WOODLAND HILLS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants; CALIFORNIA WESTERN CONCEPTS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
L.A. No. 31133
Supreme Court of California
Apr. 24, 1980.
26 Cal. 3d 938
WOODLAND HILLS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants; CALIFORNIA WESTERN CONCEPTS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Antonio Rossmann and Linda Ogerter for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Daniel Lowenstein, Andrew Shepard, Peter I. Bersin, Robert M. Brownstein, Robert Snider, Carolyn Sutton, Fadem, Berger & Norton, Michael M. Berger, Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., and Mark A. Posener as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Burt Pines, City Attorney, Mary D. Nichols and Sally Disco, Chief Assistant City Attorneys, Claude Hilker and Jerome Montgomery, Assistant City Attorneys, and Anthony S. Alperin, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Appellants.
Eric Lauterer, City Attorney (Garden Grove), Rodney R. Atchison, City Attorney (Santa Cruz), Peter D. Bullens, City Attorney (Antioch), Bush, Ackley, Milich & Hallinan, City Attorneys (Escalon, Riverbank and Oakdale), Jerome F. Coleman, City Attorney (Burlingame), Daniel J. Cutrin, City Attorney (Walnut Creek), James L. Darrow, City Attorney (El Centro), Keith Gow, City Attorney (Santa Ana), Donald S.
Latham & Watkins, Peter H. Benzian and David Keuser for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Cox, Castle & Nicholson, George M. Cox, Carol S. May, John S. Miller, Jr., and John F. Nicholson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Turner & Sullivan, James P. Corn, Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Thomas F. Winfield III, Louis E. Goebel, Ruth R. Mijuskovic and Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Herbert M. Rosenthal and Gael T. Infande as Amici Curiae.
OPINION
CLARK, J.—Plaintiff associations commenced this mandamus action against the City Council of Los Angeles and certain of its members, challenging approval of a subdivision map for a real estate development by real party in interest.1
The trial court initially denied the petition but on appeal that judgment was reversed, the Court of Appeal concluding city had erred in approving the subdivision without specifically finding it was consistent with the city‘s general plan for the area. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 825 [118 Cal.Rptr. 856].) The matter was remanded to the trial court with directions to further remand to the city council “for proceedings in the manner required by law, particularly as required by
City prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) and again approved the proposed subdivision. In further proceedings for discharge of the peremptory writ in the trial court, plaintiffs contended the EIR had not been submitted for public discussion and that city had, in the interim, prepared a second EIR relating to an alternate plan of develop
Although issuing its supplemental peremptory writ as prayed for by plaintiffs, the trial court rejected certain of plaintiffs’ contentions. Plaintiffs appeal, contending (1) that particular council members should have been disqualified from voting on the proposed subdivision because the real party and its agents and representatives had made political contributions to campaign committees controlled by such council members; (2) that certain council members had failed to exercise their discretion on mandated reconsideration of the application; (3) that the city had not followed mandated procedures on reconsideration; (4) that the evidence does not support findings that the proposed subdivision is consistent with the general district plan “including specifically density and minimizing of grading;” and (5) that the evidence does not support council findings that the subdivision, its site, design and improvements are consistent with applicable general and specific plans, are physically suitable for the type of proposed development and density, are not likely to cause substantial environmental damage, and will not conflict with easements for access through or use of the property within the subdivision.3
We affirm the judgment.
COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY REASON OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
The issue most vigorously argued on appeal is plaintiffs’ contention that council members who had received campaign contributions from parties having a financial interest in an application before the council are disqualified from considering and voting on that application. Plaintiffs’ contention is based on the fair hearing requirement of
Expression of political support by campaign contribution does not prevent a fair hearing before an impartial city council within the meaning of
Plaintiffs do not contend the contributions were bribes for favorable votes. Nor did all recipients vote in favor of the proposed subdivision. The contributions were lawfully made and received pursuant to laws governing campaign contributions. The Political Reform Act of 1974 (
Political contribution involves an exercise of fundamental freedom protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 2 of the California Constitution. (Buckley v. Valeo (1975) 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 22 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 684-685, 689, 96 S.Ct. 612]; Hardie v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 377 [134 Cal.Rptr. 201, 556 P.2d 301]; Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 671, 674-675 [129 Cal.Rptr. 106, 547 P.2d 1386].) To disqualify a city council member from acting on a development proposal because the developer had made a campaign contribution to that member would threaten constitutionally protected political speech and associational freedoms.
Governmental restraint on political activity must be strictly scrutinized and justified only by compelling state interest. (Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 25 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691].) While disqualifying contribution recipients from voting would not prohibit contributions,
Public policy strongly encourages the giving and receiving of campaign contributions. Such contributions do not automatically create an appearance of unfairness. Adequate protection against corruption and bias is afforded through the Political Reform Act and criminal sanctions. (
Plaintiffs further complain because city did not on remand follow normal procedures for approval of a proposed subdivision. This would have required approval first by subordinate agencies followed by appeals eventually to the city council. However, we do not now consider procedures to be followed upon initiation of an application for approval of a proposed subdivision. The procedures to be followed in this case were dictated, first, by the Court of Appeal in remanding the cause to the trial court (see fn. 2, ante), and then by the trial court in its peremptory writ.10 The writ expressly affords to city an election either to
OTHER CONTENTIONS URGED BY PLAINTIFFS ON APPEAL NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED
Because we conclude for reasons discussed below that the trial court properly vacated the city‘s order approving the subdivision, we need not address certain of plaintiffs’ additional challenges to the approval. Such challenges are embodied in plaintiffs’ objections to trial court findings with respect to compliance with mandated procedures and the compatibility of the subdivision and various requirements of the governing general plan. As hereinafter appears, a new EIR will necessarily be prepared on remand and the city will be required to consider again approval of the plan if resubmitted. Issues of noncompliance in procedures leading to the now-vacated order of approval are moot.
DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL IS NOT MOOT
A preliminary issue is presented before considering defendants’ substantive contentions on appeal. Plaintiffs urge defendants’ appeal is moot because the city has, since this appeal, caused a new EIR to be prepared in accordance with the supplemental writ. There have not been, so far as we are aware, proceedings in the city council on the new EIR nor, of course, determination by the trial court that defendants have in fact complied with the supplemental writ. Clearly, the question whether the city has complied with CEQA procedures is not moot, and requires our review for a proper disposition of this appeal.
DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT
The net effect of the judgment is that the city—in approving the subdivision—failed to follow proper procedures, and that it must vacate its
The trial court further found that defendants had prepared two EIRs, one for the proposed 123-unit development, and a later one for a 73-unit development. The court concluded that defendants had “thereby failed to prepare a single integrated EIR on those developments as required by California Administrative Code, title 14, section 15061(f),” and that the council had accordingly been precluded from “fully, fairly and openly determining whether there are feasible alternatives to [the proposed subdivision] and whether specific economic, social or other considerations make infeasible such alternatives.”
As to the trial court‘s determination of defendants’ failure to consult with plaintiffs during early preparation of the draft EIR, defendants contend informal communications between plaintiffs and the city agency preparing the EIR on the 123-unit development, in combination with public hearings on the draft EIR after its preparation, satisfies requirements of law. Defendants’ contention is basically a factual challenge to court findings on the issue in dispute. As to such issues the court found the proposed final EIR recited that during preparation of the draft city agencies were in “regular communication” with plaintiffs’ representatives and “on numerous occasions” discussed the proposed project and draft EIR, that plaintiffs’ representatives had access to the EIR file and were sent copies of the draft EIR “approximately one month prior to commencement of the formal circulation period,” and that the “items of environmental concern” to plaintiffs were documented and known to the concerned city agency “and were addressed in such draft.”
The trial court nevertheless further found defendants had failed “to seek the citizens’ comments in time to influence the preparation and content of the draft EIR,” that although city was aware of plaintiffs’ opposition, it failed prior to publication of the draft EIR “to solicit the citizens’ specific environmental comments or objections for use in preparation of” the draft EIR, and that citizens—not the city—“initiated the contacts with the planning staff prior to publication of the draft EIR.”
As to the trial court‘s conclusion city had failed to prepare an integrated EIR for the project, city contends it is required to prepare but one report for each “project,” and that real party‘s alternative proposals are for separate projects. An analysis of the environmental change resulting from a proposed development is incomplete unless the proposed alternative developments are also considered and reported. The “project” constitutes the entire tract of land proposed for development by the applicant. Real party proposes only alternative developments—whether for 123 or 73 building sites—of the same project. City must consider such alternatives in a single report.
The judgment is affirmed. All parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the judgment, but I cannot join the majority‘s sweeping language and conclusions.
Although I am sympathetic with the attempts of plaintiffs to ensure governmental decision making which is free from bias, this court is not well equipped to hammer out the proper standards for disqualification based solely on the receipt of lawful campaign contributions. Surely the amount of the contribution, its timing, its method, as well as the signifi-
Accordingly, it is not the place of this court to declare, as does the majority, that “[a]dequate protection against corruption and bias is afforded through the Political Reform Act and criminal sanctions.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 947.) Whether or not this is true is a matter for the Legislature to determine.
The presence of an unbiased tribunal has long been regarded as an essential component of due process of law. (In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [99 L.Ed. 942, 946, 75 S.Ct. 623]; Peters v. Kiff (1972) 407 U.S. 493, 501-502 [33 L.Ed.2d 83, 93-94, 92 S.Ct. 2163].) It is essential if our political and jurisprudential systems are to function. Indeed, little value would attach to other procedural protections if the decision makers were biased.
Sensitive to the importance that fairness plays in our political and legal processes, the courts have repeatedly held that furtherance of these objectives justifies infringing on the very “fundamental rights” at issue in this case. (E.g., Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, 26-29 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691-694, 96 S.Ct. 612] [upholding recordkeeping, reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as a limitation on campaign contributions]; Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 780, 782-783 [160 Cal.Rptr. 102, 603 P.2d 19] [upholding disclosure requirements]; Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 46-48 [157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46] [upholding registration and reporting requirements]; County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662 [114 Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345] [upholding a conflict of interest law and disclosure requirements]; Morial v. Judiciary Com‘n. of State of La. (5th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 295, cert. den. 435 U.S. 1013 [56 L.Ed.2d 395, 98 S.Ct. 1887] [upholding statute and canon of judicial
The majority correctly note that a campaign contribution does not constitute a “financial interest” which could precipitate the official‘s disqualification under the Political Reform Act of 1974. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 945.) Therefore, the act is not available as a basis for precluding the defendant council members from participating in the underlying proceeding. However, the majority proceed to suggest that even if there were a conflict of interest, the participation of the council members would be permitted. (Maj. opn., ante, fn. 7.) This unnecessary observation is not only gratuitous but erroneous as well.
NEWMAN, J.—I concur in the result. I share the Chief Justice‘s concern regarding the majority‘s pronouncement that “[a]dequate protection against corruption and bias is afforded...” (maj. opn., ante, p. 947). I also agree with her view regarding the interpretation of
TOBRINER, J.——I join in the majority opinion upon my understanding that nothing in that opinion is intended to preclude the Legislature or a local governmental entity from enacting appropriately defined legislation providing for the disqualification of a decisionmaker in a quasi-judicial proceeding on the basis of the decisionmaker‘s receipt of campaign contributions from a party to the proceeding. We have no such disqualifying legislation in the present case. Thus the majority correctly holds that in the absence of such provision the fact that a decisionmaker has received a campaign contribution does not automatically demonstrate bias or the appearance of bias. The receipt of such a contribution does not preclude the decisionmaker‘s participation in the proceeding under the “fair hearing” principles of