17 Conn. 500 | Conn. | 1846
This is an action of debt on a judgment recovered in the superior court of the city of New-York, in the state of New-York, in favour of the plaintiffs, against Wells, Vandervoort Watkinson, all of whom are named as defendants in the suit, but in which service of the writ has been made only upon Watkinson, who alone appears to defend.
It appears by the record, introduced by the plaintiffs, of the judgment on which they rely, and it is admitted, that service of the process in the suit in which it was rendered, was made on Vandervoort, but not on either Wells or Watkinson ; and that neither of the two latter had any notice of, or appeared in, that suit; and it is also admitted, that at the time of the commencement of the suit, and ever since, Watkinson has resided in the state of Connecticut. On these facts it is very clear, that, independent of the construction and effect which is to be given to the statute of New-York, which is made a part of this case, and to the proceedings of said court under
The statute of the state of New-York, which has been mentioned, provides, in the first section, that “ in actions against two or more persons jointly indebted upon any joint obligation, contract, or liability, if the process is issued against all the defendants, and shall have been duly served upon either of them, the defendants so served shall answer to the plainliil';” and that “ in such cases, the judgment so rendered in favour of the plaintiff shall be against all the defendants, in the same manner as if all had been served with process and, in the second section, that “ such judgment shall be conclusive evi
Taking it for granted, that when a judgment recovered in the court of a sovereign state, or of one of the states of this union, is sought to be enforced in another state than that in which it was rendered, there is no objection to its validity, on the ground of a want of jurisdiction in that court, it is well settled, that no greater effect is to be given to it than it would have in the state where it was rendered. It has no highejr dignity in any other state than in the one where it was pronounced ; and hence, if in the courts of the state where the judgment was rendered, it is inconclusive, or if it is enquira-bleinto there, during a particularperiod, or on certain conditions,
What effect, then, is given in the state of New-York, by the laws of that state, to the judgment in question, as it respects the defendant Watkinson, against whom personally it is here sought to be enforced ? The statute of that state, which has been recited, most explicitly answers this enquiry. In the first place, it provides, that in an action against joint debtors» where the process is against all, and is served upon either of them, “ the defendants so served shall answer to the plaintiffs;” implying that none of the others, unless at least they appeared as defendants in the suit, are to be deemed parties to the proceeding, except for the mere sake of form. In the next place, it prescribes the form of the judgment in such case, if rendered for the plaintiff: it “ shall be against all the defendants, in the same manner as if all had been served with process.” And lastly, it declares the effect of such judgment: “ such judgment shall be conclusive evidence of the liability of the defendants, who were personally served with process in the suit, and who appeared to defend therein; but against every other defendant, it shall be evidence only of the extent of the plaintiff’s demand, after the liability of such defendant shall be established by other evidence.” Hence it is perfectly clear, that it was the intention of the makers of this law, that the judgment, although in form against all the defendants, should not create any obligation, personal or otherwise, nor be any evidence of indebtedness, against those not served with process in the suit. As to them, therefore, it had only the form of a judgment, without any of its qualities, attributes, or consequences ; it could not be enforced as a judgment usually is, by execution, nor by any action founded upon it, which would be sustained by any evidence that the record of it furnished ; it did not, as an ordinary judgment does, create a debt of record, arising from and evidenced by matter of record, because it is expressly provided here, that the record shall be no evidence of their liability. We have then, before us, an action of debt, brought upon a judgment, ■which creates no obligation, and furnishes no evidence of lia
It is urged as a reason why we should sustain this action in the present case, that by the laws of New-York, a similar action may be there sustained against all the defendants in the suit in which such a judgment is entered ; and by the authorities cited from that state, such appears to be the case. Merwin Goldsmith v. Kumbull, 23 Wend. 293. It also appears, that, after such a judgment is entered, the plaintiff is not at liberty there to recur to the original cause of action, but that his remedy on such cause of action is in the form of an action of debt on such judgment. It is very obvious, however, that that action is prescribed there, in such case, not because there is in fact any judgment which creates or furnishes evidence of any liability, but on grounds of local policy, as a convenient mode of proceeding for the recovery of the original debt from those of the joint debtors who were not, as well as those who were, served with process in the first suit; because it is there held, in pursuance of the provisions of the statute on which that judgment was entered, that such judgment, in the action so brought upon it, furnishes no evidence of the liability of those defendants, who were not served with process in the suit in which it was entered, but that their liability must be established by other evidence. That it was competent for that state to prescribe that, or any other form of remedy, in such case, there is no doubt. But that regulation was only local in its operation, and had no effect elsewhere. It appertained merely to the remedy in the case, and not to its merits. In stating the principle- on this subject, we take the language of Judge Story : “ It is universally admitted and established, that the forms of remedies, and the modes of proceeding, and the execution of judgments, are to be regulated solely and exclusively, by the laws of the place where the action is instituted ; or, as the civilians uniformly express it, according to the lex fori.” And, after explaining the reasons for this doctrine, he adds; “ The doctrine of the common law
The plaintiffs further claim, that by the laws of New-York, the judgment in question merged the debt of the defendants on which it was rendered ; — that therefore, that debt was thereby discharged ; that what operates as a discharge of it there, must have the same effect here : and that, therefore, no action will lie upon it, either in that state or elsewhere. If it were a correct use of language, it would be more proper to say, that the remedy, which before existed in that state, for the recovery of the debt, rather than that the debt itself, was merged by that judgment. Nothing was done by the statute of that state, except to take away the former remedy for the recovery of it, and provide a new one. That the original cause of action did not, by the formal judgment which was entered, become res adjudícala, is admitted. The plaintiffs disclaim that ground of recovery ; and if so, we do not perceive how the original nature of the debt is changed, or the cause of action upon it has become merged or extinguished in one of a higher nature. If the debt itself is merged or extinguished, and thus discharged, by the judgment, it surely would not be necessary to prove the existence of that debt, by other evidence than the record of the judgment, in order to recover in an action on that judgment. It could hardly be claimed, at least by thfe defendant who is now before us, in an appropriate suit brought upon the original cause of action, that it was barred by a judgment, which, as to him, is entirely inoperative.
For these reasons, we are of opinion, that judgment should be rendered by the superior court in favour of the defendant.
Judgment for defendant.