*1 TEEM,' 1917. N. 0.] Corporation.
Wood Public not back, damages proximate ber walk tbe tbe exposure ber from duty. result of tbe road’s breach of R., beld: a rail v. R. 172 N. tbe Court “Where C., 638,
In Garland mile two lias carried a female negligently company road to walk that distance to ber home station, ber her beyond causing ber, damages because ber husband failed to meet suitcase, thereby did arise up proxi reason of a storm not by coming sustained included an element carrier’s tort and cannot be mately from tbe damages.” and does efficiency
In that “If the cause is remote case is said: tort, proximate. it will not be considered as naturally not result from in continuous ‘a the result such, produced To be it must be cause occurred, would and one and without which it sequence have foreseen man of could ordinary prudence- existed.’ Ramsbottom v. they under all tbe facts as result was probable R., 392.” City, C., Brewster v. Elizabeth 137 N. C., 38; R. 138 N. consider tbe sustained damages tbe permitting jury cattle guard refusing into the falling aboye out, there was of instruction set prayers
Error. PUBLIC-SERVICE
ANNA E. NORTH CAROLINA WOOD v. CORPORATION.
(Filed December, 1917.) 1. Evidence —Nonsuit—Trials—Motion. light Upon nonsuit, most in tiie a motion to the evidence is considered may tbe and 'an inference defendant’s favor favorable to be drawn from bis own evidence. — — — — Damage Separate Negligence Entire Parties Concurrent Cause Actions. proximately concurrently parties cause Where tbe of two blame, may personal injury person, maintain to a third free damage. against action either of tbe others for the entire — — — Railways Alighting Passengers Negligence Evidence Con- 3. Street — Jury. tributory Negligence Trials—Questions — high de- A street car owes the to its to use they safely alight they stop gree at of care to see that from its cars when stopping points; tending regular and where there is to show evidence injured usually passed at that automobiles minute, care, rate or two a the exercise of a street car of one approach, high speed them, seen the could have of one conductor failed to danger, warn a of her for which she had looked injury see, and that she was struck and sustained the com- failed IN THE SUPREME COURT. Corporation. Wood v. Public *2 plained alighting immediately thereafter, of while she was or it is suffi- upon negligence, plaintiff cient the issue of defendant’s actionable the and held, law, right will not as a matter of to be barred of her to recover negligence. contributory of the issue ClArk, concurring; Walker, J., dissenting; Brown, J., concurring J., O. in dissenting opinion Walker, the of J.
Appeal J., by defendant at Long, Term, from tbe May 1917, of GUIL- FORD. This is an action to recover damages personal for as injury caused, tlie plaintiff alleges, by negligence tlie of the defendant street company.
On 5 the on July, 1916, plaintiff became’ one of the de- fendant’s street cars for the to her home west of purpose, going the city Greensboro, and when the car reached a point nearly opposite Store, Fields’ about one-half mile west of the limits of corporate Greens- boro, stopped at regular stopping and at the destination of the for the plaintiff purpose allowing alight.
The while in the plaintiff alighting act of the immediately from had reached the ground, was stricken an automobile run- 25 to 30 ning hour, miles an and The seriously injured. was automobile was running opposite direction from the car. The evidence of the defendant plaintiff tended to show that injured the was feet the street car while attempting she was to the pass sidewalk. There was also evidence on the part plaintiff that permitted she had been on the get out the other side of street car she could stepped from-the car path. cinder
At the conclusion of the evidence there a motion for a judgment was the excepted. and nonsuit, denied, defendant a verdict There was and the defendant judgment plaintiff, appealed. (?. Barringer 8. Bradshaw and John A. plaintiff.
Jerome, & Scales Jerome defendant. presented by J. the from the refusal only question appeal Allen, to nonsuit the is whether there is evidence fit to be sub- the on the jury part defendant; mitted to accept the consideration of this we must the evidence the question light and construe it the most favorable to her. We are not base our on the permitted judgment evidence the nor defendant, can the favorable inference, defendant, we draw the auto- the right mobile was extreme side of road turned struck the as that the auto- suddenly plaintiff, no witness testified TEEM, 1917. N. 0.] Oobpobation. “The changed course,
mobile one witness testified auto- (Boyles) act upon of the car.” cannot along by mobile was side We coming defendant’s that the evidence shows that the statement brief absence suddenly automobile turned struck can fact, and it be inferred only presumption evidence obeying that the driver of the vio- road, side when all the evidence shows she was
right-hand law lating limit. exceeding speed irreconcilable,
The evidence that “as soon testifying the plaintiff I “I cleared the car ground me”; just struck the automobile got street”; “I got me”; barely get cleared the car to down to just “I made “I hadn’t just hadn’t off the car and taken any steps”; stepped *3 12 10, a and the witnesses the defendant that she single step”; or 15 feet from the car when she was stricken.
Giving, a construction favorable to the therefore, plain- evidence the tiff, true, do, and it as as it our to it shows that accepting is roadway, permitted defendant the to on plaintiff, passenger, imme- minute, which one of two automobiles were each along passing and rapidly, warning, front an automobile without diately moving of knew the dangers when the the of the of defendant, conductor of approaching. did not look road, to see driver the negligence Is negligence? this evidence of the but this does not relieve the evidence, automobile is established may if it there be two negligent, was also as liability, defendant injury; exists, an and where this condition causes of proximate causes must is those the injured negligent, responsible party instead of damage, each liable for the whole damages, answer the of one exonerate other. negligence the permitting except is where the held, in the it principle It is this application cannot negligence prevails, of comparative doctrine with the negligence if his concurs contributory negligence recover own because is one causing negligence defendant in as his injury, liable he as the defendant causes, as well proximate he tort among there is contribution feasors damage, whole and as. anything recover the defendant. cannot injury, it than cause of an and may “There be more one proximate himself and blame, a claimant is free from that when well established cause injury such sued is for one responsible a defendant causes may proximate other though the action will be sustained Enc. Eng. 21 Am. injury. contributing and & concurring causes concurred pro- it ‘To show that other 495, is said: (2 Ed.), defense is no complained result ducing contributing in this rule settled There is indeed no better negligence. action THE 700 SUPREME COURT. Corporation. connection than that the ren negligence, defendant’s in order to
present need he liable, injuries.’ Again, der him the sole cause of plaintiff’s 496, is said: ‘When two causes contribute page it efficient proximate injury, to an if defendant’s act about one of negligent brought ” Co., v. he is liable.’ Harton Tel. 141 N. causes, C., 461, approved Co., Harvell v. Lumber 154 C., 262, pointed N it was out that only the difference inion the Hartón case was as op applica tion of the in that principle to facts record. ' here We must then as and inquire defendant, the decision whether the defendant depends owed plain- tiff, who was on its and who was passenger car, injured thereafter, according evidence, to her and whether immediately failed in the performance duty.
There is a conflict rail authority obligation as to the of the street way has left the Ken Courts of Alabama and tucky must holding that safe provide reasonably way Mitchell, v. 133 (Montgomery Ry., Ala., 529; Street R. R. v. Ky., 190), others that, has no stations and no control over obligation its streets, should be coextensive with control, relation of carrier ceases has when the passenger R., safely alighted. Law, Mass., Clark’s Accident v. 13; Creamer R. R., 321; Street R. R. v. Body, Term., v. R. 669; Schley Anno. R., Cases, Stuart R. Anno. 1912 B note; Cases, note.
The weight authority of seems to be the latter view, with and also that in any event the degree care, must exercise the of railway highest and must afford alight safety. to opportunity Co.,
The Court v. says Anderson Street R. R. 12 197: “There Ind., ais marked difference between the duties imposes upon those street operate railways and those who steam rail operate ordinary ways. The latter run usually upon scheduled and time have fixed places for and receiving discharging There passengers. higher is of degree railways care than imposed upon railways. ordinary steam When their cars their stop passengers to it is the of alight duty to long enough servants stop passengers alight, and to see the car does start again one is attempting alight exposed to danger.” R.,
In Smith v. R.
consistent management . . . This rule extends to tbe of tbe ears and negligence. safety for tbe of subsiduary arrangements necessary track to all tbe passengers.” Scott, themselves,
In R. R. v. carriers bind Va., 907, “Passenger a learned those whom take into their says author, carry safely they coaches, is, as far as human care and will foresight go—that . . And in very persons. utmost care and of cautious . R. R. diligence Prindle, carry contract to Va., 122, said, implied this Court ‘The safely duty giving opportunity includes the reasonable passengers alight train, and a violation of this part In lie.’ company’s duty culpable negligence, is for which an action will Wharton on sec. it is laid down that ‘When Negligence, it is the of the officers of the approaches, duty notify passengers,, road to so that can take to avoid and failure to notice is they it; give such if there is a is negligence. So, also, dangerous place landing, of the conductor warn and ‘he duty stepping out,’ those about ” must notice to all if any danger alighting probable.’ R., J., In v. R. “If Cartwright Mich., 606, Cooley, says: C. a car in which there were passengers was where it would be safe standing for them to assistance, without it was the of the company provide assistance, or move the car give warning, or to more suitable . . . place. These authorities show the extent to which the liability liability carriers of in cases like the passengers goes present, street or as well railways, horse as other classes of are bound.” carriers, Twiname, R. R. v. 591: Ind., Street “A railway company railway a common carrier of as well as A passengers freight. company is also a common carrier passengers, respon duties sibilities entirely to, as, the same those analogous substantially railway in the Both com carriage passengers. are general within the usual panies meaning term, the same rules and of care in the must be degree transportation passengers . . passengers observed each. . Carriers of to exercise required their foresight performance utmost care as such de carriers. . . . This is the that the equivalent requiring highest of care and skill be used in the gree transportation shall decided many as the rule is stated cases.” *5 Kan., implies In R. R. v. 383: “All skill and care Higgs, possible in and management operation that reasonable every precaution injuries tracks, be used to to it means prevent passengers; good street cars drivers, management, judicious oper safe careful and cars, experienced All more than foresight this; in means every respect. possible ation IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT. Cokpobation. means anticipation, knowledge, operation that cars of street danger will result in and that passengers, to there must be some action a future, reference care to provident guard against a wise and avert occurrences, forethought prudent that will provision evil if thought the threatened human or action can do so.” Tobriner, S., In R. R. v. of a duty 147 U. after speaking duty deliver in “It was not a railway safety, its solely because he person being hurt, duty but a owed to a person deliver, whom the defendant undertaken to and who was danger.” entitled to be delivered by being alight allowed to without safely author, L., general And the in 4 R. “The rule just C. considered fa having the case o carrier exclusive or occupation control of its and stations, traveling may tracks one still retain the a pas- status of carrier’s senger alighting vehicle, is from the nature to carriers not so things applicable situated, instance, as for traveling case of cars. at- persons "While person tempting to from a street.car remains a until he has the act accomplished alighting safety, and the carrier to the owes and passenger alighting very high degree of care attention puts upon the end of its generally promoting will passengers, negligent injury be liable for to the accepted so it is the view that one generally alighted who has car and safety upon from street is in is no highway longer pas- senger.”
If, therefore, care, defendant owed high degree of and if it was her from and warn her duty protect of danger to see that alighted safety, duty? has there a breach of that
The question presented to us the motion for nonsuit judgment of is within even narrower as the law commits limits, to the jury of saying how-the is, fact and leaves to no jurisdic- this Court power tion to decide except whether there is evidence breach of fit to be considered enjoins us that jury, we give evidence the construction favorable most that she is entitled to benefit of every reasonable inference arising upon evidence.
The evidence is and that of conflicting, alone, the plaintiff, standing would raise serious doubts minds if our we were as sitting jurors to her right to recover, we cannot her the give benefit of the legal principles we have declared, which as of apply right to all litigants, say there evidence that the defendant failed to protect and warn her, her the opportunity to alight from its car in safety. *6 N. O.]
Wood v. Public Coedoeatiost. 120, passed and another automobiles tbat One witness testified that the plaintiff all evidence shows hour, in an tbe injury roadway. a much traveled on alighted her as soon as the automobile testified she was struck
The plaintiff I struck the Her “As soon as language is, were the ground. feet on when it got “I had cleared the car me”; just the automobile ground got to the street.” “I cleared the car to down me”; just barely get “The testified: passenger, who was a defendant, A witness for the looking- I was I car stopped. first saw of the automobile was .the conductor the street car.” The got the window. It had not quite out according with the plaintiff, the car was on the charge platform whether “I did look to see specially and he evidence, testified, her car.” was when Mrs. Wood off the coming got automobile tho plaintiff inference from this evidence that Is it not reasonable which automobiles were permitted alight roadway along was on front of a minute, two a immediately at the rate of one or passing looked, if conductor had automobile, and that rapidly moving could have seen the precaution, approaching had taken the he slightest and could have averted the plaintiff, injury? __ __ if getting car, must have-been the act of off saw the automobile not true, quite evidence is the time had looked would he not have car, the street the conductor was not the side of the thing, and that the automobile seen same but was down on the away rushing plaintiff, roadway the defendant afforded the true, if these facts are said, can be was evidence safety? so, opportunity alight which was the cause of the defendant part of a breach of jury. submitted to the properly and the case was injury, the plaintiff’s part contributory negligence evidence of There is charge submitted as the we assume that this was must as matter It cannot be declared not sent as a of the record. up part action would right that her law that of such guilty attention when she paying that she was because she testified barred, she looked for attempting before off, immediately and that got and did not see one. an automobile should be held to the made as to the conductor why
If the inquiry testifies that she looked when the plaintiff the automobile seeing the automobile was the answer is one, and did not see well have looked and not minute, might and that she about 800 yards and the conductor could have seen alight, preparing see it as she must have enough elapsed time it while she was hundred from the time she yards have run two or three automobile to actually ground. reached the off the car until she get prepared THE SUPREME COURT. Cobpoeation. Wood Public There is other evidence in the record which referred to we *7 because we have in thought it that the motorman front of necessary the could have the seen automobile one-half mile dis- approaching tance.
We have considered the of that the carefully opinion record must judgment be affirmed.
No error. J., well concurs all that is so said in the opinion C. of the
Clark, Court, and the additional upon ground that the defendant did not give the the plaintiff opportunity alight upon sidewalk opposite on the car, side of the where would safe. The evidence- perfectly right-hand is that the track- on the west, side of the street going which direction the ear ran was moving, close the and that the sidewalk, could have plaintiff stepped off the of the car sidewalk. step upon this This would have been entirely contrary, safe. On the the conductor put off on her the left-hand side the car, middle of the street, which she thus cross where two cars'per average, on an were- minute, at a running high rate in front speed, put immediately down a car hour, was at the rate of 30 to 35 an approaching miles defendant’s according to conductor.
The defendant contends that it was unsafe to her off put right- hand street, side of the sidewalk, track was close along because telegraph poles were on that side, telegraph poles yards apart, would more standing still, of a menace to passen- off ger from a car than getting standing her off on the left-hand putting side in the maelstrom of moving cars, shooting two to the by minute, or “at least 100 per hour,” going at rate rapid asphalt on an roadbed— the smoothest and (from best road in the State Greensboro High Point) immediately front of car which struck —and which, was 35 miles according evidence, moving defendant’s hour, which was a minute. per nearly -yards J., dissenting: It will be necessary proper to a understand- Walker, view ing case, as we that we should a brief rehearsal it, make the facts:
The brought action was to recover by plaintiff damages on account of her, received she had one of the personal injuries alighted cars, run defendant’s over and an automobile being dragged by Coleman, Mrs. H. E. Md. The driven-by Baltimore, plaintiff, on July, became a on one of the defendant’s cars for her home west purpose going city Greensboro, nearly opposite- when the said street car had reached its run point N. 0.] Oobpoeation.-
Fields’ about one-balf store, being mile west of the limits corporate city Greensboro, stopped purpose of allowing passen- alight therefrom, at a defendant’s gers regular stopping place for cars, the destination of The being plaintiff upon plain- this occasion. tiff alighted car, from the street when she was stricken immediately an automobile driven by Mrs. H. F. Coleman at a rate very high speed, for which receiving injuries this action was brought. at
automobile, the time it ran over the plaintiff, was east and going direction to that opposite of defendant’s and was at the rate of 25 driving to miles an hour. Mrs. Coleman, who automobile, not only violating speed as to the excessive which she was but was left-hand running, driving the same side of the road violation of the law. If the did not see the automobile when she looked free straight ahead, the line of vision *8 from obstruction for a long distance, must have been necessarily road, on the other side of the and it could feet appeared not have six from the side of the car when first seen by plaintiff’s witnesses without veered from The that having suddenly its course. evidence shows the defendant’s track beyond corporate limits of the of Greens- city west, is located the right-hand boro on side of the public highway going and to the left the street car track west is a well-constructed going way, wide, paved asphalt, about feet with for the use of pedestrians vehicles, and various kinds of automobiles. It had been the including discharge defendant passen- custom rule of for twelve years from its car west at this the left-hand gers going point, on side said car, and this custom or rule was known to the time of plaintiff prior to The injury upon alighted her occasion. place smooth, with and was side of paved asphalt upon right-hand a ditch and at poles, except point directly the track there was one a where there was sidewalk a short dis- store, front of Fields’ and wet weather a tance, paved cinders, passenger getting off step happened would have to in the mud. The accident side a m., and at this could see both p. point person about o’clock east west a distance of one-half mile. Plaintiff was along highway time of her existing injury, familiar with the conditions there defendant’s prior injury gotten numerous "occasions off having cars at that stopping place. moved plaintiff’s evidence,
At the close of defendant to dismiss the as in nonsuit, statute, and for case of under the judgment action testimony. renewed at the close all the motion this motion was this Court. refused, appealed defendant kind a familiar that a defendant in an action of this principle It is liable in a breach damages duty plaintiffs— can be made for only 45 —174 THE SUPREME COURT. OobpobatioN. Public
Wood v. injured ber at time sbe was owing wbicb was tbe is, tbat of a tbe. owing was no tbe automobile. liability. a follows tbat there is no duty, breach of which its upon save right way A has no company held that generally the Courts have and for this reason laid, tracks are purpose highways, other where a car streets or stops public is iiassenger a carrier and the relation of discharging passenger, then not for be is as soon as the latter alights terminated the street over which upon upon premises company, carrier is as that the true; argued, no control. It be company may has at a where the street is out discharge place not allowed the car that to dangerous and in such a condition repair it is not may be, be but however this highway perilous; would upon at the when the street is in condition good the case car, occupies position as as be leaves the for then the soon passenger, respon relative rights a traveler on the with the same highway, the high decided in several cases Courts of sibilities. It has been so authority. est a from a car on just alighted public of a
Speaking passenger Co., Ry. Mass., 320, End St. Court, Creamer West highway, and be ceased occurred, “He was not when the accident passenger said: car. Tbe the street from bis alighted upon to be of which passenger station, street is no sense from the car responsible. "When terminates highway, a traveler street, be becomes railway company as a relationship rights passenger, bis him a condition the street or carrier for the responsible carrier car to common bis safe the sidewalk. When passage *9 and can stations, arrange its tracks and occupation has the exclusive held tbat fit, may properly persons them as its sees it be manage a or leave train have the relation passage upon to take intending a station or the cars at passengers leaving approaching rights Co., 85 Am. Mc Allen, 227; Dec., 700; v. R. B. (Warren Fitchburg etc., Boston, etc., Boston, Co., 139 v. Mass., 542; Dodge Kimble v. R. R. Co., 12 Am. St. 207, Rep., 541); but one Steamship Mass., 214; a car to the street is not the steps railway upon premises from street a where be has the company, upon public place the street but railway has which the occupier, company same other over rights every a the upon highway, no control. His are those of traveler rights not of a passenger.” immediately-after leaving
In that was killed case, passenger in an direction line, running opposite another car the same is defendant stronger a this case upon parallel track, so that than there sued. Other cases the same was the case cited for the one 1917. N. 0.] Corporation.
Wood v. Public Co., Mass., are: v. E. Street v. Ry. 393; effect W. Bigelow Oddy Co., Boddin, 105 Street Cit. Elec. Co. v. Ry. Mass, 341; Ry. W. Term., Co.,
It E. appeared Oddy Ry. supra, W. Street that the plaintiff the ear stricken a upon leaving hose cart reach immediately upon and before he had an ing ground opportunity to take a after step doing so. The Court said: car companies “Street carrying passengers in ordinary streets or public highways negligent pro viding warning means about a to leave car of the with or of run colliding being over other vehicles in the street. The risk of hurt by such vehicles is the risk of the passenger, not that It carrier. is not carrier is danger against bound protect him And warning.” case, Tennessee the Court said: “If the did passenger relation not ter minate when the defendant safely alighted from the when would end? Would it continue only track, while he was crossing parallel or until comparative he had reached a point safety on the far side of the street? Or if, reaching steps he had directed his ground, street, other side would it have continued until reached he the pavement? We think that the Massachusetts Supreme Court was wise in adopting the rule that this relation terminates the moment pas descend to the street. sengers specu This is fixed free from all point lation or uncertainty.”
The same doctrine is stated in a note Duchemin v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 104 Am. St. where it is said: “The instant a Rep., p. pas riding, or frees himself from the car on which he senger steps has he, for most ceases The street in no purposes, passenger. com station, safety- sense of which a street railway street, a car pany responsible. passenger steps upon When upon he becomes traveler and terminates his relation and highway, him rights responsible is not passenger, railway company aas carrier for the condition of the street or his safe passage car to the sidewalk. One who from a street car to the railway company, street is not of the railroad premises public street, where he has the same other and over rights any occupier, which the has no control.” street, in the this case there is no evidence of inherent defect any adopt which defendant had anything over control. we do not im- cited, of the cases which have been would be next to principle operate for a street its cars for the convenience
possible will accommodation of the The decision this case result public. *10 the defendant. The cause of the acci- peculiar hardship proximate the recklessness defendant,
dent was not attributable to the THE SUPBEME OOUBT. Oobpoeation. have If another which could not well been foreseen. it was not the sole intervening it was at least an one and still the cause. cause, proximate circumstances which tended and from show, There are physical auto- stated, them the inference is as we have that the clearly deducible, car just mobile was not on the side of the road where the street therefore, before it struck the that it must have been sud- plaintiff, and, from, turned direction the street denly course driven unobstructed, car. The view to the along west the road was clear and if it had been car side where the street was the bound to see it when she witnesses showed that looked, plaintiff’s sight. would be in the line not in vision, she stated that it was collision impracticable It was for the defendant prevented with the It was not bound that Mrs. Coleman plaintiff. anticipate and in suddenly, manner, would so reckless drive her near imperil so the street car and the lives of were passengers they therefrom. alighting approach-
It is also to be said that the law of this State “In provides: ing or a car of a street been to allow passing stopped has vehicle embark, operator every motor shall down, slow it be he shall necessary public, Upon said vehicle to a full bring stop. approaching pedestrian sidewalk, the traveled and not part any highway, intersecting curve, or a or a corner upon approaching any highway a highway oper- where the view is operator’s obstructed, every person with his ating signal motor vehicle shall slow down and a timely Supplement, horn or other device 446. bell, signaling.” Gregory’s p. The defendant’s servant of the street car was not bound charge anticipate positive Coleman, a violation of the law Mrs. one obeyed, else. and if had been known, they The laws of road well there would have been There was a clear injury plaintiff. automobile, and wide between the under space proper position where the from the street car. law, plaintiff alighted reduced, the automobile had or even had the stopped, speed would have been no accident. It was not a natural and conse- probable that the automobile would be driven so near the street quence then the act of and the conductor was injure Oyc., not, unexpected to look out for such event. law, required regulating speed The law the State use of automobiles very purpose protecting persons was enacted for the highways cars without the of their conductors to look leaving necessity discharging passengers. already direction before every when she had a approaching automobile, in the direction of the looked *11 709 N. O.] Oobpoeation. it. Sbe bad a ebance view, and did not see better clear unobstructed sbe range conductor, if tbe tban tbe because it, vision, see witbin be car, was tbe in tbe act of off tbe was occupying getting if required behind her on tbe It would seem that tbe law platform. look, the conductor to which we deny, required was to do so instance, because be would not have seen as well as sbe could, better did. If certainly than sbe sbe was where the automobile could seen, have been and did not it, see bow could be have seen it he bad looked tbe same direction? There is no reason tbe con- why ductor should have helped tbe off tbe for sbe was car, fully able to herself. Sbe “I help said, just bad cleared tbe car when tbe auto- mobile me.” got
If the rule we have laid down, and supported by prece well-considered dents, is the one, correct we do not see bow the street railway can be liable when she admits that bad cleared the and there fore inwas when she highway was struck the automobile. But by there is from testimony two disinterested introduced witnesses, by (and not by who were the car at time defendant), and looking out of the windows, she was well in street, one from stating distance the car to be six feet, the other that the street car was moving when the automobile first seen, was before it reached her, that when she was struck by the she fell automobile, near “very the middle of the street” and was lying when the auto mobile her. passed One of these witnesses, testified that “passengers always get off on the left-hand side at this place,” the other that was usual “it custom to do so.”
There was width in the street of 25 feet. It will make the case appear clearly more for the defendant if we conclude by quoting L. A. testimony Jackson, a witness for the automo plaintiff: “The bile was passing the window where I was when I sitting first saw it. It fast. Mrs. very Coleman was I I driving it, so beard. did not see the automobile strike Mrs. I Wood. think the automobile was five or six feet from the street car when struck her. Tbe street car track is off from the part of paved the road. When passed the street car it was going straight ahead. After the automobile the window where I passed seated, would have go about 25 feet before it struck Mrs. I Wood. heard Mrs. Wood scream-and looked out window. Sbe was about in the center of the paved part of the road and was about the center when the automobile her— finally left about feet from the car. I think the car bad just started when the automobile went by window.”
This sbe proves that was not tbe side of tbe sbe was stricken tbe automobile, at the feet, near- very THE COURT. SUPREME'
Poe v. Town" oe Brevard. excited, it. She was necessarily per- feet away at least est, events the sudden unconscious and oblivious of the rendered haps disadvantages. under her witnesses were not whereas impact, there was on the matter, true account of the they give *12 ground her on the testimony places defendant. But own of the part have severed the relation stricken, and that is sufficient to when she was her injury. at the time of carrier and passenger strongly most were and who testified persons two E. and Mr. L. A. Boyles her own witnesses M. (Mr. were her, against street when the' her near the middle and they placed Jackson), - when construed testimony, view of the any left her. But premises not on the ground, she was on the her, for favorably most A. Mr. L. witnesses, and one of her hurt; when she was company, stricken had started before she was that the street car stated Jackson, sitting. window where she passed and as the automobile would have ahead, had looked he conductor seen this case, looks, a conductor besides, saw, herself than the plaintiff more could could, speed rate of high driven at a an automobile see, and fails to before he discharged are being reach the let them and then and assure them again reach the platform restraining passing for that was the reason off. And in the difficulty knew Legislature as the chauffeurs, method. other CO., OF BREVARD. THE TOWN A. & Inc.,
R. POE December, 1917.)
(Filed 5 — — — — Equity— — Damages Improvements Benefits Breach 1. Contract Quantum Meruit. damages party Ordinarily for breach of contract cannot recover performance averring proving his own ante- stipulations without legal arising obligations excuse non- contract or some on the cedent stipulations concurrent, or, thereof, performance his readiness- if the per- perform them; ability far modified as to is so doctrine quantum meruit his breach to recover improvement mit the contractor case the owner appear building contracts when is made enjoy contracting party and continues to has received or other equity good con- circumstances that work under the contractor’s science compensation. call Contracts—Specific Method. 2. Same — quantum right in- the circumstances on a meruit under to recover This appears stipulations prevail of the con- where it does not dicated agree- provide, parties undertaken to and the written tract that