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Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.
704 P.2d 483
Okla.
1985
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*1 ruling judgment upon legisla- on the dubious and un- the Town’s Without legal tive body. for the court’s substantiated basis conclusion, support factual in we find no opinion Appeals Court of holding. for The Code of

the record judgment therefore VACATED and the Tipton, for the Town of Okla- Ordinances the trial court is REVERSED. an exhibit and exam- homa was admitted as validity by the trial court and ined HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, challenged. is not this Code Ordinances OPALA, WILSON, KAUGER, ALMA A review of Code shows Town SUMMERS, JJ., concur. statutory power regulate its formalized building by enacting limits within town C.J., SIMMS, judgment. concurs in 43-101, O.S.1981, language ver- Fur- as its own 16-15.1. batim Ordinance

ther, 4-10, there is an exten- Ordinance governing procedures set of rules

sive building application and issuance

permits. 13 of that ordinance Subsection provides:

further any aggrieved person from

Appeals Clerk, concerning a of the Town decision WOODIS, Evelyn Parents John and granting Building Per- relative to Henry and Next Friends of John mits, shall be to the Town Board of taken Woodis, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Trustees, who act as a shall Board Tipton, Appeals for Town of Okla-

homa. AND ELECTRIC OKLAHOMA GAS exactly procedure COMPANY, followed corporation, Which case. by Landowner the instant Defendant-Appellant. No. 58815. holding

The trial no court erred procedure existed within Town’s ordi of Oklahoma. Supreme Court governing building application for nances Further, permit hearing and for a thereon. July appears fol it both Landowner Town application procedures as writ lowed

ten, and based all the relevant infor ex

mation available the Board Trustees- legislative in a its discretion reason

ercised if, prudent Even for the

able and manner. argument, had been

sake of there a defi building permit proce

ciency the Town’s

dures, says we find no rule of law which ground overturning

this is a sufficient decision, long appli so as an

the Town’s equal rights process pro

cant’s due

tection are violated. the trial erred find-

Because court procedure governing

ing that no existed

building permits because there no

finding unreasonably, the Town acted arbi-

trarily capriciously, the trial court had independent grounds superimpose

no

LAVENDER, Justice: The sole Oklahoma Gas and (OG&E) Company Electric raises for our appeal wrong- consideration this from a judgment ful death the trial in refusing jury court erred to instruct the that the decedent was a on its transmission-line tower and that the injure of care it owed him was not to wilfully wantonly. him or We conclude that under facts adduced and the law applicable thereto OG&E not entitled to the refused instruction affirm the judgment. fifteen-year boy

The deceased was a old who climbed to the of an top unlighted shortly transmission-line tower after mid- night. fifty The feet tower was stood in a field a third owned boy not defendant in the case. The by electricity was killed that arced toward high-voltage him from the line or insulator when he reached the near top crossbar of the tower. parents boy brought

The of the deceased action OG&E on theory that the electric had “high degree breached the of care” it owed properly son maintaining their Specifically, transmission-line tower. parents alleged sought prove had safety OG&E violated standards set Safety the National Electrical Code and safety precautions had failed to take other required were under circumstanc- parents es. The contended to make more failure difficult for tower their son to climb had caused his death. grounds defended on the OG&E that it complied applicable safety had with the precluded recovery code and that the decedent’s status as George, Sallisaw, S.Daniel plaintiffs- contributory negligence. The trial appellees. court refused instruct Wilcoxen, Cate, Andrew Wilcoxen & awas on OG&E’s trans- Muskogee, Stratton, H. Duane E. Steven only duty mission-linetower and that Moore, City, defendant-ap- Oklahoma care OG&E owed the entrant was not to pellant. injure wilfully wantonly. him OG&E Jay Galt, Nichols, Looney, requested M. Johnson & claims error this refusal Hayes, City, Oklahoma for amicus curiae. instruction. “(b) par- using intermeddling a verdict for the with a jury returned

ents, thirty-five per- possession chattel with an attribution in the another.” negligence to the deceased and six- cent of part following As of the “Comment” ty-five to OG&E. 217, it is stated: Physical “e. contact with Chattel: I. “ ‘Intermeddling’ *3 intentionally means We first consider the decedent- bringing physical about a contact with of occupied the status a entrant may chattel. The actor commit a at of his electrocution. the time trespass brings by an act which him into undisputed It that OG&E a owned physical intended contact with a chat perpetual right-of-way easement across another, tel in the as possession of when owner, it upon land a third which dog, he beats another’s horse or or electric transmission towers maintained directing object or intentionally missle including and the tower climbed lines against it, as when the actor a throws decedent; possession it had of the that at stone another’s automobile or inten lines, and, by ease- towers and virtue of its tionally drives his own car it...." ment, right possession of both. need not address the We entry by Here the unauthorized deceased trespasser upon was a whether decedent possession in the tower and wires easement, property, real for the reason placed of OG&E the deceased in the statue that occu we here determine decedent trespasser upon of a OG&E’s transmission pied upon per of a the status tower and wires. sona] OG&E, i.e., and property its tower wires. Johnson, In Kaw 202 Okl. City v. (1949), P.2d 699 held that the owner of we personal property Trespass to is delineat- light power duty electric and wires owed no Trespass ed in Am Jur 2d as fol- 9§ except toward a thereon to re- lows: him injuring intentionally frain from or “Trespass personalty is the inten- wantonly. supra, a City, In Kaw nineteen tional use of or interference with a chat- county a year boy old climbed owned possession tel in the which is bridge City Kaw top on of which owned Any in- justification. unlawful without with and maintained wires the con- terference, slight, en- however with the county. of the The wires were bare in sent joyment personal prop- another of his a spots places covered with weather trespass. ...” erty is a grabbed the insulation. The wires Torts, ed, 2nd further Restatement of lights grab- city twice to dim the elucidates: time, bing them third received a for the 215. Definition Possession of “§ him to jolting caused fall shock which Chattel: bridge floor, his death resulted. Subject, “In the Restatement of specifically address While the Court did person ‘possession who is in of a chattel’ personal trespass fact physical who has control of the one trespass upon property, in fact a it was with intent to exercise such con- chattel duty- traditional personal and the property behalf, trol on own on behalf applied. to-trespasser rule was another.” Ways Committing Tres- “§ to be committed appears Oklahoma pass to Chattel: negligence liability in var the view trespass chattel “A to a be com- complain entrant ies with the status intentionally mitted applies traditional ing injury, expressed in trespassers as Kaw “(a) dispossessing rule as to another of the chat- Johnson, supra. Sutherland tel, City v. Okl., Inc., Hospital, Code, with the Safety Saint Francis National Electrical (1979). required P.2d 780 Corporation order of the

Commission, exculpated an electric com- II. pany charge from a negligent that it was maintaining voltage next consider whether viola uninsulated We provisions building lines close to a metal tion of National Elec where it knew or Safety trical should have code constitutes known ladders per would be used in the part se and breach of on the maintenance of the building might general which come in electric owed contact public, including trespassers, with uninsulated through the wires. We there police power compliance of a held that regulation. invocation with the National Safety in the Electrical Code We answer affirmative. is not conclusive company’s evidence of the electric exer- There is substantial evidence in the care, of due cise “but one factor to support finding record of a viola- *4 Rotramel, be considered.” is distin- tion of Safety the National Electrical Code bar, guishable from the in case at that of rung 1941 in that the lowest the of compliance the sought with code was as ladder on OG&E’s transmission tower was shield, whereas, here, noncompliance a is ground, less than feet 6½ from “the sought as a sword. readily place” other accessible as forbid- In the Langazo case of v. San Joa by added). den code. (Emphasis the quin Light Power Corporation, & jury a was instructed that violation the of App.2d (1939), Cal. 90 P.2d 825 a se, negligence per code was and the duty telephone to remove an abandoned was further instructed: charged line which became with electrici power “An company using electric in ty was to determined be a of an violation an right-of-way poles easement or for its commission, order of the railroad the appliances conducting wires and its purpose of which order towas remove a required high- is business to exercise the or property.” hazard to “life There the degree good est of care to maintain in (832): Court said safe, condition and render its business (vi- “The support cases which this rule care, degree and to that of use caution statutory duty respect olation of a with circumspection keeping and with the the property) to condition of the are dangerous of character its business.” concept based the fundamental Compa- Service “In v.Public Rotramel party of status of the ny, Okl., (1976), 546 P.2d 1015 we held raised, injured cannot be for reason company that an electric “transporting police law a regulation de- selling electricity profit, and a known protect (Citations signed public.” to deadly dangerous though and useful omitted). product, greater degree a owes care of and precaution its use than [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] property character,” of a dangerous less important thing “The there is that power compa- we further held that such we statutes as have mentioned ... required nies are highest exercise the usually and these statutes bear the as- degree of care and to maintain in the pect police regulations protec- possible appli- best condition best public tion relative to matters with science, ances known to to render its public commonly which the contact is safe, use degree business and to a through individuals as to which the indi- care, circumspection keep- caution viduals are entitled to assume that the ing dangerous with the character (Citations law has been observed. omit- business.” ted). The benefits to be derived from its Rotramel,

In through we further performance public considered inure to the compliance power aby company safety the added assured to individual of-way, appellant-trespasser and can person property, duty effect great way. as must exercised public in no other That the failure as be general public. (Ci electric requirements of such a to observe omitted). degree will, high tation While this proximate if the cause of statute expressed care Power & Light even a tres- injury, support an action [Florida Bridgeman, Co. Fla. by an 182 So. passer v.] sustained [133 abundance (1938) does not raise an electric (Citations omitted). com authority.” ] pany against of an insurer the level all the trespasser- between The distinction (Citation omitted), possible accidents it does status-liability part determination on the demand company guard that an electric against negli- as ordinary landowner against reasonably occurrences which can gence the one claim of a anticipated by foresight.” the utmost hand, trespasser-status-liability de- and the part of Thus, on the the owner termination of a police where a violation voltage operator electric lines who power regulation has been invoked police safety has statute comply violated electric company’s failure to there negligence with, regulation the traditional rules as to a claimant trespasser on the other hand is occupying claim of a apply, status do not City in the case Norris v. illustrated and the one of issue becomes whether the (1979). Miami, App., Fla. 367 So.2d 1038 police power violation of the statute or independent (plaintiff- contractor regulation proximate There an cause was the appellant) engaged third injuries. claimant’s property trim located on owned trees *5 trespass foreseeability While of a was plaintiff The failed City the of Miami. had involved, foreseeability not of an inter- the the permit city to from and occu- obtain vening present and in cause was considered the pied status of a as to the Wise, City 193 Okl. Altus city. plaintiff The sustained an electrical (131): (1943). “Companies said P.2d 128 We shock a severed tree came into when limb in engaged conducting elec- the business company’s electric over- contact with the are tricity high voltage over wires bound to alleged lines which were to be power head precautions greater in its exercise much by camouflaged foliage and negligently property than if were a less use the tree growth. (Citations omitted). dangerous character. are, therefore, to “Thus, They, anticipate bound (1040): by Court said The Florida danger.” possibilities of permission more remote appellant’s to receive failure Miami) (City of enter the to landowner Corpora- In Keel v. Titan Construction (via the property and cut trees tion, Okl., (1982),this P.2d 1228 Court permit) fact that and his awareness (1232): said not located on the Cohn trees were “In Okl. v. Anderson Lisle [61 clearly trespass- property, appellant was (1916)], held: ‘Whenever the P. 278 we City of Miami. As to the er as to the ... attending a situation are circumstances trespasser-appel- precarious status of the person ordinarily prudent such lant, greater duty to City owed no than that, apprehand as the reasonably could conduct toward avoid and wanton wilful consequences his probably natural and and, discovery presence, him in act, danger person ... will another dangers open to warn him of known not duty to exercise injury, a receiving (Citation omitted). ordinary observation.” injury such ordinary prevent care ’ (Footnote citations omit- arises ... liability However, as to the of the ted). took a different view the Court company, before one “Thus, appear requirement “The (1042): judice, it would sub injury to tortious Light for his become liable long as Florida Power & that as of must complained injury appel- reasonably anticipated have could reasonably foreseeable right- have been City of Miami presence on the lant’s n firmly high-voltage ensconced from a line or insulator tortfeasor when (Footnote citations are Oklahoma law. top he reached the crossbar near the omitted). And, as we said Atherton v. tower. (1979), (Okl., supra: 602 P.2d 634 Devine boy’s parents brought negli- traditionally lies within the ‘Causation gence They alleged action OG&E. fact, In an action for realm of not law. had failed to exercise the negli- injuries by caused the defendant’s “high degree of care” it owed their son question gence, jury it is a properly maintaining its trans- injurious consequences resulting from mission-line tower and its breach of reasonably negligence could have mandatory safety certain standards. anticipated. or ... Fore- been foreseen complied OG&E countered that it had with of law seeableness becomes code, applicable safety and that recov- for the court when one reasonable ery precluded the decedent’s both from the conclusion can be drawn ” his contrib- status facts.’ utory negligence. AFFIRMED. The trial court to instruct refused HODGES, DOOLIN, V.C.J., and HAR was a on OG&E’s WILSON, JJ., concur.

GRAVE and the only transmission-line tower and him of care owed OG&E was not to KAUGER, J., judgment. concurs in wilfully wantonly. injure Judgment him C.J., SIMMS, part, concurs dissents rendered on a verdict below part. parents, thirty-five with an attribution of OPALA, J., dissents. percent deceased and sixty-five single to OG&E. OG&E’s claim SUMMERS,J., disqualified. judge’s give error is the trial refusal to OPALA, Justice, dissenting. requested instruction on the decedent’s wrongful In this death action the court trespasser status. pronounces power generat- that an electric view, Although, my requested ing company company] owes the *6 [OG&E charge correctly the that did not state law who, highest degree care to one as a decedent, spells duty the the out its toward trespasser upon by the land not owned the given by instructions the trial court are company, climbing was electrocuted while Where, fraught nonetheless with error.2 company’s the transmission-line tower. I join opinion. here, by the cannot as a decisive issue is formed together pleadings with evidence adduced deceased, fifteen-year boy, The old trial, to the attention of the at and is called upon unlighted climbed an trans- OG&E by requested charge, the court has court shortly midnight. mission-line after tower motion, duty, to set forth the on its own fifty The tower was feet and stpod governs the tendered is- rule of law by a field owned a third who was not informing sue.3 The trial court’s error litigation.1 in this The involved of care by electricity arced him the of the correct standard killed toward O.G.&E., only duty quo in the locus in O.G.&E.owed has but an easement of the and the 1. OG&E fatality wilfully —the land on which the in suit oc- or wanton- to the deceased was to avoid nonpossessory curred. Easements are estates in injuring ly him.” Property the land of another. Restatement of 450, 2903; (b) p. comment at Beetschen v. § McNeal, 31, 451, 3. Mason v. 187 Okl. 100 P.2d 751, Pipe Corp., Shell Line 363 Mo. 253 S.W.2d [1939], 452-453 cited in McCorklev. Great Atlan 785, [1952], 786 Co., Okl., 583, tic Ins. [1981]; 637 P.2d note 3 at 586 578; 12 O.S. Tapley, § 1981 Shelton v. requested OG&E stated: 2. The instruction Okl., 672, syllabus 329 P.2d [1958]. Decedent, "You are instructed that the Plaintiffs’ Woodis, 'Bo' John was a on the tower

489 prejudiced liability the criteria of the 386 doubtless tort by OG&E § owed —because ‘premises on the created, OG&E had posture.4 defense company’s here, an artificial condition — (Second) of the Restatement 386 Section transmission-line tower —which it should case, the sole provides, in this of Torts recognized as involving have an unreason- basis liability be im- upon which tort persons might harm to able risk of qua electric transmission OG&E, posed on come upon imperiled the land be the of an uninvit- company, injury for or death condition,7 dangerous indeed, may, OG&E upon its dan- unauthorized entrant ed and like to one the damages be answerable the gerous facility upon land of constructed who was a decedent vis-a-vis components of The critical recov- another. the as well unautho- landowner as an 386 were neither ery authorized under § rized entrant on tower. OG&E’s In parties requested in their by the tendered short, purposes 386 the decedent’s § any of the court charge nor included status on the land and on the tower was instructions.5 immaterial. The owed OG&E depend did not on decedent’s status but an “aca- 386 fashions neither Section the on elements 386. § a new norm of liabili- demic construct” nor other ty. It draws essence —as sections single to drawn Because inference pertinent ap- do—from of the Restatement undisputed here from the facts facts similar to pellate pronouncements6 on record is that was indeed a decedent us. 386 embodies the or, those before Section as I vis-a-vis landowner — apply case, common-law norms prefer say American it in this unautho- If of this case. rized on under the circumstances and uninvited entrant both fit negligent did the basic land and the tower8 —it was incumbent conduct 4. 6. For 8. 7. possessor." which land v. vides: P.2d or a member reasonable physical harm may or outside tive By three harm land trants to Neither cy sees Pacific I Restatement This Ward 255 considerations do not diminished behalf, varying claim common law’s trichotomous division trespassers and invitees—the common occupier 794, a structure or other a recent categories occasioned is the “Any person, except he should consent of the classified historical Ins. now may be agree with the court that the decedent risk of who creates or [emphasis supplied] only Co. —a Or. [1969]. application thereby water down (Second) as between themselves and they responsibility his household protected theory entrants — of as a recognize land, 85, antecedents militate in favor rested. physical New York v. are 464 possessor or of trespasser defects caused to of tort lawfully upon care §of subject P.2d class harm to others maintains the tort artificial Torts, *7 386, applicable possessor nor modern in the liability involving trespasser, or one 698, Frank, Okl., vis-a-vis OG&E. law affords the them, otherwise, yore see liability 701 [1970]. liability condition acting extending premises. Escobedo 386, on form—a irrespec- of land an un- which of en- licen- land, poli- pro- 452 plete Bartmess, shield from Invitees, occupier. immunity where the was held Marsh, non-possessors, 2), whose ponds polluted between has Okl. harm to Section 386 tion that the nonpossessors possessors well articulated in 21 N.Y.S.2d ests in land] tion. This the land of reflects the "involving any spective and Earl discussion Hughes, Survey ment and Restatement refused Machinery (Second) L.Q.Rev. cattle & of whether Duties liability Licensees others", applies W. Baker Revaluation, defendant, rule 181 Okl. liable to an See general section, common law’s History another owner of of Restatement trespassed P.2d for conditions [owners 182, apply such as to a defendant other e.g., & unreasonable (Second) of [1940], Equipment Torts, Trespassers: A the defendant’s negligence. 359-361 occupiers and that they which Utilities Co. v. occupier 501, Phillips may OG&E 68 Yale 623-624 dangerous Trespassers, and were owner where was adjoining to all traditional Comparative of 76 P.2d 352 claim nonpossessory rejection governs upon the [1953]. Torts, (Second) of Torts lawfully upon Petroleum Co., under in this case. See risk distinction, Ireland Com L.J. 633 of an oil § The distinction entrants, [1950], 386, Comparative facility upon § poisoned by Haney, operations, liability landowner 386. of (pt. Oklahoma considera occupier’s occupier's Misc. premises than physical Restate v. Law of [1937], Co. [1959] 1 and For a lease, inter "irre non- see no 91, SIMMS, jury, Justice, the trial court to instruct Chief concurring part, dissenting part: requirements, accordance with the § degree highest of care was not I concur in I majority opinion Part of the applicable. That standard be claimed but dissent to Part II. I believe the trial an electric transmission or court in refusing erred to instruct generating company only by one who does decedent was a and that occupy the of an invitee or status licensee only duty of care owed to him was to not facility op- injure or the him wilfully wantonly. vis-a-vis the landowner I would reverse and remand the matter for a new erator.9 trial. 386, Although in view of OG&E could § invoking recovery by

not defeat the dece- vis-a-vis itself or

dent’s status landowner,10 clearly it was entitled to ordinary-degree-of-care charge. Plain- recovery wrongful

tiffs’ for decedent’s

death can be rested here on OG&E’s liability ordinary 386 tort for breach of

§ care. The was not so instructed. It CITICORP SAVINGS AND TRUST charged highest was that OG&E owed “the COMPANY, an Oklahoma degree admittedly of care” to one who was Corporation, Appellant, neither a an invitee in licensee nor quo. locus in The BANKING BOARD OF STATE short, In I cannot accede to the court’s Empie, OF OKLAHOMA and R.Y. OG&E, holding qua power-trans- Commissioner, Appel Oklahoma Bank facility mission with a constructed lees. highest the land of owes the No. 61663. degree care to an unauthorized en- trant its tower and a vis-a- Supreme Court of Oklahoma. proves vis that land’s owner who OG&E’s 23, July noncompliance police power with some (1) regulation. I would hold that

liability governed exclusively by here is (Second)

terms of Restatement § (2)

Torts and because the decedent was not quo,

a licensee or invitee in the locus in entrant,

but unauthorized and uninvited him,

OG&E owed under the standards of ordinary no more than care. uation, 640; pump placed Injured supra land ..." In Ireland a hand at Annot.: Status of bank, alley request Trespasser in an near a at the on Land Not Adult Electricity Supplier, Owned bank, purpose pumping Affecting Liability for the water out of As Its Injuries its basement. The court held that § 386 did not Inflicted on Him Electric Wires it defendant-contractor, apply Thereon, and that the Maintains 30 A.L.R.3rd 777 [1970]. operating pump plaintiff was injured, when the *8 Okl., Company, protection 9. Rotramel v. Public Service was entitled to the operating rule P.2d 1015 [1976]. because he was pump at the invitation and for the benefit of the Inc., Hospital, 10. Sutherland v. Saint landowner. occupier, Francis Some courts have found that an Okl., operates inherently dangerous P.2d 780 Under the common- [1979]. apparatus, may system, only duty owe a to those who law status classification of care technically trespassers. injuring Hughes, See Duties owed a is to avoid him wil Trespassers: fully wantonly. Comparative Survey A & Reval-

Case Details

Case Name: Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.
Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Date Published: Jul 23, 1985
Citation: 704 P.2d 483
Docket Number: 58815
Court Abbreviation: Okla.
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