2d 470 unfitness of Care, ment. See v. Knight Beverly Health parent a natural custody of a child 820 So.2d at 101-02 (requiring clear and (Davis Collinsworth, v. Ky., 771 S.W.2d convincing patient evidence that is in a (1989)), (Clemens proof 329 of a lost will persistent state); Rasmussen, vegetative Richards, 154, v. Ky. 200 S.W.2d 156 (these 741 P.2d at 691 cases involve “life- (Larmon (1947)), Miller, and fraud or-death issues” that “must be resolved 654, Ky. (1922); 243 S.W. 939 Fer- clear convincing evidence.”); Wend Cussins, guson v. Ky.App., 713 S.W.2d 5 land, 412, 166, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 28 P.3d at (1986)). 174 (construing reciting statute no stan Savageau, Ky., 356, Hardin v. 906 S.W.2d proof dard of requiring clear and con evidence; vincing applies regard standard Ironically, the presented issue in Cru- less of whether the decision was based zan, supra, protection whether of patient’s patient’s wishes or the best inter patient’s rights required proof by clear ests “in possibility order to minimize the convincing evidence but whether a its unconstitutional application”); McCon state could constitutionally require clear nell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, and convincing evidence before authorizing Inc., 692, 596, 209 Conn. 553 A.2d withholding withdrawal or life-pro- (1989); Tavel, 661 (requir A.2d at 1068-70 longing treatment from an incompetent ing clear and convincing evidence that i.e., ward or patient, whether the reject ward would life-sustaining feeding liberty precluded interest the erection of competent); tube if Browning, 568 So.2d higher evidentiary barrier. 497 U.S. (in at formerly 15-16 where compe cases 280, 110 S.Ct. at 2852. The Court held patient tent designated proxy has that it did not. explicitly stated regarding wishes life-sus stringent more proof burden of treatment, taining decision-maker must be bear, party party must the more that evidence, satisfied clear and convincing bears the risk of an erroneous deci- alia, inter that patient would have refused sion .... An erroneous decision not to treatment and that regain will not terminate in a results maintenance of competence); In re Longeway, Estate of quo; status .... An erroneous deci- 133 I11.2d 139 Ill.Dec. 549 N.E.2d sion to life-sustaining withdraw treat- intent); (patient’s In re ment, however, susceptible is not of cor- Swan, (Me.1990) 569 A.2d (per rection. curiam); Mack, 618 A.2d at 754 (proponent 283,110 Id. at S.Ct. at 2854. withholding withdrawing support A among vegetative consensus has arisen state prove state must *20 withholding by courts that the convincing pa withdrawal clear and evidence that of life-prolonging same); artificial treatment is au tient’s decision would have been

45 convincing and evidence Martin, sumption in of clear (patient’s 538 at 410 N.W.2d 408, tent); Harmon, does v. 760 to a written declaration Cruzan S.W.2d that attaches (en (“[N]o (Mo.1988) banc) declarations.”); can purely 425 oral not attach to State, 45, incompetent choice for 492 assume that v. 129 Misc.2d Saunders required of the formalities 510, (living the absence (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1985) 517 N.Y.S.2d statutes or Living under Missouri’s Will persuasive “evidence of the most will is inherently reli convincing, the clear and convincing clear dem- and is a and quality here.”), evidence absent sub able wishes). also patient’s of’ See onstration aff'd nom., Director, Dept. v. Cruzan Mo. (“[A] Martin, written 538 N.W.2d at 410 of 365, Health, Peter, In re 108 N.J. supra; provide the most concrete directive would (1987) (where 419, 425 decision is 529 A.2d ”). ... patient’s decisions evidence wishes, must patient’s proponent based only applies where KRS 311.631 Since that, if convincing proof clear and present di- advance has issued an patient patient decline the competent, would rective, Assembly we assume General (re treatment); Conroy, 1241 486 A.2d at that a valid advance directive intended that quiring convincing proof clear followed. would be regain patient capacity); decisional will Eichner, 266, 438 N.Y.S.2d 420 at N.E.2d VIL PUBLIC POLICY. intent, 72 and ab (patient’s incompetence, argues ad litem recovery); of chance of Leach v. sence “public poli that 311.631 violates the Ctr., 1, Akron Gen. Med. 68 Ohio Mise. 426 cy” in the obiter dic embodied DeGrella (Com.Pl.1980) (“because 809, 815 N.E.2d tum, say: at it to 702. Suffice 858 S.W.2d importance the nature of the issues is public policy establishment of [T]he involved, court if it would be remiss authority not within adopt highest did not civil possible public courts.... The establishment convincing”), super standard of clear and granted legislature is alone. policy grounds by seded on other statute as stat beyond power of a court to It is by Myers, ed In re 62 Guardianship of an act of the on the legislature vitiate 663, 665-66, Ohio Misc.2d 610 N.E.2d public that grounds policy promulgated (Com.Pl.1993) 670 (abandoning substituted contrary the court therein is to what Leach, judgment test used in requiring but It interest. public considers convincing proof clear legislature prerogative is the persistent vegetative perma in a state declare that acts constitute a violation unconscious, recover); nently and will not public policy. 660 P.2d at condi Colyer, (patient’s tion). Only Pennsylvania and Wisconsin ex rel. v. Wilkin- Cowan Commonwealth Fiori, hold otherwise. 652 A.2d at 1356- (1992). son, See Ky., 828 S.W.2d L.W., 58; 482 N.W.2d at 68. Finck, Pump Ky., Co. also Reda (1986) (“[T]he establish- S.W.2d join majority

We for the reason policy prerogative of public ment of is the of a person’s evidence wishes “[w]hen Assembly.”), superseded the General or mental physical equivocal, condition recognized by grounds on other err, all, statute if at of preserv- is best favor Brock, Ky., Inc. v. 915 S.W.2d Caterpillar, Conroy, Two ing life.” A.2d 1233. As the Court living noted jurisdictions have held that a valid Maryland, question “The convincing Appeals clear evi- will constitutes adopt quality of life—best respect wishes. whether dence with (“[T]he concerns our societal val- Browning, pre- 568 So.2d at 16 interest standard *21 ues a most important fundamental sense. The circumstances that are question answer to that quintessentially making po- LSMT decisions and the Mack, legislative.” patient, A.2d at tential to benefit the and 761. See (“The Hamlin, labels such prob- “extraordinary,” also 689 P.2d at 1379 as “ordi- “heroic,” nary,” social, lem and which are of before us involves moral and in actually making little value ethical considerations well as complex as Indeed, they LSMT decision. tend legal and medical issues for which the making. to confuse the decision legislative process is best suited to address (5) in comprehensive manner.” hydration Artificial nutrition and are treatment; forms in gen- of medical VIII. ETHICAL STANDARDS. eral, their use discontinuation Contrary guard- to the assertion of the governed by should be same litem, ian ad KRS 311.681 does not contra- principles practices govern and standards, vene modern ethical wheth- other forms of medical treatment. medical, legal, er or moral. The National Although involving issues artificial Center for State Courts identifies the fob hydration nutrition and are often lowing generally accepted as ethical stan- presented emotionally, more from a respect life-sustaining dards with to medi- legal standpoint, they moral and (LSMT) cal treatment cases: questions raise the same as do other forms of medical treatment. (1) significant There are no distinctions (6) significant There are moral withholding withdrawing legal between (in- letting distinctions die (stopping starting) and not between LSMT. cluding the use of medications to (2) ... Regardless con- suffering during dying relieve dition, overriding for concerns (assisted process) killing sui- provider the health-care in the for- cide/euthanasia). die, letting In . (a) going respecting of LSMT are: cause as the death is seen under- (self-determina- patient autonomy lying process disease or trauma. (b) tion), improving patient well- suicide/euthanasia, assisted (the being weighing of benefits and cause of death is seen as the inher- plan burdens of one of care com- ently lethal action itself. alternatives). parison with Coordinating Life-Sustaining on Council (3) professionals Health care have a Making by Medical Treatment Decision duty promote the welfare their Courts, Guidelines State Court De However, patients. this does Making Life-Sustaining cision Medi necessarily duty pre- include the (2d ed. rev. cal Treatment Cases 143-45 all serve life at costs. Where LSMT 1993) added). (emphasis promote patient’s welfare, fails On March The American Medi- longer there is no an ethical obli- it, Association, its through cal Council gation provide treatments Affairs, issued the longer no Ethical and Judicial beneficial stopped. following statement: Withholding Withdrawing Life Pro- forms, many can take LSMT longing Medical Treatment. something simple penicillin as aas physician commitment of the pill something complex as a The social suffering. upon pa- is to sustain life and relieve respirator, depending duty performance of one con- It is these Where tient’s circumstances. *22 other, the Medical Association Council fliets with the the choice of American Affairs, Withholding Ethical Judicial family legal or or patient, represen- his Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical or if the to act patient incompetent tative is 1986) (March 15, (emphasis Treatment behalf, In the prevail. in his own should Rasmussen, at added), 741 P.2d quoted in an of choice or absence the 684. physician must act proxy, authorized the patient.

in the best interest of the authority on There is a dearth of written religious viewpoint from the of this issue reasons, For humane with informed resuscitation, ethicists, it- perhaps because consent, is physician do what self, advance- relatively is a recent medical medically necessary to alleviate severe ema- authority The that exists has ment. pain, per- or cease or omit treatment primarily nated from sources associated terminally patient mit a ill death whose Pope Church. the Roman Catholic However, is imminent to die. he should of Pius XII discussed the moralities both intentionally cause death. In decid- it: terminating resuscitation and accepting ing poten- whether the administration of technique which The of resuscitation tially life-prolonging treatment medical any- concerns us here does contain in the who patient is best interest the thing in itself. Therefore immoral behalf, incompetent in his is to act own making if he of patient, capable were the determine the physician should what it lawfully could use personal decision under possibility extending is for and, consequently give per- the doctor humane and comfortable conditions and hand, it. On the other mission use of prior expressed what are the wishes go of be- since these forms treatment family of or patient and attitudes the ordinary means to one is yond the which responsibility those who have for the bound, that an it cannot be held there is custody of patient. nor, obligation consequent- to use them Even death is not imminent but if give that one the doctor ly, is bound beyond patient’s coma is doubt irrevers- them. permission use adequate safeguards ible and there are accuracy diagnosis confirm of appears if it that the at- Consequently, and with the concurrence those who of at tempt resuscitation constitutes responsibility care of reality family such for the a burden patient, it is not unethical discontin- impose one cannot all conscience prolonging ue all medical means of life them, lawfully upon they can insist treatment. at- the doctor should discontinue these in- prolonging Life medical treatment lawfully can com- tempts, and the doctor artificially cludes medication and is a case of ply. There not involved here nu- technologically supplied respiration, of disposal patient, of the life direct hydration. treating a ter- way: trition this would nor of euthanasia ill minally irreversibly pa- comatose licit. Even when it causes never be tient, circulation, physician interruption should determine arrest out- more attempts whether benefits resuscitation never times, weigh its At all cause of cessation burdens. than indirect life, case the dignity apply main- and one must should be effect.13 principle tained. double likely action to have two effects— "principle double assumes that an 13. The effect” XII, Life, Pope Prolongation techniques, Pius even if these means are still *23 experimental stage An an at the Congress Address to International and are not (Nov. 24, 1957), By of a certain Anesthesiologists, accepting in 4 without risk. them, patient gener- the can even show The Pope Speaks Magazine osity in humanity. the service of permitted, patient’s It is also with the Vatican, May On the with the consent, means, to interrupt these where II, approval Pope published of John Paul results expectations. the short fall of its “Declaration on which Euthanasia” made, But such a decision to be states with respect “right as follows to the account be will have to taken of the to die”: patient reasonable wishes of the and the very Today important protect, it is to at patient’s family, of the advice as also of death, of dignity the moment both the of specially competent the doctors who are person the human and the Christian may in the matter. The latter in partic- life, against technological concept of judge ular that the investment in instru- attitude that threatens to become an personnel disproportionate and is ments abuse. Thus some of a people speak foreseen; they may to the results also die,” “right expression to which is an judge techniques applied the im- procure mean right does not the to on pose the or suffering strain by death either one’s own hand or proportion of the out benefits which else, pleases, means of someone as one may gain he she from such tech- but the peacefully rather to die niques. dignity. and with human Christian to permissible It is also make do with view, of of point From this the use ther- normal the means that medicine can of- apeutic prob- can pose means sometimes Therefore, impose fer. one cannot on lems. obligation to have anyone recourse cases, In numerous of complexity is technique already to a which in use can the situation be such as cause but which carries a risk or is burden- the way principles doubts about ethical is not the equiva- some. Such refusal applied. analysis, should be the final suicide; the contrary, lent on it pertains it to the conscience either of the acceptance be should considered as person, qualified sick those condition, human or a wish to avoid name, speak person’s sick or of application procedure of a medical doctors, decide, light in the disproportionate results that can to the obligations moral and of the various as- expected, or not to impose be a desire pects of the case. family expense excessive or the community. remedies,

If there are no other sufficient is imminent in inevitable death When used, it is with the con- it permitted, permitted is spite means sent, pro- to have recourse to the means in conscience to take decision to vided the most advanced medical that would forms refuse Thevathasan, good one one bad. be See Pravin Moral Absolutes The action act. act, itself, (1) good, Effect, taken if or at least Principle Cath. Med. and the Double neutral; (2) good, Q. actor’s intent (Nov.2003), http://www.catholicdoc- bad; (3) precedes, or at good CMQ/Nov_2003/ effect least tors.org.uk/ lutes_double_effect.htm. moraLabso- with, bad; simultaneously occurs grave justifies proportionately reason 17-18, Commission, 15 n. and burden- ident’s precarious secure a Do-Not-Resuscitate De- life, Lipton, as the L. long so Helene prolongation some Hospital: Inci- Community to the cisions in person normal care due sick Outcomes, dence, Implications In such interrupted. similar cases is (1986)). 1164,1168 no reason the doctor has JAMA circumstances help failing himself with reproach Thus, impossible logistically would danger. every decision approval court require *24 Doctrine Congregation Sacred life-prolonging or withdraw to withhold Faith, Declaration on Euthanasia Furthermore, “[j]udicial inter treatment. roman_cu- (1980), http://www.vatican.va/ decision-making of this private into vention docu- ria/congregations/cfaith/ DeGrel expensive and intrusive.” sort is ments/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19800505_eutha- impossi at 710. It is both 858 S.W.2d nasia_en.html added). also (emphasis See gratuitous “a en bly cumbersome and Bernardin, Joseph The Consis- Cardinal profession’s upon the medical croachment Challenge tent Life: The and the Ethic of Quinlan, 355 competence.” A.2d field of Care, Health Address Witness Catholic Thus, parties unless the interested at 669. Jamaica, Center, at the Medical Catholic is unwar resort the courts disagree, 1986) (“[T]here (May N.Y. is no obli- Rasmussen, at 741 P.2d 691 ranted. terminally gation, regard in to care (“[The encroachment into sub court’s] ill, extraordinary initiate continue concerning medical stantive decisions which ineffec- medical treatments would be resolving treatment should be limited which, despite tive prolonging among family, the disputes patient’s their regard, effectiveness that would attending physicians, independent phy an impose patient.”). excessive burdens on the sician, facility, guard the health care These are authorities consistent with litem.”); Drabick, ian, guardian and the ad there Judeo-Christian-Muslim belief that (construing Cal.Rptr. at 850-51 statute 245 an is afterlife more desirable than guardian give consent permitting as To those that earthly espouse one. who L.H.R., re judicial approval); In without belief, more to de- egregious seem (1984), 439, 321 S.E.2d 723 253 Ga. lay a beginning natural death and the by grounds statute on other as superseded needlessly prolong eternal life than Doe, re recognized by In 262 Ga. 418 unnatural, artificially-maintained existence Lawrance, (1992); 3, 6 In re 579 S.E.2d on earth. (Ind.1991) (health 32, 41-42 care N.E.2d authorities, From conclude these we their “patients, should be left to decisions does not modern 311.631 contravene families, where none physicians;” and their medical, legal, or moral ethical standards. disagree, participants the interested Jobes, unnecessary); court action IX. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT. (“Courts proper not the at 451 are A.2d approximately people Of the 2 million personal agonizing to resolve the place year, hospitals 80% in who die each die issues. Our that underlie these problems institutions, per- care and long-term more cannot inti legal system replace haps of those a decision 70% after be borne struggle mate must forgo life-sustaining treatment has been caring patient, those for the patient, made. Fiori, patient.”); care about the those who (“[T]here for a Cruzan, 302-03, is no need at 652 A.2d at 497 U.S. 110 S.Ct. (Brennan, J., decisionmaking intervene in this (citing Pres- court to dissenting) process disagreement unless there is expected by be judg- reasonable medical tween parties, days. the interested who are usu ment within a few The statute re- ally professionals quires identified as the medical good that such decisions be made in in treating evaluating involved faith pa patient. the best interest patient’s family tient and the In that guard regard, the is not statute unconsti- ian.”); Hamlin, (“[I]f 689 P.2d at tutional public and does not contravene treating physicians, the prognosis policy commit or modern ethical standards. If tee, guardian and the are all in agreement there is no physicians, and the (if incompetent that the family, best inter and ethics committee there is one) ests are served agree termination of life sus all surrogate’s with the .deci- treatment, taining sion, legislation absent to the there is appoint guard- no need to contrary, here, judicial there is no need for in ian. If surrogate, judicial- is a decision.”); L.W., volvement ly-appointed guardian, physicians, and the *25 (court committee, approval required only family N.W.2d at 75 agree and ethics with the decision, where disagreement guardian’s there is a with the there is no need to decision). guardian’s approval The President’s seek court appointment the of litem; agreed. guardian Commission a “[Djecisionmaking ad and that is true life-sustaining rarely guardian about care im is whether the is a member proved by or, patient’s resort to courts.” family President’s or an institution Commission, here, at governmental 247. Neither the cases a If entity. there is a however, nor disagreement, KRS 311.631 draw a distinction in this may resort be had courts; and, regard so, between if situations where the the the burden bewill guardian is a patient’s upon seeking member of the fami those to withhold or with- ly and involving support patient situations institutional or draw life from the prove governmental guardians. by convincing clear and evidence that the patient permanently is unconscious or a necessary Nor is to obtain the state, persistent vegetative or that death is appointment guardian of a there where is imminent, and that it would in the be best disagreement no respect appro with to the patient interest of the to withhold or with- priate parties, treatment. “If all im the life-prolonging draw treatment. family, treating mediate the physicians and one], prognosis the [if committee there is In determining patient’s the best inter- treatment, agree as to the course of est, consider, courts but are not limit- Hamlin, necessary.” is not (1) ed to considering: patient’s present the P.2d 1377. emotional, physical, level of sensory, and

cognitive functioning possibility and the X. CONCLUSION. (2) thereof; improvement any relevant summarize, incompetent pa- To when an the expressions statements made living patient, competent, tient has not executed a valid orwill when as to his or her designated surrogate, a health presumption care KRS own wishes with rebuttable permits surrogate, designated attaching living designa- 311.631 to a valid will or a (3) priority, surrogate; order of to make health care deci- tion of a health care to the behalf, known, patient’s including sions on the patient’s philosoph- extent own ical, views, withholding life-prolong- religious, goals, withdrawal and moral life ing patient per- purpose treatment from a who is values about the of life and the lived, manently persistent way unconscious or in a it should attitudes to- and state, sickness, vegetative or when death procedures, inevitable ward medical suffer- (4) M.D., death; M.P.H., “Role Brain Death and physical ing degree condition, in the the Dead-Donor Rule Ethics patient’s caused pain Care treatment, treatment; Organ Transplantation,” Critical and termination of Medicine, (5) p. 2003 Vol. No. 2391. humiliation, degree dependence, resulting of dignity probably and loss WINTERSHEIMER, Justice (6) treatment; the condition or dissenting. recovery expectancy prognosis (7) treatment; completely I dis- respectfully must and without the with deep- It majority opinion. risks, sent from options and their various that de- effects; (8) ly this Court would benefits, disappointing and side whether agency this State to end cide allow an particular proportion- treatment would be totally the life of a innocent ward of disproportionate ate or in terms very It is more shame- same State. even gained; and impact benefits ful that the State would seek (the realize family being assumption human terminate the innocent life of patient be concerned about the would care and protec- entrusted its well-being her happiness of his or own disturbing tion. is the role of the Equally members). family hospital charged and the ethics committee Accordingly, the decision of the Court of care and comfort of part Appeals affirmed and reversed in actively deplorable in this sit- participating *26 part. Because Matthew is now de- Woods uation. ceased, unnecessary. remand is fatally lengthy majority opinion The is facts, it incomplete flawed in that recites LAMBERT, C.J.; JOHNSTONE, and cases, and seeks misinterprets previous KELLER, JJ., concur. justification moral from outdated sources. GRAVES, J., by concurs separate requires comprehensive It and detailed opinion. response. WINTERSHEIMER, J., by dissents major The concern here whether separate opinion. Act, Kentucky Living Will Directive KRS 311.643, applicable 311.621 to KRS and STUMBO, J., separate dissents without Kentucky, allows the Commonwealth opinion for reasons I set forth Parts guardian, to authorize the withdrawal through IV the dissenting opinion life-sustaining medical treatment WINTERSHEIMER, J. lifelong incompetent ward of the State. GRAVES, concurring. Justice This the decision to end case involves person, I concur and write the life a ward of this state separately because retardation, give KRS 446.400 is outdated and does not with mild to moderate mental guidance although crime did accurately sufficient to determine he committed no and judgment from the It meaningfully when death occurs. “The not seek this court. more been is estimated that there are than 2500 concept long brain death has rec- however, Kentucky ognized, plagued people guard- to be who have state seri- and ous inconsistencies and contradictions. In- ians. mental retardation Some deed, Such concept correspond fails to others have mental illness. individu- to and biological helpless un- als are vulnerable philosophical particularly coherent to derstanding deprived opportunity D. and Truog, of death.” Robert thus M.D., Robinson, Cei1;ainly, make for themselves. F.C.C.M. and Walter M. choices

is generally understood that tucky there is a Medical Center for a routine asthma necessity protect treatment, individuals with sub- he suffered a serious heart at- stantial mental disabilities from the tack. ad- consequences unwise, verse of potentially a district court jury found ill-informed or incompetently made deci- partially managing Woods disabled in his Ellis, sions. See James W. Decisions personal affairs and financial resources People with Mental Retardation: for pursuant seq. KRS 387.500 et Conse-

Balancing Automomy Considerations of quently, appointed the district court Protection, 37 Villanova L.Rev. 1779 Commonwealth as a guardian limited (1992). person’s This includes a inalien- deprived Woods. district court order right able to life as articulated in the Unit- dispose property; Woods his ed States Independence Declaration of instruments; to execute to enter into con- guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution tracts; living arrangements; determine 1,§ Elston, as set out Ky., DeGrella v. procedures; consent to medical to ob- Kentucky S.W.2d 698 law re- license; tain an automobile driver’s and to quires guardians per- assure manage his financial affairs. The Com- sonal, civil human rights of the ward monwealth, guardian, as limited had the protected. Chapter are 387 and De- responsibility authority and the to exercise Grella, supra, govern should the decision rights such for Woods. of a withdraw withhold It should be clear that con- Woods was treatment under KRS 311.629 and KRS pursuant sidered to appropriate civil action 311.631. not to be of sound mind before he fell into old, year mildly Woods was a 54 retard- placed unconscious state and was on a man, ed who had been a ward of the state mechanical ventilator. As noted since years he was 18 old. The evidence court, Appeals Court of and the circuit *27 I.Q. indicates that he an had 71 and the probably capacity Woods had the never to capacity intellectual of an year 8 to 10 old decide whether he would have wanted life- child. supporting if he measures discontinued required ever such measures. He had not apparently Woods lived a full in a prepared any living advance directive or family care home. It is entirely likely that will, doing nor was he ever capable so. he had in Mends the home and knew professionals who worked with him fairly The circuit court applied should not have girlMend. well. He had a He went to an Living the a Will Directive Act. As Court day program days review, adult treatment three a of final required we are not to week. He attended church and com- adopt was the decisions of the trial court as to law, traveling fortable across town interpret bus to a matter of but must the visit guardian provided meaning his Mends. His according plain statutes to the him with limited medical and financial legisla- de- the act and accordance with the cision-making assistance and Floyd County Woods was tive intent. Bd. Ed. v. capable taking personal care of his Ratliff, Ky., 955 It is S.W.2d always very friendly needs. He had been plain reading Living clear from a of the frequently greeted and strangers total Will Directive Act that the Assem- General with enthusiasm and exuberance. bly apply He was did not intend that it to would polite, outgoing, up liked to dress and oc- someone like Matthew Woods because casionally cigarette. smoked a Act applies to adults who are at least University years while en route to the of Ken- mind. old and of sound 1) Act Directive Living The Will Act on two time 1991. periods: The focuses that, patient, adult who decisional “If an patient provides Before adult loses 2) and After the has not capacity capacity, adult not have does decisional capacity. such The Act does to the loses an directive or executed advance person of a who has address situation not ad- directive does extent the advance per- life-long incompetent. Such made, been ... must be a decision that dress made advance son could never have an au- individuals] shall be specified [certain directive because he was never of sound care to make health decisions thorized mind to the time in which he lost his prior 311.631(1). KRS patient.” behalf make capacity decisional and communi-

cate health care decisions. Guardianship Statutes II. in the proper approach The was out set that this always possibility There is con- relating guardianship statutes and guid- and again, will arise some situation servatorship persons Chap- for disabled and ance should be available individuals and as interpreted ter 387 consistent with organizations that are confronted with used, If such criteria DeGrella. had been It is respectfully or a similar situation. the Commonwealth would have had no ba- relating to suggested that the statutes request on which to of life- sis removal dis- conservatorship guardianship from supporting patient. 386 et. Chapter seq., should persons, abled principal issue in DeGrella be invoked. could lawfully ap- whether trial court 387.640, a limited Pursuant KRS legal prove guardian general duty guardian, has the guardian authorize the termination of artificial nu- good carry diligently out faith hydration trition and of an incompetent by the powers assigned duties and specific person person, competent, when that while and, in to assure part, Court expressed life-support- had her wishes rights civil and human personal, Although a ing measures be discontinued. protected. Although specific ward are majority upheld this Court decision order, can be modified court duties hydration from to withdraw nutrition limited must follow DeGrella, majority made it clear that it (3) (4) 387.660(2), as follows: permit of life- would withdrawal incompetent support *28 make for the ward’s provision To the of that un- where wishes were care, comfort, and ar- and maintenance fact, In that known. DeGrella established educational, social, voca- range for such life-supporting the withdrawal of measures tional, as are and rehabilitation services right the of a violated inalienable to life will the ward appropriate and as assist if such not based patient withdrawal were of maximum self- development in the clearly expressed the of the on wishes independence. reliance patient. (3) necessary give any To consent unambiguous language The clear and the receive to enable ward to approval patient at required the Act an adult to be care, coun- professional medical or other years age and of mind least 18 sound service, sel, that a except treatment or 311.621(1). regard to a civil matter. KRS of a may not consent behalf abortion, sterilization, psy- deprived had been ward previously

Woods organ, bodily of a things, chosurgery, removal right, among his other to consent pro- of a limb unless the procedures by amputation the court to medical district eedure approved by is first order of the medial and intended to provide services for court or necessary, in an emergency incompetent persons reasonably as infera- situation, preserve prevent the life or ble from the nature of guardian’s pow- the serious impairment er, physical majority guard- refused allow a health of the ward. ian to support withdraw life measures incompetent from an ward where the respect To act with to the ward in a wishes of the ward were manner which unknown. The deprivation limits the opinion DeGrella recognized that rights civil personal his restricts rights of self-determination and only informed necessary freedom to the extent consent in obtaining and provide withholding medi- needed care and services to him. cal treatment can be exercised an in- These statutes do not mention the competent through process of surro- life-support withdrawal of systems. gate decision-making long so as the wishes DeGrella, this Court considered the patient were known. guardianship statutes as remedial and not ' Thus, under exclusive, guardian- DeGrella and the stating that those in- statutes ship Commonwealth, statutes of this tend to provide services for incompetent decision to support systems withhold life persons, not only specifically articulat- ed, from Woods improper. Such a deci- reasonably but also as inferable from only sion could been made if his powers nature of the guardian. known, they wishes were which were not. The rationale of large the court relied in DeGrella, As stated “we do not approve measure on Rasmussen Mitchell v. permitting anyone to decide when another Fleming, 154 Ariz. 741 P.2d 674 die,on any should basis other than clear approved This Court the state- and convincing patient evidence that Rasmussen, ment in supra, the court would chose to do so.” 858 at 702. S.W.2d presume will wishes to contin- opinion ue to The DeGrella receive medical treatment and states that- “as party long wishing to discontinue that as the case is confined to treat- substitute ment decision-making by bears the burden to prove surrogate to the in con- DeGrella, contrary. See formity patient’s at with the previously S.W.2d ex- wishes, 705. This Court pressed considered the term “best case involves solely interest” of the ward from the and not self-determination ” standpoint DeGrella, being the health and well of quality S.W.2d of life. added). synonymous the ward and (emphasis with the deci- 702 Our court noted sion the ward would have chosen if con- support when the withdrawal of life However, competent scious and solely do so. person’s becomes another decision stated, life, Court made clear when it that patient’s quality about which not go step, “We do to the. next as the reasonably patient’s would occur when the unknown, Arizona court did in the Rasmussen case wishes are inalien- *29 to decide that ‘best right interest’ can extend to to outweighs any able life consider- terminating life-sustaining medical treat- ation of the quality or value of the life where the of the are wishes ward involved. ment

unknown.” Id. 387.640(1) Pursuant to KRS and KRS 387.660(4),

Consequently, although majority the of any favoring decision the re- the DeGrella court determined that the moval of support systems solely life based invalid, guardianship inherently statutes related to and con- on quality the of life is servatorship persons case, for disabled particularly were re- where as in this the of the subject At the where withdrawal point of life of the ward on views be- medical life-prolonging It is are unknown. fundamental support person’s decision pro- solely another guardians charged that are with the comes life, rights quality of the civil and human of of tection about the life,” their to as right wards. “inalienable individual’s Decla- in the so declared United States significance in the fact that There is by protected Independence ration of 387.660(3) in that nonlife- requires KRS (1) Kentucky of our Consti- Section One circumstances, court threatening approval tution, any outweighs consideration necessary may con- guardian before a is life, or the value quality of abortion, on the behalf of a ward to sent life, Nothing Opinion in this stake. sterilization, psychosurgery, removal of a sanctioning should construed be of a It bodily organ amputation limb. euthanasia, mercy killing. supporting that from appear analogy such would to permitting anyone do approve We to requirement, legislature intended die decide another should when guardians all wards from those protect any than and con- other clear basis not have their interest” at who did “best vincing that would patient evidence minimum, appear At a it would heart. choose so. to do life-long ward incompetent that a should protection receive the same level of from DeGrella, at 702. 858 S.W.2d Therefore, logically it is inconceiva- harm. Here, presented no there was evidence to guardian ble that would seek end the preference as to the of Woods to his intent of his ward. life-sustaining for the treat- withdrawal they ment. testified that Every witness Appeals III. Court Error did not his intentions and there was know in Appeals The Court erred determin- DeGrella, no of his intentions. record that the 1994 to ing amendments her desires had made medical 311.621-311.643, Kentucky Living Will prior incompetent. to becoming known Act, superseded guidelines Directive to competent enough Woods was never this Court DeGrella. statutes He to make a choice. entitled such was question legislative response were duly of his protection State or DeGrella, departure but rather a appointed protect right his application that Al- reasonable case. vulnerable, extremely unpro- He live. though there are factual significant differ- medi- against any tected termination of his ences, majori- it is clear the DeGrella Any deprivation cal of life treatment. ty contemplated involving the situation v. subject scrutiny. Bowers to strict similarly and other individuals situ- Woods Hardwick, 478 U.S. 106 S.Ct. gave ated. DeGrella clear direction on other L.Ed.2d 140 overruled those who would be involved future Texas, grounds Lawrence 539 U.S. involving right nutrition decisions L.Ed.2d S.Ct. hydration right to the effect interfering action in Any state upheld respected to live should subject with a fundamental convincing absence of clear and evi- Cleburne, City Tex- scrutiny. strict See as to what the individual would dence *30 Center, Inc., Living as v. Cleburne choose to do. 87 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. opinion part: The states in

When the decision is between ically life and and not any personal as a result of death, involved, and the state is surrogate the deci- governmental choice. sion maker is limited to those options con- test, In applying scrutiny the strict we forming to the preference constitutional find that the can showing state make no matters, life over death. In civil life that its outweigh private interests in- must Incompetent be chosen. individuals terests of the individual guaranteed by as right pursuant retain a to life to the Four- the federal and state constitutions. The teenth Amendment to the United States state, through agents, prove its must that Constitution and Sections One and Two of a governmental interest in the nontreat- Kentucky Constitution. DeGrella. Cf. ment of patient a overrides the interest in life of patient. Such a burden was not Best IV. Interest Test satisfied in this case and could not be The Court of Appeals erred when any satisfied in case involving a ward of adopted the “best interest” test announced the state. in Rasmussen. The Appeals Court of was attempted The State to present evidence mistaken when it held that KRS 311.631 providing that life-sustaining measures exercise, guardian authorized a “substi- life,” denied him a “meaningful Woods tute decision-making” incompetent for an “inhumane,” “futile,” in “not his best inter- person based on the best interest stan- est,” and “abusive.” Such beliefs amount dard. a Such conclusion was considered to a personal subjective judgment by state clearly explained in DeGrella to the quality bureaucrats about the effect that the best interests was to be ward. The State should not be allowed to exclusively viewed from the standpoint of quality question. determine the of life well-being health and of the ward and public The policy Kentucky as synonymous with the ex- decision the ward pressed in Chapter would 387 is to consider the choose to make if conscious and wishes of the in the ward manner ex- competent to do so. As noted in DeGrella: pressed by him and to involve the ward go We do not to the next step, as the decision-making greatest pos- extent Arizona court did in the Rasmussen sible. case, to decide that “best interest” can terminating extend to life-sustaining Decisions under KRS 311.629 and medical treatment where the wishes of irreversible, 311.631 be but all such

the ward are unknown. caution, decisions should err on the side of Here, 858 S.W.2d at 705. if at although judge all. the trial found “permanently Woods uncon- of Appeals Court does not define law, scious” as defined ad what it means “best interest” and thus began litem indicated that Woods to im- subjective opens interpre- the door to prove dramatically evening of the trial. tation of majority such standard. The There is some medical evidence recognized Court DeGrella that us- actually longer persis- Woods was no ing judgment incorporates substituted vegetative recovering tent state but was quality very of life assessment creates from anoxic encephalopathy. dangerous situation which can involve the subjective application of values in deter- The function of legal process, as that Constitution, a minimum mining accepted that can be concept is embodied a quality life. The to live is a natural and in factfinding, the realm right. and fundamental It arises automat- minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. *31 right of only the self-determina- spectrum of the of con- involves Because broad of quality tion the life. must and not apply, to which the term cerns flexibility necessary gear pro- is to the Id. need; the particular quan- to the cess ignores the fact majority opinion The quality process the due in a tum and of deprived court order that the district on the depend situation need particular rights: dispose to following of Woods the minimizing of the purpose to serve instruments, en- to of to execute property, of error. risk to deter- relationships, into ter contractual v. Inmates Nebraska Penal Greenholtz to consent arrangements, mine to living of 1 at Complex, U.S. and Correctional motor ve- procedures, medical obtain a L.Ed.2d 668 99 S.Ct. license, manage his operator’s hicle own financial affairs. Majority Errors Standard Y. attempts to majority persuade The lengthy analysis majority of the The nonetheless within Woods would seemingly relatively opinion ignores Act, Kentucky purview Living of the Will recent, contrary dispositive holding of citing variety inapplicable of cases majority The this Court DeGrella. can person hold that a make a testamenta- attempts itself into intel- opinion to hoist requi- ry will if he does have the even judicial consistency integrity lectual business, capacity to transact site mental by asserting that with DeGrella “DeGrella ignores the crucial generally. opinion The require us the ‘best did not to reach inter- jealous protection distinction between analysis as could be ests’ the case decided every by the of testator’s law judgment.” of on basis substituted fit on dispose property of his as he sees hand, law necessity the one and the for the Actually, honesty compels intellectual sanctity of human protect innocent recognition specifically that DeGrella hand. are life on the other “Life” issues rejected judgment the “substituted test” certainly of disposed appropriately majority now embraced and im- “property” cases issues. dealing with fact, properly attributed to DeGrella. DeGrella made clear: legislative intent that act should anyone not approve permitting do who at least 18 apply only

We to adults are die decide when another should of who are sound mind years age and convincing persons other than clear and such as Woods patently basis excludes that the would chose to had since his evidence who been a ward state ... birthday, age do so had a mental of 8 or 18th never been to be years and had shown at 702. DeGrella also stated: 858 S.W.2d testamentary capacity. sound mind or prefatory There is one issue which we testamentary prop- wills disposing Even embarking on this must address before erty made unless a cannot be lest our words be misunder- discussion mind, of sound much less years age and step slippery stood as first onto food furnishing regarding decisions by trial slope, misapplied courts essential medical care. and water and quality future cases: that is the “Permanently A. Unconscious” long issue. As as the case is confined Fallacy making by a substituted decision surro- disturbing aspects most conformity One gate wishes, is the reliance expressed majority opinion the case subtle previously *32 on the statutory “Permanently term improved,” that, Un- he noted in the next cou- conscious” 311.621(12), as defined in ple days: it became apparent that Woods supra, maj. op., at note 1. That term has was to open eyes able and look at him his medical meaning but the common import is awakened; when he was appeared Woods senseless because it infers irreversibility to pain to show when he was struck with an illogic unconscious state. The needle; and, through intravenous neuro- import is that it implies certainty logical analysis Robertson, by Dr. Woods person labeled such will never recover. longer was no in a Vegetative Persistent sense, In only person permanently words, State. In paralyz- other when the already unconscious is one that dead. ing drug stopped had been Woods’s condi- however, Using the label makes the tion improved. attempting govern the life or death of Restarting the placed medication Woods moderately likely another more to assume back in a perceived state of unconscious- that recovery impossible thereby 2, 1995, ness. a letter dated June Dr. order the death of another when the likeli- Robertson had re-evaluated Woods and

hood of adequately consciousness is not the conclusion that drawn Woods’s recov- ascertainable or if the likelihood becomes ery temporary was response because the predict. difficult to to external stimuli had dropped. Howev- Perhaps chilling aspect the most of this er, myoclonic jerks he also noted that the case is that the treating physicians had had diminished as “perhaps the result of arrived at the conclusion that Woods had medication”. Medication made for the permanent reached state of unconscious- purpose paralyzing likely pro- seems ness order to recommend withdrawal of duce a coma-like state. There was no support. Such a recommendation had indication in Dr. Robertson’s letter that been per- made on the belief that he was the downward turn in Woods’s condition unconscious, however, manently Woods was not the exclusive result of medication. recovery had later strong enough shown Woods became awakened and showed previous cause one doctor to retract his signs of pain paralyzing drug when. recommendation. According was removed. to Webster’s Medicinally-Induced 1. Permanent New Collegiate Dictionary, Awake means Unconsciousness? sleeping “1: to cease 2: to become It is even more serious to realize that again aroused or active 3: to become con- the lack of improvement Woods’ condi- scious or something.” aware or aware of tion being have been the result of his fair inference from evidence that by a paralyzing drug. medicated Ostensi- he could be awakened is that Woods was bly purpose diminishing for the an occa- no longer permanently unconscious. The motion, jerking majority sional opinion interpre- Woods had been has a different placed evidence, on a designed para- medication tation of this but a differ- that’s lyze opinion, his movements. medication is at ence of not a of accuracy Such matter likely Therefore, “permanent suggests. least to be the cause of as it it is unclear as In a paralyzing drug unconsciousness”. motion to the to the extent to which the 23, 1995, court filed June Dr. Suhl administered Woods had on contribut- report ing noted to that the administration of to his appearance “permanent un- consciousness,” the paralyzing drug stopped had been nor is it clear that hearing. paralyzing drug the date of the In addition to did not hinder his recov- Hurst, saying, myoclonus ery. “his Dr. (twitching/spasms) who treated Woods St. withholding medical speak of had withdrawal we Joseph Hospital, ordered *33 water, ward, of we must food, any person, and ventilation because of from a water, It Food, experienced. Woods and certain seizures we mean. specify what majority opinion that the should be noted any of these life. are Without ah’ basic by impassioned made part plea cites of the not, any person, conscious things, three much Hurst, “Frankly, I not see Dr. do Therefore, said that it can be die. will doing are difference between what we inter- of mors every person is a state that we here some of atrocities and (death food, save for ruptus interrupted) by remarks read Bosnia”. The about water, interrupted by air. Death is and subject in- Dr. be to various Hurst could interposi- supply things. of these further ex- terpretations as he offered no latín, however, makes the term tion of However, reasonably planation. can be therefore frightening more and seem atrocity the true is the termi- inferred that the medical the decision to remove makes life. nation of Woods’s The terms acceptable. seem treatments improvements and the of the Because trae using to describe the actions arewe recovery, had re- potential for Dr. Suhl food, reality: removing water masking are of earlier recommendation tracted his atrocity. living person is and air from and withdrawing mechanical ventilation life-pro- “removing the words to Change specifically recommended “continuation who from a longing treatment hydra- and artificially provided nutrition and it all sounds permanently unconscious” tion comfort and all care needed for his must easy to Care nice and swallow. “treat- life-sustaining and Such hygiene.” language our prohibit taken then to food, water, air, ments”, are neces- i.e. and atrocity. masking from standard live, sary every person including who are Dr. Suhl still those conscious. considerations on whether Many of the a lesser for resus- recommended standard food, water, and ventilation withdraw citation, life- meaning providing no longer concerning poor judgments made on are prolonging treatments such as resuscita- recovery probability However, key tion surgeries. Although at an unconscious state. water, food, separated that and Dr. Suhl unlikely it looked Woods one time types air treatments. from other medical again and three could become conscious Dr. Suhl’s retraction Despite be taken thought Woods should doctors majority potential recovery, die, Woods’s thereby he from the ventilator and conveniently opinion ignores this evidence off recovery was taken once he made (in- that the asserts eleven members Notwithstanding paralyzing drag. hospital cluding physicians) four of the “permanently had been labeled that Woods agreed with unanimously ethics committee unconscious,” reported Dr. Suhl the recommendation. during period of time recover Woods did Broad B. “Medical Treatments” is Too para- removal concurrent Distinction Would Give Without paralyzing drug Once lyzing drug. Rights Per- Prisoners More Than Sick again, him Woods administered to son. conditions. into the coma-like went back recovery, permitted had it been Such avail- the several of care

Among types para- 1) continue without intervention able, categories apparent: three are later included ventilation; drag, nutrition, lyzing hydration, basic 2) 3) machine ventilator. medicine; and, breathing without the procedures. When

An overbroad standard that its loose danger prison culosis because of to other food, water, ers); language includes see also Washington Harper, and air un- der the label of U.S. 110 S.Ct. “medical treatment” 108 L.Ed.2d 178 will (1990) (due process permit prevent did forced withdrawal of these basic ne- medication mentally-ill prisoner pre guise “removing cessities life- others). vent harm to himself or Those prolonging medical treatment”. Nowhere standard, cases use a balancing but the food, water, else is the restriction of or air hunger food, strike case did not because *34 permitted by person the State from a un- water, air necessity. are basic A care, der its including prisoners, which are prisoner ability has the to refuse some to be furnished with food at least “suffi- treatments, Whitley medical however. See cient to sustain normal health”. See Cun- Albers, v. 475 U.S. 106 S.Ct. (6th Jones, ningham v. 667 F.2d 565 Cir. (1986) (prisoners may L.Ed.2d 251 refuse 1982). (Ky.) Other necessities are re- some unwanted medical treatments as un quired to Starving, be furnished as well. necessary pain and wanton infliction of dehydrating, suffocating a prisoner is Amendment); violation Eighth see impermissible, therefore ought as well as it Schmitt, (6th also Noble v. 87 F.3d 157 to be for other under State Cir.1996). care, including requiring wards medical The bottom line is that while a through prisoner treatment prolonged care. may treatments, refuse certain he or she Allowing- judgment substituted or best refuse, cannot necessities of life and the interest standards to animate decisions re- necessities, provide State must those even garding withdrawal of basic life necessities if forcibly necessary. places the ward in a position worse than a being medically In the case of a ward food, water, air, prisoner. Regarding treated and under the care of a only standard is for the ward to de- litem, ought ad the standard be mand their all supply at times because it is food, water, air or mechanical ventila- necessary to all life. Prisoners are not may tion never be removed—the State even able to make a choice refuse to eat provide must them until death because because the State will force-feed them to these are life-sustaining necessities and See, preserve e.g., their health. Martinez merely not Using medical treatment. (8th Cir.1992) Turner, 977 F.2d proposed by majority standard will (rejecting constitutional challenge deci- rights reduce the innocent person of sick by prison sion officials to force-feed something than give prisoners. less we strike). However, hunger inmate on C. Characterizations of Medical Care majority opinion will allow ward to be denied food. majority opinion justifi- The seeks moral by citing cation outdated comments Types beyond of medical treatment ba (1939-1958) Pope XII Pius from an earlier medicine, necessity, sic surgeries, such as philosophy time of death not when procedures, and invasive should be treated prevalent. pronouncements so The recent differently ordinary than or basic care. II Pope upon John Paul built those of prison place types cases these Pope Pius XII and are more in concert balancing treatment under different than philosophy. with traditional moral See, provision necessity. e.g., McCor (5th Stalder, mick v. 105 F.3d 1059 Cir. Specifically, majority opinion fails to 1997) (due process prevent did not forced a common in care. The make distinction standard, medical prisoner presented with tuber best interest as states, forego “To easily Evangelium ex- majority opinion, can be abused Vitae traordinary disproportionate means is the future because it does differentiate extraordinary euthanasia; ordinary equivalent between care of suicide or as By failing safeguard care. basic care expresses acceptance of hu- it rather mandatory, the standard would allow condition in the face of death.” Id. man quality of these under withdrawal items words, extraordinary care other Although cites determination. it refused, ordinary but refuse care sources, it fails to properly some moral equivalent of suicide or euthanasia. conform the best interest standard to the Therefore, interest standard con- the best care type limited for which is meant majority tained in the should be limited to to be tend applied. Moral commentators extraordinary care. Safe- methods two categories: to divide medical care into ordinary care as a basic guarding See, extraordinary ordinary and care. consistent with the standard Ken- Orsi, e.g., P. Think- Rev. Michael Catholic law, tucky powers in DeGrella the *35 (Pauline ing on End Decisions of Life above, or with the guardianship outlined 2000). Books Ordinary & Media care reading of the moral authorities cited preserving the of proportionate means life. majority. the care, Ordinary care includes basic which is Ordinary care is basic health care. provision water, the of food and whether provision of Clearly delineating the ordi- naturally, hygiene, artificial means or care, nary extraordinary care from earlier Extraordinary and comfort. includes care II year, Pope John Paul stated in a surgical procedures types and other of Address, particular- “I Vatican should like care generally not associated basic the ly to underline how administration of Ordinary may life support. care never be food, provided by water and even when See, person. e.g. from a living withdrawn means, Orsi, always represents artificial natu- supra. life, means not a medical preserving ral Extraordinary care is best suited to the II, Pope Paul To act.” Address John adopted by majority standard because Participants in the International Con- many aspects balances the of the deci- Sustaining on Treatments and gress “Life sion, such as the proportionality of Vegetative Advances and State: Scientific person needing care to the A situation. (March 20, para. at Ethical Dillemas” extraordinary may, care when death 2004) all (emphasis original). Like oth- clearly inevitable, imminent and “refuse person vegetative “sick in a persons, er forms of treatment that would only secure end, state, recovery or a natural awaiting precarious prolongation and burdensome has the health care still basic life, long so the normal care due cleanliness, warmth, (nutrition, hydration, person the sick in similar cases is not etc.), prevention complica- and to II, Pope Paul The interrupted”. John to the tions related confinement bed”. (1995), Gospel Evangelium Vitae of Life: Concurrently, Pope and with John Paul Id. para. citing Congregation at for the II, of health Congress an International Faith, Eu- Doctrine of Declaration on (5 and ethicists convened 1980), providers care May Iura et thanasia Bona (1980), However, purpose was to discuss life-sustain- whose IV: at 551. AAS ing vegetative state. long limitation in cite treatments the crucial is: so (last www.vegetativestate.org visited as normal care to the sick is See due 2004). clear, congress That resulted interrupted. August The distinction is with all Continuing, joint in a statement accords because of limitation. points them, Pope John Paul II omitting address. food and water from we are However, strongest point is the accord sanctioning murder. It is made worse with the distinction made above between through adopting by citing the standard extraordinary ordinary pa- care. The clearly references that that basic state pal address states: willingly knowingly care never be obligation provide Therefore,

The ought the “normal removed. we not allow (Con- State, care due to the sick in such cases” our standard to permit through gregation Faith, for the otherwise, Doctrine of the ad litem or deprive a IV) Bona, includes, fact, lura p. et the KentucMan of life. (cf. hydration use of nutrition and Pon- papal address also states that “it is Unum”, tifical Council “Cor le Ca- Dans enough general princi- to reaffirm the dre, 2, 4;4, Pontifical council for Pasto- ple according to which the value aof Workers, ral Assistance to Health Care man’s cannot be made subordinate to Workers, 120). Charter Health Care n. any judgment quality expressed by oth- probabilities, The evaluation of founded men; er necessary promote it is waning hopes recovery when the taking positive actions as a stand vegetative prolonged beyond state is against pressures hydration to withdraw year, ethically justify cannot the cessa- way put and nutrition as a end tion or interruption of minimal care for patients.” (emphasis these Id. lives patient, including hy- nutrition and *36 added.) by dehy- dration. Death or starvation expressed The standard in majority the is, fact, only dration in the out- possible opinion has failed to make an adequate come as a result of their withdrawal. ordinary distinction of care from extraordi- up becoming,

this sense it ends if done nary care. knowingly willingly, proper true and by euthanasia by majority omission. opinion The reference the that the afterlife is somehow than better Address, Paul II Pope supra, para John at impaired only on life is founded sincere (emphasis original). 4 religious religions generally faith. These Finally, any lest there be confusion over assert that are euthanasia and suicide euthanasia, espoused the stance on wrong because the end of life is God’s Vitae, Evangelium supra, para says, hands, not man’s. choice of The euthanasia becomes more majority ignore Not does the the serious it the form of a when takes authorities, also, ignores above but it the by murder committed on a per- others against teaching quality clear of way requested son who has in no it and DeGrella of life” Again, “quality life tests. the who has never consented to it. The rejected recently ethic was most in Grubbs height injustice of arbitrariness and is Family Center, v. Barbourville Health people, reached when certain such as P.S.C.: physicians legislators, arrogate power

themselves the to decide who argument The that there is Mnd ought ought to five and who to die. “quality of life” ethic is without mer- again Once we find ourselves before the rejected quality it. This has the Court temptation of Eden: to become like God philosophy By of life in DeGrella 3:5). (cf. good who ‘knows and evil’ Gen Elston, Ky., 858 Through Parrent v. (1993), By adopting recognized a standard that allows one 698 which S.W.2d Mil by to determine to an individual has an inalienable another

63 slowly by killed as their behalf will be by life declared the United States on of food and water. We done Independence pro- Declaration of removal authority, but of moral Kentucky so with veneer by tected Section One of full of core error. Any ethic decision quality Constitution. healthy

favors life of over the Proposed Not D. The Standard is Ob- infirm, the able-bodied over disabled jective intelligent mentally and the over analysis by the of best interests The extended, If challenged. logically contradictory majority opinion logically could a culture that condones produce to base the by permitting surrogate “the the extermination of the weak object inquiry into the decision strong more powerful. or the interest.” incompetent best regime Adolph The Nazi under Hitler is objec- is no mention of standards There too distant reminder this kind so-called tive measurements best eugenic approach. Unfortunately, such test. interest thoughts na- foreign are limited to philosophic logical inconsisten- tions can also but be found the writ- cies, contradictory nature and indeed ings of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes apparent analysis, immediately are of the Bell,

Buck U.S. S.Ct. simple reference Colle- Webster’s (1927), approved L.Ed. which “Objective” Dictionary. is defined giate mentally of the incompetent. sterilization ideas, events, “viewing phenomena, etc. as Taylor Kurapati 236 Mich.App. [v. apart as external and from self-conscious- (1999)], calls to our N.W.2d “Objectivism” as ness.” is defined ex- attention influence Hitler’s “stressing objective reality, especially periments with sterilization had on subjec- distinguished purely from the eugenics Eugen- movement. American world, existence, phenomenal tive ics the fit espouses reproduction of *37 good the moral or the like.” discourages over unfit and the the birth “not “Subjective” is deter- defined Bowman, unfit. The the Road reason or the universal mined universal Eugenics, 3 U. Chic. L. Sch. Roundtable experience of human knowl- condition (1996). “a “Subjectivism” defined as edge.” is (Wintersheimer at 692 S.W.3d concur- supreme great which attaches theory ring). subjective elements importance to conclusion, majority In standard has the doctrine that individual experience... by ignoring been built the distinctions well the ultimate cri- feeling apprehension is it seated the authorities Or- within used. good right.” and the terion of what is dinary care, persons even reliant on majority opinion upon The focus care, may for such sub- State be incompetent patient’s best interests” “the jected judgment ato substituted standard subjective Simply actually a test. call- is person’s because it is the basic and funda- objective not make it so. ing it does such For right mental receive care. opinion to protect majority it basic refusal of the purposes, these fails to objec- rights rely recognize dichotomy who on the Kentuckians tive/subjective problem are further illustrat- during they State these times when Instead, that in following: elaborate majority opened sick. has ed “We determining pa- the best interests potential for atrocities similar to Bosnia tient, life’ not relying speak quality ‘the considered people where on the State to subjective from the point of view of scrutiny which is constitutionally required surrogate, objective but inquiry is an into when State seeks to terminate medical ‘the value that the glaringly continuation of life has treatment for one of its wards is ’ patient.” 311.631; for the absent KRS the State and its agents prove governmental must that a again, focusing subject Once on the patient’s interest in a nontreatment over- dealing with ‘quality obviously of life’ is rides the individual’s to life. This subjective. Calling objective is of no clearly burden was not satisfied avail. case of Matthew Woods and it could not any be satisfied for similarly other situat- YI. Conclusion ed case involving a ward of the state. It has person been said that no or court potential KRS 311.631 establishes a can judgment substitute its as to what is patient’s rights abuse of because how can an acceptable quality of life for another it be in the best interests to die? person. County re Westchester Medi- great potential There is a for serious con- O’Connor, cal Center on Behalf of flict of interest for the State when it is N.Y.2d 534 N.Y.S.2d 531 N.E.2d paying the for the treatment of médical bill distressing its ward. It is to note that it question There is no significant days after attack the heart safeguards for incompetent wards should Woods the Commonwealth filed in required any process by which this seeking district court to termi- approval might State seek to terminate life sustain- nate im- medical treatment. The ward ing incompetént medical proved immediately after the trial to the wards of the state. Most of the cases in point where his doctor rescinded his rec- the field of “right the so-called to die” discontinuing ommendation about the ven- jurisprudence deal with situations where a tilator. According physicians, to his competent person formerly competent or a dead, clinically Woods was never nor brain incapacitated who has become has sense, legal was he in other dead. expressed some thought or wish about how It was for the of Ap- erroneous Court he or she wanted to be treated such a peals to determine that au- KRS 311.631 situation. thorized a to exercise “substitut-

Even requires DeGrella that at least a ed decision-making” incompetent for an *38 clear convincing proof standard of is person subjective based on a best interests the necessary determining standard for Ap- test. It was error for the Court of surrogate may whether a healthcare au- peals to decide that the 1994 amendments withholding thorize the withdrawal or Act, Kentucky Living Will Directive hydration nutrition and and that the sub- 311.644, superseded KRS 311.621 and proof stantive standard of is substantial clear constitutional directives established and specific. by this Court DeGrella. right

The to life by majority natural The assertion that it is automatically which inheres approving and can be euthanasia or assisted sui- asserted all human beings. certainly appear It does cide is hollow. It would through any per- majority rise the exercise of that the has now taken the next surrogate governmental step slippery slope away sonal choice. down the from (cf. It is bestowed on man human sanctity his Creator of all innocent life and Independence). Declaration of meaningful The strict toward the secular value of Wade, v. in Roe U.S. introduced LICKLITER, Appellant, Philip Alan It is L.Ed.2d

93 S.Ct. DeGrella, complete abandonment years ago specifically only eleven which Kentucky, COMMONWEALTH subjective judg- rejected “substituted Appellee. recognized for It must be ment test.” De- departure it what is—a severe No. 2002-SC-0487-MR. Permitting when anyone decide Grella. Kentucky. Supreme Court than any die on basis other another should convincing pa- clear evidence that Aug. 2004. so, chose to is specifically tient would do tragically in DeGrella and now condemned majority opinion. in the

approved slopes articulat- slippery

concern about dissenting majority

ed both obviously us.

opinions upon in DeGrella is even any society which claims

the veneer of civilization such behavior

totally unacceptable. cannot close our We

eyes to life at the destruction of innocent development any stage impaired degrades

condition of To do so existence. En-

our own culture and all of us. The (1570-1631) poet ex-

glish John Donne when

pressed it well he wrote:

Any me, man’s death diminishes because mankind;

I am involved and there-

fore, never send to know whom tolls,

bell it tolls for thee.

Today, mentally this case involves a defi- knows

cient ward State. Who Only in the

whom it will involve future?

by making assumption the mistaken happen, power

could never of the State

has been unleashed to kill its own citizens.

STUMBO, J., joins as to this dissent I through

Parts IV.

Case Details

Case Name: Woods Ex Rel. Simpson v. Commonwealth
Court Name: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 26, 2004
Citation: 142 S.W.3d 24
Docket Number: 1999-SC-0773-DG
Court Abbreviation: Ky.
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