97 Neb. 215 | Neb. | 1914
This action was brought by plaintiff in bis official capacity, in tbe district court for Red Willow county, to recover taxes upon personal property assessed against tbe defendant for tbe year 1911. A general demurrer to tbe petition was overruled, and, defendant declining to plead further, judgment was entered for plaintiff for tbe amount of tbe tax. Defendant appeals.
Tbe petition alleges substantially: That on April 1, 1911, defendant was a corporation, with its principal office and place of business and all of its property, upon which tbe tax was assessed, located in tbe city of McCook, and also in school district No. 17; that'on that date defendant was engaged in selling water to tbe city of McCook and its
The assignments of error are that the court erred in overruling the demurrer and in rendering judgment against defendant. The contention of defendant is that the sale and delivery by defendant of its property to the - city of McCook on July 1 was prior to the completion of the assessment for 1911, and prior to the levy of any tax for that year; that the property was exempt from taxation
In a typewritten memorandum, submitted by counsel for defendant by leave of court after the arguments at the bar, it is claimed that the statute does not fix any definite date when personal property shall be assessed either as to valuation or ownership; that the whole matter of assessment is progressive, and is not concluded until the work of the assessor, the county board and the state board is completed in the final levy made after all their work is done, which was August 3 in this case.
Prior to 1903, section 6, art. I, ch. 77, Comp. St. 1901, of the revenue law, provided: “Personal property shall be listed between the first day of April and the first day of June of each year, when required by the assessor, with reference to the quantity held or owned on the first day of April in the year for which the property is required to be listed.” By an act approved April 4, 1903 (laws 1908, ch. 73), the legislature provided a system of public revenues, and repealed all of article I, chapter 77, as it had existed prior thereto. In the new act section 6, art. I of the prior act, above quoted, seems to have been omitted, but that the legislature did not intend to change the rule that assessments of personal property are based upon the amount of property owned by the taxpayer on April 1 is shown by the oath which the taxpayer is required to make to the schedule furnished him by the assessor, which is:
That the revenue law as to the assessment of personal property has been so construed by all taxing officers and taxpayers of the state since the act of 1903, the same as prior thereto, is a matter of common knowledge. Such being the fact, the courts will so construe it until the legislature has further spoken on the subject. The petition alleges that, after defendant made and delivered its schedule to the assessor on or about May 20, the assessor thereupon “duly fixed and made a valuation of all the tangible personal property belonging to said corporation on the first day of April, 1911.” If the assessor “duly” fixed and made his valuation, he did so on or before the 1st day of June, 1911. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 77, art. I, sec. 116. It appears, therefore, from the allegations in the petition, that, at the time defendant sold the property covered by the schedule which it filed May 20, such property had been duly assessed by the county assessor a full month prior to the time of such- sale. Conceding the defendant’s contention that the assessment did not become final until after it had been acted upon by the state and county boards of equalization, we do not see how that can aid it. It knew that it had'been assessed by the county assessor in the sum of $8,710, and that any tax levied upon that assessment would impose upon it a personal liability therefor. If any change in conditions had occurred after it had returned its schedule and an assessment had been made thereon by the assessor, which would have authorized the county board of equalization to give it any relief, it should have
Did the sale of the property on July 1 to the city, cancel defendant’s liability upon the assessment because of the. fact that after the property passed to the ownership of the city it thereafter would not be liable to taxation? We think the answer to this question must be adverse to defendant. The case is not different from what it would be if, after defendant had filed its schedule and the assessor had made the assessment, and while still owning the property, it had changed the use of it to a purpose which would relieve it from taxation. Such a change would not relieve it from liability. People v. Commissioners, 104 U. S. 466. In that case the relator was assessed for taxation as of January 1,1876, upon his personal estate, to the amount of $60,000. He made application, supported by affidavit, for a reduction or remission of his assessment upon the ground that the value of all his personal estate on January 1 did not exceed $125,000, and that as to all except $5,500 it consisted of money which “was continuously employed in the business of exporting cotton from the United States of America to foreign countries, through the customs department of the United States aforesaid, and that said employment consists in purchasing and paying for the cotton in different states of the United States, and actually exported by deponent in said business, .and for the payment of all the expenses of shipping the same as such exports.” The reduction and remission were both denied. Upon writ of certiorari the proceedings of the tax commissioners were affirmed in the supreme court of the state of New York, and its judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, whereupon relator prosecuted error in the supreme court of the United States. In the opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan it is said: “The plaintiff in error wás assessed, upon his personal property, .as of January 1, 1876. If the capital, which he claims was uniformly and continuously employed in the business of purchasing cotton .for exportation from
The demurrer was properly overruled.
Affirmed.