103 So. 356 | Miss. | 1925
Lead Opinion
* Headnote 1. Injunctions, 32 C.J., Sections 185, 440.
[EDITORS' NOTE: THE MARKER FOR FOOTNOTE * IS OMITTED FROM THE OFFICIAL COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT, THEREFORE THE MARKER IS NOT DISPLAYED IN THE ONLINE VERSION.] The appellant J.R. Wood lived with his family on his place about six miles east of Lauderdale Station, in a stock-law district. The appellee Ratliff and his family lived near by on an adjoining farm. These neighbors had a controversy with reference to the stock of Ratliff trespassing upon the land of appellant Wood, and this bill for an injunction restraining Ratliff from further trespassing upon his land was sued out by appellant Wood, and on a hearing of a citation of appellee Ratliff for contempt, the bill was dismissed upon the ground that — "The violations of the injunction by the defendants on the 16th day of March, 1924, if any, were acts in the nature of violation of the criminal statutes of the state, and as such are punishable in the criminal courts, of the proper jurisdiction, and not in a court of equity."
This excerpt is copied from the written opinion of the chancellor.
The bill for the injunction charged that the Ratliffs had been guilty of various trespasses upon the land of *786 appellant Wood, had personally assaulted appellant and his family, allowed live stock, such as hogs and goats, etc., to habitually go upon appellant's land and destroy the crops, and that the Ratliffs were threatening the lives of appellant and his family, and threatening to continue further trespasses upon the property of appellant, and to do other irreparable injury to the property of appellant.
After the injunction was issued, the appellant complained to the court that the injunction had been violated by appellee Ratliff, whereupon Ratliff was cited to appear for contempt before the court, and after a hearing of the testimony on the contempt proceedings, the chancellor dismissed the injunction and discharged the appellee, upon the ground, as stated above, that the acts complained of were criminal in their nature and should be punished by the criminal laws instead of by a court of equity. There was one other ground appearing in the decree upon which the chancellor ruled, but we see no relevancy in it and shall not discuss it for that reason.
The sole question before us, then, is whether or not a court of equity will enjoin, and punish for contempt, a person who trespasses and damages the property of another, and who continues to do so, and threatens to further trespass upon the property, where the acts complained of are both criminal and civil wrongs.
We think the case of Durham v. State,
In view of these conclusions, we think the decree of the lower court was error, and it is therefore reversed.
Reversed and remanded. *787
Addendum
In the opinion of the court, rendered in this case on a former day, the judgment of the court below was reversed, and the cause remanded. It is insisted now that the appellee, Ratliff, could not be taxed with the costs of the appeal in the court below on the hearing of the contempt proceedings because acquitted of the contempt by the chancellor.
The position might be true if the contempt was a criminal proceeding, but in the case before us it is a civil proceeding, to vindicate a civil right and to protect property rights and interests. Consequently the judgment of the chancellor, adjudging him not guilty of contempt, on being reversed by this court, stands for naught, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to enforce the injunction herein granted.
Where a contempt proceeding is a civil suit for the protection of civil rights, it is governed like other civil cases. Millis
v. State,
The opinion hereinbefore rendered refers only to the contempt proceeding branch of the case, and does not affect the merits on the main issue of the suit filed, any further than the rule of law announced in the opinion is applicable.
The motion to correct the judgment and retax the costs will be overruled.
Overruled.
