107 Ga. 389 | Ga. | 1899
The defendants in error brought suit to the July term, 1897, of Floyd superior court, against the plaintiff in error, Charles D. Wood, to recover a certain tract of land in his possession. It appeared on the trial that the premises in -dispute were levied on by virtue of afi. fa. for State and county taxes, and by the sheriff were advertised and put up for sale on the first Tuesday in September, 1895, when they were “knocked off” to Charles D. Wood for the sum of $108. The fi. fa. was issued against T. B. and A. J. Higginbotham, administrators. An entry was made by the sheriff on the fi. fa., on May -12, 1896, to the effect that the property levied on was sold at sheriff’s sale on the first Tuesday in September, 1895, to Charles D. Wood for $108. Then follows the sheriff’s statement as to the application of the proceeds of the sale. After paying off the fi. fa. and costs of sale, the balance was applied to a fi. fa. for the year 1894, in favor of the State and county .against the same defendants. Wood, the purchaser at the sale, did not pay any part of the purchase-money until the 12th day •of May, 1896, on which day the sheriff executed to him a deed do the property; the deed bearing date May 12, 1896. The
The defendants in error, in their petition, set forth their chain of title. It appears from their petition that the lots-were assessed and appear on the State and county digest as-the property of T. B. and A. J. Higginbotham, and that the-execution was issued against T. B. and A. J. Higginbotham,, administrators, and was levied on the lands as the property of defendants. It was not contended, however, that the taxes-on these particular lands had ever been paid before the levy and sale. It was claimed in the petition that the levy and sale-of the lands for taxes was void for the following reasons: (1) that there was no title to this realty in defendants in fi. fa. for any purpose whatever; (2) that the levy was so grossly excessive as to render a sale thereunder void; and (3) that there-had been a tender by petitioners to the defendant of the full amount of principal, interest, penalty, and costs due him-in consequence of the tax sale, which tender was made on the 12th day of March, 1897, and had ever since been continuous ; that the defendant refused to accept the same, claiming that the time for redeeming the land by the owners had expired, and
There was a conflict in the testimony, relating to the value of the property and the excessiveness of the levy, and also as to whether Wood, the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale, had ever tendered to the sheriff the amount of the'bid prior to May 12, 1896, when he paid the money and received the sheriff’s deed. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs below, and also found in their favor the sum of $35 as rent. There was sufficient testimony to sustain this verdict under the charge of the court. The controlling question, therefore, in this case is, when land is sold for State and county taxes, has the owner twelve months within which to redeem the same from the time the bidder at such sale pays the purchase-money, or should this time be computed from the day of the sale; that is, from the day when property was actually bid off by the purchaser? Section 909 of the Political Code declares, in substance, that whenever any land is sold by virtue of a tax execution issued under the code, the owner thereof shall have the privilege of redeeming the same within one year, by paying the purchaser the amount paid by said purchaser for said land, with ten per cent, premium thereon from the date of the purchase to the time of payment. It is insisted that the limitation period fixed by the terms of this section begins to run from the date of the sale, and that the sale is complete when the property is cried off to the highest bidder and his bid has been accepted by the sheriff, and that neither the payment of the purchase-money nor the date of the sheriff’s deed necessarily controls the period as to when such a sale is complete in law. Ordinarily an acceptance of a bid made at such a sale by an officer is evidenced by his receipt of the purchase-money, and is immediately followed by his execution and delivery of a
It is true this court has decided in the case of Willbanks v. Untriner, 98 Ga. 801 (5), that if a sheriff’s sale was in other respects lawful, the mere fact that he gave the bidder to whom the property had been knocked'off time within which to raise the money to pay for the property would not render it a credit sale, and that the bidder was liable as soon as the bid was accepted, and the sheriff’s responsibility for the purchase-money immediately began. That ruling of the court was based upon error assigned in the charge of the court, to the effect that unless the money was paid or tendered on sale day the bidder would not be a bona fide purchaser, and that if it was agreed by the sheriff and the plaintiff in fi. fa. that the purchaser
In the case we are now considering, however, the facts are quite different. It appears that there was no entry or other official return made by the sheriff touching the sale of this property for taxes until May 12, 1896, some six months after the property was exposed by him for sale. His entry was then of the fact that the property was sold at sheriff’s sale on the
Judgment affirmed.