222 Pa. 384 | Pa. | 1909
Opinion by
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment from
The lease is of a tract of land of 102 acres and 15 perches, for a period of ten years from March 23,1898, with the privilege at the expiration of that period of renewing for another period of ten years. The consideration inducing the lessors to “demise, lease and to mine let” their land was the following covenant: “The lessee will pay to said lessors in monthly installments for so much coal as they may mine during the year 1898 at the rates hereinafter named — $3,000.00 for the balance of 1898; $6,000.00 for the year 1899; $6,000.00 for each and every year thereafter until all the coal is exhausted, or this lease is determined in monthly installments payable on the 15th day of each month for the proportion of mine rent due for the preceding month. And in consideration of the payment of said mine rent the said lessee shall be entitled to mine and move each year from the demised premises so many tons of coal of 2,240 lbs. each as multiplied by twenty-five cents per ton will be the equivalent of mine rent for such year; and for all coal mined in any year in excess hereof the said lessee shall pay at the rate of twenty-five cents per ton of 2,240 lbs. each in monthly installments as aforesaid.” There is not another line in the lease upon the subject of how much the lessee is to pay, how or when he is to pay, how much coal he is to mine or when he is to mine it, and no other clause is, therefore, to be read in determining whether he must pay the minimum royalty provided for in the lease for 1898 and 1899, without regard to what he may have paid for excess coal mined in subsequent years. In construing the lease as
The lessee agreed unconditionally to pay in monthly installments, on the 15th of each month, $3,000 for the remaining portion of the year 1898, $6,000 for- 1899 and the same sum for each succeeding year. This is an agreement to pay a fixed sum at a fixed time during a fixed period for a certain privilege. That privilege is to occupy the land of the lessors and mine and remove therefrom during each year of the fixed period a certain amount of coal — 12,000 tons of 2,240 lbs. during the remaining portion of the year 1898 and 24,000 tons during each of the remaining years of the lease. For all coal mined in 1898 in excess of 12,000 tons, and for all mined in any subsequent year in excess of 24,000 tons, the lessee is to pay twenty-five cents per ton. Whether the privilege to mine a certain amount of coal, in consideration of the payment of an annual royalty or rent, is exercised or not, the covenant of the lessee is to pay a fixed sum for the privilege. If the amount of coal which the lessee is permitted to mine in each year is not mined, there is no stipulation for a proportionate abatement of the annual royalty, nor is a privilege given to him to recoup himself after having paid such royalty by mining the deficiency in a subsequent year without paying therefor. Such was the privilege in the leases under consideration in Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company v. Wright, 177 Pa. 387; Lehigh Valley Coal Company v. Everhart, 206 Pa. 118; Pennsylvania Coal and Coke Company v. Witherow, 215 Pa. 327; but the express covenant of the present lessee is that for each year and in each year he will pay a fixed sum, and in addition thereto twenty-five cents for every ton of coal mined in excess of what he is permitted to mine in consideration of the payment of the fixed sum. The payment of the royalty or rental for each year is independent of the payment in any other year, and the mining of the coal each year is independent of the mining in any other year. With the intention of the parties thus clearly expressed, it is impossible to attribute a
When the appellee declares the claim of the appellant to be unconscionable he forgets that it is based upon a' contract entered into by himself in terms so clear that but one meaning can be given to them, and as he intelligently contracted, he is bound. If he made what he now regards as a hard bargain, he cannot, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake in making it, ask to be relieved from it, and if he was foolish in making it, neither the legal nor chancery side of the court will shield him from the consequences of his folly: Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Everhart, 206 Pa. 118.
The first assignment of error is sustained and the judgment reversed, with a venire facias de novo.