120 Cal. 463 | Cal. | 1898
The plaintiff began an action in the superior court of Los Angeles county against the appellant upon a money demand, and caused a writ of attachment to be issued therein directed to the sheriff of the county of SanBernardino, under which he levied upon certain real and personal property of the defendant in that county. Prior thereto, under a writ of attachment issued in another action against the same defendant, the sheriff had taken the property into his possession, and was in the possession thereof at the commencement of the present action. Judgment was afterward rendered in the plaintiff's action in his favor and an execution issued thereon was returned unsatisfied. Sundry other creditors of the appellant also began actions against it and
The action herein is in the nature of a creditor’s bill to remove an obstruction to the enforcement of the judgments in favor of the plaintiff against the railway company, which exists by reason of the mortgage made by it to its codefendant, and which the plaintiff alleges was fraudulent and void as against him. The superior court of Los Angeles county had jurisdiction of the original action against the railway company, and in that action the property in question was taken into its custody by the sheriff of the county of San Bernardino, under the writs of attachment and of execution issued therein, and, as the court is authorized to direct the sale of this property for the purpose of
The judgment that the mortgage issued by the appellant was fraudulent and void, and directing its cancellation, is in accordance with the allegations of the complaint. The plaintiff alleges that it was executed without authority of law, and not in accordance with the forms prescribed by law. The averment that all of the “bonds,” with certain exceptions, were issued without any consideration, and that the holders thereof are not Iona fide holders, does not impair the averment that the mortgage or deed of trust was illegally issued. The trustee named in the deed of trust suffered default, and has not appealed. Any defect of parties was waived by the appellant by not demurring upon that ground.
It is unnecessary to determine whether the court could direct the receiver to issue a deed of the property immediately upon the receipt of the purchase price. The direction in the judgment is that “after the confirmation of the sale” he forthwith execute the deed. We will not assume that he will execute the deed before he is authorized by law so to do. If the court had no authority to direct that it be executed before the expiration of six months from the sale, his deed prior to that time will be ineffective. The purchaser will be interested in having it executed at the proper time, but the direction in the judgment is not available to the judgment debtor for the purpose of impairing the efficiency of the judgment directing the sale.
The judgment is affirmed.
Garoutte, J., and Van Fleet, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.