Lawrence D. WOODHAMS, SSA 521 72 6241, Claimant-Appellant, v. ORE-IDA FOODS, INC., Employer, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 13149.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
July 1, 1980.
613 P.2d 380
“as an adverb, means ‘at that time,’ referring to a time specified, either past or future. It has no power in itself to fix а time. It simply refers to a time already fixed. It may also denote a contingency, and be equivalent to ‘in that event.‘”
The use of the word “then” clearly indicates that the right to terminate the lease, to the extent that it was granted by paragraph 21, was limited to a fixed period of time, to the happening of a specific event, to-wit, Gruener‘s sale to a new owner (other than SNT) who desired to cancel, i. e., “If I sell the premises, then my purchaser may then, and at his option tеrminate the lease.” Once Gruener sold the premises, to whomever, she had no reason whatever to want the lease emburdened with the provisions of paragraph 21. Bergkamp on the other hand, or any lessees, would have evеry reason to want that paragraph out, making it difficult indeed to envision any person who would accept a ten year lease which was subject to cancellation any time the ownership of the property changed hands.
In shоrt, a review of the lease agreement as a whole leads to the inescapable conclusion that the parties intended by paragraph 21 a contingency arrangement whereby, as a special covenant betwеen the immediate parties and not as a continuing reservation against the leasehold, Gruener, Inc. reserved the right, if the particular sale to SNT did not materialize, to sell to a buyer who conditioned his purchase on getting the premisеs free of the lease. Since this contingency—a sale of the premises to Spence, Thornton and Noxon—did take place, paragraph 21 should be read out of the lease. The judgment should be reversed with directions to entеr judgment in favor of the lessees—the Bergkamps.
McFADDEN, J., concurs.
Louis Garbrecht, III, of Bennett, Powers & Garbrecht, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Roger B. Madsen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for Dept. of Employment.
PER CURIAM.
Lawrence Woodhams was employed by Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. in September of 1976, working satisfactorily and without incident until summаrily discharged some twenty months later. His application for unemployment benefits, though not initially opposed by Ore-Ida, was turned down by the Department of Employment.
Woodhams for all of his life has suffered epilepsy seizures. In applying for benefits, he stated that Ore-Ida grounded his discharge on his failure, in applying for work at its plant, to enter a checkmark to indicate that he had had “epilepsy or fits.” The evidence supports the Commission‘s findings that Woodhams’ fellow employеes at the plant were aware of his affliction, and that he made no attempt to conceal it. It equally appears that when he applied for work he had been seizure-free for over six years.
He had no seizures while оn the job, and the seizure which precipitated his discharge—for having given false information as to his physical condition—occurred at his home, with fellow employees passing the news of this reason for his absence on to his supervisors.
A fаctual issue resolved against Woodhams by the Commission, and hence binding on us, is his contention that at the time he was employed he orally advised his interviewer of his condition, and was advised, in light of his six problem-free years, to answer on the application as he did.
In Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 556 P.2d 859 (1976), the issue was similar. There Wroble was discharged and unemployment benefits denied because of misconduct in not giving full and accurate information as to previous employment, where the giving of such information on an aрplication was the employer‘s rule. Here, the application form signed by Woodhams clearly stated that the giving of false information was grounds for termination.
In Wroble we noted a Commission finding that Wroble “had inadvertently omitted from his application a temporary two-week employment with the post office in 1969.” We reversed the Commission‘s decision, saying:
“We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting
I.C. § 72-1366(e) nor do we construe our opinion in Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., supra, to require that any violation of any rule of an employer will, per se, constitute misconduct such as will result in the denial of unemployment compensation benefits upon discharge. While an employer may make almost any kind of a rule for the conduct of his employees and under some circumstances may be able to discharge an employee for violation of any rule, such does not, per se, amount to ‘misconduct’ constituting a bar to unemployment compensation benefits.“Here, if misconduct there was, it came from the claimant‘s nonconformance with the letter of the rulе enunciated by the employer. Here, there appears to be no deliberate violation of the spirit of the rule.
. . . .
“Given all of the above facts as found by the Commission the record simply does not support any deceitful intent on the part of the claimant in concealing previous employment history for the purpose of obtaining employment. All inferences are to the contrary. Therefore we hold that there is not shown any deliberate violation of the spirit of the employer‘s rules.”
97 Idaho at 902-903, 556 P.2d 859, 861-62. In Wroble the Commission did not express itself on Wroble‘s “deceitful intent.”
Woodhams, on the other hand, runs headon into a Commission finding that he was possessed of a “deceitful intent” in not truthfully answering the questions on his application, thus effectively shutting the door on Woodhams’ chances for another Wroble decision by this Court.
The decision of the Commission is affirmed. Jenkins v. Agri-lines Corp., 100 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979); Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., 91 Idaho 312, 420 P.2d 317 (1966); Johns v. S. H. Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957).
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.
To my mind, the issue presented by Woodhams—whether his falsification of his application was “misconduct” such as that he should be precluded from recovering benefits—is a mixed question of law and fact, and this Court should be bound by the determination made by the Commission. On that basis we should affirm.
However, this Court in Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957), took unto itself the power to reverse findings such as this. Where the Court continues making ultimate decisions whether or not the given misconduct in question is such as to precludе recovery of benefits, as will be apparently so until Johns is discarded, I cannot agree that this decision should be affirmed.
In Wroble we said that the falsification must have been deliberate; I would go one step further and hold that the falsification must be job-related and detrimental to the interests of the employer. Why punish the claimant where the failure to disclose the information was in the justifiable belief that the withholding was necessary in order to gain employment, and did not result in one iota of harm to the employer, the “deceitful intent” being aimed not at harming the employer, but at becoming employed? While the employer may still be within his rights in discharging the claimant, the withholding of unemployment benefits, at the hands of a state agency, seems both uncharitable and unwarranted.
Although Justice Keeton wrote in Mandes v. Employment Security Agency, 74 Idaho 23, 31, 255 P.2d 1049 (1953), in a dissenting opinion that the majority opinion in that case allowing benefits “lets the bars down and opens the flood gates for unauthorized claims,” nevertheless he also pointed out therein that “[t]he legislature declared in no uncertain terms that the purpose of the law is to provide ‘for the benefits of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.‘”
I submit that the entire membership of the Mandes court, which was the same constituency of the court three years later in Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., notwithstanding their decided split on the liberality of purpose of the Unemployment Security Lаw, would have been unanimous in allowing benefits for Woodhams. Woodhams essentially became unemployed through no fault of his own, that is, unless it can be said with any grace that being afflicted with epilepsy is some fault in the man. As Justice Keeton wrotе in Mandes, the Act proposed that the claimant who should not receive benefits was the claimant “who wilfully fails to produce work which might be reasonably expected of him, or who is discharged for
In this case the Commission found that “[t]he concealment of the medical history was a violation of the employer‘s rules and also a deliberate violation of the employer‘s interests because it deprived the employer of its right to assign the claimant to work which would not be hazardous to the claimant, employer, or other employees.” Although this finding might be read as an implicit finding that Woodham‘s falsification was job-related and detrimental to the interests of the employer, I do not believe that there wаs substantial and competent evidence to support such an implicit finding.
The only hazard shown here was that if Woodhams had a seizure, he might fall into moving machinery or off a deck onto someone else. There was no evidence that he was more likely than anyone else to suffer a loss of consciousness. I would not hold as a matter of law that an epileptic who has not had a seizure in over five years can never safely work in any type of job that poses any danger if he should subsequently have a seizure.1 Since no evidence was introduced on the issue of the likelihood of Woodhams’ having a seizure, beyond Woodhams’ testimony that he hadn‘t had one in over five years before he filled out the аpplication, I would remand this case for a determination of the actual detriment to Ore-Ida posed by Woodhams’ falsification.
Woodhams filed his claim for benefits on September 6, 1977, over two and one-half years ago. This is typicаl of unemployment claims that come before this Court, and this time lapse between the filing of a claim and its final resolution ought to be brought to a halt, ere claimants will be receiving old age benefits before they receive any unemployment benefits. The greater portion of the time span intervening between filing of a claim and ultimate disposition would disappear were the Court to hold that Commission decisions may be interfered with by this Court only when there is a pure question of law. On questions of fact, and mixed questions of fact and law, earlier finality of unemployment claims—in itself a quality of great desirability—is an end toward which there should be judicial abstention in favor of administrative expedience.