*1 court, therefore, join than this ture rather writing of Justice Sabers. WOODRUFF,
Rod d/b/a
Beer, Appellee,
MEADE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Appellant.
Nos. 18491.
Supreme South Dakota. Rehearing
Considered on Feb. 1995. Sept:
Decided Dillon, Costello, Porter, Hill,
David M. Bushnell, Heisterkamp Rapid City, appellee.
Bryce Jackley, A. Flint and Michael J. Attorney, Sturgis, State’s appellant.
KONENKAMP, Justice. County, (S.D.1994) (Woodruff we reinstated commission’s decision not to re- new Ron Woodruffs malt license. Rehearing granted to reconsider Wood- Finding ruffs due claims. that he requisite received affirm our *2 to FACTS have been overlooked or misapprehended by Although the court[.]” Woodruff’s issues operates Ron owns and specifically address question Beer, a beer establishment on located the law, of Woodruff argue continues to also that Chip Campground Sturgis, near findings the trial court’s clearly were not typically South Dakota. The business is erroneous. This was settled and open only during Sturgis motorcy- the annual was not the basis for our granting a rehear- rally. Although one-year cle it had renewed fact, ing. In with two members of the Wood- beverage past, licenses in the the retired, I Court now it would be rather Board of Commission- questionable for a reconstituted Court to re- (Meade County) ers denied Woodruff’s 1992 hash the same issues on the appeal. application. The same occurred in 1993. only Thus we consider process ques- the due Nudity inability of law enforcement to purportedly tion misappre- “overlooked or effectively campground work when at the hended” in were the cornerstones of the denial. Applicants for go renewal must appealed both denials circuit the same applicants. as new review, In a consolidated de novo the 35-2-1.2. SDCL 35-2-10 ad trial court held Meade decision was dresses suspension revocation and of alcohol an abuse of discretion and re- ic beverage licenses. South Dakota law versed. We reversed the circuit court and separate provision makes no renewing for determining reinstated the denials after that such licenses. What are we to conclude from trial findings the erred this? Is a who seeks to renew to be fact and Woodruff, conclusions of law. original applicant, treated the same as an no response N.W.2d at 774. In to his claim to many years matter how has held process protections of SDCL 35-2- the license? City Wyo Woodruff cites 10, inapplicable we held the statute was as it Comm’n, ming Liquor v. Control 48 Ill. suspension only, concerned revocation and 404, 258, 262, App.3d 6 Ill.Dec. not renewal. Id. at 774. SDCL 35-2-10 (1977): 1080, 1084 provides: could not legislative [I]t have been the Any may, license issued under this title liquor intent that a local control commis- 1-26, compliance chapter be revoked easily sioner be able to applica- avoid the suspended by secretary upon or the proof statutory procedural tion of require- the licensee, violation agents the his or ments to waiting license revocation employees by manager or or contractu- expire and then refuse to operators al of retail establishments and issue a renewal license. For that reason agents employees their or operating under interpret the term “revocation” ... license, municipal or any provi- include the refusal to issue a renewal li- title, sion of regulation this rule or cense. adopted by secretary provided as title, in Wyoming this The court that in regu- violation of ordinance or reasoned complete political lation absence of issuing of the subdivision applicants, legislature the license the Illinois beverage relevant of alcoholic must applicants control. have intended that such would be treated the same as those whose rehearing petition, his Woodruff asks that licenses were for revocation. fully application we more consider the of due Lake, Bundo v. Walled 395 Mich. process to the renewal of alcohol 154,160 (1976), another case licenses. upon, Woodruff relies held the interest of a ANALYSIS obtaining licensee renewal of his rehearing A property not a “second bite at the license is akin to the interest a apple.” requires SDCL 15-30-4 renewing employment teacher has in in an briefly ground upon “state attempt which a to establish tenure. This was a points supposed is asked and the interpretation holding Perry broad of the very provided the reality, Dakota law Sindermann, South 92 S.Ct. 408 U.S. claims he was process Woodruff (1972), procedural circum- which held 33 L.Ed.2d more, much, proce- denied; if not got he quasi- could create employment stances of required in than the courts protections dural of a suffi- form the basis could tenure which applied for re- Wyoming. He Bundo re-employment “property” cient *3 a and was denied at of his license newal process protection. Woodruff requiring due published notice. hearing, held after public in sales would involved beer a states Thereafter, request at his a de he received business, money in the and time not invest judge. a circuit SDCL 7-8- trial before novo will be that the license anticipating
without circuit court this statute the 30. Under different, practice “Were renewed. if it issues as had and determines the hears opening such take the risk of no one would originally: the brought before the court been necessary making the an establishment was entitled to county commission’s decision Bundo, at 161. 238 N.W.2d expenditures.” hearing At the de novo both no deference. be viewed holding must nonetheless This County presented their and Meade Woodruff in Michigan of law exis- context within the witnesses, introduced evi- arguments, called licensing renewal was at that time: tence dence, adverse wit- and cross-examined gave by a statute which governed judge Following proceeding, the nesses. authority right on a whim even the local findings of fact and conclu- detailed issued at The same lack deny Id. renewal. prevailed and his of law. Woodruff sions Wyoming in the case. of existed criteria County then was renewed. Meade license held one Consequently, the court Bundo ruling, novo which we re- appealed the de existing alcoholic bev seeking of an renewal versed. “rudimentary erage was entitled license Suitability remains a of location at 162. This process.” 238 N.W.2d (a) many ap times an timely detailing regardless of how written notice factor involves approval past in the at plicant ac has received proposed administrative the reasons for (b) SDCL 35-2-1.2. tion; opportunity to defend the same location. See an effective every right to assert this had confronting any adverse witnesses and Meade witnesses, presume not that a loca present criteria. We will being allowed (c) tion, hearing though at one time declared suitable evidence, arguments; ex (d) alcohol, always written, relatively remain so. aminer; although the sale of will neighborhoods and busi informal, findings. character of of Id. The statement change time and a local at nesses tend to over Wyoming, 6 Ill.Dec. at governing body legitimate has a liquor license is not a which held a beverage licensing in nearly managing the alcoholic property right, mandated identical jurisdiction whether an alcohol concerning the re to assess procedures be followed to be suitable. The in Illinois. sales location continues newal of a Chip Campground was found not to applicants in other License renewal pertinent The facts be a suitable location. rudimentary jurisdictions may be entitled to considered were not procedural due but our law does hearing. novo We affirmed the determi de require imposing allowed to I, unsuitability. 522 nation of revocation, licenses are those whose at 775. N.W.2d general property “there is no because people agree with right beverage] license in We alcoholic [an opening a not take the risk of business as between the state and the would South Dakota expenses they if did Kurylas, all the attendant Rushmore State Bank v. licensee.” (S.D.1988); stay open than it could for more 650 not believe 424 N.W.2d SDCL cf. Maxam, protec 35-2-10; year. applicant’s one But renewal Janssen v. (S.D.1980) (administrative prohibition law’s procedures act tion lies 256 by a coun applica capricious exercise of discretion applicable to denial of license not tion). full novo review of tuning ty commission and de leave the fine Thus we must hold- upon the factual Legislature. such decision. Based procedures to our I, County’s decision that matter Meade “was settled and was ings Woodruff ini- arbitrary. granting Beer not basis for our rehearing.” When was license, its location was tially received its Now, due to law en- the location suitable. SABERS, (dissenting). Justice problems objectionable. is There-
forcement I dissent my for all the reasons stated in fore, denial the 1992 and (Wood dissent upheld. licenses (S.D.1994). N.W.2d The of the circuit basis court’s decision under AMUNDSON, J., concurs. factual, 7-8-30 was and is entitled to MILLER, C.J., in result. concurs deference from this The circuit right was then and still is. SABERS, J., dissents. wrong then and still is. Due *4 GILBERTSON, J., having been a equal protection of the laws of this at the time this case member court, require an affirmance the circuit considered, participate. did not is a which reversal of I on this rehearing. MILLER, (concurring in re- Chief Justice sult).
I the earlier dissents of Justice stand myself and continue to be of the
Sabers majority misap- that the
belief However, plied the standard of review. majority noted, author on has