1 Walk. Ch. 256 | New York Court of Chancery | 1843
The premises in question were mortgaged to Lewis on the 4th day of March, 1837, by one William Walker; and, on the 6th day of June, 1839, they were sold under a power of sale in the mortgage,
First. That the register was not authorized to l-eceive the money, by the act of March 31st, 1840.
Secondly. Admitting his authority, that he' could not receive a check, or any thing except money.
By the revised statutes, a certificate was given to the purchaser, for a deed after the time of redemption had expired; and the premises were redeemed by paying to the purchaser, or officer who sold them, the sum for which they were sold, with ten per cent interest. R. S. 501. The law of 1840 requiz-es the officer or person making the sale, forthwith to execute a deed to the purchaser, endorsing thereon when it will become operative in law, unless the land is redeemed, and then to deposite it in the register’s office of the proper county, where it is to be kept in
The register should not have received the chock, or any thing but the money. The statute does not authorize him to receive any thing else. His powers are limited to receiving the money, and destroying the deed, and his acts are not binding upon the purchaser, when he exceeds those powers, or departs from them by receiving something else
Griswold is a competent witness to prove that the chéck, and not the money, was deposited with him when he gave the receipt. His interest is equally balanced. The receipt is evidence against him, of so much money received by him, for the person to whom it belongs, whether it be complainant or defendant. He must account to one or the other; and it is immaterial which, so far as he is concerned, for the receipt in either event would be evidence against him, and the decree in this case would not be evidence in his favor. Milward v. Hallett, 2 Caines R. 77, and note, jj. 84.
The receipt is not conclusive evidence against defendant, of the payment of money.
Bill dismissed, with costs.