Woodhull v. MeinelWoodhull v. Meinel
{1} Angela V. Woodhull, Ph.D. (Plaintiff), acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Carolyn Meinel (Defendant). The trial court ruled that the applicable New Mexico statute of limitations and
{2} Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s decision on three other matters, including denial of her motion for summary judgment, denial of her motion to sanction defense counsel, and denial of her motion to amend her civil complaint. Defendant argues that, while her motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and CDA was properly granted, her motion for summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff is not the real party in interest was improperly denied. We
BACKGROUND
{3} Defendant operates the website http:// www.happyhacker.org. Plaintiffs defamation claim is based on two instances of Defendant’s posting comments on her website about or relating to Plaintiff in a section entitled “It Sucks to Be Me.” On October 14, 2003, Defendant posted an email message from Plaintiff entitled “Please contact me” and stating “I have a job for you.” Just below the email message Defendant posted her own comments. Specifically, she stated that upon calling, Plaintiff knowingly solicited her to commit a federal crime by offering her the job of “breaking into a news web site that had written something unflattering about her.”
{4} Approximately two years later, on January 6, 2006, Defendant made a second posting on her website titled “The worst of ‘It Sucks to Be Me,’ 2005.” The posting first recapped the 2003 incident described above, adding that even after Plaintiff was informed that she was requesting a criminal act, she nonetheless offered to pay for its performance. It went on to state that Defendant’s only recourse against Plaintiff for her alleged unlawful request was “to make fun of her on this website.”
{5} Defendant’s 2006 posting also contained the content of an email exchange between Defendant and Mike Gimignani, a staff member at the Independent Florida Alligator (the Alligator), a student run newspaper at the University of Florida. In that exchange, Defendant asked Gimignani whether his newspaper’s website (http://www.alligator. org) had information about Plaintiff that she “disliked.” Gimignani’s response contained details about a dispute between Plaintiff and the Alligator related to whether a play by Plaintiff featured “dancing penises and condoms.” Defendant additionally commented that further research revealed that Plaintiff had “been on America’s Funniest Home Videos ” and “says she is proud to be known as Wedgie Woman.”
{6} Defendant argues that summary judgment was proper because the statute of limitations has expired as to both postings by operation of New Mexico’s so-called “single publication” rule. See
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7} Our review from a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Farmington Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Farmington,
DISCUSSION
Statute of Limitations and Single Publication Rule
{8} The statute of limitations for a defamation claim is three years and begins running at the point of publication. Fikes v. Furst,
{9} Defendant argues that Plaintiffs defamation claim for the 2006 posting is also time-barred based on New Mexico’s single publication rule, which provides as follows:
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any othertort founded upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
{10} We take this opportunity to adopt the majority position applying the rule to Internet publications. See Atkinson v. McLaughlin,
{11} The single publication rule is designed “to protect the defendants] and the courts from a multiplicity of suits, an almost endless tolling of the statute of limitations, and diversity in applicable substantive law.” Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc.,
{12} “Republication” is an exception to the single publication rule, giving rise to a new cause of action that restarts the statute of limitations. Firth v. State,
{13} Updating a website with information unrelated to the originally alleged defamatory material is not sufficient to trigger the republication exception. In Firth, the defendant posted a report on its website which contained allegedly defamatory statements. Id. at 464. Although the claim was otherwise barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff argued that a republication occurred when the website was updated with new reports unrelated to the plaintiff. Id. at 466. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that “[t]he justification for the republication exception has no application ... to the addition of unrelated material .,, for it is not reasonably inferable that the addition was made either with the intent or the result of communicating the earlier and separate defamatory information to a new audience.” Id.
{14} Similarly, mere technical modifications, as opposed to changes in the nature of the information itself, are insufficient to constitute republication. In Churchill v. State, a website had been modified by moving and altering a menu bar and a press release in a new section of the website, the effect of which was to make the offending material more prominent and more easily
{15} Drawing from both Firth and Churchill, at least one court has found republication based on changes to the actual “substance or form” of the original material. In In re Davis, the defendant created a website that allegedly defamed the plaintiff and members of the Plaintiffs’ family.
{16} The question of whether Internet republication has occurred is highly factual in that it turns on the content of the second publication as it relates to the first. When a second publication goes beyond mere editing or adds content, it may properly be considered a republication if the effect is more than a “delayed circulation of the original edition.” See Firth,
{17} While Defendant concedes that alterations were made in 2006, she also argues that substantive changes alone are insufficient to constitute republication. Defendant relies on Hoesten v. Best,
{18} We hold that the 2006 publication is sufficiently different from the 2003 version to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 2006 posting can reasonably be viewed as a republication. A jury should make that decision. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on this issue and remand for further proceedings.
Communications Decency Act
{19} Under the CDA “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
{20} In order to qualify for immunity, a factual determination must be made to establish whether (1) the defendant is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service,” (2) the claim asserted treats the defendant as the “publisher or speaker of information,” and (3) the published information was “provided by another information content provider.” Gentry v. eBay, Inc.,
{21} Although the record indicates some dispute as to whether Defendant’s website constitutes an “interactive computer service,” we conclude that this element is met.
{22} Plaintiffs argument fails to consider the full scope of the CDA. The CDA protects not only providers of interactive computer services, but also mere users of such services. Individual websites like Defendant’s fall within the CDA by their use of the interactive computer services making them available on the Internet. See Batzel v. Smith,
{23} Next, we examine whether Plaintiff is treating Defendant as the publisher or speaker of the defamatory material. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Defendant made defamatory claims against Plaintiff on her website and continues to post defamatory material about Plaintiff. At trial, Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant used specific defamatory words in reference to Plaintiff. Thus, we conclude that this element is met.
{24} Finally, we consider whether the alleged defamatory material was provided by another “information content provider” within the meaning of the CDA. The CDA defines an information content provider as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”
{25} In general, the exercise of traditional editorial functions such as selecting material for publication or editing portions of material before posting do not rise to the level of content creation or development. Batzel,
{26} The holding in Batzel stems from the prevalent view that the CDA is intended and designed to promote Internet self-regulation.
Congress enacted [47 U.S.C.]§ 230 to remove the disincentives to self[-]regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision. Under that court’s holding, computer service providers who regulated the dissemination of offensive material on their services risked subjecting themselves to liability, because such regulation east the service provider in the role of a publisher. Fearing that the specter of liability would therefore deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted [47 U.S.C.]§ 230 ’s broad immunity to “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) . In line with this purpose, [47 U.S.C.]§ 230 forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.
Zeran,
{27} Another aspect of this case raises a related issue of fact that remains to be determined. Defendant parses out the individual elements of her 2006 post in order to focus solely on her editorial role with respect to the content provided by Mr. Gimignani. By parsing out the text of Mr. Gimignani’s email from Defendant’s own additions, Defendant creates a question as to whether the 2006 posting could reasonably be viewed
Other Matters
{28} Having found the grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations and CDA improper, we do not consider Plaintiffs appeal of the denial of her motion for summary judgment on the merits or Defendant’s appeal of the denial of her motion for summary judgment in which she claims Plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Generally, denial of a motion for summary judgment is not in itself appealable because parties may still obtain the relief to which they may be entitled after additional discovery or trial on the merits. See Doe v. Leach,
{29} Nor do we consider Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on this issue pursuant to
{30} Finally, we dispose of Plaintiffs appeal of the denial of her motion to sanction defense counsel and her motion to amend her civil complaint. Plaintiffs pro se brief is generally quite deficient and, with respect to these matters, fails to provide any argument other than citing two irrelevant, non-binding cases. “Although pro se pleadings are viewed with tolerance, a pro se litigant, having chosen to represent himself, is held to the same standard of conduct and compliance with court rules, procedures, and orders as are members of the bar.” Newsome v. Farer,
CONCLUSION
{31} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the statute of limitations and the CDA and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{32} IT IS SO ORDERED.