100 Va. 318 | Va. | 1902
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of assumpsit, brought by plaintiff in error against the city of Lynchburg, to recover five hundred dollars alleged to have been illegally exacted of him by way of license tax for the privilege of conducting business as a labor agent. There are three counts in the declaration. The important alie
It is further alleged that the tax was paid under protest, and under threats of the penalties imposed by the ordinance (a fine of not less than five dollars nor more than twenty dollars per day for each day that plaintiff might conduct the business of labor agent without license).
The defendant in error demurred generally to the declaration, and the demurrer was sustained. This judgment of the Circuit Court we are asked to review.
The ordinance complained of was passed in pursuance of the authority vested in the city by chapter 8, sec. 5, of the revised charter of Lynchburg (Acts 1895-6, p. 213-1). This language
It is settled law that where the Legislature confers upon a municipality the general power of taxation, it grants all the power possessed by itself in respect to the imposition of taxes, and the city can then impose taxes, in its discretion, upon all subjects within its jurisdiction not withheld from taxation by the Legislature, whether they be taxed by the State or not. Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Co., 95 Va. 564; Newport News Rwy. Co. v. Newport News, supra.
The power of the Council of the city of Lynchburg to impose the tax complained of must, therefore, be regarded in the same light as if an act of the Legislature imposing such tax was called in question.
The power of taxation is a most important and delicate trust, and, under our system of government, rests with the legislative and not with the judicial department, and its province cannot be invaded by the courts. As was said by Chief Justice Marshall: “It is unfit for the judicial department to inquire what degree ■of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse, of the power.”
Mr. Justice Cooley, in his admirable work on Constitutional Limitations, says: “The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force -and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. ... Ho attribute of sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point does the power of the government
Again, in Weston v. Charleston, 2 Peters, 449, 466, Chief-Jus^ ti'ce Marshall says: “If the right to impose a tax exists, it is a right which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which imposes it, which the will of such State or corporation may prescribe.”
These principles have been repeatedly approved and applied by this court. Ould & Carrington v. City of Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464; Commonwealth v. Moore & Goodsons, 25 Gratt. 951; Commonwealth v. Maury, 82 Va. 888; Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Co., supra, and other cases.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Moore & Goodsons, supra, involving the constitutionality of a license tax imposed by the State upon merchants, the court says: “If the legislation complained of is unjust and unequal, unwise and oppressive, to any particular class (about which we express no. opinion), the remedy for unwise and oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal, not to the courts, but to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If this ffailsj the people, in their sovereign capacity, may Correct the
It will be observed that the declaration in the case at bar concedes the authority of the City Council under its charter to assess (the plaintiff in error with a license tax for the privilege of conducting his occupation of labor agent. The complaint is. that the amount of the tax imposed is so excessive and burdensome that the plaintiff in error cannot prosecute his business of labor agent -at a profit. If it be true that the tax complained of is excessive and oppressive, as to which we express no opinion, the relief sought would compel the court to determine what degree of tax was reasonable. This would be for the court to assume legislative functions which it has no authority to exercise.
Bor these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.