30 F. 289 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Virginia | 1887
The ease is before tne on the demurrer to the bill. Speaking strictly with reference to the demurrer, I shall now state my conclusions on the questions argued so fully on the seventh and eighth instant. The suit is brought by an executor of a probated will against another executor, an executrix who is also a legatee, and the other legatees. There is no contest over the validity of the will, or question of the proceedings or tribunal by which it was established as the will of the testator. The bill alleges that the will requires a sale of a hotel property, supposed to he worth $100,000 or more, which belonged to the testator,
At the hearing of the argument on the demurrer, a good many questions were elaborately discussed by counsel which I need only refer to. As already stated, the validity of the probate of the will of the testator is conceded by the bill. No question of probate is before this court. The competency of the county court of Elizabeth City county, which admitted this will to probate, to do so, is conceded by the bill; is certainly not denied by it. I do not think it a debatable question whether the circuit court of Elizabeth City county, as a court of equity, has jurisdiction of controversies which may arise between the executors of the will mentioned in the bill in the administration of their trust. That court certainly has jurisdiction of the controversy in any suit that may arise between the executors in regard to the will. If this court, by reason of citizenship, has jurisdiction also of such controversy, the jurisdiction of the twro courts is concurrent; and the jurisdiction of one or the other court, in order to become exclusive, must be exercised before that of the other becomes established.
It is to me equally clear that, within the territory belonging to the United,States at Fortress Monroe, jurisdiction is exclusively in the United States, whether exercised by its executive, its congress, or its judiciary. Therefore, as to any jurisdiction operating in rem directly upon property within the lands of the United States at that place, and requiring an actual, corporeal, personal exercise in situ by an officer present in per
Coming to another question much dwelt upon in the argument, X am very confident that this bill presents no conflict of jurisdiction with the probate court of Elizabeth City county. The demurrant herself recognizes this fact by having filed a bill for a sale in the chancery court of that county. The powers of a probate court are, in Virginia, not greater than those of the ecclesiastical courts of England, which, with respect to the administration of trusts created by wills, are proverbially courts of “a lame jurisdiction.” When the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is invoked by or against an executor, to direct the administration of a will, its power to do so has been held to exist from the beginning of chancery jurisprudence in England, and not in any manner or degree to interfere with that of a probate court, exercising its legitimate jurisdiction as such. Mr. Pomeroy says that the relation subsisting between executors, and administrators, on the one hand, and legatees, distributees, and creditors; on the other, has so many of the features and incidents of an express, active trust that it has been completely embraced within the equitable jurisdiction in England, and also in the United States, where the statutes of states have not interfered to take away or abridge the jurisdiction. Section 156. lie gives a full discussion to the character of the several and varying state statutes, (sections 346-352).and, in view of all their provisions, declares that, “although the general jurisdiction of equity over the subject of administration is practically, and even, in the instances of some slates, expressly, abolished, still the jurisdiction remains in all matters of trusts created by or arising from the provisions of wills; and that thus a largo field is left for the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction in the construction of wills, and in the determination and enforcement of equitable rights, interests, and estates created and conferred thereby.”
It cannot be pretended, however the case may he in other states, that general chancery powers over the administration of the estates of decedents have in Virginia been taken away from courts of equity, as such,
There seems, therefore, to be no doubt of the competency of a court of chancery to assume the direction of the trusts of a will, in a case properly brought before it. Is the present case properly here? It is brought by one of three executors against the two others, all of whom have entered upon the trust. One of the defendant executors is also a legatee, or else, in her character of widow, elects to become a distributee of the estate. The infant children of the decedent, who are the other legatees, are also made defendants. The suit is brought to determine a controversy that has arisen between the complainant and his co-executors as to the sale of the property in their charge. If this were a friendly suit, there would possibly be a doubt whether the case would present such a “controversy” between parties as is contemplated by the first section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1875. But this is no friendly suit. It is a suit arising out of an earnest, actual antagonism of purposes, objects, opinions, and wishes existing between the parties to it, affecting the administration of the estate. One executor seeks to sell the estate, in open competition to the highest bidder. The other wishes to be herself the purchaser, at a price to be ratified by a court. One of them seeks to sell as alleged to be directed by the will. Another of them wishes to hold the property in the family, in a manner deemed by the plaintiff to be in conflict with the direction of the will. Here a question is submitted to the court for its determination, involving the construction of the will and the administration of its trusts, of the most profound monrent to the estate and its legatees and distributees. It is .clearly a “case” or “controversy” within the jurisdiction of a federal court of chancery. It is a real, unfeigned, actual contention inter partes. It is a suit of a character, not only not novel, but such as is usually brought, and is proper to be brought, in a court of equity. If the controversy here be such as. is properly cognizable by a court of chancery, and presents, besides, the jurisdictional facts necessary to give jurisdiction to a federal court, then the case is properly'here. I think thc«e conditions exist in the present case, as they present themselves on the demurrer.
As long ago as the case of Doyle v. Blake, 2 Schoales & L. 245, it was held that, an executor, who had once taken out powers of administration, cannot discharge himself from his duties, unless he goes on and executes the trusts of the will, or puts the administration into the hands of a court. It was held that, not only had he the choice of going into a court of equit}1', but that it was his duty to do so. It is urged here that the single fact that the bill prays the court to enjoin proceedings in the probate court of the county of Elizabeth City invalidates the suit, under the decision in Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 255. That was a bill in which, as Judge Bradley said, the “great object ” was to enjoin
I repeat what I said the other day, that the will gives no power to the executors to keep the hotel open; tliat, by keeping it open and conducting it on their own account as long as they have done, they have created an account of huge proportions, unauthorized by the will, which brings them under very grave and heavy responsibilities. As this has been done without authority from the will, it may be a matter of serious consideration wdiether a court of equity would be willing to let the hotel go on indefinitely without appointing a receiver. On the whole case, I think the demurrer must be overruled, and that the bill must be amended in the particular that has been mentioned; namely, by striking out the prayer for an injunction to stay proceedings in the county court of Elizabeth City county.
On February 11th Judge Hughes delivered the following opinion on on the plea to jurisdiction:
The question now before the court is interesting and important. Tt involves matters of great value, and both court and counsel are bound to deal with it in a spirit of the utmost candor. I am not conscious of bias in the matter, unless it he the natural and pardonable bias which a court may have in favor of its own jurisdiction.
The case now stands on a plea to the jurisdiction. The matter pleaded is that the executrix, who is widow' and a legatee, and the remaining legatees, who are minors, are not citizens or residents of Virginia, but are residents of territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United Slates at Fortress Monroe. To this plea the plaintiff demurs, and alleges as grounds of his demurrer the following, to-wit: (1) This is a suit between the plaintiff and several, three different, defendants, one of whom, Joseph G. Eulton, is a citizen of Virginia; and that this fact gives jurisdiction on the score of the character of parties, even though the other defendants are, as alleged in the plea, not citizens of Virginia or of any other state. (2) That, however the case may be in respect to the citizenship of parties, still the court has jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the suit, and the plea is insufficient.
An examination of the hill shows the following state of facts: Tt invokes the aid of the court in administering the trusts of a decedent’s will;
Such is the case as now presented to the court by the pleadings. The question is whether they show a case, arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, requiring a construction of their meaning by this court. If so, then this court has jurisdiction by virtue of the character of the cause, no matter who may be parties to the record. It is a principle as old as the constitution that whenever, under the second section of the third article of the constitution, jurisdiction depends upon the character of the particular cause, it matters not who may he the parties of record. And as early as the case of Cohens v. Virginia, reported in 6 Wheat. 375-412, the subject was thoroughly discussed by Chief Justice Marshall, and the principle judicially established by the unanimous judgment of the supreme court of the United States. In all the cases which have since been decided by that court it has been held that, where a national question arises in any case upon a provision of the constitution or a law of congress, in such manner as to require of the court a construction of the meaning of the constitution or the law, then a case of federal jurisdiction is shown, irrespectively of the status and relation of the parties named in the record. Suits have been brought into the federal courts where deeds of conveyance from the United States have constituted a part of the muniments of title to property which was the subject of suit; neither party making any contest on the title -which emanated from the United States, the real controversy being on the construction of instruments executed after title had passed from the United States. It has been held in all these cases that, as there was no dispute on the validity of the title which passed from the United States,'themere fact that title had come through a law of the United States which was unquestioned, did not constitute a case of jurisdiction for a federal court.
Our inquiry in the present case, therefore, is whether this is a case arising under the constitution and any law of the United States in such
Now, this is a stronger case for the federal jurisdiction than those ordinarily arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, requiring a judicial construction, where the property in litigation is not situated in a territory of exclusive federal jurisdiction. There the property and parties are amenable to federal jurisdiction only by virtue of the right of the federal courts to construe the federal constitution and laws. Here, if we are required to construe those laws, we have a jurisdiction, not only valid for this reason, hut necessary to be invoked because of our exclusive jurisdiction over the territory of the federal fortress in which the property is situated, and thereby of the res which is the subject of the suit. It seems to me that, if the bill sets forth facts which make it apparent that the question of federal jurisdiction over Fortress Monroe, and over the Hygeia Hotel, is a leading one in the case, it is not necessary for the court to wait until there is a formal denial of any of those facts to determine whether to entertain the suit. Tf, in any suit, the bill sets out on its face such facts as show that the court has jurisdiction from the citizenship of the parties, it at onoe assumes jurisdiction, without waiting for an issue to be made up by the pleadings contesting those facts. So I take it, if the bill shows by its averments such a series of jurisdictional facts as make it apparent to the court that it will be necessary to construe the constitution and one or moro laws of the United States in conducting the suit, in passing upon the rights oí parties and in administering the relief prayed for, then I think it has jurisdiction, without waiting for it to be developed in the sequel, whether there will be such a denial of the facts as to make an actual construction of the constitution and laws necessary.
The supreme court of appeals of Virginia, in a spirit of generous comity towards the United States, has in the case of Foley v. Shriver, 10 Va. Law J. 419, in order to guard against such a state of things, declared that lands in that vicinity, ceded to the United States by Virginia, are no longer a part of the state of Virginia, and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts. I am unwilling, by any decision of this court, to neutralize the effect of that decision by seeming to recognize the existence of two judicial jurisdictions at Fortress Monroe. Without, thore-fore, passing upon the question raised by the plea, whether the suit must abate by reason that some of the defendants are not citizens of the state of Virginia, or of any other state, I overrule it as insufficient, on the ground that the bill presents a case in which it will be necessary for this court to construe the constitution and certain laws of congress on questions arising thereunder.
Although I have thought it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether Mrs. Phoebus and her children, defendants in this suit, by residing at Fortress Monroe, were by that fact alone non-residents and not citizens of Virginia, yet I may as well say, obiter, that I do not think that such is the result of that residence. Fortress Monroe is not a part of
I suggest these thoughts in the form of quaere, and make what is said no part of the adjudication of the case. But see U. S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; Com. v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306; Foley v. Shriver, 10 Va. Law J. 419.
So ordered.