117 Va. 930 | Va. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
Percy Wooden, about sixteen years of age, was indicted for maliciously, feloniously and unlawfully making an assault with a dangerous weapon, to-wit, a stone or rock, upon one Wallace Mowyer, with intent to maim, disable and kill the said Wallace Mowyer, and upon his trial was found guilty as charged in the indictment and sentenced to pay a fine of ten dollars and be confined in jail for sixty days. He thereupon applied for and obtained this writ of error from one of the judges of this court.
The only assignment of error is to the ruling of the trial court refusing to set aside the verdict of the jury upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support it, and there are but two questions raised by the record for consideration by this court: First, whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the offense charged against the accused was committed within the jurisdiction of the Corporation Court of the city of Buena Vista; and, second, whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him of the offense charged.
In the view that this court takes of the case, it is only necessary to consider the second of the questions stated.
It appears that on Saturday night, April 25, 1915, five boys, viz: Wallace Mowyer, the prosecutor: Howard Wooden, Percy Wooden, the accused; Earle Bryant and Harry Campbell, met on the street in front of a picture show. They all started up the street, Mowyer and Bryant being in front of the Wooden boys, and in their progress up the street it seems that Howard Wooden either called Mowyer “Arch Wilson,” or in talking to himself said, “My name is Wilson. I am a brother of Arch Wilson, or Tyree,” the significance of which is not shown, and both Bryant and Campbell testify that Howard Wooden did not call Mow-yer “Arch Wilson,” but Mowyer seems to have been in
The only evidence in the record as to the hitting of the Mowyer boy with the rock is that of Mowyer himself, who states that they were about the electric light when he was hit; that it was very light and that he could see both Howard and Percy Wooden; that he was looking at Percy when he was hit, but he was trying to watch both of the boys; that if Percy had thrown the rock while he was looking at him he could have seen him, but that he saw nobody throw the rock, and after he was hit he knew nothing and never did know who hit him. Mowyer was asked: “You told Mr. Rucker you were watching both of them and had your head turned looking at Percy. Were you hit while you were looking at Percy? A. Yes, sir; but I was trying to watch both of them.
“Q. If Percy had thrown a rock while you were looking at him you could have seen him, couldn't you? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you see anybody throw a rock? A. No, sir.”
After Mowyer was hit he was taken to the house of the
The authorities are uniform that the mere presence of a person at the' time and place of an assault, without any act, word or gesture in aid or encouragement of it, and without anything to show that he advised the assault, will not render him guilty. The authorities on the subject are collated in a note to Brink v. Purnell, 22 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 829, where the rule is stated as follows:
“It is a general and well established principle of law, that one who is present at an assault, and who encourages the person who commits it, is liable criminally in ihe same manner and to the same extent as the person committing the assault. * * *
“The principle that in cases of assault all who are guilty are principals and that there are no accessories applies, and hence a person who is so present at and encourages an assault is a principal and not merely an accessory. * * *
“The mere presence of a person at the time and place of an assault, without any act, word or gesture in aid or encouragement of it, and without anything to show that he*935 advised the assault, will not render him guilty; * * * nor will the mere fact that the defendant knew of the assault justify a conviction. * * * He must do something; he must aid and encourage by words or gestures, or do some act in the way of encouragement of the actual participants-in order to make him guilty as a principal.”
In Mitchell’s Case, 33 Gratt. (74 Va.) 845, the court said: “Principals are such either in the first or second degree. Principals in the first degree are those who are the immediate perpetrators of the act. Principals in the second degree are those who did not with their own hands commit the act, but were present aiding and abetting it.” See, also Horton’s Case, 99 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184; Daingerfield v. Thompson, 33 Gratt. (74 Va.) 136, 36 Am. Rep. 783; 2 Rul. Cas. Law, 526.
It is well settled by numerous cases that it is not sufficient to create a suspicion or probability of guilt, but the evidence must go further and exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. As said in Hairston’s Case, 97 Va. 757, 32 S. E. 797, “The guilt of a party is not to be inferred because the facts are consistent with his guilt, but they must be inconsistent with his innocence.”
In the case of Burton & Conquest v. Com’th, 108 Va. 892, 62 S. E. 376, the opinion by Keith, P., held, that while motions for new trials must be heard as upon a demurrer • to the evidence, yet “The rule does not leave the jury at liberty to guess, and where a fact is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, they cannot arbitrarily adopt that interpretation which incriminates him.”
It might be conceded that either the accused or his brother threw the rock that hit Mowyer, but as we have seen it clearly appears from Mowyer’s testimony that the. accused did not throw it, for it was thrown and Mowyer was hit while he was looking directly at the accused, and
In our view of the evidence in this case as a whole, it is entirely insufficient to sustain the finding of the jury, that the accused was guilty as charged in the indictment, or that he was guilty of any offense, and, therefore, the judgment upon their verdict is erroneous, and it will be reversed and annulled, the verdict of the jury set aside, and the case remanded to the Corporation Court of the city of Buena Vista for a new trial, if the court and prosecuting attorney shall be of opinion that a better case against the accused can be made.
Reversed.