83 Md. 257 | Md. | 1896
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought by the appellee to recover damages for injuries sustained in the works of the Maryland Steel Company, while engaged in the service of the receiver of that concern. He entered upon his employment about the thirteenth day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, as a moulder and general laborer. On the 29th of March following he was ordered by his foreman to clean certain castings on a car-truck, used for transferring material from place to place in the foundry. It was then located from twenty-five to thirty feet distant from an appliance then being used by other workmen in breaking up defective castings. This appliance consisted of an arrangement by which an heavy iron ball, weighing seventeen or eighteen hundred pounds, could be hoisted to the roof of the building and dropped upon the castings beneath. From a drum (revolved by a crab-engine), a rope passed through a pulley fixed in
Upon this evidence the Court submitted it to the jury to determine whether the injury was caused, without fault of the plaintiff, by the unsafe and dangerous condition of the machinery and appliances, which was, or by the use of due diligence could have been, known to the defendants; and if they so found, instructed them to bring in their verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted specially to this instruction, because there was no evidence of the unsafe, dangerous or defective character or condition of the machinery.
It was not contended either in this Court or below that the drop machine was not in perfect condition, or that it was not operated by a thoroughly skillful workman. But it was insisted that the machine was dangerous and unsafe, and that the appellant should have provided additional protection to those whose duty it became to work in its vicinity.
The liabilities of the master to his employee have been considered by this Court in too many cases to require here more than a statement of the general principles applicable to the subject. When a servant engages to perform certain services for a compensation, it is implied as a part of the contract, that, as between himself and his employer, he assumes all the risks incident to the service. And these risks include such as arise, from the hazardous character .of
If a servant has knowledge of the circumstances under which the employer carries on his business and chooses to accept the employment,. or continue in it, he assumes such risks incident to the discharge of his duties as are open or obvious. In such cases it is not a question whether the place prepared for him to occupy, and which he assents to accept, might, with reasonable care, have been made more safe. His assent dispenses with the performance on the part of the master of the duty to make it so. State use Hamelin v. Malster & Reany, supra ; Wonder's case, 32 Md. 416; Stricker’s case, 51 Md. 47 ; B. & P. R. R. v. State, 75 Md. 161. Where, however, the risks to which the servant is subjected are such, as. he had no reason to believe, from the nature of his employment, he would have to encounter, and such risks arise from causes hidden or secret, or such as would reasonably escape his observation, the master is bound to notify his servant, provided he himself
The master is, therefore, not an insurer of the servant’s safety. He cannot be bound for his servant’s injury, without being chargeable with some neglect of duty, measured by the standard of ordinary care. On the other hand, the servant is under an obligation to provide for his own safety when danger is either known to him or discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care. “ He must take ordinary care to learn the dangers which are likely to beset him ; ” (Beach on Contrib. Neg., sec. 138), and where the servant is as well acquainted as the master with the dangerous nature of the instrument used he cannot recover. Beach on Contrib. Neg., sec. 140 ; Wheeler v. Mason Man. Co., 135 Mass. 298.
In the case at bar the appliance used for the breaking of castings was in perfect condition and operated by a competent and skillful person. It was constructed on the plan adopted and used in other foundries. In all their experience in operating it, none of the witnesses had ever seen pieces fly so far before. Heiges had seen the breaking of castings with the crane, for more than two months. He had witnessed the construction of the “drop,” had watched the ball hoisted to the roof, and had observed what impression was made on the ingot to be broken. For two weeks he had been a daily witness of the process, and presumably being a person oí average intelligence, must have known, as well as any one, the risks and dangers attending its use. He did not know that pieces of iron would fly twenty-five feet, nor did any one. He received two warnings that the ball was about to drop—once, when the engine stopped, and again when McAfee cried out “ heads up.” blither warning was in time to enable him to retreat to a greater distance, and though the cylinder-head was on his right, the car-truck in front and an hydraulic plunger six or eight
But apart from this, we are of opinion there is another ground upon which the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. He accepted employment to work in the foundry, with a full knowledge of all the.circumstances under which the business was conducted, and continued in it after the “ drop ” was put up. His duty was that of a moulder, chipper of castings and general laborer. Such duty required him to work in all parts of the foundry. On the particular occasion, when he was injured, he accepted the position assigned him to discharge an ordinary duty, within the scope of his employment, with a full knowledge of all its surroundings and dangers, without remonstrance ; and having done so, “ he must abide the consequences, so far as any claim against the employer is concerned.” Malster's case, supra; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Stricker, 51 Md. 47.
From what we have said it follows that there was error in granting the second and third prayers of the plaintiff, and in rejecting the defendant’s third, fifth, seventh and eighth prayers. By the granting of his ninth prayer the defendant received the substantial benefit of the principle embodied in his fourth.
There was no error in the first exception. The narr. by the second count charged that the accident was due to “ gross negligence in the working of the machinery,” &c.
The question and answers contained in the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th exceptions were properly allowed. Whether the machine was safe or not was a matter requiring special skill, knowledge and experience, and McAfee had already been shown to be one whose experience had made him familiar with the matter. President, &c., v. Leonhardt, 66 Md. 77 and 78.
The interrogatories excepted to in the third and ninth exceptions, we think, were improperly allowed. It has already been said that the master is not obliged to provide machinery similar to that used in other establishments, though that may be less dangerous. The issue was whether the particular machinery was proper and suitable; and that was to be determined by its actual condition, and not by comparing it with other machines. Crowther's case, 63 Md. 569.
Jtidgmeut reversed without a nezv trial.